Source: William K. Klingaman. The Darkest Year -
The American Home Front, 1941 - 1942 (2019)
The American Home Front, 1941 - 1942 (2019)
A full nine months after Pearl, US cities remained totally unprepared for enemy bomber attacks, with virtually every city struggling to create an effective warning system. So sad were preparations on the Atlantic Coast that U-Boats were able to get several spies/saboteurs into the US on Long Island in September 1942. Those German spies were eventually rounded up by the FBI; their goal had been to among other things sow panic by poisoning NYC’s water supply. Suddenly, in a precursor to the 2nd Red Scare after the war, Americans saw spies and saboteurs everywhere. The FBI rounded up about 200 German aliens suspected of being up to no good and sent them to Ellis Island.
By the Fall of 1942, a fair metaphor for the level of attention and involvement of the US public towards the war was that the US was “ankle deep” so far. More and more citizens came to the conclusion that as close to full mobilization as possible for war was needed for the nation. The U-Boat attacks alone in the North Atlantic meant that the US would not reach the number of merchant ships in the fleet before Pearl until mid-1943 at the earliest. In effect, most Americans believed that the level of war production was at a very high level, but the truth was that, while improved from Spring 1942, production was just crawling along by August 1942.
Ford’s defense production actually declined during the Summer of 1942. The WPB knew that factories struggled to produce more since raw materials were still scarce (e.g. hoarding); overall production fell 14% in August 1942. The main problem was the lack of discipline on the part of military authorities and industry leaders to turn the necessary corner. It wasn’t until the Fall of 1942 that the Navy and the War Department decided on which type of weapons, and how many, US forces most urgently needed. Before that point, procurement officers ordered a smorgasbord of everything, and defense industries continued to hoard raw materials and skilled workers.
By the Fall of 1942, a fair metaphor for the level of attention and involvement of the US public towards the war was that the US was “ankle deep” so far. More and more citizens came to the conclusion that as close to full mobilization as possible for war was needed for the nation. The U-Boat attacks alone in the North Atlantic meant that the US would not reach the number of merchant ships in the fleet before Pearl until mid-1943 at the earliest. In effect, most Americans believed that the level of war production was at a very high level, but the truth was that, while improved from Spring 1942, production was just crawling along by August 1942.
Ford’s defense production actually declined during the Summer of 1942. The WPB knew that factories struggled to produce more since raw materials were still scarce (e.g. hoarding); overall production fell 14% in August 1942. The main problem was the lack of discipline on the part of military authorities and industry leaders to turn the necessary corner. It wasn’t until the Fall of 1942 that the Navy and the War Department decided on which type of weapons, and how many, US forces most urgently needed. Before that point, procurement officers ordered a smorgasbord of everything, and defense industries continued to hoard raw materials and skilled workers.
The most pressing challenge was the manufacturing of steel. The WPB lost track of 20 million tons of steel, most if that amount was hidden away in various defense plants. Steel mills couldn’t meet military demands due to the shortage of scrap steel. The government pleaded with Americans to come up with metal in a scrap metal drive, with the goal of 17 million tons by the end of 1942. Confusion and ineptitude were beyond-common with government collection efforts, so local authorities took control of the scrap metal drive. Even so, by October 1942, the government asked Americans to donate old door keys.
Severe shortages in skilled manpower in defense plants plagued war production; Congress refused to fund what it considered to be yet another unnecessary additional bureaucracy from FDR to try and solve the labor shortage. Deteriorating housing conditions and/or shortages tightened the labor supply further. Detroit needed 170k additional workers by mid-1942, but there was no place to house them.
The largest drain on the pool of skilled workers remained the draft, since the Draft Board, which had exhausted Classification 1-A, moved on to lower classifications, taking men with physical problems, such as being blind in an eye or missing a finger(s). The War Department announced that by the end of 1943, the military would need 7.5 million men, which meant that potentially a few million war workers would be drafted, which would mean that men with irreplaceable skills would be drafted. FDR was advised by some of his top men, such as Baruch and the Truman Committee, that the President needed to protect war industries by at least immediately abolishing volunteer enlistments. Overtime was rising as well as absenteeism, which reached 9% by November 1942, and as high as 18% in some shipyards. Overwork was part of the reason for the absenteeism, but so was looking for other jobs, nursing hangovers, or hunting for gas; Mondays and the day after payday were the most “absent” days.
Severe shortages in skilled manpower in defense plants plagued war production; Congress refused to fund what it considered to be yet another unnecessary additional bureaucracy from FDR to try and solve the labor shortage. Deteriorating housing conditions and/or shortages tightened the labor supply further. Detroit needed 170k additional workers by mid-1942, but there was no place to house them.
The largest drain on the pool of skilled workers remained the draft, since the Draft Board, which had exhausted Classification 1-A, moved on to lower classifications, taking men with physical problems, such as being blind in an eye or missing a finger(s). The War Department announced that by the end of 1943, the military would need 7.5 million men, which meant that potentially a few million war workers would be drafted, which would mean that men with irreplaceable skills would be drafted. FDR was advised by some of his top men, such as Baruch and the Truman Committee, that the President needed to protect war industries by at least immediately abolishing volunteer enlistments. Overtime was rising as well as absenteeism, which reached 9% by November 1942, and as high as 18% in some shipyards. Overwork was part of the reason for the absenteeism, but so was looking for other jobs, nursing hangovers, or hunting for gas; Mondays and the day after payday were the most “absent” days.
During November 1942, the Truman Committee reported that absenteeism had reduced war production by as much as 10% is some defense plants (it was 25% at the Willow Run bomber plant outside of Detroit). By the Fall of 1942, more occupations had opened to women than ever before, replacing men that were off to war. Nearly 13 million women worked outside the home by the Fall of 1942, which war about 25% of the women of working age, and about 25% of all workers. That number/percentage had steadily increased since Pearl, but not spectacularly so. At the start of 1942, 500k women were employed at defense plants, which was about 10% of the war production labor force. As more women were hired for unskilled labor, defense plants absolutely refused to consider women for highly skilled vacancies.
The aircraft defense industry led the way in hiring women, since many of the jobs didn’t require a great deal of physical labor, and that many male workers had been drafted. Aircraft production supervisors noted that women workers required much less supervision, had fewer accidents, damaged fewer tools, and increased overall productivity . . . and they were less likely to be absent or quit compared to male workers. By the Summer of 1942, an airplane plant in Baltimore employed 5000 women workers and planned to hire thousands more.
On the other end of the spectrum, former automobile plants resisted hiring women as long as possible until no other real options existed. By February 1942, only 5000 women were employed in defense plants in the Detroit area, with Ford hiring less than 100. Shipyards were even less welcoming towards hiring women, with less than 1% of their workforce women by the Summer of 1942. The real concern for labor unions in shipyards was that women were a cheap replacement for unskilled jobs.
The aircraft defense industry led the way in hiring women, since many of the jobs didn’t require a great deal of physical labor, and that many male workers had been drafted. Aircraft production supervisors noted that women workers required much less supervision, had fewer accidents, damaged fewer tools, and increased overall productivity . . . and they were less likely to be absent or quit compared to male workers. By the Summer of 1942, an airplane plant in Baltimore employed 5000 women workers and planned to hire thousands more.
On the other end of the spectrum, former automobile plants resisted hiring women as long as possible until no other real options existed. By February 1942, only 5000 women were employed in defense plants in the Detroit area, with Ford hiring less than 100. Shipyards were even less welcoming towards hiring women, with less than 1% of their workforce women by the Summer of 1942. The real concern for labor unions in shipyards was that women were a cheap replacement for unskilled jobs.
The war production worker crisis worsened in August/September 1942, which led to resistance weakening for hiring women under the age or 25. By late-September 1942, 2.5 million women were employed in war related jobs, which was about 20% of the total war production workforce. The government stated that by the end of 1943, 3.5 million more women would need to be hired. During a Fireside Chat on 12 October 1942, FDR told defense plants that they had no choice but to hire millions of women, and also African-Americans, and to get past their negative opinions on both groups.
The government predicted that five million women would need to be hired in the next 12 months. The vast majority of women hired were for tedious unskilled jobs, and by November 1942 turnover for women workers became a concern. Government recruiting campaigns and higher wages helped, but women started skipping work like men, with married women doing so at a higher rate since in essence that had to do 2+ jobs.
Many rural towns delayed the start of school, thinking it patriotic, and as a result the rate of juvenile delinquency skyrocketed. The FBI stated that arrests of kids under the age of 21 increased by 17% during 1942, even though the overall population of that age group had dropped due to the draft. Enrollment in colleges and universities had dropped by 14% by the Fall of 1942, and America waited for the inevitable, when the government would start to draft 18 and 19 year olds, which was something the military had wanted to do since Pearl. Gallup conducted a poll in June 1942, and 52% were against drafting teens, with 42% in support. During that summer, Congress simply refused to deal with the military requests to lower the draft age, as did FDR, undoubtedly since the Congressional Elections of 1942 were on the horizon.
By Columbus Day 1942, FDR publicly admitted that it would be necessary to lower the draft age. Soon afterwards the House voted 345 - 16 to do so, but the bill became stalled in the Senate, which simply didn’t want to act before the midterms. The Senate delayed long enough where when it passed its version, the Conference Committee bill would be delayed until after the Congressional Elections of 1942.
The government predicted that five million women would need to be hired in the next 12 months. The vast majority of women hired were for tedious unskilled jobs, and by November 1942 turnover for women workers became a concern. Government recruiting campaigns and higher wages helped, but women started skipping work like men, with married women doing so at a higher rate since in essence that had to do 2+ jobs.
Many rural towns delayed the start of school, thinking it patriotic, and as a result the rate of juvenile delinquency skyrocketed. The FBI stated that arrests of kids under the age of 21 increased by 17% during 1942, even though the overall population of that age group had dropped due to the draft. Enrollment in colleges and universities had dropped by 14% by the Fall of 1942, and America waited for the inevitable, when the government would start to draft 18 and 19 year olds, which was something the military had wanted to do since Pearl. Gallup conducted a poll in June 1942, and 52% were against drafting teens, with 42% in support. During that summer, Congress simply refused to deal with the military requests to lower the draft age, as did FDR, undoubtedly since the Congressional Elections of 1942 were on the horizon.
By Columbus Day 1942, FDR publicly admitted that it would be necessary to lower the draft age. Soon afterwards the House voted 345 - 16 to do so, but the bill became stalled in the Senate, which simply didn’t want to act before the midterms. The Senate delayed long enough where when it passed its version, the Conference Committee bill would be delayed until after the Congressional Elections of 1942.
The shortage of cargo shipping space and the unrelenting attacks on Brazilian cargo ships off the coast of South America further decreased the supply of coffee in the US. On 21 August 1942, the WPB reduced the civilian consumption of coffee further to 65% of prewar consumption (8 cups/week). Predictably, Americans once again engaged in panic-buying to hoard as much coffee as possible; consumers didn’t know that long term storage of roasted and/or ground coffee would make the beverage at least somewhat unpalatable. Nothing grocery stores did to slow down the pace of buying coffee worked. On 26 October 1942, the government announced that coffee rationing would begin on 28 November 1942, which meant that an American over the age of 15 would only be able to buy one pound of coffee every five weeks (1 cup of coffee a day).
On the heels of coffee rationing came meat rationing. The per capita consumption of red meat in America rose 10% in 1941 to 3 pounds per week. The rise in red meat consumption was largely due to the increased number of war workers. Millions of Americans were able to afford red meat since the grip of the Great Depression had been tremendously lessened. Although farmer/ranchers produced unprecedented amounts of red meat, increasing domestic demand combined with the demand from the military led to a sharp shortage.
On the heels of coffee rationing came meat rationing. The per capita consumption of red meat in America rose 10% in 1941 to 3 pounds per week. The rise in red meat consumption was largely due to the increased number of war workers. Millions of Americans were able to afford red meat since the grip of the Great Depression had been tremendously lessened. Although farmer/ranchers produced unprecedented amounts of red meat, increasing domestic demand combined with the demand from the military led to a sharp shortage.
As with sugar, gas, and coffee, despite reminders, encouragement, and even triple-dog-dares by the government (e.g. “Meatless Tuesdays”), the buying drain on red meat continued. By August 1942, the government announced that it would start meat rationing in early-1943. The government asked that the 114m “Carnivorous Adults” in the nation limit themselves to 2.5 pounds or red meat per week. Chicken and fish were not restricted, but there wasn’t enough poultry to make up the difference, in large part because the government had purchased nearly all the (below-normal level) salmon, tuna, and sardine catches.
Americans were stunned that there could be anything resembling a food shortage in the nation, and once again, the government had to go down the road of coercion in order to change behavior. Before long, consumers had to find substitutes for red meat (e.g. liver), and many restaurants in effect started to serve child portions for adults. On 2 December 1942, the government announced that meat rationing would go into effect in early-January 1943. The government reminded Americans that nationwide gas rationing would begin on 1 December 1942; those west of the Appalachian Mountains continued to ignore government pleas to drive less to conserve rubber and gas, with highly-paid war workers simply not caring about minimizing their driving.
The government gave the power to local authorities to take gas ration books from speeders. All car drivers had to have their tires inspected every four month to check for wear-and-tear; a motorist could only legally drive if he had an approved tire-check certificate. Car owners were limited to only one spare tire per vehicle. Nationwide opposition to gas rationing and tire restrictions grew as the 1 December 1942 deadline drew near, with some critics comparing FDR to Hitler in terms of crushing liberties. Leading figures in the FDR administration labeled the scofflaw behavior as “ignorant” or “intentionally traitorous”. Many war workers threatened to walk away from their jobs if nationwide gas rationing was enacted and enforced.
Americans were stunned that there could be anything resembling a food shortage in the nation, and once again, the government had to go down the road of coercion in order to change behavior. Before long, consumers had to find substitutes for red meat (e.g. liver), and many restaurants in effect started to serve child portions for adults. On 2 December 1942, the government announced that meat rationing would go into effect in early-January 1943. The government reminded Americans that nationwide gas rationing would begin on 1 December 1942; those west of the Appalachian Mountains continued to ignore government pleas to drive less to conserve rubber and gas, with highly-paid war workers simply not caring about minimizing their driving.
The government gave the power to local authorities to take gas ration books from speeders. All car drivers had to have their tires inspected every four month to check for wear-and-tear; a motorist could only legally drive if he had an approved tire-check certificate. Car owners were limited to only one spare tire per vehicle. Nationwide opposition to gas rationing and tire restrictions grew as the 1 December 1942 deadline drew near, with some critics comparing FDR to Hitler in terms of crushing liberties. Leading figures in the FDR administration labeled the scofflaw behavior as “ignorant” or “intentionally traitorous”. Many war workers threatened to walk away from their jobs if nationwide gas rationing was enacted and enforced.
The rationing of heating oil was next, since that petroleum product was the #1 way to heat homes in 1942, and the supply of heating oil was low for the same reasons gasoline supplies were low. On 1 August 1942, FDR told Americans to be prepared for heating oil shortages in the upcoming winter. Fewer than 1% of the US population changed from heating oil to coal burners, even though coal was plentiful. Half of the home furnaces in America had originally burned coal, but had been converted to heating oil. Millions of Americans, especially in the East, simply dismissed the announced heating oil shortage as yet another myth fabricated by DC. Millions just watched/waited for their neighbors to convert their furnaces to coal so they didn’t have to.
On 15 September 1942, the government announced that the rationing of heating oil would begin on 1 October 1942 in 30 states, including most of the East Coast and much of the Midwest, as far west as Nebraska and the Dakotas. Government officials hoped to be able to supply 75% of normal amounts of heating oil so Americans could keep their thermostats at 65 degrees; transportation problems with heating oil led the government to lower the target to 67%. And (of course) the government formula for allocating heating oil left Americans frustrated and confused, in that filling out government forms for heating oil was like completing a complicated tax return.
By late-September 1942, wood burning stoves had disappeared from US stores, and firewood suppliers were almost out, and there wasn’t enough manpower to cut down enough trees or to transport firewood. Coupon books for heating oil were not even scheduled to be issued by the government until late-November 1942, and further transportation problems with heating oil led the government to again lower the percentage allotted. Government officials told Americans that the nation had yet barely begun to feel the effects of the war at home. H.L. Mencken stated that at last the nation was in the process of figuring out that the war might actually affect them, and for quite some time.
Addendum: The Rest of 1942 . . .
On 15 September 1942, the government announced that the rationing of heating oil would begin on 1 October 1942 in 30 states, including most of the East Coast and much of the Midwest, as far west as Nebraska and the Dakotas. Government officials hoped to be able to supply 75% of normal amounts of heating oil so Americans could keep their thermostats at 65 degrees; transportation problems with heating oil led the government to lower the target to 67%. And (of course) the government formula for allocating heating oil left Americans frustrated and confused, in that filling out government forms for heating oil was like completing a complicated tax return.
By late-September 1942, wood burning stoves had disappeared from US stores, and firewood suppliers were almost out, and there wasn’t enough manpower to cut down enough trees or to transport firewood. Coupon books for heating oil were not even scheduled to be issued by the government until late-November 1942, and further transportation problems with heating oil led the government to again lower the percentage allotted. Government officials told Americans that the nation had yet barely begun to feel the effects of the war at home. H.L. Mencken stated that at last the nation was in the process of figuring out that the war might actually affect them, and for quite some time.
Addendum: The Rest of 1942 . . .
