Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
Liddy’s transfer to CREEP (the Committee to Re-Elect the President; its staff preferred CRP), came as the campaign was hitting its stride, featuring the campaign slogan “Now More Than Ever”. It was decided at CREEP to not use Nixon’s name very often during the campaign, since there was support for his re-election, but his name brand recognition was unfavorable. CREEP, consistent with Nixon’s desire to consolidate as much power as possible in the Executive Branch, was designed to bypass the Republican National Committee (RNC) for the campaign. CREEP was located in the same building as the Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President as well as longtime Nixon strategist Murray Chotiner.
Nixon’s plan was to have AG Mitchell in charge of CREEP, and SecCommerce Maurice Stans in charge of the financial side of the campaign, with Kalmbacah on the outside bringing in campaign donations for CREEP. The President saw no rush to temporarily remove them from the Cabinet responsibilities, so Hugh Sloan stood in for Stans, and Jeb Magruder was the stand-in for Mitchell. Magruder was the kind of man that would do exactly what he was told without asking why, which was perhaps the main reason why he was part of the Nixon administration. Magruder’s star rose in the Nixon ranks after he wrote a memo arguing that instead of verbally attacking the media, that agencies such as the IRS should be used against the administration’s media enemies.
Stans envisioned a $52m campaign budget for 1972 (it was $34m in 1968), and he also envisioned a tidal wave of money coming into CREEP, more than what could ever be spent, which fertilized imaginations and ambitions for even the most balanced of people. Nixon feared that there was a real possibility he could lose in 1972, so he wanted as much campaign money as possible to be raised. Nixon wanted a landslide victory to silence those over the many years that doubted, laughed, and ridiculed him.
Nixon’s plan was to have AG Mitchell in charge of CREEP, and SecCommerce Maurice Stans in charge of the financial side of the campaign, with Kalmbacah on the outside bringing in campaign donations for CREEP. The President saw no rush to temporarily remove them from the Cabinet responsibilities, so Hugh Sloan stood in for Stans, and Jeb Magruder was the stand-in for Mitchell. Magruder was the kind of man that would do exactly what he was told without asking why, which was perhaps the main reason why he was part of the Nixon administration. Magruder’s star rose in the Nixon ranks after he wrote a memo arguing that instead of verbally attacking the media, that agencies such as the IRS should be used against the administration’s media enemies.
Stans envisioned a $52m campaign budget for 1972 (it was $34m in 1968), and he also envisioned a tidal wave of money coming into CREEP, more than what could ever be spent, which fertilized imaginations and ambitions for even the most balanced of people. Nixon feared that there was a real possibility he could lose in 1972, so he wanted as much campaign money as possible to be raised. Nixon wanted a landslide victory to silence those over the many years that doubted, laughed, and ridiculed him.
Vice-President Spiro Agnew was the one that most openly took Magruder’s advice, in effect becoming a hero to the rising conservative backlash to the Counterculture and the New Left, as well as the media. Agnew became thrilled and intoxicated by the outrage that resulted after his verbal onslaughts. VP Agnew’s fierce anti-media, anti-elite, and anti-Counterculture rhetoric kept the hard-line conservative Republican base fired up during an election year.
Meanwhile, Haldeman and Mitchell both viewed Magruder as a lapdog that would follow their directives exactly, which meant that Magruder would be efficient and low maintenance. Mitchell tasked Magruder with overseeing his high maintenance and unpredictable wife, Martha Mitchell. Martha was perhaps the first conservative celebrity pundit, second only to Nixon as the most requested speaker within the Republican Party. Martha simply didn’t think the normal rules applied to her, and she was a virtual loose cannon every day during the campaign. Being the wife of the Attorney General gave Martha everything she wanted (for example, she was the only Cabinet wife to have a full time government chauffeur), except her husband, who was constantly busy and unavailable. Martha was very insecure and she wanted her husband to always be near her, and she was also very dependent on him.
Martha’s controversial and conservative statements became a sort of balm for Nixon’s “Silent Majority” base; she said the kind of inflammatory things that Nixon could not say as President. DC reporters discovered that Martha made great copy, and she was well informed, often eavesdropping on her husband’s phone calls and rifling through his papers on his desk at home. By 1971, Martha received over 100 pieces of mail daily, and at the end of the year she was named to Gallup’s ten most admired women in the world. At CREEP, Magruder and the staff referred to Marth as “The Account”, which meant she was a client to keep pleased, active, and engaged. Magruder soon discovered that doing so with Martha was an around-the-clock effort, given how incessantly needy she was. Almost every night after her husband went to bed, Martha kept drinking and talked on the phone for companionship.
Meanwhile, Haldeman and Mitchell both viewed Magruder as a lapdog that would follow their directives exactly, which meant that Magruder would be efficient and low maintenance. Mitchell tasked Magruder with overseeing his high maintenance and unpredictable wife, Martha Mitchell. Martha was perhaps the first conservative celebrity pundit, second only to Nixon as the most requested speaker within the Republican Party. Martha simply didn’t think the normal rules applied to her, and she was a virtual loose cannon every day during the campaign. Being the wife of the Attorney General gave Martha everything she wanted (for example, she was the only Cabinet wife to have a full time government chauffeur), except her husband, who was constantly busy and unavailable. Martha was very insecure and she wanted her husband to always be near her, and she was also very dependent on him.
Martha’s controversial and conservative statements became a sort of balm for Nixon’s “Silent Majority” base; she said the kind of inflammatory things that Nixon could not say as President. DC reporters discovered that Martha made great copy, and she was well informed, often eavesdropping on her husband’s phone calls and rifling through his papers on his desk at home. By 1971, Martha received over 100 pieces of mail daily, and at the end of the year she was named to Gallup’s ten most admired women in the world. At CREEP, Magruder and the staff referred to Marth as “The Account”, which meant she was a client to keep pleased, active, and engaged. Magruder soon discovered that doing so with Martha was an around-the-clock effort, given how incessantly needy she was. Almost every night after her husband went to bed, Martha kept drinking and talked on the phone for companionship.
During the Winter of 1972, as Magruder was monitoring Martha Mitchell, Hunt and Liddy recruited for their covert campaign operation. In Miami, Barker was again selected by Hunt and Liddy to recruit and build a Cuban network, while Hung recruited a locksmith, who was to be the team’s covert entry specialist. By the end of January 1972, Hunt and Liddy had a battle plan with a planned budget of $1m. On 27 January 1972, Liddy made a presentation for his overall plan that he called Operation Gemstone to Mitchell, Dean, and Magruder. LIddy started with a specific plan in Gemstone he called Operation Diamond, which was a plan to undermine demonstrations at the upcoming Republican National Convention by kidnapping anti-war/New Left leaders, drugging them and then holding them in Mexico until the convention was over.
Liddy kept presenting other gems and rocks within Gemstone to the three, showing what could be done to disrupt the Democratic Party’s chances in the election. Operation Opal featured “Black Bag Jobs”, such as break-ins, that would target the campaign offices of Democratic candidates Edmund Muskie and George McGovern. All Mitchell had to say to Liddy after his long and detailed presentation was that $1m was too expensive, and to come back with a cheaper and more realistic plan, which greatly disappointed Liddy.
A week later on 4 February 1972, the same four men met again in Mitchell’s office, with Liddy making a scaled-back presentation, keeping much of Gemstone intact, but jettisoning the most expensive parts while also reducing the number of proposed break-ins. After the presentation, Mitchell said he’d think about Liddy’s revamped proposal. Dean, who arrived late to the presentation, was shocked that Mitchell was even remotely entertaining any of Liddy’s proposals of dirty tricks. Dean basically broke up the meeting, and immediately told Liddy that he didn’t want to talk about this subject again; to Liddy, that statement meant that Dean was not going to be an obstacle.
Liddy kept presenting other gems and rocks within Gemstone to the three, showing what could be done to disrupt the Democratic Party’s chances in the election. Operation Opal featured “Black Bag Jobs”, such as break-ins, that would target the campaign offices of Democratic candidates Edmund Muskie and George McGovern. All Mitchell had to say to Liddy after his long and detailed presentation was that $1m was too expensive, and to come back with a cheaper and more realistic plan, which greatly disappointed Liddy.
A week later on 4 February 1972, the same four men met again in Mitchell’s office, with Liddy making a scaled-back presentation, keeping much of Gemstone intact, but jettisoning the most expensive parts while also reducing the number of proposed break-ins. After the presentation, Mitchell said he’d think about Liddy’s revamped proposal. Dean, who arrived late to the presentation, was shocked that Mitchell was even remotely entertaining any of Liddy’s proposals of dirty tricks. Dean basically broke up the meeting, and immediately told Liddy that he didn’t want to talk about this subject again; to Liddy, that statement meant that Dean was not going to be an obstacle.
Dean briefed Haldeman on Liddy’s presentation, after which Haldeman agreed with Dean that no one in the White House should be engaged in any of those illegal activities. As far as Dean was concerned at that point, he was done with the political intelligence work that he had worked so hard to gain. Liddy’s schemes, meanwhile, became even more wild and grandiose, and no one in the Nixon administration was supervising him in any meaningful way; more importantly, no one told Liddy “no”. The main reason no one paid attention to Liddy was that the mainstream Nixon administration already had numerous dirty tricks and intelligence gathering operations underway.
Throughout the campaign, Senator Edmund Muskie (D; ME) was a target, since he was viewed as the most formidable Democratic opponent. It reached the point where a spy was planted in Muskie’s orbit, and that spy eventually became a trusted courier, where he was able to intercept key campaign documents and turn them over to CREEP and to the White House, after which some of the information on the documents were leaked to the media.
Magruder wanted Nixon to have his own Dick Tuck (JFK’s dirty trickster), who had been a constant irritating thorn in Nixon’s side through at least 1962. To start, Magruder enlisted Roger Greaves as a sort of campaign gremlin, which included stealing shoes of campaign workers and reporters outside their rooms that were to be shined in their hotel that night. However, Greaves soon enough quit, which left Magruder needing to find another full time prankster. Magruder soon found Roger Stone, who was a student at George Washington, who enlisted at least one other to carry out the pranks while embedded in the volunteer staff of Democratic candidates. Not only did they engage in pranks, but intelligence was also gathered and forwarded.
Throughout the campaign, Senator Edmund Muskie (D; ME) was a target, since he was viewed as the most formidable Democratic opponent. It reached the point where a spy was planted in Muskie’s orbit, and that spy eventually became a trusted courier, where he was able to intercept key campaign documents and turn them over to CREEP and to the White House, after which some of the information on the documents were leaked to the media.
Magruder wanted Nixon to have his own Dick Tuck (JFK’s dirty trickster), who had been a constant irritating thorn in Nixon’s side through at least 1962. To start, Magruder enlisted Roger Greaves as a sort of campaign gremlin, which included stealing shoes of campaign workers and reporters outside their rooms that were to be shined in their hotel that night. However, Greaves soon enough quit, which left Magruder needing to find another full time prankster. Magruder soon found Roger Stone, who was a student at George Washington, who enlisted at least one other to carry out the pranks while embedded in the volunteer staff of Democratic candidates. Not only did they engage in pranks, but intelligence was also gathered and forwarded.
The Justice Department was created during Grant’s Presidency, and while it was part of the Executive Branch, it was also designed to be beholden to the Constitution, so as not to be a catspaw of any President. Nixon wanted the Justice Department beholden to him, which meant first of all having Mitchell as AG, and then seven of the top eight spots in Justice went to loyal campaign staff or defeated Republican candidates, among them Richard Kleindienst as Deputy AG, who was a former Goldwater campaign aide.
In effect, Nixon politicized the Justice Department, wholly intending for it to be loyal to him. Soon enough, the Justice Department made decisions that favored the Nixon administration, such as abandoning an antitrust case against a natural gas company that was a client of Mitchell’s and Nixon’s law firm. The entire culture within Justice changed as well, since "fish stinks from the head down". By the time Nixon’s re-election campaign started, Mitchell was AG, a senior White House advisor, and CREEP chairman. Mitchell announced that he would resign as AG effective 1 March 1972 in order to focus on managing Nixon’s campaign.
Martha Mitchell was against her husband’s decision in that since she’d no longer be the wife of the AG, her status and government perks would suffer. Martha didn’t see why her husband had to choose, since he could be a temporary lame duck AG during the campaign while underlings ran the show at Justice, and on that point she wasn’t wrong. Mitchell’s resignation as AG set off a fateful series of musical chairs within the Nixon administration, with Kleindienst to be nominated as AG, and
L. Patrick Gray to succeed Kleindienst as Deputy AG. Gray’s only credentials for that post was that he had been part of both Nixon campaigns for President in 1960 and 1968, and was eventually rewarded with a mid-level position at Justice. The confirmation hearings of Kleindienst and Gray took a back seat to Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972, with a triumphant Nixon returning to the White House on 28 February 1972.
In effect, Nixon politicized the Justice Department, wholly intending for it to be loyal to him. Soon enough, the Justice Department made decisions that favored the Nixon administration, such as abandoning an antitrust case against a natural gas company that was a client of Mitchell’s and Nixon’s law firm. The entire culture within Justice changed as well, since "fish stinks from the head down". By the time Nixon’s re-election campaign started, Mitchell was AG, a senior White House advisor, and CREEP chairman. Mitchell announced that he would resign as AG effective 1 March 1972 in order to focus on managing Nixon’s campaign.
Martha Mitchell was against her husband’s decision in that since she’d no longer be the wife of the AG, her status and government perks would suffer. Martha didn’t see why her husband had to choose, since he could be a temporary lame duck AG during the campaign while underlings ran the show at Justice, and on that point she wasn’t wrong. Mitchell’s resignation as AG set off a fateful series of musical chairs within the Nixon administration, with Kleindienst to be nominated as AG, and
L. Patrick Gray to succeed Kleindienst as Deputy AG. Gray’s only credentials for that post was that he had been part of both Nixon campaigns for President in 1960 and 1968, and was eventually rewarded with a mid-level position at Justice. The confirmation hearings of Kleindienst and Gray took a back seat to Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972, with a triumphant Nixon returning to the White House on 28 February 1972.
Colson advised Haldeman that it was time to pull Kleindienst’s nomination, since there were other secrets involving Nixon and ITT that might come to light, unknown to Mitchell or Kleindienst. On his end, Kleindienst kept silent about how Nixon had directly interfered, ordering him as Deputy AG to shut down the ITT investigation and that McClaren had to go. During their confirmation hearings, Mitchell and Kleindienst committed perjury concerning ITT, supported by White House officials. Even so, the White House pushed ahead with Kleindienst’s confirmation, and the tenuous ITT cover-up held, with stark denials mixed with the confusion and obfuscation concerning the Dita Beard Memo, and public interest waned. Senators seemed satisfied with the situation while the newspaper columnist Jack Anderson raged.
The confirmation hearings ended in late-April 1972, with the Senate Judiciary Committee approving Kleindienst’s confirmation 11 - 4, with Senator Kennedy one of the four dissenting votes; to Kennedy, the ITT imbroglio was the true start of Watergate. During the same month, the FBI ended its surveillance of Jack Anderson, never finding out his sources for the Dita Beard Memo. Later, Anderson received a letter from a NYC entrepreneur, William Haddad, who claimed that a private investigator told him of plans to wiretap the phones of the Democratic National Committee; Anderson did not pursue the tip.
The confirmation hearings ended in late-April 1972, with the Senate Judiciary Committee approving Kleindienst’s confirmation 11 - 4, with Senator Kennedy one of the four dissenting votes; to Kennedy, the ITT imbroglio was the true start of Watergate. During the same month, the FBI ended its surveillance of Jack Anderson, never finding out his sources for the Dita Beard Memo. Later, Anderson received a letter from a NYC entrepreneur, William Haddad, who claimed that a private investigator told him of plans to wiretap the phones of the Democratic National Committee; Anderson did not pursue the tip.