Source: Brian Kilmeade & Don Yaeger. Andrew Jackson And The Miracle Of New
Orleans - The Battle That Shaped America's Destiny (2017)
Orleans - The Battle That Shaped America's Destiny (2017)
On 27 August 1814, Jackson received confirmation that the British were landing in force in the Gulf of Mexico just 50 miles east of his position. Jackson had intelligence that indicated that this relatively small British contingent would be supplemented by a much larger force, and that the plan was to take Pensacola, and then Mobile Bay, and then the ultimate prize, New Orleans. Jackson had to scramble in order to amass 2000 troops, and most of them were inexperienced. Jackson wrote to Nashville, asking for the entire Tennessee militia, including cavalry, but in the meantime, Jackson had to get ready to defend Fort Boyer.
Fort Bowyer stood 30 miles south of Mobile at the opening of Mobile Bay. British ships would have to pass through the narrow opening under fire from Fort Bowyer’s guns, but the fort had long been neglected and wasn’t readily fit. Jackson’s men worked around the clock to get Fort Bowyer ready knowing that the British could arrive at any time. Jackson wrote the governor of New Orleans to warn him of the British plan to advance on the city; Jackson was ready to fight the British from his position at Fort Bowyer, but the odds of defeating the British were not in his favor.
Fort Bowyer stood 30 miles south of Mobile at the opening of Mobile Bay. British ships would have to pass through the narrow opening under fire from Fort Bowyer’s guns, but the fort had long been neglected and wasn’t readily fit. Jackson’s men worked around the clock to get Fort Bowyer ready knowing that the British could arrive at any time. Jackson wrote the governor of New Orleans to warn him of the British plan to advance on the city; Jackson was ready to fight the British from his position at Fort Bowyer, but the odds of defeating the British were not in his favor.
Jackson was 100% sure of the intentions of the British in the Gulf, but that wasn’t the case in Washington, D.C. with President James Madison and Secretary of War John Armstrong. Instead of getting DC’s defenses ready, SecWar Armstrong was certain that Baltimore was the main target of the British, and Madison followed his advice. Armstrong went so far to tell Madison that DC had little strategic value to the British. On 20 August 1814, Secretary of State James Monroe decided to find out what was really going on and he took to his horse. Soon, Monroe saw that the British invasion had already started, but even Monroe, a former officer in the Revolutionary War, couldn’t ascertain the true target of the British.
On 24 August 1814, the British attacked Bladensburg (MD), 8 miles from DC, and by doing so showed their hand: DC was their ultimate target. Around 7000 US troops faced 4000 British troops, but once the British engaged the US soldiers, they turned and ran as fast as the could (the “Bladensburg Races”). Once in DC, snipers fired on British troops, and the British commander ordered the house from which they fired burned, which then started a cascade of conflagrations, which soon meant that the President’s House (it wasn’t called the White House until after the War of 1812 after it was refurbished and repainted with many coats of whitewash) was targeted for destruction. The British also set fire to other government buildings and to specific newspaper buildings/presses. Even after a hurricane forced the British out of DC, the US government was homeless; the only good news was that Armstrong was sacked, and SecState Monroe became the Acting SecWar. But not even Monroe could provide, at least right away, the kind of government assistance that Jackson needed . . . and the negotiations in Ghent were going nowhere.
On 24 August 1814, the British attacked Bladensburg (MD), 8 miles from DC, and by doing so showed their hand: DC was their ultimate target. Around 7000 US troops faced 4000 British troops, but once the British engaged the US soldiers, they turned and ran as fast as the could (the “Bladensburg Races”). Once in DC, snipers fired on British troops, and the British commander ordered the house from which they fired burned, which then started a cascade of conflagrations, which soon meant that the President’s House (it wasn’t called the White House until after the War of 1812 after it was refurbished and repainted with many coats of whitewash) was targeted for destruction. The British also set fire to other government buildings and to specific newspaper buildings/presses. Even after a hurricane forced the British out of DC, the US government was homeless; the only good news was that Armstrong was sacked, and SecState Monroe became the Acting SecWar. But not even Monroe could provide, at least right away, the kind of government assistance that Jackson needed . . . and the negotiations in Ghent were going nowhere.
2 September 1814, Bataria Bay south of New Orleans: the British attempted to meet with Jean Lafitte, and emissaries were taken to the pirate who welcomed them, and led them to his very comfortable house. Lafitte was invited to join the British for their upcoming offensive, but Lafitte had difficulty at that moment deciding whether he was being asked or being coerced. The British emissaries told Lafitte that he would receive $30,000 in cash plus land grants, as well as pardons for his men that were currently incarcerated. Lafitte was also told that New Orleans was the ultimate target for the British: the message was clear - join the British or be destroyed.
Lafitte told the British he needed time to consider their offer, and the British emissaries had no choice but to wait overnight since their boat was “guarded” by Lafitte’s men . . . Lafitte assured the British emissaries that they would have safe passage back to their ship the following morning. After the British left, Lafitte drafted his formal response, saying that he would meet them again in two weeks to give his answer. Lafitte chose to be a double agent, in that he wrote a close friend in New Orleans of the British intentions on the city. Lafitte also wrote to the governor of New Orleans to not only alert him, but to also offer his services in defense of the city. Whether or not Jackson wanted him, Jean Lafitte had thrown in his lot with the New Orleans and the general.
Lafitte told the British he needed time to consider their offer, and the British emissaries had no choice but to wait overnight since their boat was “guarded” by Lafitte’s men . . . Lafitte assured the British emissaries that they would have safe passage back to their ship the following morning. After the British left, Lafitte drafted his formal response, saying that he would meet them again in two weeks to give his answer. Lafitte chose to be a double agent, in that he wrote a close friend in New Orleans of the British intentions on the city. Lafitte also wrote to the governor of New Orleans to not only alert him, but to also offer his services in defense of the city. Whether or not Jackson wanted him, Jean Lafitte had thrown in his lot with the New Orleans and the general.
Over a week would pass until Jackson was told about the British “offer” to Lafitte, but Jackson was far more concerned about holding Mobile (AL), 150 miles to the east of New Orleans. But before Jackson could inspect the defenses at Fort Bowyer, the British made their move on the fort on 13 September 1814. In no way did Jackson want his small advancing force to be captured, so he headed back to Mobile and hoped that the fort could withstand the British onslaught . . . but Jackson had to get Mobile ready if the British advanced.
Unknown to Jackson, the British had a land force that was ready to attack Fort Bowyer from behind as well as from the water. But Jackson’s men at Fort Bowyer were made of much sterner stuff than the soldiers at Bladensburg, and the British land force’s advance was frustrated. The US guns from the fort were able to match the British guns from their ships, and the engagement was a stalemate, but it was only a matter of time until the guns at Fort Bowyer ran out of ammunition. And then one of the fort’s cannon shots hit the anchor chain of one of the British ships, and the current took it wo within 600 yards from the fort, where it ran into a submerged sandbar. The British had to abandon the ship since it was under direct fire from the fort, and three hours later, the British ship exploded.
Unknown to Jackson, the British had a land force that was ready to attack Fort Bowyer from behind as well as from the water. But Jackson’s men at Fort Bowyer were made of much sterner stuff than the soldiers at Bladensburg, and the British land force’s advance was frustrated. The US guns from the fort were able to match the British guns from their ships, and the engagement was a stalemate, but it was only a matter of time until the guns at Fort Bowyer ran out of ammunition. And then one of the fort’s cannon shots hit the anchor chain of one of the British ships, and the current took it wo within 600 yards from the fort, where it ran into a submerged sandbar. The British had to abandon the ship since it was under direct fire from the fort, and three hours later, the British ship exploded.
Jackson, even though he was 30 miles away, saw the fireball of the explosion of the British ship on the horizon, but many anxious hours would pass until Jackson received confirmation that Fort Bowyer remained in American hands. The three remaining British ships sailed away from the fort even though they had at least a 10:1 advantage in manpower: 158 US defenders had denied the British access to Mobile Bay and Mobile. Jackson wrote SecWar/SecState Monroe to inform him of the victory, but if Monroe had time to savor the news, it didn’t last long since it was about at the same time that the British attacked Fort McHenry. In a much larger-scale version of the attack on Fort Bowyer, the British were denied their goal of advancing to Baltimore.
Jackson, without the large numbers necessary to defend all the strategic locations in the Gulf, had to try and out-guess the British, and for the moment, Jackson stayed in Mobile to gather intelligence. Jackson set about to reinforce Fort Bowyer while while waiting for reinforcements. The guns from the destroyed British ship were taken and installed in Fort Bowyer, and once Jackson was satisfied with the fort’s defenses, he was ready to try and find a way to remove the British from Pensacola (in Spanish Florida, 50 miles east of Mobile). The Spanish had granted the British free use of Pensacola’s harbor, which meant that the British cold mount an overland attack on New Orleans.
Soon enough, Jackson’s force exceeded 4000 men, but he didn’t have any direction or permission from DC to take Pensacola . . . Jackson even received instructions from DC to stay away from Pensacola, since Madison and Monroe were afraid that Spain might enter the war. However, via backchannels, Monroe told Jackson that he was “authorized” to attack Pensacola, and that he would receive “support”. Monroe understood the strategic significance of Pensacola, and Jackson knew that if his attack failed, he would bear the political blame, not Madison. Jackson knew that if he took Fort Barrancas he would be able to control Pensacola Bay, and the British fleet would be forced to leave . . . but the problem was that the British held the fort. On 6 November 1814, Jackson halted just two miles from Pensacola. Jackson decided to communicate with the Spanish governor of Florida first, and the general demanded that the Spaniards expel the British and give the fort to him, and the Spanish governor refused.
Jackson, without the large numbers necessary to defend all the strategic locations in the Gulf, had to try and out-guess the British, and for the moment, Jackson stayed in Mobile to gather intelligence. Jackson set about to reinforce Fort Bowyer while while waiting for reinforcements. The guns from the destroyed British ship were taken and installed in Fort Bowyer, and once Jackson was satisfied with the fort’s defenses, he was ready to try and find a way to remove the British from Pensacola (in Spanish Florida, 50 miles east of Mobile). The Spanish had granted the British free use of Pensacola’s harbor, which meant that the British cold mount an overland attack on New Orleans.
Soon enough, Jackson’s force exceeded 4000 men, but he didn’t have any direction or permission from DC to take Pensacola . . . Jackson even received instructions from DC to stay away from Pensacola, since Madison and Monroe were afraid that Spain might enter the war. However, via backchannels, Monroe told Jackson that he was “authorized” to attack Pensacola, and that he would receive “support”. Monroe understood the strategic significance of Pensacola, and Jackson knew that if his attack failed, he would bear the political blame, not Madison. Jackson knew that if he took Fort Barrancas he would be able to control Pensacola Bay, and the British fleet would be forced to leave . . . but the problem was that the British held the fort. On 6 November 1814, Jackson halted just two miles from Pensacola. Jackson decided to communicate with the Spanish governor of Florida first, and the general demanded that the Spaniards expel the British and give the fort to him, and the Spanish governor refused.
At Ghent, as far as the US diplomats were concerned, negotiations were moving forward, but not nearly as quickly as desired. The British had insisted that the proposed treaty contain two Latin words, “uti possidetis”, which meant that when the war was over, whatever land each had had, that side kept. Gallatin correctly concluded that the British were in the process of trying to take New Orleans, which would mean that US expansion west would be controlled by the British . . . and at that point there was nothing that JQA, Clay, or Gallatin could do about those two Latin words.
During the night of 7 November 1814, Jackson moved all but 500 of his men into the woods outside of Pensacola. The Spanish defenses still believed that Jackson’s army was still in camp since their guns were trained on the (empty) tents. The British were focused on the western approach to Pensacola, so Jackson took both the Spanish and British by surprise. Jackson quickly overran the Spaniards and the British blew up the ordnance at the fort, which meant that Fort Barrancas was unusable. However, Pensacola was defenseless, even though Jackson didn’t gain the fort. More importantly, the British would not be able to use Pensacola as their base of attack on New Orleans on land.
Jackson was by far the most effective general in the US Army, as Madison and Monroe well knew; somehow, the President and Acting SecWar found $100k for Jackson’s army and promised the general additional soldiers. In just three days, Jackson was back in Mobile, where he received letters from Monroe telling him what he already knew, that the British had designs on New Orleans . . . on 22 November 1814, Jackson started his men towards the city.
During the night of 7 November 1814, Jackson moved all but 500 of his men into the woods outside of Pensacola. The Spanish defenses still believed that Jackson’s army was still in camp since their guns were trained on the (empty) tents. The British were focused on the western approach to Pensacola, so Jackson took both the Spanish and British by surprise. Jackson quickly overran the Spaniards and the British blew up the ordnance at the fort, which meant that Fort Barrancas was unusable. However, Pensacola was defenseless, even though Jackson didn’t gain the fort. More importantly, the British would not be able to use Pensacola as their base of attack on New Orleans on land.
Jackson was by far the most effective general in the US Army, as Madison and Monroe well knew; somehow, the President and Acting SecWar found $100k for Jackson’s army and promised the general additional soldiers. In just three days, Jackson was back in Mobile, where he received letters from Monroe telling him what he already knew, that the British had designs on New Orleans . . . on 22 November 1814, Jackson started his men towards the city.
26 November 1814, Jamaica: the largest fleet assembled in the history of the Western Hemisphere, featuring 50 large vessels, was ready to sail; the British were making their move on New Orleans. Among the 50 ships were 6 Ships of the Line, each with 74 guns, 8 three-masted frigates w/ 38 or more guns, and there were schooners, sloops, and barges, all of them with guns. There were also cargo ships whose job it was to carry away the spoils from taking New Orleans. However, this immense fleet left Jamaica before all of General Edward Pakenham's forces were present.
Jackson didn’t know for certain if the British fleet was indeed heading to New Orleans, and he had no way to know the size of the fleet, but Jackson assumed a large British force was heading his way. Jackson took an overland route from Mobile to New Orleans, gathering as much intelligence as he could along the way. Jackson planned on a trek lasting 12 days traveling 300 miles, needing to blaze his own trail in some parts, but it only took him 10 days to reach New Orleans.
When Jackson reached the outskirts of New Orleans, a carriage took him and his aids to the city, where many wanted to meet the “Savior of New Orleans”. Since Jackson didn’t speak French, his old Congressional colleague who lived in New Orleans, Edward Livingston, served as interpreter. Additionally, Livingston would serve Jackson as his secretary and confidant, and Livingston’s inside knowledge of how things worked in New Orleans became invaluable to the general.
Addendum: The Beginning of the Battle of Lake Borgne . . .
Jackson didn’t know for certain if the British fleet was indeed heading to New Orleans, and he had no way to know the size of the fleet, but Jackson assumed a large British force was heading his way. Jackson took an overland route from Mobile to New Orleans, gathering as much intelligence as he could along the way. Jackson planned on a trek lasting 12 days traveling 300 miles, needing to blaze his own trail in some parts, but it only took him 10 days to reach New Orleans.
When Jackson reached the outskirts of New Orleans, a carriage took him and his aids to the city, where many wanted to meet the “Savior of New Orleans”. Since Jackson didn’t speak French, his old Congressional colleague who lived in New Orleans, Edward Livingston, served as interpreter. Additionally, Livingston would serve Jackson as his secretary and confidant, and Livingston’s inside knowledge of how things worked in New Orleans became invaluable to the general.
Addendum: The Beginning of the Battle of Lake Borgne . . .