Source: Doris Kearns Goodwin. Leadership -
Lessons From the Presidents For Turbulent Times (2018)
Lessons From the Presidents For Turbulent Times (2018)
President James Buchanan's Cabinet was made up of like-minded Democrats, but Lincoln made sure that his Cabinet was represented by all factions of the Republican Party, including such men as Seward and Chase that had more national and government experience. Seward and Chase were among the Cabinet members that believed that THEY should have been President instead of Lincoln. On 22 July 1862, Lincoln assembled his Cabinet in order to announce, not debate, his plan to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. After Lincoln read his draft, he welcomed suggestions.
By June 1862 after General George McClellan's defeat in the Peninsula to General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, Union morale was at its nadir, lower than after the 2nd Battle of Bull Run. Lincoln’s habit was to gather firsthand information and ask questions, and he visited Union soldiers at the front. In addition to learning what was really going on, Lincoln’s visits increased the morale of the soldiers. Lincoln came to the conclusion that if he could find a way to deprive the Confederacy of their slave labor which allowed the Confederate Army to remain effective in the field, he could shorten the war.
Lincoln had to find space and time to think things through, which was difficult if he stayed in the White House. Lincoln decided to spend time at the Soldiers Home three miles north of Washington, D.C., which was a sprawling facility for injured soldiers. Among other buildings, there was a two story cottage where Lincoln and his family stayed from June to the middle of October in 1862.
By June 1862 after General George McClellan's defeat in the Peninsula to General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, Union morale was at its nadir, lower than after the 2nd Battle of Bull Run. Lincoln’s habit was to gather firsthand information and ask questions, and he visited Union soldiers at the front. In addition to learning what was really going on, Lincoln’s visits increased the morale of the soldiers. Lincoln came to the conclusion that if he could find a way to deprive the Confederacy of their slave labor which allowed the Confederate Army to remain effective in the field, he could shorten the war.
Lincoln had to find space and time to think things through, which was difficult if he stayed in the White House. Lincoln decided to spend time at the Soldiers Home three miles north of Washington, D.C., which was a sprawling facility for injured soldiers. Among other buildings, there was a two story cottage where Lincoln and his family stayed from June to the middle of October in 1862.
Once able to think, Lincoln concluded that he had the authority, during a war, to issue an Executive Order freeing the slaves as a “military necessity”, which under the circumstances he believed would be Constitutional. In other words, during a war the powers of the Commander-in-Chief would be greater than the Constitutional protections towards slavery. That being said, Lincoln dreaded having to release his “Weapon of Emancipation” as a unilateral military decree, so he decided that ruling by fiat would be a measure of last resort. Lincoln understood that he needed to exhaust all the possibilities of compromise before he acted unilaterally.
Lincoln had tried to get the Border States (DE, MD, KY, MO, Union Slave States) to agree to compensated emancipation, but after the Peninsula Campaign, Lincoln was again rebuffed by the Congressional members from the Border States. It was by 22 July 1862 that Lincoln felt that he only had one card left to play, in that he made the effective date for emancipation on 1 January 1863 in order to give the Confederate States of America six months to come to their senses and rejoin the Union before permanently forfeiting their slaves. Unlike the poetic and allegorical Gettysburg Address, the Emancipation Proclamation was a legal notice. Lincoln intentionally phrased the document in that manner in order to avoid making matters even worse than they already were.
While the Emancipation Proclamation only freed slaves in the Confederacy, the Emancipation Proclamation was a warning to the Border States of what would happen if they seceded and joined the South. Lincoln anticipated conflicting points-of-view, and he welcomed all perspectives after he red the Emancipation Proclamation to his Cabinet. Lincoln knew all his Cabinet members very well, so he anticipated each perspective and had his responses at the ready. In essence, LIncoln wanted feedback as to WHEN to release the Emancipation Proclamation.
Lincoln had tried to get the Border States (DE, MD, KY, MO, Union Slave States) to agree to compensated emancipation, but after the Peninsula Campaign, Lincoln was again rebuffed by the Congressional members from the Border States. It was by 22 July 1862 that Lincoln felt that he only had one card left to play, in that he made the effective date for emancipation on 1 January 1863 in order to give the Confederate States of America six months to come to their senses and rejoin the Union before permanently forfeiting their slaves. Unlike the poetic and allegorical Gettysburg Address, the Emancipation Proclamation was a legal notice. Lincoln intentionally phrased the document in that manner in order to avoid making matters even worse than they already were.
While the Emancipation Proclamation only freed slaves in the Confederacy, the Emancipation Proclamation was a warning to the Border States of what would happen if they seceded and joined the South. Lincoln anticipated conflicting points-of-view, and he welcomed all perspectives after he red the Emancipation Proclamation to his Cabinet. Lincoln knew all his Cabinet members very well, so he anticipated each perspective and had his responses at the ready. In essence, LIncoln wanted feedback as to WHEN to release the Emancipation Proclamation.
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton wanted the Emancipation Proclamation to be immediately released, seeing what Lincoln saw in terms of denying the South slave labor in order to shorten the war in favor of the Union. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, a moderate, believed that the Emancipation Proclamation would lead the South to dig in even more and the war would last longer. Postmaster General Montgomery Blair believed that the Border States would secede and that the Republicans would get hammered in the Congressional Elections of 1862. Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase, the most ardent Abolitionist in the Cabinet, was 100% against issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, which irked Lincoln to no end.
Secretary of State William Seward had the international perspective to consider in addition to domestic concerns, and he was worried that Britain and France, addicted to Southern cotton, might actively join the Confederate States of America in a military alliance against the Union. Lincoln’s perspective was that there would not be popular support in either nation for an alliance to occur. Seward brought up the timing, and he advised Lincoln to wait until there was a Union military victory on which to attach the Emancipation Proclamation so it would be issued from a position of strength and momentum. Interestingly, Lincoln hadn’t considered that aspect of the Emancipation Proclamation, and he immediately saw that Seward’s idea was the only way to proceed in terms of timing. The Battle of Antietam proved to be “enough” of a victory for Lincoln to release the Emancipation Proclamation, and Lincoln summoned his Cabinet to reconvene on 22 September 1862.
Secretary of State William Seward had the international perspective to consider in addition to domestic concerns, and he was worried that Britain and France, addicted to Southern cotton, might actively join the Confederate States of America in a military alliance against the Union. Lincoln’s perspective was that there would not be popular support in either nation for an alliance to occur. Seward brought up the timing, and he advised Lincoln to wait until there was a Union military victory on which to attach the Emancipation Proclamation so it would be issued from a position of strength and momentum. Interestingly, Lincoln hadn’t considered that aspect of the Emancipation Proclamation, and he immediately saw that Seward’s idea was the only way to proceed in terms of timing. The Battle of Antietam proved to be “enough” of a victory for Lincoln to release the Emancipation Proclamation, and Lincoln summoned his Cabinet to reconvene on 22 September 1862.
Lincoln assumed full responsibility for pivotal decisions, and although there wasn’t unanimous support for the Emancipation Proclamation in the Cabinet, those that disagreed kept their opinions private in order to support the President. More importantly, the entire Cabinet supported Lincoln when the maelstrom occurred after the Emancipation Proclamation was released in the newspapers. The Cabinet’s support was the first crucial step in terms of the Emancipation Proclamation being taken seriously in the Union.
Lincoln understood the emotional needs of all the members of his Cabinet. Lincoln forged a close political bond with Seward, and he relied on Stanton. Lincoln was aware that the other Cabinet members viewed Lincoln as favoring Seward and Stanton so he went out of his way to make personal visits to the others. Lincoln knew that everyone liked a compliment and praise for their work, loyalty, and accomplishments, often writing notes doing so.
Lincoln refused to let past resentments fester, and he worked to transcend personal vendettas. Lincoln didn’t care if someone had done wrong in the past, he was concerned about doing no wrong in the future. Such was the deal with Stanton, who as a famous lawyer years before the Civil War took one look at the gangly lawyer named Lincoln, and loudly asked who had let that damned ape into the courtroom. While very different in temperament, Stanton eventually came to deeply admire Lincoln.
Lincoln understood the emotional needs of all the members of his Cabinet. Lincoln forged a close political bond with Seward, and he relied on Stanton. Lincoln was aware that the other Cabinet members viewed Lincoln as favoring Seward and Stanton so he went out of his way to make personal visits to the others. Lincoln knew that everyone liked a compliment and praise for their work, loyalty, and accomplishments, often writing notes doing so.
Lincoln refused to let past resentments fester, and he worked to transcend personal vendettas. Lincoln didn’t care if someone had done wrong in the past, he was concerned about doing no wrong in the future. Such was the deal with Stanton, who as a famous lawyer years before the Civil War took one look at the gangly lawyer named Lincoln, and loudly asked who had let that damned ape into the courtroom. While very different in temperament, Stanton eventually came to deeply admire Lincoln.
Lincoln set a standard of mutual respect and dignity, and controlled his anger. Lincoln’s habit was to write a wrathful letter to get the words of anger out of his system, and then to not send the letter, which was advice he gave Stanton. Lincoln also forgave public attacks on him that crossed the line, as well as shielding his colleagues from blame. One example was when Lincoln shielded Stanton from McClellan’s attacks in the newspapers that the War Department didn’t back the Army of the Potomac in proper fashion. Lincoln would put up with quite a bit of high maintenance in his administration if those that served the government did their jobs right with passion and skill.
Lincoln was great at maintaining proper perspective in the face of abuse as well as accolades, which was an excellent trait in that Lincoln was disappointed in the immediate aftermath of the Emancipation Proclamation in terms of meaningful and measurable gains; in the Union, an “ill wind of discontent” was the main reaction. McClellan let everyone know that he wouldn’t fight for such an “accursed doctrine”, and his refusal to move the Army of the Potomac against Lee was in effect gross insubordination. A frustrated Union public blamed Lincoln and his administration for not prosecuting the war more effectively and vigorously.
It was that sentiment plus a conservative Republican backlash to the Emancipation Proclamation that resulted in what Blair had predicted: Republican losses in the Congressional Elections of 1862. The number of conservative Democrats in Congress that opposed the Emancipation Proclamation doubled, which left the Republicans with razor-thin majorities in both houses. And to make matters worse, the state legislatures in Ohio, Indiana, New York, and Pennsylvania turned Democratic.
Lincoln was great at maintaining proper perspective in the face of abuse as well as accolades, which was an excellent trait in that Lincoln was disappointed in the immediate aftermath of the Emancipation Proclamation in terms of meaningful and measurable gains; in the Union, an “ill wind of discontent” was the main reaction. McClellan let everyone know that he wouldn’t fight for such an “accursed doctrine”, and his refusal to move the Army of the Potomac against Lee was in effect gross insubordination. A frustrated Union public blamed Lincoln and his administration for not prosecuting the war more effectively and vigorously.
It was that sentiment plus a conservative Republican backlash to the Emancipation Proclamation that resulted in what Blair had predicted: Republican losses in the Congressional Elections of 1862. The number of conservative Democrats in Congress that opposed the Emancipation Proclamation doubled, which left the Republicans with razor-thin majorities in both houses. And to make matters worse, the state legislatures in Ohio, Indiana, New York, and Pennsylvania turned Democratic.