Source: William K. Klingaman. The Darkest Year -
The American Home Front, 1941 - 1942 (2019)
The American Home Front, 1941 - 1942 (2019)
People and goods were disappearing across the nation, and more and more new faces became part of a new routine, e.g. bank tellers and grocery clerks; those small breaks in virtually everyone’s routine was a reminder of the war. In some quarters, replacements could not be found (e.g. beauticians), and the shortage of domestic workers meant that their employers had to pay them a higher wage in 1942. For well-off Americans that were used to at least one servant, it was an adjustment on multiple fronts.
For farmers, the shortage of field laborers was potentially crippling; the government forecast a decrease in the rural workforce of 10% for 1942. At the same time, FDR and his administration expected the agricultural sector to increase production by at least 15% for the war. Making the worker shortage in the agricultural sector worse on the West Coast was the internment of Japanese-Americans/Nationals. In that era in the agricultural sector, hired hands represented about 25% of the work completed, with the balance of work completed by the farmers themselves plus their families. In early-1942, the draft had already started to curtail the number of boys/men in the fields. The Department of Agriculture predicted that the worst farm labor shortage in US History would occur during the Summer of 1942.
By that summer, women comprised 15% of the rural agricultural labor force, which was ten times greater than 1941. Under the direction of the War Production Board, by March/April 1942, there were no more new appliances being manufactured, such as radios, refrigerators, mixers, as well as lawn mowers, TV antennae, sewing machines, and a plethora of plastic goods.
For farmers, the shortage of field laborers was potentially crippling; the government forecast a decrease in the rural workforce of 10% for 1942. At the same time, FDR and his administration expected the agricultural sector to increase production by at least 15% for the war. Making the worker shortage in the agricultural sector worse on the West Coast was the internment of Japanese-Americans/Nationals. In that era in the agricultural sector, hired hands represented about 25% of the work completed, with the balance of work completed by the farmers themselves plus their families. In early-1942, the draft had already started to curtail the number of boys/men in the fields. The Department of Agriculture predicted that the worst farm labor shortage in US History would occur during the Summer of 1942.
By that summer, women comprised 15% of the rural agricultural labor force, which was ten times greater than 1941. Under the direction of the War Production Board, by March/April 1942, there were no more new appliances being manufactured, such as radios, refrigerators, mixers, as well as lawn mowers, TV antennae, sewing machines, and a plethora of plastic goods.
The WPB also issued a veiled “or else” threat to major industries, in that each area was expected to convert and maximize production. The New Yorker implored the government to never announce an impending shortage, but the government kept doing exactly that, which in every case led to panic-buying (an exception was the shortage of razor blades; unshaven faces became a sign of patriotism). On 3 March 1942, the WPB issued a directive that changed the designs of men’s suits in order to save wool/cotton, such as no more frills on pants (e.g. pleats). Before the war, few women outside the South or on college campuses wore slacks in public, but by the Spring of 1942, women of all sizes/ages started to do so.
Surveys showed that Americans spent 30 minutes more each day reading newspapers, and the news from the war remained beyond-grim. For example, in February/March 1942, the combined Allied fleet of the US, Britain, and the Netherlands were decimated by Japan at Java, which was the most serious US naval defeat since Pearl Harbor. The government censors left Americans wondering about what other awful shoes were about to be dropped on them. Early on in the war, heavy-handed propaganda did not play well with the US public, but the government nevertheless decided on using ballyhoo, which proved to be a failed strategy by the FDR administration. Artless/Useless patriotic slogans emerged, such as “Let’s Go to Tokyo”, and “We’re in it, let’s win it”. By the Spring of 1942, a significant segment of Americans remained complacent and disconnected from the war effort.
Surveys showed that Americans spent 30 minutes more each day reading newspapers, and the news from the war remained beyond-grim. For example, in February/March 1942, the combined Allied fleet of the US, Britain, and the Netherlands were decimated by Japan at Java, which was the most serious US naval defeat since Pearl Harbor. The government censors left Americans wondering about what other awful shoes were about to be dropped on them. Early on in the war, heavy-handed propaganda did not play well with the US public, but the government nevertheless decided on using ballyhoo, which proved to be a failed strategy by the FDR administration. Artless/Useless patriotic slogans emerged, such as “Let’s Go to Tokyo”, and “We’re in it, let’s win it”. By the Spring of 1942, a significant segment of Americans remained complacent and disconnected from the war effort.
FDR and his administration acted as if the war was their own private affair, which risked alienating the public further, which led to more complacency. Critics pounced on FDR and his administration, saying that the government needed to wake up, not the citizenry. The declining sales of war bonds illustrated the public’s attitude with the war: $1.075B in January 1942, followed by $711m in February 1942, and then $565m in March 1942. Americans weren’t investing in stocks either, and the overall price value of stocks plummeted to the lows last reached in April 1933.
Currency had been flying out of bank accounts wince the war in Europe began, and increased rapidly after Pearl. The Federal Reserve concluded that the main reason was far too many Americans were hoarding cash; rentals of safe-deposit boxes soared. The New York Branch of the Federal Reserve stated that hoarded dollar were “slacker dollars”, which amounted to sabotage. But the withdrawals from banks continued, and by mid-August 1942, Amerians were hoarding between $500m and $1B in cash.
The Office of Price Administration (OPA) had delayed the rationing of sugar for several months so they could have a better idea of the amount allotted for consumers, retail, and industry. The OPA also needed the time to print the ration books needed, which would have formed a tower 15 miles high. The rationed amount per person came to eight ounces a week, which equaled 42 ordinary lumps of sugar. Restaurants received 50% of what they usually used, and bakers et al received 70%.
During the first week of May 1942, Americans registered for sugar ration books at their local elementary schools. Those that admitted they had six pounds or more of sugar at home did not receive a ration book until their “household hoard” dropped below five pounds. Those dispensing the sugar ration books were astounded that no one had any sugar at all at home. The supply of tea and coffee was dwindling like sugar; victories by Japan cut tea imports by one-third, which led to panic-buying of tea. The nation’s tea reserves were down to three months, which led the OPA to slash deliveries of tea to merchants.
Currency had been flying out of bank accounts wince the war in Europe began, and increased rapidly after Pearl. The Federal Reserve concluded that the main reason was far too many Americans were hoarding cash; rentals of safe-deposit boxes soared. The New York Branch of the Federal Reserve stated that hoarded dollar were “slacker dollars”, which amounted to sabotage. But the withdrawals from banks continued, and by mid-August 1942, Amerians were hoarding between $500m and $1B in cash.
The Office of Price Administration (OPA) had delayed the rationing of sugar for several months so they could have a better idea of the amount allotted for consumers, retail, and industry. The OPA also needed the time to print the ration books needed, which would have formed a tower 15 miles high. The rationed amount per person came to eight ounces a week, which equaled 42 ordinary lumps of sugar. Restaurants received 50% of what they usually used, and bakers et al received 70%.
During the first week of May 1942, Americans registered for sugar ration books at their local elementary schools. Those that admitted they had six pounds or more of sugar at home did not receive a ration book until their “household hoard” dropped below five pounds. Those dispensing the sugar ration books were astounded that no one had any sugar at all at home. The supply of tea and coffee was dwindling like sugar; victories by Japan cut tea imports by one-third, which led to panic-buying of tea. The nation’s tea reserves were down to three months, which led the OPA to slash deliveries of tea to merchants.
Americans drank ten times more coffee than tea, and half the US supply of coffee was from Brazil, with another 25% from Colombia. The Army’s increasing demand for coffee, 5 large mugs for each soldier each day,started to crowd out the consumer. U-Boat sinkings of Brazilian freighters carrying coffee in the Atlantic made supplies even tighter. Brazil decided to keep as many of their freighters as possible in home ports, and US cargo ships couldn’t pick up the slack since they were used elsewhere for the war. The War Production Board (WPB) ordered 25% less shipments of wholesale coffee, which soon led to a limit of one pound of coffee per customer per visit at grocery stores.
While U-Boats sank cargo ships carrying coffee, it was their sinking of oil tankers that hurt the most; petroleum shipments to the Atlantic Seaboard decreased 45%. In the midst of this shortage, Americans were driving MORE often in 1942; the biggest reason were workers driving to work in a defense factory, but an additional reason were tourists that were bound-and-determined to have “Super Happy Fun Time”. Some states started to lower speed limits on their highways in an attempt to conserve oil as well as wear and tear on tires.
Some government officials lived in a fantasy land, such as Vice-President Henry Wallace, who pronounced that synthetic rubber would save the day. The reality was that the development of synthetic rubber in the US was going nowhere, in large part due to government bureaucratic bungling and red tape. During March 1942, Congress was informed that tires from civilian cars may need to be confiscated to be used in vehicles deemed essential for the war.
On 14 March 1942, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes announced that gasoline shipments to 17 Eastern states (and DC, WA, and OR) would be reduced by 20%, starting on 19 March 1942. It was estimated that 87% of the cars used by defense workers would be out of use by the end of 1942 due to worn tires. In every city, public transportation was being stressed beyond its limits.
While U-Boats sank cargo ships carrying coffee, it was their sinking of oil tankers that hurt the most; petroleum shipments to the Atlantic Seaboard decreased 45%. In the midst of this shortage, Americans were driving MORE often in 1942; the biggest reason were workers driving to work in a defense factory, but an additional reason were tourists that were bound-and-determined to have “Super Happy Fun Time”. Some states started to lower speed limits on their highways in an attempt to conserve oil as well as wear and tear on tires.
Some government officials lived in a fantasy land, such as Vice-President Henry Wallace, who pronounced that synthetic rubber would save the day. The reality was that the development of synthetic rubber in the US was going nowhere, in large part due to government bureaucratic bungling and red tape. During March 1942, Congress was informed that tires from civilian cars may need to be confiscated to be used in vehicles deemed essential for the war.
On 14 March 1942, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes announced that gasoline shipments to 17 Eastern states (and DC, WA, and OR) would be reduced by 20%, starting on 19 March 1942. It was estimated that 87% of the cars used by defense workers would be out of use by the end of 1942 due to worn tires. In every city, public transportation was being stressed beyond its limits.
By mid-February 1942, the sales of bicycles had doubled, and by the second week of March 1942, rare was the store that had a bicycle to sell. On 2 April 1942, the WPB issued an immediate “freeze” on the sale, shipment, and delivery of new bicycles, since the vast majority of people that had purchased bicycles were not using them. The government was trying to find a way for defense workers that wanted a bicycle (and would use it) to be able to get their hands on one.
On 9 April 1942, US resistance on Bataan collapsed, with the initial number of US troops that surrendered in the range of around 9000 (the eventual total would exceed 70k, the largest surrender of US troops in American History), with thousands of US troops escaping to Corregidor. News of the Fall of Bataan was in essence the reality check that was needed, in that Americans refused to believe what Pearl Harbor, Wake Island, and Guam told them about the war; Bataan carried far more emotional impact than even Pearl.
By April 1942, 10% of US men between 21 and 35 years old were in the military, with the Army inducting 300k a month; experts predicted that the percentage would reach 17%. By February 1942, nine million had registered for the draft, including Charles Lindbergh. The Army wanted as many 18 - 23 year olds as possible, and widened the pool by easing the physical standards (e.g. vision). War production suffered, in that the Army kept taking workers from defense factories, which meant the Army was taking highly-skilled workers and turning them into infantry.
Soon enough, it became obvious that 10 to 13 million additional workers would need to be added during the next twelve months, while at the same time the Army would need to draft between two and three million. AS of the Spring of 1942, the government and military had no clear guidelines for determining whether a worker should remain on the job or be drafted. On 18 April 1942, FDR created the War Manpower Commission (WMC) in order to try and sort out the competing needs between the military and industry.
On 9 April 1942, US resistance on Bataan collapsed, with the initial number of US troops that surrendered in the range of around 9000 (the eventual total would exceed 70k, the largest surrender of US troops in American History), with thousands of US troops escaping to Corregidor. News of the Fall of Bataan was in essence the reality check that was needed, in that Americans refused to believe what Pearl Harbor, Wake Island, and Guam told them about the war; Bataan carried far more emotional impact than even Pearl.
By April 1942, 10% of US men between 21 and 35 years old were in the military, with the Army inducting 300k a month; experts predicted that the percentage would reach 17%. By February 1942, nine million had registered for the draft, including Charles Lindbergh. The Army wanted as many 18 - 23 year olds as possible, and widened the pool by easing the physical standards (e.g. vision). War production suffered, in that the Army kept taking workers from defense factories, which meant the Army was taking highly-skilled workers and turning them into infantry.
Soon enough, it became obvious that 10 to 13 million additional workers would need to be added during the next twelve months, while at the same time the Army would need to draft between two and three million. AS of the Spring of 1942, the government and military had no clear guidelines for determining whether a worker should remain on the job or be drafted. On 18 April 1942, FDR created the War Manpower Commission (WMC) in order to try and sort out the competing needs between the military and industry.
FDR gave Major League Baseball the green light to continue play during the war, and two-thirds of Americans agreed with the President. Owners, on the other hand, were apprehensive about attendance and profits; in the spirit of sacrificing for the war effort, Major League Baseball owners slashed player payrolls. The owner of the Detroit Tigers slashed all player salaries even though his factory was making millions manufacturing tanks.
Joe DiMaggio held out for $42.5k, and increase over his 1941 salary of $37.5k. DiMaggio received his desired salary, but in the process he went from a very popular player to being among the most despised. One of the factors for DiMaggio’s decreased popularity was his Italian heritage, which by the Summer of 1942 was held against the Yankee Clipper. The “Star Spangled Banner” was heard at ballparks far more frequently, and more night games were scheduled in order to increase attendance; most owners scoffed at that development, believing that baseball was a “Day Game”.
In the midst of all the delays, complacency, bureaucratic bungling, and lack of action, it only took three months for the government to remove 100,000+ Japanese-Americans/Nationals from their homes on the West Coast and start to relocate them to concentration camps. Another creation from FDR, the War Relocation Authority, did the work the military either could not do or didn’t want to do; 3750 Japanese-Americans/Nationals were each day were taken from their homes and taken to “Assembly Centers” (e.g. racetracks), where they waited for the WRA to send them to a specific location. The WRA failed to get CA, OR, and WA to cooperate and resettle the Japanese-Americans/Nationals within their predominantly white areas, which forced the WRA to build what in essence became concentration camps.The Army finished the first stage of forced evacuations in early-June 1942, and then shifted its focus to “Military Area Number Two”, which was the rest of CA.
Joe DiMaggio held out for $42.5k, and increase over his 1941 salary of $37.5k. DiMaggio received his desired salary, but in the process he went from a very popular player to being among the most despised. One of the factors for DiMaggio’s decreased popularity was his Italian heritage, which by the Summer of 1942 was held against the Yankee Clipper. The “Star Spangled Banner” was heard at ballparks far more frequently, and more night games were scheduled in order to increase attendance; most owners scoffed at that development, believing that baseball was a “Day Game”.
In the midst of all the delays, complacency, bureaucratic bungling, and lack of action, it only took three months for the government to remove 100,000+ Japanese-Americans/Nationals from their homes on the West Coast and start to relocate them to concentration camps. Another creation from FDR, the War Relocation Authority, did the work the military either could not do or didn’t want to do; 3750 Japanese-Americans/Nationals were each day were taken from their homes and taken to “Assembly Centers” (e.g. racetracks), where they waited for the WRA to send them to a specific location. The WRA failed to get CA, OR, and WA to cooperate and resettle the Japanese-Americans/Nationals within their predominantly white areas, which forced the WRA to build what in essence became concentration camps.The Army finished the first stage of forced evacuations in early-June 1942, and then shifted its focus to “Military Area Number Two”, which was the rest of CA.
One of the casualties of the war on the domestic front was the disastrous Broadway season of 1941-42. Of the 66 plays, only 6 were deemed hits by Variety magazine, and none of those were released after Pearl. It was obvious to the critics and patrons that the war had a paralyzing effect on playwrights, who didn’t know how to factor in the war in their plays. One of the main problems was that the efforts to feature the war focused on the big picture and not on how the war was affecting people. Vaudeville however showed no signs of slowing down, since more-and-more Americans wanted to lose themselves in laughter for a little while.
Still, by the Spring/Summer of 1942, far too many Americans didn’t close their shades and follow blackout protocols, which meant that cargo ships were sunk at an alarming rate along the Atlantic Coast. The Navy, meanwhile, kept up their policy of heavily censoring the real casualty rates from the U-Boat attacks. Despite the horrific casualties, local authorities were slow to enforce the blackout/dimout protocols, and civilians were even more reluctant to obey those directives. A sailor on a merchant ship that was passing a New Jersey beach resort thought the lights looked like Coney Island, since the beach was all lit up for the tourists’ enjoyment. In New York City, Times Square glowed in the distance like a gigantic furnace.
On 30 April 1942, Secretary of War Henry Stimson decided that the Army would take on the responsibility for blackouts/dimouts, and new and tougher regulations were enacted all along the Atlantic Coast to the Canadian border. Civilians still resisted, and three weeks later frustrated Army officials introduced tougher regulations. In the Gulf of Mexico, German U-Boats had sunk 15 ships in May 1942 alone, and U-Boats had come as close as two miles from the Mouth of the Mississippi River.
Addendum: The Beginning of Gasoline Rationing . . .
Still, by the Spring/Summer of 1942, far too many Americans didn’t close their shades and follow blackout protocols, which meant that cargo ships were sunk at an alarming rate along the Atlantic Coast. The Navy, meanwhile, kept up their policy of heavily censoring the real casualty rates from the U-Boat attacks. Despite the horrific casualties, local authorities were slow to enforce the blackout/dimout protocols, and civilians were even more reluctant to obey those directives. A sailor on a merchant ship that was passing a New Jersey beach resort thought the lights looked like Coney Island, since the beach was all lit up for the tourists’ enjoyment. In New York City, Times Square glowed in the distance like a gigantic furnace.
On 30 April 1942, Secretary of War Henry Stimson decided that the Army would take on the responsibility for blackouts/dimouts, and new and tougher regulations were enacted all along the Atlantic Coast to the Canadian border. Civilians still resisted, and three weeks later frustrated Army officials introduced tougher regulations. In the Gulf of Mexico, German U-Boats had sunk 15 ships in May 1942 alone, and U-Boats had come as close as two miles from the Mouth of the Mississippi River.
Addendum: The Beginning of Gasoline Rationing . . .