Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
Unlike Nixon, John Mitchell was at ease in powerful circles and among the Easter Elites. Mitchell was cool and self-assured, whereas Nixon was not. Nixon desperately wanted Mitchell to serve in his administration, but Mitchell turned down all offers of being Attorney General. Mitchell accepted on the 27th offer, on the condition that Richard Kleindienst, who had worked under Mitchell in the 1968 campaign, would be Deputy AG.
The main problem with Mitchell, according to Kleindienst and others that knew him, was that he didn’t give clear directions; many times people left a meeting thinking they had Mitchell’s consent or permission, but they did not. Kleindienst had made it his role to follow up and communicate what Mitchell really wanted, which made him an invaluable asset to the new Attorney General. AG Mitchell personified Nixon’s get tough approach on the Counterculture, with Newsweek dubbing Mitchell “Mr. Law and Order”.
As the Nixon administration girded for battle with the Counterculture and the New Left, they discovered that within the government, they were fighting those forces alone. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover wanted nothing to do with going after Nixon’s enemies, largely due to the fact that he was busy going after people and groups that he considered to be enemies of the FBI and the US.
That being said, Nixon and Hoover shared common cause with their anti-communist efforts, both abroad and at home. Hoover had been one of the few powerful DC figures that kept in touch with Nixon from 1960 - 1967; for Hoover, doing so was a “just in case” motive, knowing Nixon was capable of making a political comeback. By 1969, Hoover had lost his energy and enthusiasm for doing the dirty work for Presidents. Hoover was past the mandatory federal retirement age (65), remaining FBI Director only through annual Presidential waivers. Hoover in no way wanted any scandal or controversy to threaten his extended tenure on power and force him into obscurity.
The main problem with Mitchell, according to Kleindienst and others that knew him, was that he didn’t give clear directions; many times people left a meeting thinking they had Mitchell’s consent or permission, but they did not. Kleindienst had made it his role to follow up and communicate what Mitchell really wanted, which made him an invaluable asset to the new Attorney General. AG Mitchell personified Nixon’s get tough approach on the Counterculture, with Newsweek dubbing Mitchell “Mr. Law and Order”.
As the Nixon administration girded for battle with the Counterculture and the New Left, they discovered that within the government, they were fighting those forces alone. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover wanted nothing to do with going after Nixon’s enemies, largely due to the fact that he was busy going after people and groups that he considered to be enemies of the FBI and the US.
That being said, Nixon and Hoover shared common cause with their anti-communist efforts, both abroad and at home. Hoover had been one of the few powerful DC figures that kept in touch with Nixon from 1960 - 1967; for Hoover, doing so was a “just in case” motive, knowing Nixon was capable of making a political comeback. By 1969, Hoover had lost his energy and enthusiasm for doing the dirty work for Presidents. Hoover was past the mandatory federal retirement age (65), remaining FBI Director only through annual Presidential waivers. Hoover in no way wanted any scandal or controversy to threaten his extended tenure on power and force him into obscurity.
What really bothered the Nixon administration concerning the FBI was that the agency was reluctant to deliver the kind of intelligence that previous Presidents had received. Hoover was leary of Congressional oversight of the FBI, which started in earnest in 1968. Hoover eliminated certain activities that might place the FBI (and himself) in an unfavorable light, and by the end of 1968, Hoover all but ended the FBI’s “Black Bag Jobs”, which included illegal break-ins and spy operations.
For a while, the FBI seemed to play ball with AG Mitchell after the creation of COINTELPRO, a.k.a. Counter Intelligence Program, which in theory targeted Left Wing groups such as the Weather Underground, as well as right wing groups such as the KKK. But Hoover was not going to cross his drawn-back line for Nixon, which meant no more legally dubious tactics that he had authorized in the past. Nixon tried to rekindle his partnership with Hoover and to get him on board to do what he wanted, so on 1 October 1969, Nixon, Mitchell, and Ehrlichman spent a strange night in Hoover’s dining room, listening to the FBI Director reminisce about past FBI successes. During the following weeks and months, the FBI’s lack of cooperation with the Nixon administration worsened.
The Fallout: Nixon’s relationship with Hoover was damaged beyond repair, and a permanent schism existed within the FBI between Hoover and Sullivan. Also, the Huston Plan did not go away, in that a copy of the now abandoned 43 page memo was given to the new White House counsel John Dean, who inherited Huston’s domestic security responsibilities. Dean placed the Huston Plan in his safe, where it sat like a time bomb, evidence that the Nixon administration had repeatedly and dubiously explored the limits of legal action, and then went beyond. The Huston Plan was officially dead, but it would prove to have the proverbial Nine Lives during Nixon’s Presidency.
Dean quickly learned that the key to power in the Nixon White House lay in delivering political intelligence and to keep tabs on Nixon’s enemies. It was Ehrlichman that originally recommended Dean to be his successor as White House counsel, admiring Dean’s work in the Justice Department. Haldeman also admired Dean since it seemed he would do whatever could be done in his role as White House counsel.
For a while, the FBI seemed to play ball with AG Mitchell after the creation of COINTELPRO, a.k.a. Counter Intelligence Program, which in theory targeted Left Wing groups such as the Weather Underground, as well as right wing groups such as the KKK. But Hoover was not going to cross his drawn-back line for Nixon, which meant no more legally dubious tactics that he had authorized in the past. Nixon tried to rekindle his partnership with Hoover and to get him on board to do what he wanted, so on 1 October 1969, Nixon, Mitchell, and Ehrlichman spent a strange night in Hoover’s dining room, listening to the FBI Director reminisce about past FBI successes. During the following weeks and months, the FBI’s lack of cooperation with the Nixon administration worsened.
The Fallout: Nixon’s relationship with Hoover was damaged beyond repair, and a permanent schism existed within the FBI between Hoover and Sullivan. Also, the Huston Plan did not go away, in that a copy of the now abandoned 43 page memo was given to the new White House counsel John Dean, who inherited Huston’s domestic security responsibilities. Dean placed the Huston Plan in his safe, where it sat like a time bomb, evidence that the Nixon administration had repeatedly and dubiously explored the limits of legal action, and then went beyond. The Huston Plan was officially dead, but it would prove to have the proverbial Nine Lives during Nixon’s Presidency.
Dean quickly learned that the key to power in the Nixon White House lay in delivering political intelligence and to keep tabs on Nixon’s enemies. It was Ehrlichman that originally recommended Dean to be his successor as White House counsel, admiring Dean’s work in the Justice Department. Haldeman also admired Dean since it seemed he would do whatever could be done in his role as White House counsel.
Dean had been warned by both Mitchell and Kleindienst that it would be most unwise to go to work in the White House, since it was an absolute zoo with an unhealthy atmosphere. Dean accepted the position of White House counsel due to his ambition, seeing the move as the right one at the right time given his young age. By the end of July 1970, Dean was in an office in the White House just down the hall from Charles Colson.
Dean’s first assignment was to defend Vice-President Spiro Agnew against reports that he planned to cancel the Election of 1972; Dean soon discovered that it was Nixon that advocated the cancellation. Dean soon was recognized as a man that was in a hurry to become someone of importance. Dean’s habit was to take the ideas of others and to present them as his brainchild, leading many in the Nixon administration to view him as a snake. Adding to the sense of unease about Dean was that he stood out from everyone else at the White House, since he was flashy, wore fancy suits and loafers, and drove a Porsche. Many felt, including Ehrlichman, that it seemed Dean lived above his White House salary.
Nonetheless, Dean slowly gained the trust of his colleagues and superiors, and as a result he was pulled into the world of “intelligence requests”, which included digging up dirt on prominent anti-war protesters. Dean brought in staffers to work for him, such as Jack Caulfield, a former NYPD detective who handled discreet tasks for the White House. Caulfield had a lot of experience investigating suspected communists, agitators, activists, radicals, and troublemakers, and he was used to ignoring civil liberties and legalities. Caulfield was the Nixon campaign’s security chief in 1968, in which he excelled in that there were no troublesome incidents for Nixon during that tumultuous year.
Dean’s first assignment was to defend Vice-President Spiro Agnew against reports that he planned to cancel the Election of 1972; Dean soon discovered that it was Nixon that advocated the cancellation. Dean soon was recognized as a man that was in a hurry to become someone of importance. Dean’s habit was to take the ideas of others and to present them as his brainchild, leading many in the Nixon administration to view him as a snake. Adding to the sense of unease about Dean was that he stood out from everyone else at the White House, since he was flashy, wore fancy suits and loafers, and drove a Porsche. Many felt, including Ehrlichman, that it seemed Dean lived above his White House salary.
Nonetheless, Dean slowly gained the trust of his colleagues and superiors, and as a result he was pulled into the world of “intelligence requests”, which included digging up dirt on prominent anti-war protesters. Dean brought in staffers to work for him, such as Jack Caulfield, a former NYPD detective who handled discreet tasks for the White House. Caulfield had a lot of experience investigating suspected communists, agitators, activists, radicals, and troublemakers, and he was used to ignoring civil liberties and legalities. Caulfield was the Nixon campaign’s security chief in 1968, in which he excelled in that there were no troublesome incidents for Nixon during that tumultuous year.
Caulfield wanted to be the #1 US Marshal, but instead he became a “fixer” for Ehrlichman; among Caulfield’s duties was keeping tabs on Senator Ted Kennedy (D; MA). Among Caulfield’s recruits to work under him in the Nixon administration was Tony Ulasewicz, who would in essence become Nixon’s private detective. Ulasewicz became expert at making sure there were no traceable ties between him and the White House. After Ehrlichman’s formal approval, Ulasewicz was handed off to Herbert Kalmbach, who was a Nixon aide. Kalmbach’s role for Nixon was part lawyer, part fixer, and he also operated behind the scenes. Kalmbach handled Nixon’s 1969 acquisition of his estate at San Clemente (CA), which was valued at $1.4m, with no public records showing Nixon’s ownership, since it was held in trust. A large part of Kalmbach’s job was to safeguard Nixon’s campaign case, which paid for people such as Ulasewicz.
In 1969 Nixon’s leftover campaign cash amounted to $1.67m, with about a million stored in cash in various safe-deposit boxes in Chase Manhattan and Riggs National Bank (DC). Kalmbach moved the cash west, laundering the money until it was basically untraceable. By the time the 1972 campaign started, Kalmbach had amassed almost $2m ($14.4m in 2022 dollars) that could be used at the discretion of a small number of Nixon aides for what they deemed “political purposes”. Ulasewicz created an alias, Edward T. Stanley, and he set up an elaborate and secure system on how he could be contacted. During July 1969, Caulfield sent Ulasewicz to Martha’s Vineyard within hours after learning of Ted Kennedy and Chappaquiddick, but he was unable to uncover any additional details to be used against Kennedy. Ulasewicz returned to the area again to dig up dirt on Kennedy, and eventually he did the same kind of job in 90+ other assignments.
In 1969 Nixon’s leftover campaign cash amounted to $1.67m, with about a million stored in cash in various safe-deposit boxes in Chase Manhattan and Riggs National Bank (DC). Kalmbach moved the cash west, laundering the money until it was basically untraceable. By the time the 1972 campaign started, Kalmbach had amassed almost $2m ($14.4m in 2022 dollars) that could be used at the discretion of a small number of Nixon aides for what they deemed “political purposes”. Ulasewicz created an alias, Edward T. Stanley, and he set up an elaborate and secure system on how he could be contacted. During July 1969, Caulfield sent Ulasewicz to Martha’s Vineyard within hours after learning of Ted Kennedy and Chappaquiddick, but he was unable to uncover any additional details to be used against Kennedy. Ulasewicz returned to the area again to dig up dirt on Kennedy, and eventually he did the same kind of job in 90+ other assignments.
The further Nixon went into his first term, the less he trusted those around him, even suspecting there were enemies in the White House; and those he trusted the most he didn’t really trust that much. By February 1971, Nixon decided that he needed to be far more aggressive in terms of action in order to secure his stature as a “Great Man” in US History. Alexander Butterfield had been one of the most accomplished pilots in the Air Force with 98 combat missions in Vietnam. Colonel Butterfield, via some inventive and sneaky networking, succeeded in reconnecting with Haldeman, an old UCLA acquaintance, and Haldeman immediately added Butterfield to his own staff. Haldeman knew that Butterfield had excellent people skills (which he lacked), as well as experience navigating the political landscape around DC. Butterfield was part of Haldeman’s staff from the beginning of Nixon’s Presidency, attending Haldeman’s first staff meeting on 21 January 1969, the day after Nixon’s Inauguration.
It took time, but Butterfield became an important and reliable person for Haldeman and Nixon, and was as close to being seen as trustworthy as Nixon would ever view an individual. Butterfield was promoted to handle the daily functioning of the Oval Office operations, and was privy to Nixon’s biggest secrets. Butterfield was familiar with every minute of Nixon’s work day, understanding not only Nixon’s routines, but also the reasons why. For example, Butterfield knew that Nixon took a one hour nap at 1 pm almost every day in a sideroom off the Oval Office, and at 10:30 pm, Nixon would take off his tie.
As his Presidency moved into 1970, Nixon fretted that his brilliant mind and decisive leadership would not be properly captured for posterity. The notes taken in meetings by Haldeman, Butterfield, and others did not capture the full and dramatic moments. Soon enough, Butterfield was told, albeit indirectly, from Nixon to Haldeman to one other person to Butterfield, that Nixon wanted a taping system installed (ironically, Nixon had ordered LBJ’s secret taping system dismantled when he took office). Haldeman wanted the taping system to be of the utmost secrecy, which meant that the White House Communications Agency and the military would not be informed or involved.
It took time, but Butterfield became an important and reliable person for Haldeman and Nixon, and was as close to being seen as trustworthy as Nixon would ever view an individual. Butterfield was promoted to handle the daily functioning of the Oval Office operations, and was privy to Nixon’s biggest secrets. Butterfield was familiar with every minute of Nixon’s work day, understanding not only Nixon’s routines, but also the reasons why. For example, Butterfield knew that Nixon took a one hour nap at 1 pm almost every day in a sideroom off the Oval Office, and at 10:30 pm, Nixon would take off his tie.
As his Presidency moved into 1970, Nixon fretted that his brilliant mind and decisive leadership would not be properly captured for posterity. The notes taken in meetings by Haldeman, Butterfield, and others did not capture the full and dramatic moments. Soon enough, Butterfield was told, albeit indirectly, from Nixon to Haldeman to one other person to Butterfield, that Nixon wanted a taping system installed (ironically, Nixon had ordered LBJ’s secret taping system dismantled when he took office). Haldeman wanted the taping system to be of the utmost secrecy, which meant that the White House Communications Agency and the military would not be informed or involved.
Butterfield contacted Al Wong who was the head of the Secret Service’s Technical Security Division concerning the installation of the secret taping system. While Nixon was in Key Biscayne, Secret Service technicians carefully drilled five microphones up through the President’s desk in the Oval Office, while other microphones were hidden in the lights above the fireplace mantle (other locations that the Oval Office were prepped as well). Everything fed into Sony 800B tape recorders which were hidden in a sealed compartment in the basement of the White House, and all of it was voice-activated (largely since Nixon was a colossal klutz).
When Haldeman and Butterfield told Nixon that the secret taping system was in place in the Oval Office, Nixon wanted to know who else knew about it. Haldeman told Nixon that only himself, Butterfield, Larry Higby (on Haldeman’s staff), and the Secret Service technicians knew about the system. Nixon wanted to know if
Rose Mary Woods, his long time personal secretary and confidant, knew about the system, and the answer was no. Nixon did not want Haldeman (or the others) to tell Kissinger or Ehrlichman about the system, and Haldeman agreed. To Haldeman, Nixon’s desire to keep Kissinger in the dark about the secret taping system was a sign that the President was afraid he might not get credit for his administration’s foreign policy successes.
DC Society had fallen in love with Kissinger, and it seemed that he was getting all the credit instead of Nixon for the things that had and were going right, while laying the blame squarely on Nixon if things had gone wrong. In the Oval Office, Kissinger was a Hawk, but at DC dinner parties with the Eastern (liberal) Elites, he was a Dove, a fact of which Nixon had become all too aware from a trove of reports that had reached him. Haldeman suggested that if the need ever came to use the tapes to set the record straight concerning Kissinger (or with anyone else), the President should state that the information came from Haldeman’s notes or his own notes.
From February 1971 until 12 July 1973, the secret taping system recorded 3432 hours of conversation, providing a look at Nixon’s mind and decision-making that was the most thorough and intimate view the US had ever seen from a President, so it was mission accomplished on that front. The tapes would also be the main reason for Nixon’s Fall From Grace.
When Haldeman and Butterfield told Nixon that the secret taping system was in place in the Oval Office, Nixon wanted to know who else knew about it. Haldeman told Nixon that only himself, Butterfield, Larry Higby (on Haldeman’s staff), and the Secret Service technicians knew about the system. Nixon wanted to know if
Rose Mary Woods, his long time personal secretary and confidant, knew about the system, and the answer was no. Nixon did not want Haldeman (or the others) to tell Kissinger or Ehrlichman about the system, and Haldeman agreed. To Haldeman, Nixon’s desire to keep Kissinger in the dark about the secret taping system was a sign that the President was afraid he might not get credit for his administration’s foreign policy successes.
DC Society had fallen in love with Kissinger, and it seemed that he was getting all the credit instead of Nixon for the things that had and were going right, while laying the blame squarely on Nixon if things had gone wrong. In the Oval Office, Kissinger was a Hawk, but at DC dinner parties with the Eastern (liberal) Elites, he was a Dove, a fact of which Nixon had become all too aware from a trove of reports that had reached him. Haldeman suggested that if the need ever came to use the tapes to set the record straight concerning Kissinger (or with anyone else), the President should state that the information came from Haldeman’s notes or his own notes.
From February 1971 until 12 July 1973, the secret taping system recorded 3432 hours of conversation, providing a look at Nixon’s mind and decision-making that was the most thorough and intimate view the US had ever seen from a President, so it was mission accomplished on that front. The tapes would also be the main reason for Nixon’s Fall From Grace.
During the Spring of 1971 progressed, Dean ran the command post in the White House during the May Day Tribe protests, where hundreds of thousands of protesters descended on DC, paralyzing the city’s normal business functions. Over 14k were arrested during two weeks of running battles, from 22 April to 6 May 1971, with half that number arrested on a single day. All of those that were arrested were taken to outdoor makeshift camps at RFK Stadium. These protests had led to some of the scariest and darkest moments of the Nixon administration to that point in time.
Dean monitored the government response from the White House, submitting two reports every hour to the President, and Nixon received many other reports from other sources and agencies, such as police and military units in DC. Running the May Day command post was a heady experience for Dean, who by then had been the White House counsel for a year; Dean believed that he had become an indispensable part of Nixon’s administration.
During July 1971, Caulfield and Ulasewicz met in Dean’s office; the former NYPD detective and the private eye seemed to be the perfect pairing for the plot forming in the mind of Charles Colson. The plan Colson had in mind was to follow through on Nixon’s order to break into the Brookings Institution to steal the “secret report” that Huston had claimed was in a safe. Successfully doing so would insure that Nixon’s darkest secrets (e.g. the Chennault Affair) stayed buried forever. Colson believed that he needed a little more assistance for his plan to work, so he contacted the CIA’s most prolific novelist, E. Howard Hunt.
Dean monitored the government response from the White House, submitting two reports every hour to the President, and Nixon received many other reports from other sources and agencies, such as police and military units in DC. Running the May Day command post was a heady experience for Dean, who by then had been the White House counsel for a year; Dean believed that he had become an indispensable part of Nixon’s administration.
During July 1971, Caulfield and Ulasewicz met in Dean’s office; the former NYPD detective and the private eye seemed to be the perfect pairing for the plot forming in the mind of Charles Colson. The plan Colson had in mind was to follow through on Nixon’s order to break into the Brookings Institution to steal the “secret report” that Huston had claimed was in a safe. Successfully doing so would insure that Nixon’s darkest secrets (e.g. the Chennault Affair) stayed buried forever. Colson believed that he needed a little more assistance for his plan to work, so he contacted the CIA’s most prolific novelist, E. Howard Hunt.