Source: William K. Klingaman. The Darkest Year -
The American Home Front, 1941-1942 (2019)
The American Home Front, 1941-1942 (2019)
By Christmas 1941, the US was coming out of the Great Depression, in large part due to the government’s increased defense spending over the previous 18 months. Never before had Americans had that much money to spend; proof came with the largest-ever (to that point) consumer spending spree, which was confirmed just one week into the holiday shopping season.
Three million new workers were added in 1942, making the overall national total 42 million workers, which was the highest number to that point in US History. Fewer Americans were receiving unemployment benefits since that federal program had started. Agricultural prices rose, and agricultural income was up $2 billion from 1940, and corporate profits in the industrial sector greatly increased. More new homes were built in the US from January through October 1941 since 1929. In short, in 1941 Americans were living better compared to any other previous year.
In the midst of all of this was FDR’s preparedness program, with many businesses trying to increase their profits by showing how patriotic they were (e.g. buying a car = greater national defense). Anne Morrow Lindbergh (Lindbergh’s wife, and also an Isolationist) was appalled at the link between crass materialism and the appeal to patriotism.
Three million new workers were added in 1942, making the overall national total 42 million workers, which was the highest number to that point in US History. Fewer Americans were receiving unemployment benefits since that federal program had started. Agricultural prices rose, and agricultural income was up $2 billion from 1940, and corporate profits in the industrial sector greatly increased. More new homes were built in the US from January through October 1941 since 1929. In short, in 1941 Americans were living better compared to any other previous year.
In the midst of all of this was FDR’s preparedness program, with many businesses trying to increase their profits by showing how patriotic they were (e.g. buying a car = greater national defense). Anne Morrow Lindbergh (Lindbergh’s wife, and also an Isolationist) was appalled at the link between crass materialism and the appeal to patriotism.
From 1 September 1939 to 6 December 1941, 80% of Americans polled opposed US entry into the war in Europe. Since World War I, America had done its best to politically ignore the rest of the world, since most Americans believed that the US decision to declare war on Germany was a colossal mistake never to be repeated. That being said, as war raged in Europe, most Americans favored the cause of the Allies (Britain/France) over Hitler, since most believed that Hitler may eventually turn his attention across the Atlantic.
The “Sitzkrieg” gave the US a false sense of security, which was shattered in the Spring of 1940 when Germany defeated Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and by June 1940, France fell. In the US, there were very serious discussions concerning the level of US preparedness (or the lack thereof). Congress approved $3 billion for military spending, and soon, in essence, Congress gave FDR a blank check in terms of military spending with a House vote of 391 - 1. While most Americans didn’t want troops in Europe, Isolationists and Internationalists both wanted a strong military. For the Isolationists, the military build up was for defense, while the Internationalists wanted to be prepared for the inevitable US involvement in Europe.
The “Sitzkrieg” gave the US a false sense of security, which was shattered in the Spring of 1940 when Germany defeated Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and by June 1940, France fell. In the US, there were very serious discussions concerning the level of US preparedness (or the lack thereof). Congress approved $3 billion for military spending, and soon, in essence, Congress gave FDR a blank check in terms of military spending with a House vote of 391 - 1. While most Americans didn’t want troops in Europe, Isolationists and Internationalists both wanted a strong military. For the Isolationists, the military build up was for defense, while the Internationalists wanted to be prepared for the inevitable US involvement in Europe.
Any consensus that had existed fell apart in 1940 in terms of whether Britain (and what was left of France), should be the recipient of any direct US aid. That debate intensified during the Battle for Britain, and then the Blitz, with Life magazine in particular providing photographs of the suffering in Britain for Americans to see and read. And fear rose in America of a Fifth Column, a.k.a. German spies working in the US, since most German nationals and many native-born Americans were pro-Nazi (the most famous: Charles Lindbergh).
The US Army was beyond-woeful due to 20 years of neglect after World War I, being the smallest and worst-equipped army of the world’s major nations by 1938. The German blitzkrieg during 1939 - 40 showed how far behind the US Army was compared to the Wehrmacht. Both General George C. Marshall and General “Hap” Arnold (the US Air Air Corps commander) knew they only had perhaps months to try and make up for years of no real military preparation. With the Fall of France, the US had to not only focus on new and additional weapons, but also conscription. The Army would need at least 1.2 million men, but with only 250k in the ranks with soldiers leaving due to enlistments being up, there was no way to reach that necessary figure without a draft . . . but the US had never before instituted a draft in peacetime. Despite the virulent protests, Americans became more supportive of conscription by the Fall of 1939 based on polling conducted by Gallup (October 1939: 39%; July 1940: 66%).
The US Army was beyond-woeful due to 20 years of neglect after World War I, being the smallest and worst-equipped army of the world’s major nations by 1938. The German blitzkrieg during 1939 - 40 showed how far behind the US Army was compared to the Wehrmacht. Both General George C. Marshall and General “Hap” Arnold (the US Air Air Corps commander) knew they only had perhaps months to try and make up for years of no real military preparation. With the Fall of France, the US had to not only focus on new and additional weapons, but also conscription. The Army would need at least 1.2 million men, but with only 250k in the ranks with soldiers leaving due to enlistments being up, there was no way to reach that necessary figure without a draft . . . but the US had never before instituted a draft in peacetime. Despite the virulent protests, Americans became more supportive of conscription by the Fall of 1939 based on polling conducted by Gallup (October 1939: 39%; July 1940: 66%).
On 15 September 1940, Congress passed the Selective Service Act which required all US male citizens between the ages of 21 and 35 to register for a possible draft. That being said, there was an Isolationist streak in the Act, in that the 800k draftees called in that first year of the draft were prohibited from serving outside of the Western Hemisphere, except in US territories. By October 1940, over 16 million had registered for the draft without protest, including James Stewart and Henry Fonda. By December 1940 those initial draftees were on their way to camp with the second wave of the draft coming up in January 1941.
During that time, government spending that subsidized defense contractors started to decrease unemployment. In the Spring of 1941, the Lend-Lease Act was passed, and the US became formally allied with Britain against Nazi Germany. That spring also featured confusion, uncertainty, and growing tension between the two goals of keeping Britain from surrendering while also keeping US soldiers from Europe, since those two impulses were at odds with each other. There was also the increasing dread that the US would be forced into the conflict in Europe, with 85% believing that to be the case by May 1941. By any measure, the US was nowhere near ready for global war much less involving itself itself in a war in Europe again.
During that time, government spending that subsidized defense contractors started to decrease unemployment. In the Spring of 1941, the Lend-Lease Act was passed, and the US became formally allied with Britain against Nazi Germany. That spring also featured confusion, uncertainty, and growing tension between the two goals of keeping Britain from surrendering while also keeping US soldiers from Europe, since those two impulses were at odds with each other. There was also the increasing dread that the US would be forced into the conflict in Europe, with 85% believing that to be the case by May 1941. By any measure, the US was nowhere near ready for global war much less involving itself itself in a war in Europe again.
Among the obstacles was FDR and his administration, who was not yet sure how to allocate US resources between the military and civilian sectors, and they had to overall strategic plan in place in case of war. Making matters worse was that FDR created various war boards whose responsibilities overlapped. Businesses were reluctant to manufacture things for the military, preferring instead to focus on civilian products to maximize their products and to hire more workers. By the Fall of 1941, there were far more consumer goods produced, which was at the expense of military production. And then came numerous and vicious labor strikes in 1941, the largest occurring in the steel and bituminous coal industries.
During a time when the US needed to be more united for the inevitable upcoming conflict, US society instead was splitting apart. Also in play was FDR’s lack of leadership and direction, since he didn’t want to move ahead of public opinion on US involvement in the war in Europe. FDR also lent far too much credence to the power of the Isolationists in Congress. On 27 May 1941, FDR gave a radio address (a “Fireside Chat”) concerning the massive British losses in the North Atlantic to German U-Boats. FDR told the 65 million listeners that the Nazis wanted more than Europe, and would eventually head across the Atlantic. FDR stated that he had strengthened the US naval presence in the North Atlantic in order to increase the chances of the Allied convoys reaching Britain.
During a time when the US needed to be more united for the inevitable upcoming conflict, US society instead was splitting apart. Also in play was FDR’s lack of leadership and direction, since he didn’t want to move ahead of public opinion on US involvement in the war in Europe. FDR also lent far too much credence to the power of the Isolationists in Congress. On 27 May 1941, FDR gave a radio address (a “Fireside Chat”) concerning the massive British losses in the North Atlantic to German U-Boats. FDR told the 65 million listeners that the Nazis wanted more than Europe, and would eventually head across the Atlantic. FDR stated that he had strengthened the US naval presence in the North Atlantic in order to increase the chances of the Allied convoys reaching Britain.
FDR used the phrase “national emergency” which added to the level of confusion. FDR backtracked, saying that what he stated did not mean that US ships would escort British ships (which was of course occurring out of necessity, at least in some instances); once again FDR refused to move past public opinion in terms of direct involvement in the war in Europe and on the Atlantic. For the next six months, in essence the US simply waited for something awful to happen.
When Operation Barbarossa started on 22 June 1941, the situation in the US became even more confused and muddled, in that Britain was off the hook, but would the US partner in any way w/ Stalin and the USSR. Japan wasn’t pleased with the Nazi invasion of the USSR, in that Japan wanted the British to be unable to defend their possessions in Asia and the Pacific.
During September 1941, Japan formally allied itself with Germany and Italy by signing the Tripartite Pact, and even Isolationists wanted to find a way to rein in Japan. During July 1941, in part for raw materials but also for a springboard to attack US and British possessions, Japan moved into Indochina. Not long afterwards, the US froze Japanese assets in the US. Overzealous US officials in the FDR administration went further, refusing to sell oil or scrap steel to Japan, which was seen as an act of war by the Japanese military, and many in the government. US officials, especially in the State Department, simply assumed that Japan would modify its behavior as a result of those sanctions.
When Operation Barbarossa started on 22 June 1941, the situation in the US became even more confused and muddled, in that Britain was off the hook, but would the US partner in any way w/ Stalin and the USSR. Japan wasn’t pleased with the Nazi invasion of the USSR, in that Japan wanted the British to be unable to defend their possessions in Asia and the Pacific.
During September 1941, Japan formally allied itself with Germany and Italy by signing the Tripartite Pact, and even Isolationists wanted to find a way to rein in Japan. During July 1941, in part for raw materials but also for a springboard to attack US and British possessions, Japan moved into Indochina. Not long afterwards, the US froze Japanese assets in the US. Overzealous US officials in the FDR administration went further, refusing to sell oil or scrap steel to Japan, which was seen as an act of war by the Japanese military, and many in the government. US officials, especially in the State Department, simply assumed that Japan would modify its behavior as a result of those sanctions.
During the Summer of 1941, US consumers had purchased more gasoline compared to any prior period. By November 1941, 25% of US production capacity was geared towards military production. Prices for consumer goods increased due to shortages and the inflation that was caused by economic expansion. From September to early-December 1941, Congress was in session, working around the clock as relations between the US and Japan deteriorated. China proved to be a stumbling block, with FDR wanting Japan to leave China, and Japan refusing to give up what it had taken, especially over the last four years. By October 1941, Hideki Tojo had been elected Premier, and it was clear to even Secretary of State Cordell Hull that Japan was gearing up for war in the Pacific. During November 1941, FDR informed his Cabinet that war with Japan was inevitable.
Starting on 1 December 1941, FDR spent most of his time with his military and diplomatic advisors. It was still believed that Japan would attack Thailand, Burma, or the Malay Peninsula, which would provoke the US into a similar situation in the Pacific as in the North Atlantic with Germany, as well as embargoes and blockades. Most Americans simply dismissed Japan’s ability to fight a war with the US, given the vastness of the Pacific and that they were non-whites, and therefore not the equal of the US.
Addendum: Pearl Harbor - The Immediate Aftermath . . .
Starting on 1 December 1941, FDR spent most of his time with his military and diplomatic advisors. It was still believed that Japan would attack Thailand, Burma, or the Malay Peninsula, which would provoke the US into a similar situation in the Pacific as in the North Atlantic with Germany, as well as embargoes and blockades. Most Americans simply dismissed Japan’s ability to fight a war with the US, given the vastness of the Pacific and that they were non-whites, and therefore not the equal of the US.
Addendum: Pearl Harbor - The Immediate Aftermath . . .