Source: Joseph J. Ellis. Founding Brothers - The Revolutionary Generation (2000)
As the Election of 1796 approached, to the Electors in the Electoral College the real meaningful difference between the major candidates were their Revolutionary War credentials. In other words, the main qualification for the Presidency was the candidate’s historic role in the Revolution. Only the 30 or so that stepped forward at the national level for the good of the fledgling nation were eligible to be President. But by 1796, two clear front runners had emerged from the 30+, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.
By 1796, Adams and Jefferson were political rivals, but they earned their impeccable credentials concerning the Revolution together. Choosing between the two was like trying to select the head or the heart of the Revolution. Adams became active in Boston during the Stamp Act in 1765, and soon he was a constant opponent of British policies in the Colonies, especially by 1774 with the Intolerable Acts. Despite his tremendous contributions, Adams’ reputation fell in large part because he was the first Vice-President, which proved to be a meaningless elected post. Adams deeply resented being marooned and muted in the Senate, and President Washington rarely consulted his Vice-President.
By 1796, Adams and Jefferson were political rivals, but they earned their impeccable credentials concerning the Revolution together. Choosing between the two was like trying to select the head or the heart of the Revolution. Adams became active in Boston during the Stamp Act in 1765, and soon he was a constant opponent of British policies in the Colonies, especially by 1774 with the Intolerable Acts. Despite his tremendous contributions, Adams’ reputation fell in large part because he was the first Vice-President, which proved to be a meaningless elected post. Adams deeply resented being marooned and muted in the Senate, and President Washington rarely consulted his Vice-President.
Adding to the troubles of Adams was that based on the essays he published as VP, his support for a strong Executive was taken by many as support for a monarchy in the US, which was a misunderstanding to be sure, but the way Adams worded his essays left him open to such attacks. It was then, if not before, that the friendship of Adams and Jefferson became seriously stressed, which could be seen in their correspondence. Jefferson believed that Adams had been inadvertently taken in by the Federalist monarchists. Jefferson and Adams remained cordial during Washington’s first term, in large part because Vice-President Adams was muted and Secretary of State Jefferson was part of Washington’s Cabinet.
It was Jefferson’s over-the-top support of the French Revolution that did it for Adams, who though it was lunacy that anyone could see similarities between the American and French Revolutions. Adams began to describe Jefferson as a “dangerous dreamer” and a man “poisoned by ambition”. By the time Washington accepted Jefferson’s resignation as SecState on 1 January 1794, only a remnant remained of Jefferson’s and Adams’ friendship. By the mid-1790s, Jefferson and Madison had become the Republican dynamic duo, and the only true confidant Adams had was his wife Abigail.
To Adams, being the second President was his ‘Revolutionary Right” that he had earned not only by his many years of distinguished service before/during/after the Revolutionary War, but also for languishing for eight years as Vice-President. In March and April 1796, John and Abigail Adams did the Electoral College math state-by-state; Adams predicted a very tight election, even a tie. Abigail still believed that Jefferson as VP would work out okay with her husband as President. After many nervous moments and many temper tantrums, Adams found out that he had prevailed over Jefferson 71 - 68 in the Electoral College (two months prior, Jefferson told Madison that he would lose by 3 Electoral Votes).
It was Jefferson’s over-the-top support of the French Revolution that did it for Adams, who though it was lunacy that anyone could see similarities between the American and French Revolutions. Adams began to describe Jefferson as a “dangerous dreamer” and a man “poisoned by ambition”. By the time Washington accepted Jefferson’s resignation as SecState on 1 January 1794, only a remnant remained of Jefferson’s and Adams’ friendship. By the mid-1790s, Jefferson and Madison had become the Republican dynamic duo, and the only true confidant Adams had was his wife Abigail.
To Adams, being the second President was his ‘Revolutionary Right” that he had earned not only by his many years of distinguished service before/during/after the Revolutionary War, but also for languishing for eight years as Vice-President. In March and April 1796, John and Abigail Adams did the Electoral College math state-by-state; Adams predicted a very tight election, even a tie. Abigail still believed that Jefferson as VP would work out okay with her husband as President. After many nervous moments and many temper tantrums, Adams found out that he had prevailed over Jefferson 71 - 68 in the Electoral College (two months prior, Jefferson told Madison that he would lose by 3 Electoral Votes).
Adams and Jefferson were back together, this time as President and Vice-President, but they had incompatible political ideals and strategies. Adams wanted to bring Jefferson into his Circle of Trust where Adams would treat Jefferson as Washington should have treated VP Adams. But trust from Jefferson was no longer on the table in that as early as 1793 Jefferson and Adams had been on opposite sides politically with foreign policy. A major difference between Adams and Jefferson was that Adams, when push-came-to-shove, was far more willing to negotiate/compromise than Jefferson, who by 1797 had become ideologically rigid (a luxury he would not be able to maintain once he became President).
Adams wanted to collaborate with Jefferson, but the Federalists did not want Jefferson in any way on the inside. Jefferson’s first instinct was to accept Adams’ proposal, but Madison would have none of it. Madison threw the gauntlet at Jefferson’s feet, saying he needed to decide on renewing his friendship with Adams or advancing the prospects of the Republicans. Madison made it clear to Jefferson that in no way should he be drawn into the decisions of Adams’ Presidency in that he could hurt the Republicans. Jefferson almost always took Madison’s advice when it was given, but he told Madison that there would be a cost, which would be his dealings with President Adams (added to the mix was Jefferson’s absolute fear of personal confrontation). Adams made a political blunder, keeping Washington’s Cabinet from his second term intact after they had threatened to resign if the President had involved Jefferson in any way. Adams would have been much better off had he got rid of all of them, since not only were they still loyal to Washington, but they were in effect informants for Hamilton.
Adams wanted to collaborate with Jefferson, but the Federalists did not want Jefferson in any way on the inside. Jefferson’s first instinct was to accept Adams’ proposal, but Madison would have none of it. Madison threw the gauntlet at Jefferson’s feet, saying he needed to decide on renewing his friendship with Adams or advancing the prospects of the Republicans. Madison made it clear to Jefferson that in no way should he be drawn into the decisions of Adams’ Presidency in that he could hurt the Republicans. Jefferson almost always took Madison’s advice when it was given, but he told Madison that there would be a cost, which would be his dealings with President Adams (added to the mix was Jefferson’s absolute fear of personal confrontation). Adams made a political blunder, keeping Washington’s Cabinet from his second term intact after they had threatened to resign if the President had involved Jefferson in any way. Adams would have been much better off had he got rid of all of them, since not only were they still loyal to Washington, but they were in effect informants for Hamilton.
On 6 March 1797, Adams and Jefferson dined with Washington at the Presidential mansion in Philadelphia. During that dinner, Adam learned that Jefferson would not be a part of his Cabinet and that Jefferson and Madison would not be part of the peace delegation to France. On 13 March 1797, Adams was sworn in as President in the Senate (the “official” inauguration in those days), and immediately after the inaugural ceremony, Vice-President Jefferson departed for Monticello. Adams soon discovered that his only true political confidant was Abigail.
Looking back, it’s hard to find another Presidency more dominated by a single foreign policy problem while at the same time the nation was divided on how to solve it. Adams was the victim of inherited circumstances, as all Presidents have been, for better and for worse. The US was waging an undeclared war on the Atlantic and the Caribbean against French privateers, and Adams faced the dilemma of declaring war on France or go all-in to find a diplomatic solution. Adams opted to build up the US Navy for defensive reasons in case negotiations broke down with France, which was by far the wisest move, but that strategy depended on a normal government in France, and there simply wasn’t one.
The Directory was like the shifting sands of the desert, unable to form any kind of cohesion, direction, or consensus concerning the quasi-war with the US. Also, America was seen as only a minor distraction (Britain felt the same) and irrelevant. So the conditions for finding a workable solution to the quasi-war didn’t exist, and President Adams bore the cost. Making the problem worse was the raging ideological debate in America between the Federalists (pro-Britain) and the Republicans (pro-France), with each side viewing the other as traitors to the core principles of the nation as defined by the Revolution.
Looking back, it’s hard to find another Presidency more dominated by a single foreign policy problem while at the same time the nation was divided on how to solve it. Adams was the victim of inherited circumstances, as all Presidents have been, for better and for worse. The US was waging an undeclared war on the Atlantic and the Caribbean against French privateers, and Adams faced the dilemma of declaring war on France or go all-in to find a diplomatic solution. Adams opted to build up the US Navy for defensive reasons in case negotiations broke down with France, which was by far the wisest move, but that strategy depended on a normal government in France, and there simply wasn’t one.
The Directory was like the shifting sands of the desert, unable to form any kind of cohesion, direction, or consensus concerning the quasi-war with the US. Also, America was seen as only a minor distraction (Britain felt the same) and irrelevant. So the conditions for finding a workable solution to the quasi-war didn’t exist, and President Adams bore the cost. Making the problem worse was the raging ideological debate in America between the Federalists (pro-Britain) and the Republicans (pro-France), with each side viewing the other as traitors to the core principles of the nation as defined by the Revolution.
Jefferson was very good at lamenting the chasm between former fellow Revolutionaries, and then doing his best to build walls from his side of the debate. The idea of legitimate political opposition didn’t exist in the late-1790s, and there wasn’t yet any vocabulary to describe the development of political parties as they were growing. Adams’ Vice-President was the leader of the opposition party, and the President’s Cabinet was loyal to Hamilton (and the memory of Washington), and the emerging role/influence of public opinion was off the rails in the press in terms of attacking the other party and/or its members. The authority of the federal government was not yet formed, and the emerging political parties were too new and ill-formed/informed to effectively cope with the challenges of the new nation.
Adams ignored his Cabinet, and in effect Abigail became his one-person administration. Jefferson remained in Philadelphia as VP leading the Republicans while Madison was home at Montpelier. So Adams and Jefferson went their separate political ways with separate Circles of Trust. Adams had no prior experience as an Executive, never having served as a governor (as had Jefferson) or as a military leader. The idea that he should, as President, manage his Cabinet and factions in Congress never occurred to Adams, so he relied on his own judgment (as well as Abigail’s).
One of Adams’ unilateral decisions was to include Elbridge Gerry on the delegation he was sending to France. By that point, Gerry saw the French Revolution in the same way as Jefferson, but even so, Adams saw Gerry as someone he could trust. plus he knew that Gerry could be bipartisan. Adams appointed his son, John Quincy Adams, to be the US Minister to Prussia despite the obvious nepotism (JQA was more than qualified for the post). In effect, Adams decided to serve as his own Secretary of State, and he wanted trusted men in Europe to let him know what was really going on with the negotiations with France.
Adams ignored his Cabinet, and in effect Abigail became his one-person administration. Jefferson remained in Philadelphia as VP leading the Republicans while Madison was home at Montpelier. So Adams and Jefferson went their separate political ways with separate Circles of Trust. Adams had no prior experience as an Executive, never having served as a governor (as had Jefferson) or as a military leader. The idea that he should, as President, manage his Cabinet and factions in Congress never occurred to Adams, so he relied on his own judgment (as well as Abigail’s).
One of Adams’ unilateral decisions was to include Elbridge Gerry on the delegation he was sending to France. By that point, Gerry saw the French Revolution in the same way as Jefferson, but even so, Adams saw Gerry as someone he could trust. plus he knew that Gerry could be bipartisan. Adams appointed his son, John Quincy Adams, to be the US Minister to Prussia despite the obvious nepotism (JQA was more than qualified for the post). In effect, Adams decided to serve as his own Secretary of State, and he wanted trusted men in Europe to let him know what was really going on with the negotiations with France.
Gerry informed Adams of the XYZ Affair, and Adams decided to keep it quiet/secret as long as possible in order to buy time in the face of increasing tensions between the US and France, as well as the increasing rhetoric/actions in the US. Gerry remained in Paris, and through him Adams found out that he needed to be patient with the mess that was the French government. Gerry also told Adams that the Marquis de Talleyrand’s shenanigans (e.g. demanding $$ for a bribe) were seen as a gross miscalculation. Gerry, JQA, and other trusted contacts in Europe also counseled patience with France, so Adams decided to hold out for peace in the face of very strong pressure from the pro-British Federalists (e.g. Hamilton) to declare war on France.
The Republican newspapers, controlled/influenced by Jefferson, savaged and vilified Adams, which in large part led Adams (with Abigail’s blessing) to sign into law the Alien and Sedition Acts (1798), which was Adams’ biggest blunder as President. Adams went to his grave arguing that he signed those four bills into law very reluctantly under intense pressure from Federalist extremists, and that those laws never had his support once put into effect, which was all true enough. Moderate Federalists like
John Marshall urged Adams to not sign the bills; even Hamilton was lukewarm about the Sedition Act. It was perhaps the one time where Abigail led her husband astray in terms of political advice.
The Republican newspapers, controlled/influenced by Jefferson, savaged and vilified Adams, which in large part led Adams (with Abigail’s blessing) to sign into law the Alien and Sedition Acts (1798), which was Adams’ biggest blunder as President. Adams went to his grave arguing that he signed those four bills into law very reluctantly under intense pressure from Federalist extremists, and that those laws never had his support once put into effect, which was all true enough. Moderate Federalists like
John Marshall urged Adams to not sign the bills; even Hamilton was lukewarm about the Sedition Act. It was perhaps the one time where Abigail led her husband astray in terms of political advice.