Nothing in Europe prepared Hoover for Senator James Reed (D; MO), who was among the minority in Congress that had opposed the Lever Bill. Reed was not a Wilson Democrat, and he scoffed at the President’s idealism, which he saw as nothing but opportunism. To Reed, the Lever Bill was a declaration of war against American farmers and agriculture.
Reed went after Hoover hard when he appeared before a Senate agriculture committee, but the press believed that Hoover got the better of the Senator. Hoover kept his cool throughout, but Reed was undeterred. Reed firmly believed that Hoover would have total control over flour and sugar, that America’s menus in restaurants would become limited, and the Senator called Hoover the “greatest calamity howler”. Reed’s appetite for destruction was only whetted when Hoover came out of the committee hearing without any scars. The Senator accused Hoover of driving up the price of wheat in the US for the consumption of foreigners (apparently Reed was unmoved by starving Belgians). Hoover watched as the Senate debated and dissected the Lever Bill in June 1917, and Wilson advised Hoover to be patient and wait for the bill to be passed by Congress . . . Wilson’s advice proved to be sound.
Where Reed mocked Hoover however and whenever he could in the Senate, Supreme Court Associate Justice Louis Brandeis publicly supported Hoover’s initiative and bravado. Reed wanted Hoover’s past investigated, but there was little support in the Senate to do so. Reed also wanted a 3 to 5 member Food Board to oversee Hoover, and that demand was also defeated. Reed urged most Americans to ignore Hoover and his sloganeering, but what occurred is that most Americans ignored Reed. Hoover would have had smoother political sailing if he had the political acumen to involve Congressional leaders in his efforts, and more humility on Hoover’s end would have been beneficial.
Hurt and humiliated by Reed’s attacks, frustrated by the delay of the Lever Bill in the Senate, still without an official role to his liking. Hoover grew paranoid and desperate, making empty threats in the press in an effort to reduce the influence of his opponents in Congress, and muttering about quitting. On 4 July 1917, Hoover poured out his feelings to Colonel House, who told him that he’d feel better about the situation if he met with Wilson. Hoover was in the process of discovering that Wilson was not a detail-oriented President, who often golfed, went for daily car rides, and spent a great deal of time reading and answering letters. Wilson rarely broke his “Banker’s Hours”, and he refused to work weekends, habits of which Hoover simply couldn’t understand.
After their meeting, Wilson responded to Hoover’s concerns by writing to the Senate Majority Leader, wanting the Lever Bill passed without any amendments. Wilson told Hoover that the smart play was to simply endure and outlast Reed, and the Lever Bill will become law. Wilson’s prediction came true after two contentious months of debate on 8 August 1917, with only seven Senators voting against, of course including Reed.
Of course the grain growers became furious, and protest rallies occurred from the Dakotas to New Mexico. Farmers continued to withhold wheat, hoping that the shortage would force Hoover to at least increase the price, if not destroy him. Hoover used propaganda techniques supporting his efforts as well as using the press to his advantage, and imported wheat from Canada to shore up the shortage. Doing so broke the protests, and farmers reluctantly played ball, but they never forgave Hoover. By October 1917, Hoover had established his hold over the nation’s food chain. Hoover’s influence was throughout the systems network of the production and distribution of food, and failure to meet the terms of the issued licenses meant that he would shut down the offenders, and even pursue criminal charges. Hoover’s critics feared that he would become a dictator without any checks basically came true.
William McAdoo, who was also the national director of the railroads, as well as Wilson’s son-in-law. McAdoo was in effect the nation’s “Railroad Czar”, which meant that he could be a major disrupter to Hoover and the Food Administration. Hoover publicly complained about the shortage of rail cars to transport food, whereas other segments of the economy (e.g. brewers) had not problem finding enough rail cars.
On 22 February 1918, Hoover brought the problem with McAdoo to a head by telling the press that the incompetence of the railroad director was about to cause an unprecedented crisis. Hoover lost support among his Executive Branch colleagues with his attacks on McAdoo, including the President, and Hoover had no choice but to back down. Hoover and McAdoo would never reconcile, in part because McAdoo suspected that Hoover was a closet Republican, and the SecTreas continued to scoff at Hoover’s humanitarian achievements in Belgium. Hoover hated McAdoo for decades, calling him a complete phony, and the “most arrogant person in Washington”. Like Wilson, Hoover was hyper-sensitive to criticism, with both believing that they were doing God’s work. Intellectually, Hoover understood that he would have harsh critics, but emotionally he more-often-than-not handled the criticism poorly.
Wilson relied on Hoover for all things food-related, as well as other matters, such as input for his addresses to Congress. However, Wilson tired of Hoover’s diva behavior and relentless pessimism. Colonel House agreed with Wilson’s views concerning Hoover, and added that Hoover’s self-centeredness meant that he thought his job was the most important in the entire Executive Branch, other than the President. However, those that actually worked with Hoover saw things very differently, viewing him as open and collaborative. Hoover often asked for input before making decisions, and most actually enjoyed being in Hoover’s company. There were those in “The Firm” that noticed that Hoover didn’t care for niceties, and very often he refused reasonable compromises, with some even viewing Hoover as a bully. But to the vast majority that worked with and under Hoover, none of his negative traits amounted to much since they knew his heart was in the right place.
Hoover became a national figure and a household name. To “Hooverize” meant to clean one’s plate, to have a meatless meal, and to basically sacrifice in some way for the war effort. During June 1918, Hoover met with House and informed him that there should be a bountiful crop in the 1918 harvest, which would supply the US troops in Europe and the Allies for a year. Then, to House’s dismay, Hoover announced that he wanted to return to Europe to personally spread the good news and to improve the morale of the Allies. To House, Hoover’s request sounded like self-promotion by the “greatest living advertiser”. Even so, House wrote in his diary some thoughts about how he would run a Presidential campaign for Hoover. So off to Europe Hoover went on board the British White Star Line's RMS Olympic with 6000 US servicemen. Once in Britain a special train took Hoover to London, where he was the center of attention in a media frenzy. After London, Hoover left for Paris, where he received another wild reception.