Source: William K. Klingaman. The Darkest Year -
The American Home Front, 1941 - 1942 (2019)
The American Home Front, 1941 - 1942 (2019)
FDR wanted a name for the war, and he was not happy with World War II or the Second World War, so he asked journalists to invite readers to submit suggestions. The Washington Post stated that FDR had reduced the war to the equivalent to naming a brand of soap or breakfast cereal. Submissions poured in, with the vast majority ridiculous, such as “The Righteous War”. FDR, very dissatisfied with the submissions, suggested “The Survival War”, but that didn’t resonate at all with the public.
Prominent Americans, such as General George C. Marshall and Wendell Willkie, opined that it was time that America took to the offensive instead of trying to defend positions. On 18 April 1942, the Doolittle Raid occurred; 72 of the 80 crew members (on 16 B-25’s, the “Mitchell”) survived, and made their way back to the US. Americans first learned of the Doolittle Raid from Japanese media sources that were carried by US newspapers. For almost a month, the government refused to confirm that the Doolittle Raid had even taken place. Even inaccurate accounts of the Doolittle Raid raised national morale, but soon enough the reality that the raid had only been a pinprick began to take hold. The true significance of the Doolittle Raid was not apparent to the US: Tokyo overreacted to the raid, and that overreaction led to the decision to send a vast force to Midway, which proved to be a major turning point in the Pacific in early-June 1942.
On 6 May 1942 came the Fall of Corregidor, and the end of the war stretched further into the future. May 1942 also featured the Battle of the Coral Sea, where Japan failed to gain a foothold on moving towards Australia. Neither nation’s navies saw each other, rather it was a massive battle with aircraft carriers and planes. When the battle was over on 9 May 1942, the US had lost more ships, but Japan had lost more men and aircraft; more importantly, Japan had suffered its first serious setback in the war.
Prominent Americans, such as General George C. Marshall and Wendell Willkie, opined that it was time that America took to the offensive instead of trying to defend positions. On 18 April 1942, the Doolittle Raid occurred; 72 of the 80 crew members (on 16 B-25’s, the “Mitchell”) survived, and made their way back to the US. Americans first learned of the Doolittle Raid from Japanese media sources that were carried by US newspapers. For almost a month, the government refused to confirm that the Doolittle Raid had even taken place. Even inaccurate accounts of the Doolittle Raid raised national morale, but soon enough the reality that the raid had only been a pinprick began to take hold. The true significance of the Doolittle Raid was not apparent to the US: Tokyo overreacted to the raid, and that overreaction led to the decision to send a vast force to Midway, which proved to be a major turning point in the Pacific in early-June 1942.
On 6 May 1942 came the Fall of Corregidor, and the end of the war stretched further into the future. May 1942 also featured the Battle of the Coral Sea, where Japan failed to gain a foothold on moving towards Australia. Neither nation’s navies saw each other, rather it was a massive battle with aircraft carriers and planes. When the battle was over on 9 May 1942, the US had lost more ships, but Japan had lost more men and aircraft; more importantly, Japan had suffered its first serious setback in the war.
The initial military communiques far exaggerated Japan’s losses in the Battle of the Coral Sea, and some civilians actually believed that the war was over. Newsweek predicted that the war would end before 1942 was over, and Time also stated that the war would soon end. But most Americans realized that the war would not be over soon, which caused continued apathy and complacency, since there wasn’t any immediate direct danger, and that someone else would do the fighting for them. Supreme Court Associate Justice William O. Douglas believed that citizens viewed the war as a 200 meter sprint instead of the marathon in really was. Douglas believed the expectation of a sprint was due to the belief that US war production would eventually overwhelm the enemies, basically by default.
For seven months after Pearl Harbor, FDR and his administration hid arms production statistics from the public, arguing that if it did so it would only aid the Axis. The government used descriptive words instead to convince the public that war production was progressing as scheduled (e.g. “vast”, “huge”, “enormous”, “tremendous”, “magnificent”, and “immense”). Journalists were taken on tours of defense plants, but were only shows areas where the factory was doing very well. On April 1942, the government announced that it was “oer the hump” on war production. VP Wallace stated that by late-Summer 1942 the US would be out-producing every other belligerent nation, and in May 1942, FDR declared that US shipyards were performing at a “near-miracle” level.
For seven months after Pearl Harbor, FDR and his administration hid arms production statistics from the public, arguing that if it did so it would only aid the Axis. The government used descriptive words instead to convince the public that war production was progressing as scheduled (e.g. “vast”, “huge”, “enormous”, “tremendous”, “magnificent”, and “immense”). Journalists were taken on tours of defense plants, but were only shows areas where the factory was doing very well. On April 1942, the government announced that it was “oer the hump” on war production. VP Wallace stated that by late-Summer 1942 the US would be out-producing every other belligerent nation, and in May 1942, FDR declared that US shipyards were performing at a “near-miracle” level.
Finally, later in May 1942, FDR provided specific war production information for the month: 4000 planes, 1500+ tanks, 2000 artillery, and 50k machine guns. By August 1942, the US was out-producing Britain, and the auto industry had converted more rapidly to war production than the government predicted, while also increasing efficiency/productivity. That being said, the US failed to properly mobilize after Pearl, which cost billions of dollars and lost time, adding at least months to the war and far more KIA/WIA. While it was true that civilian consumption hampered government efforts at mobilization, another significant hurdle was that scarce materials were hoarded by competing industries in order to improve their chances a meeting government quotas and to rake in lucrative government subsidies. US industries had mountains of stockpiles which were useless since the WPB didn’t know about them (e.g. steel plates). Shipyards reported rising absenteeism, reaching as high as 10% - 15%, and sheer loafing on the job was a major problem as well, since labor unions encouraged slow-downs.
Ernie Pyle noted that ships could have been built much faster, but shipyards weren’t able to operate at full capacity. Although large strikes didn’t occur in 1942, smaller strikes were a primary reason for the 225k lost man-days during the year. A Gallup poll showed that 86% of Americans wanted strikes in defense plants to become illegal. A soldier was not able to lay down his rifle and simply say “not today”, but a worker in a defense plant sure could, and did for many days which added up to weeks, thumbing his nose at the war in the name of organized labor. A majority of Americans favored drafting defense workers that didn’t show up for work.
Ernie Pyle noted that ships could have been built much faster, but shipyards weren’t able to operate at full capacity. Although large strikes didn’t occur in 1942, smaller strikes were a primary reason for the 225k lost man-days during the year. A Gallup poll showed that 86% of Americans wanted strikes in defense plants to become illegal. A soldier was not able to lay down his rifle and simply say “not today”, but a worker in a defense plant sure could, and did for many days which added up to weeks, thumbing his nose at the war in the name of organized labor. A majority of Americans favored drafting defense workers that didn’t show up for work.
By the Summer of 1942, most war laborers were working 40 - 50 hours/week, and the debate became whether or not to honor overtime past 40 hours a week. FDR, not wanting to alienate one of his stout political bases, stated that workers deserved overtime pay. Some wanted the 40 hour work week to be abolished during the war, fearful that labor unions would insist on higher regular hourly wages. A majority of Americans favored a 40 hour work week with time-and-a-half for overtime hours, as did most of Congress. The agricultural sector complained that labor unions were being babied, since farmers and field workers didn’t have the equivalent overtime benefits.
Management seldom made a fuss about paying overtime, using overtime as an incentive to increase production. War plants played dirty pool, in that factories offered sweeter packages for skilled workers in competing plants to lure them away (“Labor Piracy”). The government used propaganda to try and get laborers to work harder and more efficiently/longer, using such strategies as motivational posters in the plant. Haste in defense plants invited accidents. In the first six months of 1942, 4300 workers were killed in industrial accidents which was a 13% increase from the first half of 1941, leading to more lost man-hours/days.
Housing for war workers continued to be a problem. In one month during 1942, Ford hired 2900 workers, but 3100 left that month out of sheer frustration at the lack of housing or substandard housing. Months after Pearl, no one had figured out how to transport workers from Detroit to Ford’s Willow Run defense plant 25 miles outside the city. In the midst of all this, Americans were betting more on sports than ever before, with horse racing the clear #1; racetrack after racetrack broke records in terms of money bet, and all of that was in the face of gasoline rationing. Coastal resorts on the Atlantic (e.g. Atlantic City in NJ), were feeling the pain of noticeably fewer tourists.
Management seldom made a fuss about paying overtime, using overtime as an incentive to increase production. War plants played dirty pool, in that factories offered sweeter packages for skilled workers in competing plants to lure them away (“Labor Piracy”). The government used propaganda to try and get laborers to work harder and more efficiently/longer, using such strategies as motivational posters in the plant. Haste in defense plants invited accidents. In the first six months of 1942, 4300 workers were killed in industrial accidents which was a 13% increase from the first half of 1941, leading to more lost man-hours/days.
Housing for war workers continued to be a problem. In one month during 1942, Ford hired 2900 workers, but 3100 left that month out of sheer frustration at the lack of housing or substandard housing. Months after Pearl, no one had figured out how to transport workers from Detroit to Ford’s Willow Run defense plant 25 miles outside the city. In the midst of all this, Americans were betting more on sports than ever before, with horse racing the clear #1; racetrack after racetrack broke records in terms of money bet, and all of that was in the face of gasoline rationing. Coastal resorts on the Atlantic (e.g. Atlantic City in NJ), were feeling the pain of noticeably fewer tourists.
The Battle of Midway occurred during the first week of June 1942. Japan lost four aircraft carriers, a heavy cruiser, and 3057 men, hundreds of them pilots. Japan only had two aircraft carriers remaining in their fleet, and the nation didn’t have the industrial capacity to replace them. The US Pacific Fleet lost the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown, but still had three aircraft carriers in service, and the US had the industrial capacity to produce dozens of much larger/improved aircraft carriers, the Essex Class (The USS Essex sailed into Pearl Harbor in the late-Spring of 1943).
News of the victory at Midway was again blunted by Navy censors, and Americans had to wait weeks for the barest of details of what would be a major turning point in the War in the Pacific. Americans instead heard far more about Japan’s attacks on the Aleutian Islands and parts of the Alaskan coast, which occurred at the same time as the attack on Midway. Japan’s goal was to make sure the US couldn’t have island bases from which to try and bomb Japan. The presence of Japanese troops in Alaska led to an overreaction by the US public; Midway was the crucial battle, but the West Coast again freaked out since Japanese troops were on the Aleutians. The Navy made the situation worse by (of course) not providing accurate detailed information concerning what was really going on in the Aleutians. The Navy claimed that Japan executed a raid on the Aleutians in order to save face from the Doolittle Raid.
Throughout the Spring/Summer of 1942, the spectre of inflation haunted FDR and his administration, who knew that high inflation could very well interfere with the war effort. Since September 1939, the cost of living had increased 15%. The main reason was the gap between the increasing purchasing power and the shrinking supply of consumer goods; that gap reached $17B by the Summer of 1942.
News of the victory at Midway was again blunted by Navy censors, and Americans had to wait weeks for the barest of details of what would be a major turning point in the War in the Pacific. Americans instead heard far more about Japan’s attacks on the Aleutian Islands and parts of the Alaskan coast, which occurred at the same time as the attack on Midway. Japan’s goal was to make sure the US couldn’t have island bases from which to try and bomb Japan. The presence of Japanese troops in Alaska led to an overreaction by the US public; Midway was the crucial battle, but the West Coast again freaked out since Japanese troops were on the Aleutians. The Navy made the situation worse by (of course) not providing accurate detailed information concerning what was really going on in the Aleutians. The Navy claimed that Japan executed a raid on the Aleutians in order to save face from the Doolittle Raid.
Throughout the Spring/Summer of 1942, the spectre of inflation haunted FDR and his administration, who knew that high inflation could very well interfere with the war effort. Since September 1939, the cost of living had increased 15%. The main reason was the gap between the increasing purchasing power and the shrinking supply of consumer goods; that gap reached $17B by the Summer of 1942.
During the Spring of 1942, SecTreas Morgenthau asked Congress for a tax increase which would add up to $7.68B, which would not only help pay for the war, but to also help curb inflation. When Congress proved reluctant to act, FDR doubled-down by asking Congress to impose a 100% levy on all individual incomes over $25k/yr, and on married incomes over $50k/yr. That “supertax” would have only affected about 11,000 Americans and only produced about $200m in revenue, and its effect on curbing inflation would have been laughably negligible. FDR stated that the overall goal of the tax was to curb profiteering, and that it was a morale-building policy. The business sector roundly and loudly condemned the President’s proposal.
The main part of FDR’s anti-inflation program was the General Maximum Price Regulation (“General Max”), which sought to freeze prices on about 200 ke consumer goods such as clothing, shoes, fuel, and tobacco. But FDR’s refusal to also freeze wages doomed General Max from the start. Congress did its part ot sabotage General Max by failing/refusing to effectively control food prices. Between September 1939 and the Summer of 1942, agricultural prices rose 50%, fueled by Lend-Lease, supplying the US military, and the working class American’s desire for an improved (read more expensive) diet. Food costs represented about 20% of the average American household’s budget. Congress ignored FDR’s “supertax” proposal and did its best to drag its feet on the tax increase proposal from SecTreas Morgenthau, with special interest groups entering the fray. James Reston commented that Congress was far too focused on settling old scores from the New Deal than doing the right things for the war.
The main part of FDR’s anti-inflation program was the General Maximum Price Regulation (“General Max”), which sought to freeze prices on about 200 ke consumer goods such as clothing, shoes, fuel, and tobacco. But FDR’s refusal to also freeze wages doomed General Max from the start. Congress did its part ot sabotage General Max by failing/refusing to effectively control food prices. Between September 1939 and the Summer of 1942, agricultural prices rose 50%, fueled by Lend-Lease, supplying the US military, and the working class American’s desire for an improved (read more expensive) diet. Food costs represented about 20% of the average American household’s budget. Congress ignored FDR’s “supertax” proposal and did its best to drag its feet on the tax increase proposal from SecTreas Morgenthau, with special interest groups entering the fray. James Reston commented that Congress was far too focused on settling old scores from the New Deal than doing the right things for the war.
During July 1942, the OPA announced that it had discovered widespread fraud in the gas rationing program among motorists and service stations, using among other strategies sting operations. So many service stations provided service with a wink-and-a-nod, never demanding gas ration cards. As a result, gasoline supplies drained away even faster, and service stations up and down the Atlantic Coast ran out of gas to sell. Motorists began to stalk gasoline delivery trucks and follow them to their destination. War workers took days off in order to hunt for gas, and then defense plants put gas stations near their factories, which exacerbated the gas shortage.
On 22 July 1942, the permanent gas rationing program went into effect. The OPA tried to plug the worst holes by issuing coupon books instead of ration cards. An “A” coupon book had eight coupons, each good for four gallons of gas; the entire “A” coupon book had to be used within 60 days, and there was no carry-over. To get additional coupons during that period, a person had to fill out a detailed four page form. Extra gas was only granted to workers that drove more than 150 miles each month to work, and for those that carpooled with at least four other workers; this time, two-thirds of car owners in the East received “A” gas coupon books, 18% “B” coupon books, and 14% “C” coupon books (e.g. doctors and members of Congress).
Each car had to display a color-coded sticker for their rationing status. The OPA hoped that constant public scrutiny would hold people in line this time. Service stations were required to collect a coupon(s) for each sale of gas, and then to redeem those coupons for gas deliveries. There were no guarantees made by the government that if a motorist presented a coupon that there would be gas waiting for them, and the government also reserved the right to further restrict gas rationing. By early-August 1942, motorists in the East had reduced their driving to 50% - 60% less than before Pearl. However, in the rest of the nation, mileage was only down 15% - 20%, in that gas was still plentiful west of the Appalachian Mountains, especially west of the Mississippi River . . . but all that driving spelled huge trouble for tires.
Addendum: The Rubber Crisis Worsens and Guadalcanal . . .
On 22 July 1942, the permanent gas rationing program went into effect. The OPA tried to plug the worst holes by issuing coupon books instead of ration cards. An “A” coupon book had eight coupons, each good for four gallons of gas; the entire “A” coupon book had to be used within 60 days, and there was no carry-over. To get additional coupons during that period, a person had to fill out a detailed four page form. Extra gas was only granted to workers that drove more than 150 miles each month to work, and for those that carpooled with at least four other workers; this time, two-thirds of car owners in the East received “A” gas coupon books, 18% “B” coupon books, and 14% “C” coupon books (e.g. doctors and members of Congress).
Each car had to display a color-coded sticker for their rationing status. The OPA hoped that constant public scrutiny would hold people in line this time. Service stations were required to collect a coupon(s) for each sale of gas, and then to redeem those coupons for gas deliveries. There were no guarantees made by the government that if a motorist presented a coupon that there would be gas waiting for them, and the government also reserved the right to further restrict gas rationing. By early-August 1942, motorists in the East had reduced their driving to 50% - 60% less than before Pearl. However, in the rest of the nation, mileage was only down 15% - 20%, in that gas was still plentiful west of the Appalachian Mountains, especially west of the Mississippi River . . . but all that driving spelled huge trouble for tires.
Addendum: The Rubber Crisis Worsens and Guadalcanal . . .