Source: H.W. Brands. Heirs of the Founders (2017)
The opening of the Erie Canal in 1825 in New York was the greatest thing to happen to that state to that point in US History. The Erie Canal transformed the economic geography of the eastern-half of the US, and in effect, Rochester NY became a city-of-the-world. The Erie Canal was 360 miles long (to the Hudson River), 40 feet wide, and 4 feet deep with dozens upon dozens of dams and locks. Transportation costs for such commodities as wheat, corn, pigs, and lumber decreased by 90%, and New York City supplanted New Orleans as America’s #1 port (NYC also eclipsed Philadelphia as America’s financial hub).
To commemorate the opening of the Erie Canal, cannon fire salutes were carried out, with the next cannon firing after it heard the report from the cannon further up the canal. It took only 82 minutes for the last cannon in NYC to fire to end the sequence, which was to that point the most rapid long distance communication in history. NYC was the most delirious, suddenly finding itself the gateway to the American West. The opening of the Erie Canal started a series of events that would propel the US into the modern era, with the steam engine being used in steamboats and locomotives. The Industrial Revolution truly started in the US when steam power came to the nation’s factories.
Costs of manufactured goods such as textiles were sharply reduced, which in turn generated more demand, which led to greater investment in new equipment; a continuing cycle of economic growth occurred in the North. In the South, however, the saving of labor held very little appeal, since slavery was a fixed, not a variable, cost. The Southern economy expanded, but only as a result of the increased cotton trade with foreign nations (and the North), not actual transformation. The South experienced additive growth, while the North went through multiplicative growth; by the mid-1820s, it became clear to any objective person that the South would fall behind the North in terms of population and wealth.
To commemorate the opening of the Erie Canal, cannon fire salutes were carried out, with the next cannon firing after it heard the report from the cannon further up the canal. It took only 82 minutes for the last cannon in NYC to fire to end the sequence, which was to that point the most rapid long distance communication in history. NYC was the most delirious, suddenly finding itself the gateway to the American West. The opening of the Erie Canal started a series of events that would propel the US into the modern era, with the steam engine being used in steamboats and locomotives. The Industrial Revolution truly started in the US when steam power came to the nation’s factories.
Costs of manufactured goods such as textiles were sharply reduced, which in turn generated more demand, which led to greater investment in new equipment; a continuing cycle of economic growth occurred in the North. In the South, however, the saving of labor held very little appeal, since slavery was a fixed, not a variable, cost. The Southern economy expanded, but only as a result of the increased cotton trade with foreign nations (and the North), not actual transformation. The South experienced additive growth, while the North went through multiplicative growth; by the mid-1820s, it became clear to any objective person that the South would fall behind the North in terms of population and wealth.
Senator Daniel Webster (MA) spoke out against protectionism and in favor of free trade, knowing that the differing needs in the various regions of the globe led to reciprocal wants, which meant that free trade was a win-win for the US. Webster dismissed the popular notion advanced by Henry Clay (Speaker of the House) and the other protectionists that trade was a zero-sum game; Webster correctly stated that overall, free trade was a plus-sum game. Webster also pointed out that free trade wasn’t limited to trade between just two nations (bilateral trade).
Protectionists stated that their main interest was to foster US industries, and to that Webster argued that navigation and commerce were already-existing industries that would be harmed by protectionism. Webster scoffed at the argument from protectionists that every dollar paid by and American for a foreign-produced good went to that specific foreign producer; Webster argued (not using these exact words) that a multiplier-effect was in play. Webster also dismissed the protectionist argument that US security would be improved by high tariffs in that self-sufficiency equaled greater security, and that the US would no longer be susceptible to a foreign power’s interference with US trade.
Webster stated that it was free trade that had raised the stature of America in the eyes of the world, and protectionism would diminish that stature. Webster made sure his speech in favor of free trade was widely circulated in print, but before too long Webster wished he could take back every copy. Webster realized that while he was right about free trade economically, he had entered a world where protectionism and free trade had become politicized (much like the current debate on global warming), and that he had become politically very vulnerable with his constituents.
Protectionists stated that their main interest was to foster US industries, and to that Webster argued that navigation and commerce were already-existing industries that would be harmed by protectionism. Webster scoffed at the argument from protectionists that every dollar paid by and American for a foreign-produced good went to that specific foreign producer; Webster argued (not using these exact words) that a multiplier-effect was in play. Webster also dismissed the protectionist argument that US security would be improved by high tariffs in that self-sufficiency equaled greater security, and that the US would no longer be susceptible to a foreign power’s interference with US trade.
Webster stated that it was free trade that had raised the stature of America in the eyes of the world, and protectionism would diminish that stature. Webster made sure his speech in favor of free trade was widely circulated in print, but before too long Webster wished he could take back every copy. Webster realized that while he was right about free trade economically, he had entered a world where protectionism and free trade had become politicized (much like the current debate on global warming), and that he had become politically very vulnerable with his constituents.
As the Election of 1828 approached, both the Jacksonians and those supporting John Quincy Adams/Henry Clay fashioned tariff schedules and policies to their political views in order to garner votes, ignoring (or not knowing) the economic ramifications. What emerged from that political scrum was the Tariff of 1828, which raised the tariff on competing imports of US manufactured goods by 50%. Little thought was given to the American consumer who had to pay the increased cost of the imported good.
The tariff drew strong support in the North due to the importance of industry in the region, and Northern support in Congress meant that the tariff would be enacted. Southerners felt that they had simply been used-and-abused, since there was no offsetting benefit for their region. There was also the prospect that Great Britain could retaliate by purchasing less cotton. The Tariff of 1828 served its main political purpose in undermining
John Quincy Adams' administration, while Andrew Jackson became a hero to both sides of the tariff debate in virtually every state. John Quincy Adams’ only hope in winning re-election in 1828 hinged with a possible coalition with New England and the South, but the Tariff of 1828 doomed that prospect.
Webster was caught in the maelstrom of the tariff debate and almost politically drowned. Webster found himself moving towards partial protectionism due to the demands of his constituents in his district, even though doing so went against his economic beliefs/knowledge. In the end, the Tariff of 1828 strongly benefited and protected such New England industries as wool, which in theory would keep the South and the West addicted to New England’s wool industry for many decades to come.
The tariff drew strong support in the North due to the importance of industry in the region, and Northern support in Congress meant that the tariff would be enacted. Southerners felt that they had simply been used-and-abused, since there was no offsetting benefit for their region. There was also the prospect that Great Britain could retaliate by purchasing less cotton. The Tariff of 1828 served its main political purpose in undermining
John Quincy Adams' administration, while Andrew Jackson became a hero to both sides of the tariff debate in virtually every state. John Quincy Adams’ only hope in winning re-election in 1828 hinged with a possible coalition with New England and the South, but the Tariff of 1828 doomed that prospect.
Webster was caught in the maelstrom of the tariff debate and almost politically drowned. Webster found himself moving towards partial protectionism due to the demands of his constituents in his district, even though doing so went against his economic beliefs/knowledge. In the end, the Tariff of 1828 strongly benefited and protected such New England industries as wool, which in theory would keep the South and the West addicted to New England’s wool industry for many decades to come.
Webster agonized on how he would vote in the Senate on the tariff bill, in that his free trade conscience wrestled with his political ambitions. Webster dreaded the possibility that his vote could be the deciding vote, and he felt that the eyes of the nation were upon him. After the Tariff of 1828 became law, Webster rationalized his vote in favor of the tariff, saying he was glad New England benefited, but in the future changes would have to be made.
To Vice-President John C. Calhoun (SC), it was the sectionalism of the vote in both houses of Congress that rankled him. The VP had nothing against protectionism in the abstract, but as far as Calhoun was concerned, the Tariff of 1828 was a sword that the North had swung against the South. Calhoun had witnessed the glee that emanated from Northern members of Congress as they worked the tariff through the legislative process. Soon, Calhoun and the South referred to the Tariff of 1828 as the “Tariff of Abominations”.
Calhoun noted that the tariff hit the South at a very vulnerable time, in that the textile industry in the North had rebounded from the Panic of 1819, and cotton prices had soared which led to Southern planters borrowing more money to plant/cultivate/harvest more cotton on additional lands. Planters in other cotton producing nations had done the same, and the price of a bale of cotton in the world market plummeted from the resulting glut, falling 2/3’s between 1828 and 1828. Sugar and rice planters were not affected, but cotton planters were hit hard, over their heads in debt. The Tariff of 1828 made hard times even worse in the South, and Southerners were desperate to find someone to blame for their misfortune. Proud Southerners such as Calhoun simply wouldn’t stand for that treatment, and as far as the South was concerned, the North had declared economic warfare on their region.
To Vice-President John C. Calhoun (SC), it was the sectionalism of the vote in both houses of Congress that rankled him. The VP had nothing against protectionism in the abstract, but as far as Calhoun was concerned, the Tariff of 1828 was a sword that the North had swung against the South. Calhoun had witnessed the glee that emanated from Northern members of Congress as they worked the tariff through the legislative process. Soon, Calhoun and the South referred to the Tariff of 1828 as the “Tariff of Abominations”.
Calhoun noted that the tariff hit the South at a very vulnerable time, in that the textile industry in the North had rebounded from the Panic of 1819, and cotton prices had soared which led to Southern planters borrowing more money to plant/cultivate/harvest more cotton on additional lands. Planters in other cotton producing nations had done the same, and the price of a bale of cotton in the world market plummeted from the resulting glut, falling 2/3’s between 1828 and 1828. Sugar and rice planters were not affected, but cotton planters were hit hard, over their heads in debt. The Tariff of 1828 made hard times even worse in the South, and Southerners were desperate to find someone to blame for their misfortune. Proud Southerners such as Calhoun simply wouldn’t stand for that treatment, and as far as the South was concerned, the North had declared economic warfare on their region.
During the Summer of 1828, South Carolina voiced their resistance to Northern tyranny, seeing the North as the “New Great Britain in Town”, and their resistance akin to that of the Patriots during the Revolutionary War Era. South Carolina sought a single voice to air their grievances, and VP Calhoun was their man. Calhoun soon wrote a manifesto of over 35,000 words, but unlike Webster, he didn’t publish right away, since Calhoun knew his words could have unintended consequences concerning the Election of 1828; in no way did Calhoun want President John Quincy Adams to win re-election.
Calhoun knew he couldn’t overcome the tidal wave of support behind Jackson, so once again Calhoun ran for Vice-President and again easily prevailed in the Electoral College. The Campaign of 1828 was easily the nastiest to that point in US History, with Clay behind much of the anti-Jackson attacks. In a Kentucky newspaper, Rachel Jackson was referred to as a “dirty black wench” . . . Jackson seethed. In the end, Jackson won by a large margin in the Electoral College, 178 to 83 over JQA, and Jackson saw the result as confirmation of the rising tide of democracy. Soon thereafter, Jacksonians started to call themselves Democrats, and not only did the Average American elect Jackson as President, but the Democrats also had a majority in both houses in Congress.
Calhoun knew he couldn’t overcome the tidal wave of support behind Jackson, so once again Calhoun ran for Vice-President and again easily prevailed in the Electoral College. The Campaign of 1828 was easily the nastiest to that point in US History, with Clay behind much of the anti-Jackson attacks. In a Kentucky newspaper, Rachel Jackson was referred to as a “dirty black wench” . . . Jackson seethed. In the end, Jackson won by a large margin in the Electoral College, 178 to 83 over JQA, and Jackson saw the result as confirmation of the rising tide of democracy. Soon thereafter, Jacksonians started to call themselves Democrats, and not only did the Average American elect Jackson as President, but the Democrats also had a majority in both houses in Congress.
After the election (while Rachel was dying with Jackson at her side), Calhoun released his manifesto against the Tariff of 1828. Calhoun’s name was not on the document; instead, prominent South Carolinians signed lengthy diatribe. Calhoun didn’t want his name on the document since he believed his arguments needed to stand on their own merits, and that as VP it would have been unseemly to be seen arguing against federal law.
Additionally, Thomas Jefferson had withheld his identity as the author of the Kentucky Resolution in 1799, and Calhoun figured that was good for Jefferson was good for him. Calhoun argued that the Tariff of 1828 was unconstitutional, in that it went beyond the powers granted to the federal government in the Constitution. The power to tax was for revenue, Calhoun argued, not for protecting/promoting the commerce of one region of a nation over another. Calhoun also argued that the Tariff of 1828 would actually lead to less revenue for the federal government.
Additionally, Thomas Jefferson had withheld his identity as the author of the Kentucky Resolution in 1799, and Calhoun figured that was good for Jefferson was good for him. Calhoun argued that the Tariff of 1828 was unconstitutional, in that it went beyond the powers granted to the federal government in the Constitution. The power to tax was for revenue, Calhoun argued, not for protecting/promoting the commerce of one region of a nation over another. Calhoun also argued that the Tariff of 1828 would actually lead to less revenue for the federal government.
Calhoun stated that there was nothing to keep the North from raising the price of goods they sold to the South, while the South had no comparable advantage. Also, Southern cotton growers may lose their global market share, perhaps permanently. According to Calhoun, the only power to counter the Tariff of 1828 was the power of the states, and that the arguments of Jefferson and Madison in the Kentucky & Virginia Resolutions were still valid.
Calhoun went on to say that a state such as South Carolina could declare a federal law null and void in their state. Calhoun admitted that the Constitution didn’t give a state the right to review/interpret federal law, but neither did the Constitution give the Supreme Court that right. Yet the Court asserted for themselves the right to interpret the Constitution in terms of Acts of Congress, and the states should have that same right, Calhoun stated. Calhoun also argued that the states had a much greater argument in their favor compared to the Supreme Court due to the 10th Amendment.
Calhoun went on to say that a state such as South Carolina could declare a federal law null and void in their state. Calhoun admitted that the Constitution didn’t give a state the right to review/interpret federal law, but neither did the Constitution give the Supreme Court that right. Yet the Court asserted for themselves the right to interpret the Constitution in terms of Acts of Congress, and the states should have that same right, Calhoun stated. Calhoun also argued that the states had a much greater argument in their favor compared to the Supreme Court due to the 10th Amendment.