Hoover’s efforts during the Mississippi River Flood would stand for decades on how the federal government should respond during a national emergency. Soon thereafter, Coolidge signed the Flood Control Act, which had been championed by Hoover for many years. The act improved and re-engineered levees, diversion methods and outlets along the Mississippi and Sacramento Rivers. However, more than 80 lives were lost under Hoover’s supervision, and he greatly exaggerated the level of volunteerism under his watch. Hoover also underestimated the level of refusal by Southern whites to allow any meaningful rights for African-Americans during the disaster, which in part meant that the Southern economy did not receive a boost from what federal funding there was during the flood. Hoover was able to keep the racial abuses in the camps and work sites out of the press; once again, Hoover could not admit any setbacks or failures, even though his efforts were a rousing success.
2 August 1927 at the “Summer White House” in the Black Hills: President Coolidge announced to the assembled press that he would not run again for President in 1928, which sent shock waves throughout the Republican Party. Hoover was at the Bohemian Grove when he heard that Coolidge was not going to run in 1928. The Bohemian Grove was located in the California Redwoods, and was founded in the late-19th Century by actual bohemians. By the late-1920s, Bohemian Grove had become a large gentlemen’s club for Republican elites. Hoover relished his time at the Grove, finding the location and company invigorating and stimulating. Soon after Coolidge’s announcement, Hoover left the Grove and headed back to DC.
Hoover was on the short list of successors to Coolidge, as was Charles Evans Hughes and VP Charles Dawes. Hoover once again played coy, saying he had no interest in a position that he clearly and dearly craved. Coolidge had left just enough doubt in his statement that Hoover had to resort to a stealth campaign for the nomination. Hoover also knew he faced stiff opposition from the old guard in the GOP due to his service in the Wilson administration.
2 August 1927 at the “Summer White House” in the Black Hills: President Coolidge announced to the assembled press that he would not run again for President in 1928, which sent shock waves throughout the Republican Party. Hoover was at the Bohemian Grove when he heard that Coolidge was not going to run in 1928. The Bohemian Grove was located in the California Redwoods, and was founded in the late-19th Century by actual bohemians. By the late-1920s, Bohemian Grove had become a large gentlemen’s club for Republican elites. Hoover relished his time at the Grove, finding the location and company invigorating and stimulating. Soon after Coolidge’s announcement, Hoover left the Grove and headed back to DC.
Hoover was on the short list of successors to Coolidge, as was Charles Evans Hughes and VP Charles Dawes. Hoover once again played coy, saying he had no interest in a position that he clearly and dearly craved. Coolidge had left just enough doubt in his statement that Hoover had to resort to a stealth campaign for the nomination. Hoover also knew he faced stiff opposition from the old guard in the GOP due to his service in the Wilson administration.
Hoover was an easy sale among Republicans, given his fame, resume, and accomplishments. Hoover continued to use his platform as SecCommerce to polish and improve his image and reputation, and he emerged as the frontrunner in the GOP, but there were still 11 months until the Republican National Convention. Even though Hoover remained undeclared for the vast majority of that time, he worked nonstop on his campaign, doing his best to make it appear that he was on an “immaculate ascent” instead of working hard to gain the GOP nomination.
The only real obstacle to Hoover’s pursuit of the nomination was Coolidge, in terms of a surprise announcement that he would again run; uncharacteristically, Coolidge played the part of a diva. On 6 December 1927, Coolidge told the Republican National Committee that it was time for new leadership, but he didn’t say that he would refuse being drafted by the convention to run again. It wasn’t until February 1928 when Hoover visited Coolidge that he received a satisfactory “I won’t run” from the President, which meant that he could publicly pursue the GOP nomination. Coolidge’s health was failing, but even so he didn’t like being elbowed aside by Hoover. Coolidge had a mean streak, and it became centered on Hoover, calling him the “Wonder Boy” to the press. Coolidge knew (and enjoyed) that his enigmatic statements very much bothered Hoover. Hoover always envisioned the possibility of catastrophe, and he still believed that Coolidge might swoop down and steal the nomination as late as one month before the convention. Coolidge kept toying with Hoover, keeping alive the prospect that he might be drafted at the convention to run again.
The GOP convention in Kansas City started on 12 June 1928, and Hoover had the nomination all sewn up. Hoover had entered 11 primaries, winning 6 (including CA), and he and those working in his campaign played the “Inside Game” for all it was worth, making it seem like they were doing no such thing. The Mississippi River Flood relief efforts by the federal government in 1927 caused Republican progressives to support Hoover. A full one-third of the delegates at the convention were from Southern states, and Hoover and his team worked hard to win them over. While Hoover still fretted, he won the Republican nomination for President on the first ballot. Coolidge was vacationing in WI when he was told of Hoover’s victory; the President’s face hardened, and he ordered a bottle of whiskey.
The only real obstacle to Hoover’s pursuit of the nomination was Coolidge, in terms of a surprise announcement that he would again run; uncharacteristically, Coolidge played the part of a diva. On 6 December 1927, Coolidge told the Republican National Committee that it was time for new leadership, but he didn’t say that he would refuse being drafted by the convention to run again. It wasn’t until February 1928 when Hoover visited Coolidge that he received a satisfactory “I won’t run” from the President, which meant that he could publicly pursue the GOP nomination. Coolidge’s health was failing, but even so he didn’t like being elbowed aside by Hoover. Coolidge had a mean streak, and it became centered on Hoover, calling him the “Wonder Boy” to the press. Coolidge knew (and enjoyed) that his enigmatic statements very much bothered Hoover. Hoover always envisioned the possibility of catastrophe, and he still believed that Coolidge might swoop down and steal the nomination as late as one month before the convention. Coolidge kept toying with Hoover, keeping alive the prospect that he might be drafted at the convention to run again.
The GOP convention in Kansas City started on 12 June 1928, and Hoover had the nomination all sewn up. Hoover had entered 11 primaries, winning 6 (including CA), and he and those working in his campaign played the “Inside Game” for all it was worth, making it seem like they were doing no such thing. The Mississippi River Flood relief efforts by the federal government in 1927 caused Republican progressives to support Hoover. A full one-third of the delegates at the convention were from Southern states, and Hoover and his team worked hard to win them over. While Hoover still fretted, he won the Republican nomination for President on the first ballot. Coolidge was vacationing in WI when he was told of Hoover’s victory; the President’s face hardened, and he ordered a bottle of whiskey.
During 1928 there were no acute international or domestic issues, and in America prosperity was seen as given by a majority of citizens. The smart strategy therefore was to not campaign too hard or too obviously, given that victory was assured, which fit right in Hoover’s wheelhouse. Despite the thousands of miles William Jennings Bryan traveled running for President in 1896 and 1900, it was still viewed as not proper to travel to campaign for President, which again was in Hoover’s wheelhouse. Hoover struck the pose of Olympian indifference, so chasing votes would be done by other Republicans at the national, state, and local levels.
The Democratic candidate, Al Smith (the governor of NY), was the opposite of Hoover in many ways. Smith was outgoing, combative, very public, never embarrassed, and loved politics. As the Democratic governor of NY, Smith had proved to be incredibly effective in a Republican state. Smith was a man of the people, while Hoover was a technocrat, a public professional, which was another reason why Hoover didn’t want to campaign very often, if at all. The Republicans sold Hoover as the most useful American alive, an almost supernatural figure. Hoover focused on campaigning on his resume, something of which Time magazine didn’t care for as a strategy running for President. Hoover’s campaign was the first to be packaged by advertising strategies, taking advantage of the rise of consumerism in the late-1920s. Voters didn’t object to slogans, billboards, newsreels, and radio spots of Hoover running for President.
Smith was unable to transfer his positive characteristics to the national level, and he remained a distant runner-up throughout the campaign. In 1928, as Prohibition entered its 8th year, there were millions of “Drys” ready to vote against a “Wet” (Smith was anti-Prohibition). Hoover had no objections to the Republican support of Prohibition, but he didn’t have any passion for it either, since moral crusades such as Prohibition didn’t really register with him. Hoover characterized Prohibition as an “experiment”, terminology that didn’t alienate the “Drys” or the “Wets”. The ugly strain of Nativism worked against Smith, since he was the first Catholic to run for President; Hoover being a Quaker didn’t much bother the electorate. Hoover made sure that everyone knew he didn’t believe religion should be a factor in Presidential politics, and he called for tolerance.
The Democratic candidate, Al Smith (the governor of NY), was the opposite of Hoover in many ways. Smith was outgoing, combative, very public, never embarrassed, and loved politics. As the Democratic governor of NY, Smith had proved to be incredibly effective in a Republican state. Smith was a man of the people, while Hoover was a technocrat, a public professional, which was another reason why Hoover didn’t want to campaign very often, if at all. The Republicans sold Hoover as the most useful American alive, an almost supernatural figure. Hoover focused on campaigning on his resume, something of which Time magazine didn’t care for as a strategy running for President. Hoover’s campaign was the first to be packaged by advertising strategies, taking advantage of the rise of consumerism in the late-1920s. Voters didn’t object to slogans, billboards, newsreels, and radio spots of Hoover running for President.
Smith was unable to transfer his positive characteristics to the national level, and he remained a distant runner-up throughout the campaign. In 1928, as Prohibition entered its 8th year, there were millions of “Drys” ready to vote against a “Wet” (Smith was anti-Prohibition). Hoover had no objections to the Republican support of Prohibition, but he didn’t have any passion for it either, since moral crusades such as Prohibition didn’t really register with him. Hoover characterized Prohibition as an “experiment”, terminology that didn’t alienate the “Drys” or the “Wets”. The ugly strain of Nativism worked against Smith, since he was the first Catholic to run for President; Hoover being a Quaker didn’t much bother the electorate. Hoover made sure that everyone knew he didn’t believe religion should be a factor in Presidential politics, and he called for tolerance.
Hoover and the Republicans campaigned on continued prosperity, an obvious winning issue, while intolerance was the theme for Smith and the Democrats, which did not resonate with voters in 1928. Hoover was well-received everywhere except in Boston, where Catholics threw rocks at his car. Hoover campaigned for continued prosperity even though he had severe doubts that it would continue; the Stock Market had Hoover’s attention, in that he thought easy credit would superheat the economy, priming it for a downturn. Coolidge and SecTreas Mellon didn’t make any announcements concerning the economy other than repeating the mantra that everything was fine, which angered Hoover on multiple fronts. Hoover saw the economy ready for a downturn, perhaps even a depression. However, Hoover couldn’t say so campaigning for President, other than adding qualifying statements to his rosy picture of continued prosperity.
Hoover fretted over every move made by Smith’s campaign, but the election results showed that Hoover had nothing to worry about. In the Electoral College vote, Hoover received 444 to Smith’s 87, and Hoover received 58% of the popular vote and won 40 states, including five in the “Solid South”. Hoover was a tortured man, having to wait until 4 March 1929 to be inaugurated as the 31st President. Hoover couldn’t hang around DC beforehand since Coolidge didn’t want him there, and the President wasn’t cooperative with the transition with Hoover’s people. Hoover reverted to “living on the jump”, as he had done in previous years and careers. Hoover had the use of a Navy battleship as President-Elect, and he gave 25 speeches from Honduras to Argentina, focusing on the “Good Neighbor Policy”; Hoover was well-received everywhere he went. After a brief stint in DC for two weeks, Hoover traveled to FL for a vacation of fishing and playing bridge. Hoover socialized with Thomas Edison (who by then was deaf), Henry Ford, and unexpectedly Al Smith, who was very cordial and warm to Hoover.
Hoover fretted over every move made by Smith’s campaign, but the election results showed that Hoover had nothing to worry about. In the Electoral College vote, Hoover received 444 to Smith’s 87, and Hoover received 58% of the popular vote and won 40 states, including five in the “Solid South”. Hoover was a tortured man, having to wait until 4 March 1929 to be inaugurated as the 31st President. Hoover couldn’t hang around DC beforehand since Coolidge didn’t want him there, and the President wasn’t cooperative with the transition with Hoover’s people. Hoover reverted to “living on the jump”, as he had done in previous years and careers. Hoover had the use of a Navy battleship as President-Elect, and he gave 25 speeches from Honduras to Argentina, focusing on the “Good Neighbor Policy”; Hoover was well-received everywhere he went. After a brief stint in DC for two weeks, Hoover traveled to FL for a vacation of fishing and playing bridge. Hoover socialized with Thomas Edison (who by then was deaf), Henry Ford, and unexpectedly Al Smith, who was very cordial and warm to Hoover.
Creating a Cabinet was not something that Hoover relished, since it involved many political and social concerns. Hoover focused on merit instead of personal connections as much as he could, and he kept Andrew Mellon on as SecTreas if for nothing else to make Wall Street happy. Hoover made sure that he had someone as SecAg that would not be an obstacle for what he wanted to accomplish in the agricultural sector. The most difficult Cabinet post for Hoover to fill was SecState. Charles Evans Hughes told Hoover that he would not continue in the post, having served in that capacity for the same eight years that Hoover had been SecCommerce for Harding and Coolidge. Hoover had difficulty finding a qualified person that was interested. Hoover eventually offered the post to Henry Stimson, who accepted. Stimson had been Taft’s SecWar, and was currently the governor in the Philippines.
Overall, Hoover’s Cabinet looked more like an elite business group. Hoover wanted to be free of any departmental responsibilities, so he did his best to select people that could run their departments on their own (as he had done) so he could focus on major policy decisions. Hoover appointed the scions from prominent families to posts in the Executive Branch, such as Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. as the governor of Puerto Rico. The problem with doing so was that Hoover didn’t have anyone in his orbit that had come up from the factories, fields, or the streets, as he had done. Hoover didn’t account for the tendency that meritocracy often takes the form of disconnected elitism. By surrounding himself with like-minded figures in his administration, Hoover set himself up to become insulated and isolated from the American people.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court that swore Hoover into office as President on 4 March 1929 was former President William Howard Taft, which was the first-and-only time that has occurred in US History. Hoover was the first President born west of the Mississippi River, the first Quaker President (Nixon was also a Quaker), and the first surveyor/engineer to become President since George Washington.
Overall, Hoover’s Cabinet looked more like an elite business group. Hoover wanted to be free of any departmental responsibilities, so he did his best to select people that could run their departments on their own (as he had done) so he could focus on major policy decisions. Hoover appointed the scions from prominent families to posts in the Executive Branch, such as Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. as the governor of Puerto Rico. The problem with doing so was that Hoover didn’t have anyone in his orbit that had come up from the factories, fields, or the streets, as he had done. Hoover didn’t account for the tendency that meritocracy often takes the form of disconnected elitism. By surrounding himself with like-minded figures in his administration, Hoover set himself up to become insulated and isolated from the American people.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court that swore Hoover into office as President on 4 March 1929 was former President William Howard Taft, which was the first-and-only time that has occurred in US History. Hoover was the first President born west of the Mississippi River, the first Quaker President (Nixon was also a Quaker), and the first surveyor/engineer to become President since George Washington.
On 5 March 1929 the day after Inauguration, Hoover plunged into the job as President, bound-and-determined to be the hardest-working man to ever hold the office. Hoover focused on Wall Street, where the irrational exuberance showed no signs of stopping. The value of the shares of stocks had become disconnected from their actual market worth. Despite the Fed’s Discount Rate of 5%, money kept flowing into the Stock Market, as investors big-and-small saw nothing but huge guaranteed returns on their investments., and far too many banks were lending money to stock brokers.
Hoover was far less enabling towards the moneyed classes, reversing Coolidge’s policies when and where he could, often over the objections of SecTreas Mellon. Even though Hoover was President largely due to Harding and Coolidge, he didn’t use either as a model. Rather, Hoover was inspired by the progressivism of Theodore Roosevelt, especially from his failed bid to win the Presidency in 1912. At the same time, Hoover wanted to professionalize the Presidency, being low-key and collaborative instead of charismatic and combative, which was very much unlike TR, and more like Harding and Coolidge.
Hoover’s professional approach allowed him to bow out of many ceremonial duties, seeing such activities as a waste of his time as well as an energy-drainer (he was also a bit of a germaphobe). Where TR preferred to approach a problem firing on all cylinders, Hoover preferred to gather facts and manage the problem into submission, free from the demands of the public arena. Hoover’s office hours, which lasted at least 10 hours a day, sometimes 16 hours, marveled DC, who were accustomed to the “Banker’s Hours” of Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge. Hoover loved the isolation of working at his desk in his office as President, applying his giant brain in service of the nation, doing his best to avoid any distractions from doing so.
Hoover was far less enabling towards the moneyed classes, reversing Coolidge’s policies when and where he could, often over the objections of SecTreas Mellon. Even though Hoover was President largely due to Harding and Coolidge, he didn’t use either as a model. Rather, Hoover was inspired by the progressivism of Theodore Roosevelt, especially from his failed bid to win the Presidency in 1912. At the same time, Hoover wanted to professionalize the Presidency, being low-key and collaborative instead of charismatic and combative, which was very much unlike TR, and more like Harding and Coolidge.
Hoover’s professional approach allowed him to bow out of many ceremonial duties, seeing such activities as a waste of his time as well as an energy-drainer (he was also a bit of a germaphobe). Where TR preferred to approach a problem firing on all cylinders, Hoover preferred to gather facts and manage the problem into submission, free from the demands of the public arena. Hoover’s office hours, which lasted at least 10 hours a day, sometimes 16 hours, marveled DC, who were accustomed to the “Banker’s Hours” of Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge. Hoover loved the isolation of working at his desk in his office as President, applying his giant brain in service of the nation, doing his best to avoid any distractions from doing so.