Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
During early-October 1972, FBI Special Agent Angelo Lano received special permission from prosecutors to meet with Carl Bernstein, with Lano hoping to discover who were the Post’s high-placed sources. While Bernstein refused to divulge anything sources-wise, they both agreed that Watergate didn’t end with the seven men arrested for the Watergate break-in. Soon after that meeting, Bernstein received a random tip that Alex Shipley, an assistant district attorney in TN, had been contacted by CREEP. Shipley was told that there was virtually unlimited funds available to disrupt the Democratic campaign, and was asked if he was interested in doing so.
Bernstein called Shipley who confirmed the tip, saying that in June 1971 he had been approached by Donald Segretti to join a political espionage team. Segretti had plenty of ideas for low-grade pranks to pull on Democrats. with the overall goal being to create constant havoc on the Democrats. Via a confidential source at a credit card company, Bernstein confirmed that Segretti had traveled to states that held Democratic primaries, such as NH, FL, IL, and CA.
On the same day the LA Times published their Baldwin scoop, a Washington Post reporter knocked on Segretti’s door at his home in Marina del Rey (CA). The reporter, Robert Meyers, questioned Segretti about his political espionage operation. Segretti responded by saying the whole thing was ridiculous, adding that it sounded like James Bond. Back in DC, Woodward and Bernstein kept investigating Segretti’s activities, discovering that the Justice Department was probably aware of not only Segretti, but that his shenanigans went far past Watergate.
Bernstein called Shipley who confirmed the tip, saying that in June 1971 he had been approached by Donald Segretti to join a political espionage team. Segretti had plenty of ideas for low-grade pranks to pull on Democrats. with the overall goal being to create constant havoc on the Democrats. Via a confidential source at a credit card company, Bernstein confirmed that Segretti had traveled to states that held Democratic primaries, such as NH, FL, IL, and CA.
On the same day the LA Times published their Baldwin scoop, a Washington Post reporter knocked on Segretti’s door at his home in Marina del Rey (CA). The reporter, Robert Meyers, questioned Segretti about his political espionage operation. Segretti responded by saying the whole thing was ridiculous, adding that it sounded like James Bond. Back in DC, Woodward and Bernstein kept investigating Segretti’s activities, discovering that the Justice Department was probably aware of not only Segretti, but that his shenanigans went far past Watergate.
While Bernstein was tasked with writing a story based on what he’d confirmed, Woodward was told by one of his bosses at the Post to meet with his secret source. “Deep Throat” had become the nickname of Woodward’s secret source at the Post, whereas Woodward referred to his source as “my friend”. To Woodward, making sense of the Segretti business seemed to be the type of thing of which Felt could be of assistance.
On 8 October 1972, Woodward arranged to meet Felt in person. Woodward twice switched cabs, working his way to a parking garage where Felt was waiting at 1:30 am. The two talked until dawn, with Felt providing enough context so Woodward saw the scope of what he and Bernstein had been investigating, including that Mitchell was involved. Felt outlined an operation that was sinister and unprecedented, but at the same time also very naive. Felt kept being very vague, which led to Woodward grabbing Felt’s arm in absolute frustration. Felt relented, saying that easily 50 people that worked in the White House and for CREEP were involved in spying, sabotage, and intelligence gathering on Democrats. Felt added that the FBI and Justice knew all about them, since the information was in their files, but there had been no follow-up on them
When Woodward recounted his conversation at the Post, his colleagues were stunned; the Post’s understanding of Watergate took a quantum leap forward. Woodward and Bernstein’s article the next morning ran on the Post’s front page, saying the source for their story came from “information in the FBI and Department of Justice files”; the headline read “FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats”.
On 8 October 1972, Woodward arranged to meet Felt in person. Woodward twice switched cabs, working his way to a parking garage where Felt was waiting at 1:30 am. The two talked until dawn, with Felt providing enough context so Woodward saw the scope of what he and Bernstein had been investigating, including that Mitchell was involved. Felt outlined an operation that was sinister and unprecedented, but at the same time also very naive. Felt kept being very vague, which led to Woodward grabbing Felt’s arm in absolute frustration. Felt relented, saying that easily 50 people that worked in the White House and for CREEP were involved in spying, sabotage, and intelligence gathering on Democrats. Felt added that the FBI and Justice knew all about them, since the information was in their files, but there had been no follow-up on them
When Woodward recounted his conversation at the Post, his colleagues were stunned; the Post’s understanding of Watergate took a quantum leap forward. Woodward and Bernstein’s article the next morning ran on the Post’s front page, saying the source for their story came from “information in the FBI and Department of Justice files”; the headline read “FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats”.
Woodward and Bernstein (or as they were called at the Post, “Woodstein”) provided numerous examples in their article of shenanigans against Democrats, such as leaking false information to the press, seizing confidential campaign documents, and investigating dozens of Democratic campaign workers. CREEP dismissed the Post’s story saying it was fiction, while also asserting that the entire matter was in the hands of the authorities. Woodward and Bernstein recognized that Segretti was the crucial angle in moving forward; eventually, they discovered that Segretti had very few people doing his bidding (Felt’s comment that 50 operatives were involved proved to be inaccurate). During the evening of the day the Post’s article ran, Fred Fielding visited Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray in order to pick up more 302s for Dean to read on his own.
Although Felt’s identity as “Deep Throat” wouldn’t become known for 40+ years after Woodward identified him in 2005, during the Fall of 1972 Nixon already knew Felt was Woodward’s secret source. On 19 October 1972, Nixon met with Haldeman and Colson in his hideaway office in the Executive Office Building (EOB) for three hours. Haldeman told Nixon that Felt was the high-up FBI leaker, but none of the three could figure out Felt’s motive. Haldeman told Nixon that if they went after Felt, then he would tell the media everything he knows, and Felt had access to absolutely everything in the FBI’s investigation on Watergate. The three continued to try and figure out how to confront Felt without disaster befalling the administration; it was Dean’s opinion was that Felt hadn’t committed any crime with his leaks. It was considered that maybe Felt should be reassigned to get him out of DC, but that was deemed too risky as well. Nixon came to the conclusion that Felt was bitter about not being named FBI Director, and in a bizarre way, Nixon kind of admired Felt’s Machiavellian methods to try and get the top spot. The next day, discussion in Nixon’s inner circle continued about what to do with Felt, this time including Ehrlichman. The plan was to keep Felt in check, publicly dangling the prospect that after the Election of 1972 that he would be named FBI Director.
Although Felt’s identity as “Deep Throat” wouldn’t become known for 40+ years after Woodward identified him in 2005, during the Fall of 1972 Nixon already knew Felt was Woodward’s secret source. On 19 October 1972, Nixon met with Haldeman and Colson in his hideaway office in the Executive Office Building (EOB) for three hours. Haldeman told Nixon that Felt was the high-up FBI leaker, but none of the three could figure out Felt’s motive. Haldeman told Nixon that if they went after Felt, then he would tell the media everything he knows, and Felt had access to absolutely everything in the FBI’s investigation on Watergate. The three continued to try and figure out how to confront Felt without disaster befalling the administration; it was Dean’s opinion was that Felt hadn’t committed any crime with his leaks. It was considered that maybe Felt should be reassigned to get him out of DC, but that was deemed too risky as well. Nixon came to the conclusion that Felt was bitter about not being named FBI Director, and in a bizarre way, Nixon kind of admired Felt’s Machiavellian methods to try and get the top spot. The next day, discussion in Nixon’s inner circle continued about what to do with Felt, this time including Ehrlichman. The plan was to keep Felt in check, publicly dangling the prospect that after the Election of 1972 that he would be named FBI Director.
Kleindienst heard the same rumors about Felt from Mitchell, and he repeatedly informed Gray of their suspicions, telling the Acting FBI Director that it was time to fire Felt. When Gray confronted Felt about the leaks, Felt named an FBI colleague as the leaker. A few days later an article in Time magazine by Sandy Smith contained the most damaging and explosive allegations yet against not only Gray, but the Nixon administration as well, saying that the FBI was being used to help the Nixon campaign. Felt, playing the dual role of arsonist and firefighter, told Gray that Nixon was very upset about the leak for Smith’s story, and that Kleindienst believed the leaker was going after Gray. Felt was describing himself, anonymously telling Gray to his face the truth of the matter, at least in part.
As the Election of 1972 drew nearer, the Post was running out of gas in terms of covering Watergate, since there had been no new developments after Segretti. A Gallup poll showed that 48% of those polled didn’t even recognize the word “Watergate”, even though the Post had run 51 stories on the scandal. The television networks (CBS, NBC, ABC) ignored the Post’s reporting on Watergate, mostly because it wasn’t a visual story up to that point. On 25 October 1972, CBS reporter Daniel Schorr was waiting outside a DC law firm when Hugh Sloan and his lawyer arrived for a deposition. Schorr asked Sloan about an article from Woodward and Bernstein titled “Testimony Ties Top Nixon Aide to Secret Fund”, which alleged that Haldeman was involved as the fifth person authorized to approve payments from CREEP’s slush fund. That article stated that all five that controlled the slush fund had been named by Sloan in his testimony to the grand jury. Sloan’s lawyer was adamant, stating that “We categorically deny that such a statement was made by the grand jury”.
As the Election of 1972 drew nearer, the Post was running out of gas in terms of covering Watergate, since there had been no new developments after Segretti. A Gallup poll showed that 48% of those polled didn’t even recognize the word “Watergate”, even though the Post had run 51 stories on the scandal. The television networks (CBS, NBC, ABC) ignored the Post’s reporting on Watergate, mostly because it wasn’t a visual story up to that point. On 25 October 1972, CBS reporter Daniel Schorr was waiting outside a DC law firm when Hugh Sloan and his lawyer arrived for a deposition. Schorr asked Sloan about an article from Woodward and Bernstein titled “Testimony Ties Top Nixon Aide to Secret Fund”, which alleged that Haldeman was involved as the fifth person authorized to approve payments from CREEP’s slush fund. That article stated that all five that controlled the slush fund had been named by Sloan in his testimony to the grand jury. Sloan’s lawyer was adamant, stating that “We categorically deny that such a statement was made by the grand jury”.
Woodward and Bernstein were beside themselves, wondering if they had made a colossal mistake; according to Bradlee, it was the Post’s lowest moment concerning Watergate. Press Secretary Ron Ziegler blasted the Post calling the story “shabby journalism”, and their assertion concerning Haldeman as a “blatant effort at character assassination”. Later that day, Woodward contacted Sloan’s lawyer in order to try and figure out where he and Bernstein had erred. Woodward asked the lawyer if they owed Haldeman an apology, and the lawyer said no, which told Woodward that their story was right, but their problem lay in their sourcing.
Back in the Post newsroom, Bradlee decided to back Woodward and Bernstein, releasing a simple statement: “We stand by our story”. At 9 pm that evening, Bernstein called Sloan, and finally the problem was identified, in that Sloan stated that the grand jury never asked him about Haldeman. The next night, Woodward met Felt in the parking garage, who said that Haldeman had slipped away from them, and that he and Bernstein had royally screwed up. Bradlee had Woodward and Bernstein write up a story that Sloan had never been asked about Haldeman by the grand jury, but their federal sources confirmed Haldeman’s involvement in CREEP slush fund. The story covered their behinds journalism-wise, but the optics of their sourcing mistake was very damaging, which also confirmed to other newspapers, such as the NY Times, that it was wise to distance themselves from Watergate.
Soon thereafter, Walter Cronkite, the CBS Evening News anchorman, “The Most Trusted Man in America”, joined Schorr and made sure that CBS News covered Watergate. Cronkite wanted to make an on-screen attempt to attract attention to the Watergate Scandal in an extended two-part segment during the regular broadcast of the CBS Evening News, trying to explain the labyrinthine tangled mess for viewers.
Back in the Post newsroom, Bradlee decided to back Woodward and Bernstein, releasing a simple statement: “We stand by our story”. At 9 pm that evening, Bernstein called Sloan, and finally the problem was identified, in that Sloan stated that the grand jury never asked him about Haldeman. The next night, Woodward met Felt in the parking garage, who said that Haldeman had slipped away from them, and that he and Bernstein had royally screwed up. Bradlee had Woodward and Bernstein write up a story that Sloan had never been asked about Haldeman by the grand jury, but their federal sources confirmed Haldeman’s involvement in CREEP slush fund. The story covered their behinds journalism-wise, but the optics of their sourcing mistake was very damaging, which also confirmed to other newspapers, such as the NY Times, that it was wise to distance themselves from Watergate.
Soon thereafter, Walter Cronkite, the CBS Evening News anchorman, “The Most Trusted Man in America”, joined Schorr and made sure that CBS News covered Watergate. Cronkite wanted to make an on-screen attempt to attract attention to the Watergate Scandal in an extended two-part segment during the regular broadcast of the CBS Evening News, trying to explain the labyrinthine tangled mess for viewers.
Cronkite largely summarized the Post’s Watergate stories for his two extended segments. Cronkite’s journalistic integrity and gravitas meant that a large segment of the US population that had previously dismissed Watergate as irrelevant now became at least marginally interested. The first segment aired on 27 October 1972, just days after the Haldean fiasco, lasting 14 of the 22 minutes of the regular evening news broadcast. The segment had high production value, with many photos and filmed footage accompanying Cronkite’s narration, as well as clearly labeled sourcing.
Charles Colson called the head of CBS to complain, and the network’s brass debated on whether to air the next segment. The network’s executives decided to show the second segment, but to downsize it to nine minutes, where it aired on 31 October 1972. Cronkite’s involvement shifted the national attitude towards Watergate, with Katharine Graham telling Cronkite, “You saved us”. Woodward years later would say that the two segments were a “big kiss” from Cronkite.
With just days before the Election of 1972, Rugaber of the NY Times wrote an article, and with two sentences in his story, he made the most important observation concerning Watergate to that point: “There are still no definitive, conclusive answers to either of the key questions posed by the Watergate affair from the beginning: What are the limits in assessing blame? What were the intentions and actions of those involved?”. Those questions would linger unanswered through Election Day.
Charles Colson called the head of CBS to complain, and the network’s brass debated on whether to air the next segment. The network’s executives decided to show the second segment, but to downsize it to nine minutes, where it aired on 31 October 1972. Cronkite’s involvement shifted the national attitude towards Watergate, with Katharine Graham telling Cronkite, “You saved us”. Woodward years later would say that the two segments were a “big kiss” from Cronkite.
With just days before the Election of 1972, Rugaber of the NY Times wrote an article, and with two sentences in his story, he made the most important observation concerning Watergate to that point: “There are still no definitive, conclusive answers to either of the key questions posed by the Watergate affair from the beginning: What are the limits in assessing blame? What were the intentions and actions of those involved?”. Those questions would linger unanswered through Election Day.