Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
Nixon’s remaking of his administration at the start of his second term was incredibly demoralizing and devastating to many staffers, but Nixon achieved his goal, in that he centralized power at the White House to an unprecedented degree to that point in time. Nixon’s second term Cabinet would not deny or delay the President. With the deaths of Truman and LBJ in 1973, for the first time in decades, Nixon was the only President alive, and he seemed ascendant and untouchable, with a Gallup poll favorability rating of 68%, the highest of his Presidency.
On 10 January 1973, the trial of the Watergate burglars finally started, delayed in large part because Judge Sirica had suffered from a pinched nerve in his back. While the media interest was vast, the trial was seen as sort of a sideshow, something that would not affect Nixon or his administration. Prosecutors, led by Earl Silbert from Justice, entirely focused on the break-in, not the reason(s) why, which made the public grow more suspicious. On the same day the trial started, Graham had lunch with Woodward and Bernstein, who were still smarting from not being allowed to officially cover the trials for the Post (they took turns attending the trial in the gallery). Graham asked them, “Are we even going to know about all of this?”.
On 10 January 1973, the trial of the Watergate burglars finally started, delayed in large part because Judge Sirica had suffered from a pinched nerve in his back. While the media interest was vast, the trial was seen as sort of a sideshow, something that would not affect Nixon or his administration. Prosecutors, led by Earl Silbert from Justice, entirely focused on the break-in, not the reason(s) why, which made the public grow more suspicious. On the same day the trial started, Graham had lunch with Woodward and Bernstein, who were still smarting from not being allowed to officially cover the trials for the Post (they took turns attending the trial in the gallery). Graham asked them, “Are we even going to know about all of this?”.
Jury selection for the trial took just two days, with 12 jurors and 6 alternates. The prosecutor’s theory for the break-in was that Liddy was a rogue agent, which implied that the break-in started and stopped with Liddy. It didn’t take long for Judge Sirica to see that the trial had become a joke in terms of justice. A surprise came during the trial, in that Hunt stood in front of Sirica and pleaded guilty to all six charges facing him. By then, Hunt was a broken man, mostly due to the loss of his wife, but also because he had been hung out to dry by the Nixon administration, who he truly believed had his back.
On 12 January 1973, Sirica was told that the four Cubans wanted to plead guilty. However, their guilty pleas seemed suspicious, since they came after an article was published in the NY Times by Seymour Hersh that asserted that the burglars were being paid “by persons as yet unnamed”. Hersh had interviewed Frank Sturgis, one of the four Watergate burglars, who went on the record saying that they had been paid, and those payments had been sharply reduced in recent weeks. The NY Times hated to be scooped, but they also hated being first, out on a long branch on their own before other newspapers, so there had been quite the debate among the NY Times leading figures whether or not to publish Hersh’s article.
A second Hersh article claimed that the burglars were under intense pressure to plead guilty, and that a “substantial promise of money” had been made. A Time magazine article reported that the burglars would be paid $1000 a month through their prison sentences if they kept quiet. Understandably, the payoff stories in Time and the NY Times were the talk of everyone in Sirica’s courtroom.
On 12 January 1973, Sirica was told that the four Cubans wanted to plead guilty. However, their guilty pleas seemed suspicious, since they came after an article was published in the NY Times by Seymour Hersh that asserted that the burglars were being paid “by persons as yet unnamed”. Hersh had interviewed Frank Sturgis, one of the four Watergate burglars, who went on the record saying that they had been paid, and those payments had been sharply reduced in recent weeks. The NY Times hated to be scooped, but they also hated being first, out on a long branch on their own before other newspapers, so there had been quite the debate among the NY Times leading figures whether or not to publish Hersh’s article.
A second Hersh article claimed that the burglars were under intense pressure to plead guilty, and that a “substantial promise of money” had been made. A Time magazine article reported that the burglars would be paid $1000 a month through their prison sentences if they kept quiet. Understandably, the payoff stories in Time and the NY Times were the talk of everyone in Sirica’s courtroom.
Sirica accepted the guilty pleas, and he questioned the four Cuban burglars about their motives, with all four dodging the judge’s questions. With guilty pleas from Hunt and the four Cuban burglars, the two defendants remaining from the Watergate break-in were Liddy and McCord. The White House continued its high-stakes machinations behind the scenes to keep all seven Watergate burglars silent. Dean called Liddy, saying “I think you’ll recognize my voice”, and proceeded to tell Liddy that the White House needed him to remain silent, and that everything would be taken care of, such as $30k in living expenses a year. Dean also promised Liddy that he would receive a full pardon from the President in two years, as well as being sent to a comfortable minimum security prison. Liddy promised to remain silent, but he had taken careful notes after the phone call with Dean, being certain to nail down that a pardon, not commutation, was promised; Liddy then turned over those notes to his lawyer.
McCord truly believed that he had acted under authorization participating in the Watergate break-in, not only from CREEP, but also from Nixon, and he was unwilling to serve as a scapegoat. When Dean learned of McCord’s uneasiness, he called Jack Caulfield, who was now in the ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) in the Treasury Department. Dean asked Caulfield to pass along a purposefully oblique three part message to McCord, which said: a) A year in prison is not a big deal; b) Your family will be taken care of; c) You’ll be guaranteed a good job when released from prison. Caulfield, by then one of the top US law enforcement officials in the government, refused Dean’s request, so Dean used Tony Ulasewicz to deliver the message to McCord. After doing so, Ulasewicz told Dean that McCord seemed to be okay with the three part message.
McCord truly believed that he had acted under authorization participating in the Watergate break-in, not only from CREEP, but also from Nixon, and he was unwilling to serve as a scapegoat. When Dean learned of McCord’s uneasiness, he called Jack Caulfield, who was now in the ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) in the Treasury Department. Dean asked Caulfield to pass along a purposefully oblique three part message to McCord, which said: a) A year in prison is not a big deal; b) Your family will be taken care of; c) You’ll be guaranteed a good job when released from prison. Caulfield, by then one of the top US law enforcement officials in the government, refused Dean’s request, so Dean used Tony Ulasewicz to deliver the message to McCord. After doing so, Ulasewicz told Dean that McCord seemed to be okay with the three part message.
The next day, McCord contacted Caulfield, asking to see him in person, and arrangements were made via Ulasewicz. An angry McCord told Caulfield that he wanted his freedom. The next morning Caulfield met with Dean at the White House to relay to Dean what McCord had told him. Dean told Caulfield that McCord’s silence was necessary, since damage to Nixon might result if he talked. Dean went on to say to Caulfield that clemency (a pardon) for McCord was real and in the works. Caulfield met with McCord again, and McCord remained unsatisfied. Dean was clearly frustrated with the lack of progress with McCord, telling Caulfield that it was McCord’s decision which way to go.
Nixon’s 2nd Inauguration on 20 January 1973 occurred while the trial was continuing. As it turned out, Nixon would only be in office 566 of the 1461 days of his second term.
Witnesses from CREEP testified, and were basically let off the hook by prosecutors. Sirica’s frustration grew, knowing there was a cover-up, but it wasn’t coming out during the trial. As a result of his frustration, Sirica started to question witnesses himself without the jury being present. With every passing day of the trial, Sirica’s involvement increased, being welcomed by a frustrated media and public. Despite asking far superior questions to the CREEP witnesses than the prosecutors, Sirica was unable to reveal a cover-up. As the jury went into deliberation, it seemed that Liddy and McCord were content to be scapegoats.
The jury only deliberated for 98 minutes, finding Liddy and McCord guilty on all counts. Sirica set bail at $100k, and set a date for sentencing on 23 March 1973. With the trial over, Dean worried about what would happen if more inquiries were opened. While shredding two of Hunt’s notebooks, Dean realized more than ever that he was a fellow conspirator in the White House cover-up on Watergate.
Nixon’s 2nd Inauguration on 20 January 1973 occurred while the trial was continuing. As it turned out, Nixon would only be in office 566 of the 1461 days of his second term.
Witnesses from CREEP testified, and were basically let off the hook by prosecutors. Sirica’s frustration grew, knowing there was a cover-up, but it wasn’t coming out during the trial. As a result of his frustration, Sirica started to question witnesses himself without the jury being present. With every passing day of the trial, Sirica’s involvement increased, being welcomed by a frustrated media and public. Despite asking far superior questions to the CREEP witnesses than the prosecutors, Sirica was unable to reveal a cover-up. As the jury went into deliberation, it seemed that Liddy and McCord were content to be scapegoats.
The jury only deliberated for 98 minutes, finding Liddy and McCord guilty on all counts. Sirica set bail at $100k, and set a date for sentencing on 23 March 1973. With the trial over, Dean worried about what would happen if more inquiries were opened. While shredding two of Hunt’s notebooks, Dean realized more than ever that he was a fellow conspirator in the White House cover-up on Watergate.
During January 1973, the Democratic caucus in the Senate voted to create a special select committee on Watergate. Also decided was that Senator Sam Ervin (D; NC), who was not even in attendance due to a snowstorm in NC, would be the Watergate Committee’s chairman. The trials of the Watergate burglars hadn’t delivered the answers that the public wanted, so it seemed to the Senate that it was necessary to investigate on their end. The advantage for Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield
(D; MT) in creating the select Watergate Committee was that he could select the chairman (Ervin) as well as which other Senators would be on the committee. For example, there was no way that Mansfield would allow
Ted Kennedy, or anyone else that might have an axe to grind against Nixon or his administration, on the committee.
Ervin, who referred to himself as a “Country Lawyer”, had judicial experience and a reputation for being nonpartisan. But most importantly to Mansfield, Ervin did not aspire to higher office. Mansfield selected Senators for the Watergate Committee that he believed would not use the hearings for personal political gain. In addition to Ervin, Mansfield selected Howard Baker (R; TN), Herman Talmadge (D; GA), Joseph Montoya (D; NM), Daniel Inouye (D: HI), Lowell Weicher (R; CT), and Edward Gurney (R; FL). It was as close to finding the perfect six Senators, three from each party, as Mansfield could accomplish. During February 1973, the six were approved by a Senate vote of 77 - 0.
(D; MT) in creating the select Watergate Committee was that he could select the chairman (Ervin) as well as which other Senators would be on the committee. For example, there was no way that Mansfield would allow
Ted Kennedy, or anyone else that might have an axe to grind against Nixon or his administration, on the committee.
Ervin, who referred to himself as a “Country Lawyer”, had judicial experience and a reputation for being nonpartisan. But most importantly to Mansfield, Ervin did not aspire to higher office. Mansfield selected Senators for the Watergate Committee that he believed would not use the hearings for personal political gain. In addition to Ervin, Mansfield selected Howard Baker (R; TN), Herman Talmadge (D; GA), Joseph Montoya (D; NM), Daniel Inouye (D: HI), Lowell Weicher (R; CT), and Edward Gurney (R; FL). It was as close to finding the perfect six Senators, three from each party, as Mansfield could accomplish. During February 1973, the six were approved by a Senate vote of 77 - 0.
Ervins summoned Sam Dash, a criminal law professor from Georgetown Law School, to be the majority (Democratic) counsel for the Watergate Committee. The ranking Republican member of the committee, Senator Howard Baker, selected Fred Dalton Thompson as minority counsel. Thompson had spent three years as an assistant US Attorney and had worked on Senator Baker’s campaign staff in 1972. By that point in time, high-profile Congressional inquiries were very uncommon, and there were few precedents on which to draw as guidance for the Watergate Committee. It was decided that the committee would start with a subpoena for Donald Segretti, with the hope that they could gain a firm foothold into the dirty tricks of CREEP. Dash met with Woodward, asking the reporter for an “arrangement” where Woodward would share his information with the Watergate committee, but would not receive any in return. Woodward agreed to do so, but it wasn’t long before the Watergate Committee knew far more than Woodward and Bernstein, or any other journalist for that matter.
Nixon was at San Clemente with his inner circle, trying to figure out how to handle the Watergate Committee’s upcoming investigation. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean met at Haldeman’s villa at a nearby resort hotel in order to brainstorm. All three understood that the Watergate Committee was a different beast than the FBI, in that the committee had broad jurisdiction, as well as members that were not under Nixon’s control. Also, the committee’s hearings would be public, and almost certainly televised. The three decided that the only member of the committee that might be counted on to help the White House was Senator Gurney.
Nixon was at San Clemente with his inner circle, trying to figure out how to handle the Watergate Committee’s upcoming investigation. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean met at Haldeman’s villa at a nearby resort hotel in order to brainstorm. All three understood that the Watergate Committee was a different beast than the FBI, in that the committee had broad jurisdiction, as well as members that were not under Nixon’s control. Also, the committee’s hearings would be public, and almost certainly televised. The three decided that the only member of the committee that might be counted on to help the White House was Senator Gurney.
The three members of Nixon’s inner circle decided that the White House strategy would be to appear cooperative in public, but behind the scenes block the Watergate Committee’s investigation as well as push the messaging that the committee was a partisan sham. Ehrlichman posed a question, wondering if the burglars would remain silent, with Dean mentioning that they were asking for more money. Ehrlichman told Dean to tell John Mitchell that it was the former Attorney General’s responsibility to keep the burglars quiet. The cover-up had become a way of life at the White House, with the high-ranking conspirators being more open and more careless about carrying out their business.
Nixon had started to show legitimate concern by that time, as was shown during his conversation with Colson on
13 February 1973. Nixon told Colson that the main problem was that if any of the burglars started talking to prosecutors. James McCord remained on the fence in terms of what he should do, still holding out a glimmer of hope that the White House would come to his rescue. McCord met Caulfield for a third and final time, and it became clear to Caulfield that McCord was going to break his silence, refusing to be the fall guy for the Nixon administration. Caulfield gave McCord advice, telling him not to underestimate the higher-ups in the White House.
Nixon had started to show legitimate concern by that time, as was shown during his conversation with Colson on
13 February 1973. Nixon told Colson that the main problem was that if any of the burglars started talking to prosecutors. James McCord remained on the fence in terms of what he should do, still holding out a glimmer of hope that the White House would come to his rescue. McCord met Caulfield for a third and final time, and it became clear to Caulfield that McCord was going to break his silence, refusing to be the fall guy for the Nixon administration. Caulfield gave McCord advice, telling him not to underestimate the higher-ups in the White House.