Source: Brian Kilmeade & Don Yaeger. Andrew Jackson And The Miracle of New
Orleans - The Battle That Shaped America's Destiny (2017)
Orleans - The Battle That Shaped America's Destiny (2017)
The USS Carolina and now the USS Louisiana, continued to shell the British camp, and US snipers were in the area targeting any British soldier that was in their range. At night, British sentries were hit by US cavalry, and worse were the raids by Choctaws on the sentries. At 2 pm on Christmas Day 1814, General Edward Pakenham and the remaining troops arrived at the camp. Pakenham was the rare British general that truly shared the danger with his men, and he had proven his worth/stature in that he was one of the key generals that led to the defeat of Napoleon. He had been WIA many times, but this as Sir Edward Pakenham’s first real independent command.
Pakenham immediately saw that his attack would occur in a tight area with the Mississippi River on one side and a cypress swamp on the other. Pakenham was not very happy, to say the least, to find out that those in command before he arrived had placed him in such a limiting position. At an officer’s meeting, Pakenham mentioned that he would like to withdraw to a more favorable location, but Admiral Cochrane sharply disagreed, insulted at the mere suggestion that there had been any failure while he had been command. Cochrane in essence triple-dog-dared Pakenham to take the US position with his army, or Cochrane’s marines would do so. Pakenham was surprised at Cochrane’s outburst, and he needed the admiral’s assistance and ships. Pakenham realized that he was stuck, and that he needed to make the best of an awful strategic location . . . but his first plan was to destroy the USS Carolina.
Pakenham immediately saw that his attack would occur in a tight area with the Mississippi River on one side and a cypress swamp on the other. Pakenham was not very happy, to say the least, to find out that those in command before he arrived had placed him in such a limiting position. At an officer’s meeting, Pakenham mentioned that he would like to withdraw to a more favorable location, but Admiral Cochrane sharply disagreed, insulted at the mere suggestion that there had been any failure while he had been command. Cochrane in essence triple-dog-dared Pakenham to take the US position with his army, or Cochrane’s marines would do so. Pakenham was surprised at Cochrane’s outburst, and he needed the admiral’s assistance and ships. Pakenham realized that he was stuck, and that he needed to make the best of an awful strategic location . . . but his first plan was to destroy the USS Carolina.
27 December 1814: Jackson saw from his vantage point in the top floor of his “Headquarters House” that British cannon were targeting the Carolina. As far as Jackson knew, the British battery hadn’t been there the day before. Pakenham was in direct command of the battery; the artillery had been brought to the levee during Christmas night, and the guns were spaced by several hundred yards, making them very difficult for the Carolina to hit. Pakenham made sure that other necessary preparations were made for defending/stabilizing the guns on the soft soil.
Jackson ordered the Louisiana to sail out of range of the British artillery. The Carolina returned fire with the only long-range gun it had, its 12 pounder. Jackson watched as the British artillery kept hitting the Carolina, and a cannon fireball penetrated deep in the bowels of the ship, and the Carolina was soon fully ablaze. Then Jackson saw the British train their guns on the Louisiana, who had been unable to sail out of range due to the current and no wind. The only escape for the Louisiana was upriver, and the Louisiana had to be moved manually, both by oarsmen on boats and from those on shore pulling ropes. Soon enough, the Louisiana was moved half-a-mile out of range of the British guns.
Jackson ordered the Louisiana to sail out of range of the British artillery. The Carolina returned fire with the only long-range gun it had, its 12 pounder. Jackson watched as the British artillery kept hitting the Carolina, and a cannon fireball penetrated deep in the bowels of the ship, and the Carolina was soon fully ablaze. Then Jackson saw the British train their guns on the Louisiana, who had been unable to sail out of range due to the current and no wind. The only escape for the Louisiana was upriver, and the Louisiana had to be moved manually, both by oarsmen on boats and from those on shore pulling ropes. Soon enough, the Louisiana was moved half-a-mile out of range of the British guns.
Pakenham still lacked specific knowledge of Jackson’s strength/location, so next for Pakenham was to get rid of the snipers and cavalry that kept him from finding out what he needed to know. On 28 December 1814, Pakenham organized a force that would reconnoiter, and if possible, attack Jackson’s position. Pakenham simply didn’t believe that Jackson would be the kind of worthy adversary he had faced in Europe. Soon enough, Pakenham received reports that the US line was dug in from river-to-swamp with 5 foot high breastworks.
Lafitte, meanwhile, had told Jackson that his line was still vulnerable unless he extended it into the swamp. Jackson, to his credit, immediately acted on Lafitte’s advice. Pakenham, now seeing Jackson’s line with his own eyes, was surprised to see five big guns visible among the breastworks. Jackson had taken advice from ditch digging slaves that bales of cotton should be used to fill the muddy hollows. Cotton bales were buried and connected by iron rings with wooden platforms on top where the big guns were placed. Pakenham and his force came within a half mile of Jackson’s line on the canal. But the Volunteers and Riflemen were hitting what they aimed at, and the Louisiana was firing from the river. Pakenham quickly understood that he didn’t have nearly enough artillery in play, and he sent orders to bring up more guns.
While all this occurred, Jackson received a messenger from the governor of New Orleans, informing Jackson that serious talk had developed in the city about surrendering to the British. Jackson informed the messenger that if he couldn’t save the city, he would burn New Orleans to the ground, cut off the British from receiving any supplies from downriver, and force them to eventually leave. Jackson made it crystal clear that New Orleans would never raise the white flag as long as he was alive and in command.
Pakenham had seen enough and he ordered a withdrawal. British soldiers were ashamed and upset with the humiliating retreat after their proud advance into battle, but Pakenham at least had the information about Jackson’s defenses that he needed. Pakenham knew that the deadly US artillery would have to be silenced for the next advance to succeed. Jackson installed a 32 pounder in the center of his line, knowing the British would return in greater force.
Lafitte, meanwhile, had told Jackson that his line was still vulnerable unless he extended it into the swamp. Jackson, to his credit, immediately acted on Lafitte’s advice. Pakenham, now seeing Jackson’s line with his own eyes, was surprised to see five big guns visible among the breastworks. Jackson had taken advice from ditch digging slaves that bales of cotton should be used to fill the muddy hollows. Cotton bales were buried and connected by iron rings with wooden platforms on top where the big guns were placed. Pakenham and his force came within a half mile of Jackson’s line on the canal. But the Volunteers and Riflemen were hitting what they aimed at, and the Louisiana was firing from the river. Pakenham quickly understood that he didn’t have nearly enough artillery in play, and he sent orders to bring up more guns.
While all this occurred, Jackson received a messenger from the governor of New Orleans, informing Jackson that serious talk had developed in the city about surrendering to the British. Jackson informed the messenger that if he couldn’t save the city, he would burn New Orleans to the ground, cut off the British from receiving any supplies from downriver, and force them to eventually leave. Jackson made it crystal clear that New Orleans would never raise the white flag as long as he was alive and in command.
Pakenham had seen enough and he ordered a withdrawal. British soldiers were ashamed and upset with the humiliating retreat after their proud advance into battle, but Pakenham at least had the information about Jackson’s defenses that he needed. Pakenham knew that the deadly US artillery would have to be silenced for the next advance to succeed. Jackson installed a 32 pounder in the center of his line, knowing the British would return in greater force.
For the next three days the armies kept their distance, but during that time, Jackson had reinforced and extended his line into the swamp. Jackson also ordered secondary lines of defense behind his main line just in case they were needed. On the opposite bank of the Mississippi River from his position, Jackson had Patterson bring cannon ashore from the Louisiana for flanking fire on the British advance.
Pakenham ordered artillery to be located just 600 yards from Jackson’s line, and his men did so stealthily at night. Fog kept Jackson’s men from seeing what the British had done overnight, but intelligence indicated that Pakenham had heavily reinforced his army. When the fog cleared, the British guns focused much of their fire on the HQ house where Jackson was located. Over 100 cannon balls hit the HQ house, but no one was injured.
Jackson went to the line at the canal, and he noticed more British soldiers were in play with new/additional artillery. There was little Jackson could do but hope his own artillery could keep the British advance at bay. While the British had more cannon, the US guns were higher off the ground and more effective, but the British artillery proved damaging. Jackson rode up and down the line, exhorting/calming his men, and the line held, mostly due to the more accurate US artillery. Pakenham watched as his options faded, and once again the British retired from the field with nothing to show for their hardships or efforts.
Pakenham ordered artillery to be located just 600 yards from Jackson’s line, and his men did so stealthily at night. Fog kept Jackson’s men from seeing what the British had done overnight, but intelligence indicated that Pakenham had heavily reinforced his army. When the fog cleared, the British guns focused much of their fire on the HQ house where Jackson was located. Over 100 cannon balls hit the HQ house, but no one was injured.
Jackson went to the line at the canal, and he noticed more British soldiers were in play with new/additional artillery. There was little Jackson could do but hope his own artillery could keep the British advance at bay. While the British had more cannon, the US guns were higher off the ground and more effective, but the British artillery proved damaging. Jackson rode up and down the line, exhorting/calming his men, and the line held, mostly due to the more accurate US artillery. Pakenham watched as his options faded, and once again the British retired from the field with nothing to show for their hardships or efforts.
Dysentery had taken hold of the British camp, and rations were running low, since the army had taken almost everything consumable from nearby plantations. Sniper and artillery fire by the US continued as well, but Pakenham was undeterred given the conditions and setbacks so far. Pakenham’s plan was to break through Jackson’s line in using greater force, but in order to do so, he would need to take the US guns on the opposite shore of the Mississippi River, and then rain flanking artillery fire down on Jackson’s line. Yet again, the sense of impending victory took hold among the British ranks, especially with the addition of two more full regiments.
On 4 January 1815, 3000 militia had arrived, mostly Kentucky Riflemen, but they were badly outfitted and short weapons. Jackson had to threaten the governor of New Orleans to get off his behind and get all that was available from the city to his lines, and finally the additional Riflemen were set to go by 6 January 1815. Jackson located his 5000 men in terms of factions, with about 1000 of his men across the Mississippi.
On the evening of 7 January 1815, Jackson received intelligence from Patterson that the British were making a move on Jackson’s artillery across the river, and Patterson asked Jackson for reinforcements. Jackson had already sent Patterson 400 Riflemen . . . Jackson remained convinced that the British attack would be on his main line of defense, not across the river.
On 4 January 1815, 3000 militia had arrived, mostly Kentucky Riflemen, but they were badly outfitted and short weapons. Jackson had to threaten the governor of New Orleans to get off his behind and get all that was available from the city to his lines, and finally the additional Riflemen were set to go by 6 January 1815. Jackson located his 5000 men in terms of factions, with about 1000 of his men across the Mississippi.
On the evening of 7 January 1815, Jackson received intelligence from Patterson that the British were making a move on Jackson’s artillery across the river, and Patterson asked Jackson for reinforcements. Jackson had already sent Patterson 400 Riflemen . . . Jackson remained convinced that the British attack would be on his main line of defense, not across the river.
8 January 1815, the Battle of New Orleans: An American flag flew proudly at the center of Jackson’s line. Even before dawn, Pakenham received bad news, in that the attempt to take the US artillery on the opposite shore had been delayed, which meant there wouldn’t be any artillery flanking fire on Jackson’s line, at least not when Pakenham wanted it. The attempt had been delayed since Cochrane’s design for a temporary lock between the river and the bayou led to ships getting grounded.
The British contingent trying to cross the river was 8 hours behind schedule, and Pakenham had to decide whether to attack or delay. Pakenham decided to attack, hoping that the could break through Jackson’s line, even though the casualties would be great. Pakenham ordered a rocket to be fired to signal the advance, which Jackson easily saw; Jackson and his men had been at their position since 4 am. The British remained invisible due to heavy fog, so Jackson didn’t immediately see that Pakenham had divided his force into three brigades.
Under General Samuel Gibbs, the main attack would come from the British right, but his men forgot to bring scaling ladders, and they went back 500 yards to get them, which delayed their advance; military historians still debate whether that delay cost the British victory. The soldiers under Gibbs’ command that led the charge were decimated by Jackson’s force.
On the opposite flank along the river as a brigade commanded by Colonel Robert Rennie, and his orders were to take Jackson’s newly placed forward redoubt (protected cannon) at all costs. Pakenham needed that artillery silenced to prevent the slaughter of his troops in the open field. General John Keane led the other brigade, which was in the center, and Pakenham had a reserve brigade in the rear composed of the most recent arrivals. The US artillery fire started even before the fog had burned off, but Jackson’s men were able to see the redcoats nonetheless.
The British contingent trying to cross the river was 8 hours behind schedule, and Pakenham had to decide whether to attack or delay. Pakenham decided to attack, hoping that the could break through Jackson’s line, even though the casualties would be great. Pakenham ordered a rocket to be fired to signal the advance, which Jackson easily saw; Jackson and his men had been at their position since 4 am. The British remained invisible due to heavy fog, so Jackson didn’t immediately see that Pakenham had divided his force into three brigades.
Under General Samuel Gibbs, the main attack would come from the British right, but his men forgot to bring scaling ladders, and they went back 500 yards to get them, which delayed their advance; military historians still debate whether that delay cost the British victory. The soldiers under Gibbs’ command that led the charge were decimated by Jackson’s force.
On the opposite flank along the river as a brigade commanded by Colonel Robert Rennie, and his orders were to take Jackson’s newly placed forward redoubt (protected cannon) at all costs. Pakenham needed that artillery silenced to prevent the slaughter of his troops in the open field. General John Keane led the other brigade, which was in the center, and Pakenham had a reserve brigade in the rear composed of the most recent arrivals. The US artillery fire started even before the fog had burned off, but Jackson’s men were able to see the redcoats nonetheless.