Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
On 23 March 1973, the seven Watergate burglars were sentenced, but Sirica had a surprise in store, making sure that Sam Dash, the majority counsel for the Watergate Committee, was in attendance. Sirica’s surprise was a letter that he received from McCord, and the judge read the letter out loud, where McCord made six jaw-dropping revelations: 1) Political pressure was applied to keep the burglars silent; 2) Perjury occurred during the trial in terms of motive and the role of the government; 3) Others were involved in Watergate, and they could have been identified by the seven burglars; 4) Watergate was not a CIA operation; 5) One witness didn’t lie, but made honest errors in memory; 6) My motivations were different than the other six burglars.
After Sirica finished reading the letter, the courtroom erupted into chaos, with reporters racing to payphones. Sirica stated that he was delaying McCord’s sentencing, and then the judge sentenced Liddy to more than six years in prison, and gave the other four burglars maximum sentences. As a result of McCord’s letter, Ben Bradlee, the chief editor of the Washington Post, breathed a sigh of relief, probably for the first time since the Summer of 1972. McCord sent word to Dash that he wanted to meet, and during that meeting he explained that he didn’t trust the FBI or the Justice Department, since both reported to the White House, which explained why he was talking to Dash and the Watergate Committee.
Dash’s strategy was to let McCord disclose information at his own speed, and eventually McCord admitted that he lied under oath when he said that Magruder had no knowledge of the break-in. McCord stated that Magruder knew of all involved as well as who had knowledge of the break-in, and one such person was John Dean. McCord went on, saying that Magruder’s testimony at the grand jury did not mention Dean. Dash’s instincts told him to keep these revelations secret for the time being. McCord closed by saying that he only knew a small sliver of what was going on, but Hunt knew far more. Dash decided to make it public that McCord was talking to the Watergate Committee investigators in order to create cracks in the wall of silence in the White House and CREEP.
After Sirica finished reading the letter, the courtroom erupted into chaos, with reporters racing to payphones. Sirica stated that he was delaying McCord’s sentencing, and then the judge sentenced Liddy to more than six years in prison, and gave the other four burglars maximum sentences. As a result of McCord’s letter, Ben Bradlee, the chief editor of the Washington Post, breathed a sigh of relief, probably for the first time since the Summer of 1972. McCord sent word to Dash that he wanted to meet, and during that meeting he explained that he didn’t trust the FBI or the Justice Department, since both reported to the White House, which explained why he was talking to Dash and the Watergate Committee.
Dash’s strategy was to let McCord disclose information at his own speed, and eventually McCord admitted that he lied under oath when he said that Magruder had no knowledge of the break-in. McCord stated that Magruder knew of all involved as well as who had knowledge of the break-in, and one such person was John Dean. McCord went on, saying that Magruder’s testimony at the grand jury did not mention Dean. Dash’s instincts told him to keep these revelations secret for the time being. McCord closed by saying that he only knew a small sliver of what was going on, but Hunt knew far more. Dash decided to make it public that McCord was talking to the Watergate Committee investigators in order to create cracks in the wall of silence in the White House and CREEP.
23 March 1973 started out as a very bad day for Dean, since the morning newspaper headlines stated that Dean probably lied (from Gray’s testimony), and reporters were stationed in front of his house. Then during the middle part of the morning came news of McCord’s letter, after which Dean received a call from Nixon inviting him to Camp David for the weekend. At 3:38 pm on the same day, Nixon and Haldeman called Dean to discuss his assignment at Camp David, which was to finish up the “Dean Report”, providing precise guidelines for him, among which was that the whole affair stopped with Liddy.
At that point, Dean realized that he was in too deep, and that the “Dean Report” would never accomplish what Nixon thought it would. Dean decided to have a conversation with Nixon where he could come clean, thinking that the truth might alter Nixon’s decision-making concerning Watergate. During Sunday afternoon, Ron Ziegler called to tell Nixon and his inner circle at Camp David that the Los Angeles Times was going to publish a story that Magruder and Dean knew of the Watergate break-in beforehand.
On Monday, Bernstein called Dash with the very same news about Magruder and Dean, admitting his knowledge came from the article in the LA Times. Dash immediately started to think about who knew what McCord had told him, and that was a very short list with only four people: McCord, Ervin, himself, and another trusted colleague. Dash quickly concluded that the leak was McCord and his lawyer, trying to force investigators into quick action.
At that point, Dean realized that he was in too deep, and that the “Dean Report” would never accomplish what Nixon thought it would. Dean decided to have a conversation with Nixon where he could come clean, thinking that the truth might alter Nixon’s decision-making concerning Watergate. During Sunday afternoon, Ron Ziegler called to tell Nixon and his inner circle at Camp David that the Los Angeles Times was going to publish a story that Magruder and Dean knew of the Watergate break-in beforehand.
On Monday, Bernstein called Dash with the very same news about Magruder and Dean, admitting his knowledge came from the article in the LA Times. Dash immediately started to think about who knew what McCord had told him, and that was a very short list with only four people: McCord, Ervin, himself, and another trusted colleague. Dash quickly concluded that the leak was McCord and his lawyer, trying to force investigators into quick action.
The LA Times article on 26 March 1973 started the cascade of near-daily articles and editorials dealing with Watergate in newspapers across the nation, with Newseek putting Watergate on its cover. For the moment, Nixon and his inner circle stood behind Dean, but they decided it was time to cut Magruder and Mitchell loose, in particular trying to pin Watergate on the former Attorney General. In public, Dean stayed loyal to the White House, but behind the scenes he started to make arrangements to get his own criminal lawyer.
On 27 March 1973, Nixon, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman discussed how to force Mitchell to admit that he authorized the whole Watergate affair. Haldeman’s strategy for Mitchell was that he authorized apples, but the burglars instead bought oranges. All three felt that if Mitchell fell on his sword that the investigations and the media frenzy would stop, and the White House stone wall on Watergate would hold.
McCord had another ace up his sleeve, in that he told Dash that he would only speak under oath directly to the Watergate Committee, and to Dash’s chagrin, the committee’s senators loved the idea. McCord asked Sirica and the US Attorney for immunity and to be able to testify in front of the grand jury, and while Sirica pondered those requests, the Watergate Committee’s investigators started to follow up on McCord’s suggested witness list. An important lead emerged when a CREEP secretary found a duplicate copy she’d kept of Magruder’s appointment calendar from the 1972 campaign, and she gave it to the Watergate Committee investigators. The dates of 27 January and 4 February 1972 looked to be very significant, in that meetings between Mitchell, Liddy, and Dean were documented. After further corroboration, those conversations appeared to be the two of which McCord had referred, where Liddy’s dirty tricks operations were suggested and discussed.
On 27 March 1973, Nixon, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman discussed how to force Mitchell to admit that he authorized the whole Watergate affair. Haldeman’s strategy for Mitchell was that he authorized apples, but the burglars instead bought oranges. All three felt that if Mitchell fell on his sword that the investigations and the media frenzy would stop, and the White House stone wall on Watergate would hold.
McCord had another ace up his sleeve, in that he told Dash that he would only speak under oath directly to the Watergate Committee, and to Dash’s chagrin, the committee’s senators loved the idea. McCord asked Sirica and the US Attorney for immunity and to be able to testify in front of the grand jury, and while Sirica pondered those requests, the Watergate Committee’s investigators started to follow up on McCord’s suggested witness list. An important lead emerged when a CREEP secretary found a duplicate copy she’d kept of Magruder’s appointment calendar from the 1972 campaign, and she gave it to the Watergate Committee investigators. The dates of 27 January and 4 February 1972 looked to be very significant, in that meetings between Mitchell, Liddy, and Dean were documented. After further corroboration, those conversations appeared to be the two of which McCord had referred, where Liddy’s dirty tricks operations were suggested and discussed.
A very concerned Magruder went to the White House on 28 March 1973 to ask Dean and Mitchell if they were still sticking to the agreed-upon narrative about Gemstone (Liddy’s overall dirty tricks plan). Both Mitchell and Magruder pressed Dean on what he would say, and Dean said that if he was called to testify under oath, he would tell the truth. Dean’s response really bothered Magruder, in that Dean was the one that encouraged him to perjure himself under oath to save Dean, and it now appeared that Dean was going to throw him under the bus. Paranoia spread among the co-conspirators, with Haldmean, Ehrlichman, and Dean all secretly taping their conversations with each other (and with others), hoping to catch something on tape that would exonerate them and incriminate others.
When McCord was finished testifying in front of the grand jury, he resumed working with Dash and his investigators. It soon became clear to Dash that McCord’s motive was misguided patriotism, believing that he was on an official mission for the Attorney General, John Mitchell. Ervin and the other senators on the Watergate Committee worked hard to get public hearings going as soon as possible, but Dash informed them that he would need until 15 May 1973 to be ready on his end. There was concern, even fear, in the Watergate Committee that Nixon would invoke Executive Privilege to block his aides from testifying. The White House floated the idea of submitting written answers to the Watergate Committee’s questions, but the committee wanted those aides to appear in front of the committee and to be put on the spot on television.
During early-April 1973, AG Kleindienst appeared before a joint session of three House and Senate committees to discuss and debate the principles of Executive Privilege. Kleindienst argued that Executive Privilege protected the President from having anyone in the Executive Branch testify if the President didn’t want that person to do so. However, that wasn’t the view from the representatives and senators at the meeting, and each side girded for political battle.
When McCord was finished testifying in front of the grand jury, he resumed working with Dash and his investigators. It soon became clear to Dash that McCord’s motive was misguided patriotism, believing that he was on an official mission for the Attorney General, John Mitchell. Ervin and the other senators on the Watergate Committee worked hard to get public hearings going as soon as possible, but Dash informed them that he would need until 15 May 1973 to be ready on his end. There was concern, even fear, in the Watergate Committee that Nixon would invoke Executive Privilege to block his aides from testifying. The White House floated the idea of submitting written answers to the Watergate Committee’s questions, but the committee wanted those aides to appear in front of the committee and to be put on the spot on television.
During early-April 1973, AG Kleindienst appeared before a joint session of three House and Senate committees to discuss and debate the principles of Executive Privilege. Kleindienst argued that Executive Privilege protected the President from having anyone in the Executive Branch testify if the President didn’t want that person to do so. However, that wasn’t the view from the representatives and senators at the meeting, and each side girded for political battle.
On 3 April 1973, Dean wrapped up laying out his situation for his criminal lawyer, Charles Shaffer. Dean asked his lawyer what he thought, and he got a dose of legal reality when Shaffer told him that he was in very serious trouble in terms of his actions after 17 June 1972, in that Dean was guilty of conspiring to obstruct justice. Shaffer wanted to meet with Earl Silbert and his team from the Justice Department, and Dean agreed to allow his lawyer to do so. Soon thereafter, Dean told Haldeman that he had started talking to a criminal lawyer, phrasing it in a way where he tried to make it look like he was trying to find out what the Justice Department investigators knew.
Shaffer worked it out where Dean would talk to Silbert “off the record”, which was the second big break for Silbert after McCord. Dean and Shaffer scheduled their first session with Silbert and his team of prosecutors for 8 April 1973 (Sunday), which was hours before Nixon and Haldeman landed in DC from San Clemente. Dean called Haldeman right before Air Force One left CA, and Haldeman was shocked when Dean informed him that he was talking to Justice prosecutors. Dean began his off-the-record meeting, and his story stunned Silbert and his prosecutorial team, since it was the first glimmer of any specifics concerning the cover-up of the Watergate break-in. Dean spoke for two hours, saying enough where the prosecutors believed him, and they knew that Dean had much more to tell them in the future.
During the meeting, Dean received a phone call from Air Force One, telling him in verbal code to be at the White House at 4 pm to meet with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. On the one hand, that call scared Dean, but on the other, the call allowed him to cut the meeting short with Silbert. After Dean met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, none of the three trusted each other anymore. The following night, Dean resumed talking to Silbert and his team, telling them about the hush money and Acting FBI Director Gray. By that time, Nixon sensed that the walls around him were collapsing. Nixon and Haldeman wondered if Magruder was a big enough fish to satisfy the Justice Department prosecutors. The main problem seemed to be the growing body of evidence that the White House had accidentally gathered on itself from Watergate, and the potential political damage from the secretly taped conversations. Nixon and his inner circle edged closer to a decision to destroy the tapes, which went back two years, and then they leaned towards keeping the national security conversations on tape, but destroying the rest. However, nothing was done, and the tapes were left alone.
Shaffer worked it out where Dean would talk to Silbert “off the record”, which was the second big break for Silbert after McCord. Dean and Shaffer scheduled their first session with Silbert and his team of prosecutors for 8 April 1973 (Sunday), which was hours before Nixon and Haldeman landed in DC from San Clemente. Dean called Haldeman right before Air Force One left CA, and Haldeman was shocked when Dean informed him that he was talking to Justice prosecutors. Dean began his off-the-record meeting, and his story stunned Silbert and his prosecutorial team, since it was the first glimmer of any specifics concerning the cover-up of the Watergate break-in. Dean spoke for two hours, saying enough where the prosecutors believed him, and they knew that Dean had much more to tell them in the future.
During the meeting, Dean received a phone call from Air Force One, telling him in verbal code to be at the White House at 4 pm to meet with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. On the one hand, that call scared Dean, but on the other, the call allowed him to cut the meeting short with Silbert. After Dean met with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, none of the three trusted each other anymore. The following night, Dean resumed talking to Silbert and his team, telling them about the hush money and Acting FBI Director Gray. By that time, Nixon sensed that the walls around him were collapsing. Nixon and Haldeman wondered if Magruder was a big enough fish to satisfy the Justice Department prosecutors. The main problem seemed to be the growing body of evidence that the White House had accidentally gathered on itself from Watergate, and the potential political damage from the secretly taped conversations. Nixon and his inner circle edged closer to a decision to destroy the tapes, which went back two years, and then they leaned towards keeping the national security conversations on tape, but destroying the rest. However, nothing was done, and the tapes were left alone.
On 10 April 1973, Magruder owned up to his responsibilities with Watergate to his lawyers, and they told him to fess up and to cut the best deal possible with prosecutors, doing so just days after Dean on 12 April 1973. Magruder blamed Mitchell, not Dean, which was almost certainly due to the fact that Dean had approached the prosecutors first. Magruder and his lawyers tried to negotiate a reduced sentence at the outset, and eventually received an acceptable deal, with Magruder being charged with one felony (perjury), which had a maximum of five years in prison, which in reality would be about 20 months.
The morning after Magruder’s deal, Dean provided prosecutors with a long list of who he thought might be indicted, which included Mitchell, Magruder, Strachan, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, LaRue, Mardian, Colson, Kalmbach, Stans, Ulasewicz, and himself. Up to that point, Silbert and his team hadn’t told their boss, Henry Petersen, what was going on, but on 14 April 1973 they did so. After being informed, Petersen called AG Kleindienst, and the next day Kleindienst went directly to Nixon.
Nixon suggested that an outside voice might be needed for the investigation. There had been calls for a special prosecutor by lawmakers, but Nxion had in mind a special prosecutor that he could not only manage, but who would also feed him inside information. Kleindienst recused himself from any Watergate investigation, which meant that Petersen now carried the ball for the Justice Department. Kleindienst even suggested to Nixon that he should resign as AG, to which Nixon replied “Absolutely not”. Leonard Garment, a lawyer from the law firm of which Nixon had been a partner, was already somewhat involved in trying to figure out the real picture of Watergate in the White House. By mid-April, 1973, Garment was pressed into service even more as the Watergate scandal spread, which led Nixon administration witnesses to a footrace to talk to prosecutors.
The morning after Magruder’s deal, Dean provided prosecutors with a long list of who he thought might be indicted, which included Mitchell, Magruder, Strachan, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, LaRue, Mardian, Colson, Kalmbach, Stans, Ulasewicz, and himself. Up to that point, Silbert and his team hadn’t told their boss, Henry Petersen, what was going on, but on 14 April 1973 they did so. After being informed, Petersen called AG Kleindienst, and the next day Kleindienst went directly to Nixon.
Nixon suggested that an outside voice might be needed for the investigation. There had been calls for a special prosecutor by lawmakers, but Nxion had in mind a special prosecutor that he could not only manage, but who would also feed him inside information. Kleindienst recused himself from any Watergate investigation, which meant that Petersen now carried the ball for the Justice Department. Kleindienst even suggested to Nixon that he should resign as AG, to which Nixon replied “Absolutely not”. Leonard Garment, a lawyer from the law firm of which Nixon had been a partner, was already somewhat involved in trying to figure out the real picture of Watergate in the White House. By mid-April, 1973, Garment was pressed into service even more as the Watergate scandal spread, which led Nixon administration witnesses to a footrace to talk to prosecutors.
Garment pretty much knew that Watergate reached high-up in the White House. The very trio that Garment suspected, Nixon, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman, spent much of the next weekend debating how far the house cleaning in the administration should go. By that point, even to them, it didn’t seem that sacrificing Mitchell and Dean would do the trick. Haldeman offered to resign, but nothing was decided.
Dean met with Silbert on 15 April 1973, and at the end of the meeting, prompted by Shaffer, Dean told Silbert about the break-in at Dr. Fielding’s office in LA concerning Ellsberg’s files. Silbert understood that he now had a motive for Watergate: keeping secret the break-in at Fielding’s office. Immediately, Silbert told his boss, Henry Petersen, of their new information from Dean.
The next day, Dean did his best to dodge phone calls from the White House, but in the end, he had to answer a call, and it was Nixon on the other end. At 9:17 am on 16 April 1973, a dejected Dean entered Nixon’s hideaway office in the EOB, where Dean informed the President that all of them, Nixon, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and himself, had serious legal problems. Nixon asked Dean if he was prepared to resign, and Dean said that he was prepared to do so. It soon became clear to Dean that Nixon intended to maintain that the first time he had heard how bad Watergate had become was the day where Dean informed him that there was a “Cancer on the Presidency”. Four minutes after Dean left, Haldeman and Ehrlichman entered Nixon’s office, where they met until past 11 pm. When Dean walked into the Oval Office the next morning at 10 am, a Nixon aide appeared with two letters for Dean to sign. One of them being a letter requesting an immediate leave of absence, and the other being his resignation. Dean refused to sign either; he wanted to write his own resignation letter.
Dean met with Silbert on 15 April 1973, and at the end of the meeting, prompted by Shaffer, Dean told Silbert about the break-in at Dr. Fielding’s office in LA concerning Ellsberg’s files. Silbert understood that he now had a motive for Watergate: keeping secret the break-in at Fielding’s office. Immediately, Silbert told his boss, Henry Petersen, of their new information from Dean.
The next day, Dean did his best to dodge phone calls from the White House, but in the end, he had to answer a call, and it was Nixon on the other end. At 9:17 am on 16 April 1973, a dejected Dean entered Nixon’s hideaway office in the EOB, where Dean informed the President that all of them, Nixon, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and himself, had serious legal problems. Nixon asked Dean if he was prepared to resign, and Dean said that he was prepared to do so. It soon became clear to Dean that Nixon intended to maintain that the first time he had heard how bad Watergate had become was the day where Dean informed him that there was a “Cancer on the Presidency”. Four minutes after Dean left, Haldeman and Ehrlichman entered Nixon’s office, where they met until past 11 pm. When Dean walked into the Oval Office the next morning at 10 am, a Nixon aide appeared with two letters for Dean to sign. One of them being a letter requesting an immediate leave of absence, and the other being his resignation. Dean refused to sign either; he wanted to write his own resignation letter.