Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
On 11 October 1973, Cox indicted Egil Krogh for his role in the break-in at Dr. Fielding’s office, charging him with making false declarations, which carried a stiffer sentence than perjury. It was the first indictment from Cox’s team, and it caught AG Richardson and the White House by surprise.
With Agnew’s resignation as Vice-President (10 October 1973), Nixon badly wanted John Connally to be his next Vice-President, but Connally was embroiled in a controversy over donations from milk producers, so he was no longer on the President’s short list. Nixon had been told by Congressional leadership to nominate someone for VP that would be easy to confirm in both houses, and only one name was at the top of the list, Gerald Ford (R; MI), and Nixon took their advice. The DC press engaged in wild speculation on who Nixon would nominate for VP, since it was the first time the 25th Amendment (1967) had been used for such a purpose.
And then the appellate court released its decision on the tapes, ruling 5 - 2 to force Nixon to turn over the 9 tapes to Cox, rejecting claims of Executive Privilege. The court stated that if the White House balked in turning over the tapes, then Judge Sirica would listen to them in private and make the determination on what was and what was not under the category of national security. Cox, the White House, and the press tried to make sense of the appellate court’s ruling
With Agnew’s resignation as Vice-President (10 October 1973), Nixon badly wanted John Connally to be his next Vice-President, but Connally was embroiled in a controversy over donations from milk producers, so he was no longer on the President’s short list. Nixon had been told by Congressional leadership to nominate someone for VP that would be easy to confirm in both houses, and only one name was at the top of the list, Gerald Ford (R; MI), and Nixon took their advice. The DC press engaged in wild speculation on who Nixon would nominate for VP, since it was the first time the 25th Amendment (1967) had been used for such a purpose.
And then the appellate court released its decision on the tapes, ruling 5 - 2 to force Nixon to turn over the 9 tapes to Cox, rejecting claims of Executive Privilege. The court stated that if the White House balked in turning over the tapes, then Judge Sirica would listen to them in private and make the determination on what was and what was not under the category of national security. Cox, the White House, and the press tried to make sense of the appellate court’s ruling
Now the ball was in Nixon’s court, and all Cox could do was wait. The appellate court gave Nixon five days to come to an agreement with Cox, where Nixon could obey, or appeal to the Supreme Court. With the war in the Middle East, and with nearly-universal respect for Ford as the new VP, Nixon believed that he now had some wiggle room to figure out how to avoid releasing the tapes. Nixon’s plan, after consulting his inner circle, was to have transcripts prepared from the tapes, have them authenticated, and then sent to Sirica. Then Nixon would fire Cox, which would cancel the appellate court’s ruling to turn over the tapes. Nixon’s endgame was to end Watergate that week, once-and-for-all. When Haig apprised Richardson of the plan, the AG told Haig that if that all occurred, he would resign. Richardson then informed Ruckelshaus, who had moved over to Deputy AG after being the interim Acting FBI Director, that they now had a problem that was far worse than Agnew.
Haig and Buzhardt worked hard to promote what became known as the “Stennis Plan”, where Senator John Stennis (D; MS), the longest-tenured Senator in the chamber, would be the third party arbiter. Richardson floated that idea to Cox, who saw what it really was, a rubber stamp “get out of jail free” card for Nixon. Both men knew their jobs hung in the balance if they didn’t play ball with the White House. On 16 October 1973, John Chancellor, the distinguished anchorman for the NBC Nightly News, announced that negotiations were underway for a compromise on the tape between the White House and Cox. Chancellor’s announcement did not make the White House happy, in that it hoped to keep the negotiations secret.
Haig and Buzhardt worked hard to promote what became known as the “Stennis Plan”, where Senator John Stennis (D; MS), the longest-tenured Senator in the chamber, would be the third party arbiter. Richardson floated that idea to Cox, who saw what it really was, a rubber stamp “get out of jail free” card for Nixon. Both men knew their jobs hung in the balance if they didn’t play ball with the White House. On 16 October 1973, John Chancellor, the distinguished anchorman for the NBC Nightly News, announced that negotiations were underway for a compromise on the tape between the White House and Cox. Chancellor’s announcement did not make the White House happy, in that it hoped to keep the negotiations secret.
Shortly thereafter, Sirica denied the Watergate Committee’s request for Nixon to turn over the tapes to the Senate, which meant that Cox stood alone in trying to force Nixon to turn over the tapes. Richardson refined his written proposals for Senator Stennis with Buzhardt; to Richardson, Buzhardt’s suggestions seemed to have come directly from Nixon. After finalizing the “Stennis Plan’, it was sent to Cox, who told Richardson that he’d officially reply in writing. In his memo regarding the “Stennis Plan” to Richardson, Cox weighed the pros and cons. The main positive was avoiding a constitutional crisis as well as impeachment. The negatives featured the resignation of Richardson as Attorney General, as well as breaking up the office of the Special Prosecutor. Also seen by Cox as a negative was what would be turned over to Stennis, which would be edited transcripts of the 9 tapes for his review, which would be worse than useless.
Meanwhile, Dean and Shaffer (his lawyer) were negotiating a plea deal with Cox’s office. Unlike the Watergate Committee, Cox was not going to give Dean immunity, knowing that he would not be an effective witness in future trials if he had been granted immunity by Cox’s office. The single felony charge had become the go-to for the major figures in Watergate, starting with LaRue and Magruder. Eventually, Cox’s office zeroed in on two instances of obstruction of justice of which Dean had not previously admitted, with the first being when Dean asked Vernon Walters for money to pay off the Watergate burglars in the days after the break-in. The other instance was from January 1973, when Dean enlisted Caulfield to tell McCord that Nixon would grant him clemency if he remained silent.
Contained in the language of the plea deal that Dean signed with Cox was that he could still be prosecuted for perjury if it was later proven that he had lied to the office of the Special Prosecutor. Dean and his lawyer had no problem signing the plea deal, which led Cox’s team to think that the tapes, which they assumed would soon be in their hands, would be good news for Dean, since his Watergate accounts would be proven accurate. But that also meant that Cox would be in serious trouble with Nixon.
Meanwhile, Dean and Shaffer (his lawyer) were negotiating a plea deal with Cox’s office. Unlike the Watergate Committee, Cox was not going to give Dean immunity, knowing that he would not be an effective witness in future trials if he had been granted immunity by Cox’s office. The single felony charge had become the go-to for the major figures in Watergate, starting with LaRue and Magruder. Eventually, Cox’s office zeroed in on two instances of obstruction of justice of which Dean had not previously admitted, with the first being when Dean asked Vernon Walters for money to pay off the Watergate burglars in the days after the break-in. The other instance was from January 1973, when Dean enlisted Caulfield to tell McCord that Nixon would grant him clemency if he remained silent.
Contained in the language of the plea deal that Dean signed with Cox was that he could still be prosecuted for perjury if it was later proven that he had lied to the office of the Special Prosecutor. Dean and his lawyer had no problem signing the plea deal, which led Cox’s team to think that the tapes, which they assumed would soon be in their hands, would be good news for Dean, since his Watergate accounts would be proven accurate. But that also meant that Cox would be in serious trouble with Nixon.
Congressional pressure increased to turn over the tapes on Nixon, and the President’s allies conceded that impeachment would occur if he refused to turn them over. At least Nixon had allies, for the time being, anyway, but Cox stood alone, with no institution or political party backing him, which made it impossible for him to gain any leverage in any negotiation over the tapes with the White House, or even with AG Richardson. Cox sent his two page memo to Richardson in response to the proposal of the “Stennis Plan”, which was reviewed by the Attorney General, Haig, and all three of Nixon’s lawyers, where they read that Cox had rejected the proposal. Haig and the three lawyers told Richardson that he had to fire Cox.
Richardson faced a dilemma, in that his choices were to protect the nation or his reputation/tenure. Using a yellow legal pad, Richardson started to write down his thoughts under the title “Why I Must Resign”, ending up with a list of seven. To Richardson, Cox’s rejection of the “Stennis Plan” did not fall under the category of “egregiously unreasonable action”. Richardson had come to the conclusion that Nixon was not only in an increasingly indefensible position, but also flat-out wrong, and he was not going to be aligned with Nixon or the President’s inner circle any longer. The final sentence on Richardson’s list was “I cannot stay if [Cox] goes”.
Richardson faced a dilemma, in that his choices were to protect the nation or his reputation/tenure. Using a yellow legal pad, Richardson started to write down his thoughts under the title “Why I Must Resign”, ending up with a list of seven. To Richardson, Cox’s rejection of the “Stennis Plan” did not fall under the category of “egregiously unreasonable action”. Richardson had come to the conclusion that Nixon was not only in an increasingly indefensible position, but also flat-out wrong, and he was not going to be aligned with Nixon or the President’s inner circle any longer. The final sentence on Richardson’s list was “I cannot stay if [Cox] goes”.
The White House increased its efforts to portray Cox as the unreasonable party in the battle over the tapes. Cox knew what was coming, and he and his team made sure that their correspondence and documents with the White House were moved out of the Special Prosecutor’s office into a safe-deposit box, while other key files were taken to the basement of a staffer’s grandmother in VA. Shaffer (Dean’s lawyer) was approached by a member of Cox’s team, who informed him that Nixon was going to fire Cox, which meant to Shaffer that there may be no reason for Dean to go through with his plea deal with the Special Prosecutor’s office.
Haig called Richardson and told him that the President wanted to see him immediately. Richardson shook hands with people in his office, since he figured he wouldn’t return after his meeting with Nixon. When Richardson reached the White House, Haig stopped him before he entered the Oval Office with an idea. Haig suggested to Richardson that there was no need to fire Cox, in that now they should let the Watergate Committee know of the “Stennis Plan”, and hopefully get approval that way. At that point, Richardson didn’t see any reason to resign, and he went back to his office and worked with Ruckelshaus and others to try and find the best way to move forward on Haig’s suggestion. The goal of the White House, in addition to keeping the tapes, was to find a way to get rid of Cox, but to keep Richardson from resigning as Attorney General, which they believed would preserve the veneer of integrity.
Haig called Richardson and told him that the President wanted to see him immediately. Richardson shook hands with people in his office, since he figured he wouldn’t return after his meeting with Nixon. When Richardson reached the White House, Haig stopped him before he entered the Oval Office with an idea. Haig suggested to Richardson that there was no need to fire Cox, in that now they should let the Watergate Committee know of the “Stennis Plan”, and hopefully get approval that way. At that point, Richardson didn’t see any reason to resign, and he went back to his office and worked with Ruckelshaus and others to try and find the best way to move forward on Haig’s suggestion. The goal of the White House, in addition to keeping the tapes, was to find a way to get rid of Cox, but to keep Richardson from resigning as Attorney General, which they believed would preserve the veneer of integrity.
Senators Ervin and Baker met with Nixon, where the President outlined the reasonableness of the “Stennis Plan”, and the unreasonableness of Cox, after which the two senators left the Oval Office to discuss the plan with the other senators on the Watergate Committee. Nixon had lied to them about the “Stennis Plan”, in that he claimed it had the support of the Attorney General and the Special Prosecutor; Ervin later lamented that he gave Nixon “the benefit of all doubts”.
The Supreme Court ended its session during October 1973 without receiving a certiorari petition from the White House asking the court to review the ruling of the appellate court concerning the tapes. There had been no appeal from the White House, and it appeared that the legal drama in the courts over the tapes at its end. The battle over the tapes was now between Nixon and Cox, with AG Richardson caught in the middle.
Richardson received an official letter from Nixon, informing the AG that the “Stennis Plan” was being considered by the Watergate Committee, and that he was to order Cox to cease his attempts to obtain the tapes or other documents concerning Presidential conversations. A furious Richardson called Haig to vent his frustrations at being blindsided by the White House. Richardson then called Cox to inform him of the letter, making it clear to the Special Prosecutor that he was not going to follow Nixon’s directive. Nixon publicly announced the “Stennis Plan”, which he claimed complied with the appellate court’s decision on the tapes.
Nixon gave Richardson the main credit for the plan, which was news to the Attorney General, and that the plan had been endorsed by Ervin and Baker, which was news to the two senators, as well as to Stennis. Nixon concluded his announcement by saying that the battle of the tapes was now over. The President’s announcement caught the media off-guard, while Cox issued a statement that he believed that Nixon was refusing to comply with the ruling of the appellate court.
The Supreme Court ended its session during October 1973 without receiving a certiorari petition from the White House asking the court to review the ruling of the appellate court concerning the tapes. There had been no appeal from the White House, and it appeared that the legal drama in the courts over the tapes at its end. The battle over the tapes was now between Nixon and Cox, with AG Richardson caught in the middle.
Richardson received an official letter from Nixon, informing the AG that the “Stennis Plan” was being considered by the Watergate Committee, and that he was to order Cox to cease his attempts to obtain the tapes or other documents concerning Presidential conversations. A furious Richardson called Haig to vent his frustrations at being blindsided by the White House. Richardson then called Cox to inform him of the letter, making it clear to the Special Prosecutor that he was not going to follow Nixon’s directive. Nixon publicly announced the “Stennis Plan”, which he claimed complied with the appellate court’s decision on the tapes.
Nixon gave Richardson the main credit for the plan, which was news to the Attorney General, and that the plan had been endorsed by Ervin and Baker, which was news to the two senators, as well as to Stennis. Nixon concluded his announcement by saying that the battle of the tapes was now over. The President’s announcement caught the media off-guard, while Cox issued a statement that he believed that Nixon was refusing to comply with the ruling of the appellate court.