Source: Lawrence O'Donnell. Playing With Fire - The 1968 Election
and the Transformation of American Politics (2017)
and the Transformation of American Politics (2017)
As the Democratic National Convention in Chicago was about to open, LBJ wasn’t just controlling the Platform Committee, bullying Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, and making secret phone calls to Richard Nixon . . . LBJ was reconsidering his decision not to run. Humphrey was behind both McCarthy and Nixon in the latest polls. Mayor Daley (and among other notable Democrats, Texas Governor John Connally) was all for drafting LBJ at the convention since he viewed Humphrey as too weak a candidate, and he was ready to make the necessary preparations. LBJ reached the point where he told Daley that he had made tentative plans to head to Chicago so he could be handy if the “Draft LBJ” movement became a reality.
Meanwhile, the anti-war protest groups made it clear that they would proceed with their marches/protests in public parks without city permits. The Chicago Police Department prepared for 12 hour shifts and 7000 troops at Fort Hood were being trained for riot control. Daley, the Governor of Illinois, and the Pentagon all agreed that the Illinois National Guard should be called up, which would bring the overall total to deal with the protesters (on paper) to 40,000.
The various protest groups taunted Chicago’s municipal government (e.g. threatening to dump LSD in the city’s water system), and a few days ahead of the convention, the Yippies were already in Lincoln Park, as was the Student Democratic Society (SDS). Officials from the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (MOBE) came to the park to train protesters in self-defense and confrontational non-violent tactics. It wasn’t long before Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, Jerry Rubin, Abbie Hoffman, and Dave Dellinger (all would be named as part of the “Chicago 8”) figured out that they wouldn’t come close to their goal of 300k - 500k protesters in Chicago. Lincoln Park was under 24 hour surveillance by the authorities, and soon there were more police than protesters in the park; the question on everyone’s mind was what would occur at 11 pm when the park closed.
Meanwhile, the anti-war protest groups made it clear that they would proceed with their marches/protests in public parks without city permits. The Chicago Police Department prepared for 12 hour shifts and 7000 troops at Fort Hood were being trained for riot control. Daley, the Governor of Illinois, and the Pentagon all agreed that the Illinois National Guard should be called up, which would bring the overall total to deal with the protesters (on paper) to 40,000.
The various protest groups taunted Chicago’s municipal government (e.g. threatening to dump LSD in the city’s water system), and a few days ahead of the convention, the Yippies were already in Lincoln Park, as was the Student Democratic Society (SDS). Officials from the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (MOBE) came to the park to train protesters in self-defense and confrontational non-violent tactics. It wasn’t long before Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, Jerry Rubin, Abbie Hoffman, and Dave Dellinger (all would be named as part of the “Chicago 8”) figured out that they wouldn’t come close to their goal of 300k - 500k protesters in Chicago. Lincoln Park was under 24 hour surveillance by the authorities, and soon there were more police than protesters in the park; the question on everyone’s mind was what would occur at 11 pm when the park closed.
The Yippies, MOBE, and the SDS all stated that if ordered to leave by the police that the park should be vacated. By 9 pm there were fewer than 1000 protesters in Lincoln Park, and Allen Ginsberg was among them, changing “Om” while police moved into position to enforce the 11 pm closing. When some bonfires were started, police moved fast to put them out. When the police announced that the park was closed at 11 pm, Ginsburg led the protesters out of the park, and only a few straggling protesters were shooed out of the park by police.
The next day, Tom Hayden and MOBE led a large march of protesters to Grant Park, and the were left alone by the authorities; the result was a false sense of security/accomplishment on the part of Davis and Hayden. But later in the day in Lincoln Park, Davis and Hayden became frustrated that only 5000 showed up for a Yippie Music Festival, and that the police refused to allow flatbed trucks the deliver the concert sound system. So, Hayden and Davis thought it would be a good idea to remain in Lincoln Park after 11 pm to see what the police would do, and then quickly leave the park.
Soon after 9 pm in the dark, some protesters started throwing rocks at police, and when the rocks became an avalanche, the police (fully equipped in riot gear), moved in. For the next few hours, anyone in the way of the police was dealt with harshly, and tear gas was used when the protesters left the park and entered the streets. So, of course, in response the protesters clogged up traffic, and order wasn’t restored until 2 am.
The next day, Tom Hayden and MOBE led a large march of protesters to Grant Park, and the were left alone by the authorities; the result was a false sense of security/accomplishment on the part of Davis and Hayden. But later in the day in Lincoln Park, Davis and Hayden became frustrated that only 5000 showed up for a Yippie Music Festival, and that the police refused to allow flatbed trucks the deliver the concert sound system. So, Hayden and Davis thought it would be a good idea to remain in Lincoln Park after 11 pm to see what the police would do, and then quickly leave the park.
Soon after 9 pm in the dark, some protesters started throwing rocks at police, and when the rocks became an avalanche, the police (fully equipped in riot gear), moved in. For the next few hours, anyone in the way of the police was dealt with harshly, and tear gas was used when the protesters left the park and entered the streets. So, of course, in response the protesters clogged up traffic, and order wasn’t restored until 2 am.
The convention opened Monday night (26 August) at the Amphitheater and police, Illinois National Guard, and some US troops had already take up their positions. Daley made sure that the anti-war delegations were seated far from the podium, and that he was seated just three rows back from the podium so he could maintain eye contact and control the goings-on up front. The microphones of the anti-war delegations were muted or turned-down, while the other microphones worked just fine for the other delegations.
Daley then explored the possibility of a “Draft Ted Kennedy” movement, of which Senator Edward Kennedy (MA) wanted no part, and when LBJ got wind of it, he put a stop to the idea. Conventional wisdom had it if Kennedy was running, Humphrey would not have enough delegates to win on the first ballot, and so, to the anti-war faction, Kennedy seemed to be the best strategy to eventually nominate McCarthy. Soon after the opening gavel a bitter floor fight ensued over the “Unit Rule”. When placed in front of the whole floor, the Unit Rule was abolished, which meant that there would be no winner-take-all vote totals from the individual state delegations.
Then it was the turn of the Credentials Committee, and a floor fight occurred over the seating of the Georgia delegation (Joseph Rauh had challenged the delegations of three Southern states, including Governor Connally’s Texas delegation). Some McCarthy delegates wanted the Credentials Committee to deny seating all of Humphrey’s delegates, which infuriated the party’s power brokers regardless of region. Never before, in the brief history of televised political conventions, had viewers seen this level of conflict and antagonism on the floor amongst the delegates and the party leaders. At 11 pm in Lincoln Park, the scene was worse than the previous night, and this time TV cameras were positioned to capture the mayhem; to viewers, it seemed that there was no such thing to Chicago police as an innocent bystander.
Daley then explored the possibility of a “Draft Ted Kennedy” movement, of which Senator Edward Kennedy (MA) wanted no part, and when LBJ got wind of it, he put a stop to the idea. Conventional wisdom had it if Kennedy was running, Humphrey would not have enough delegates to win on the first ballot, and so, to the anti-war faction, Kennedy seemed to be the best strategy to eventually nominate McCarthy. Soon after the opening gavel a bitter floor fight ensued over the “Unit Rule”. When placed in front of the whole floor, the Unit Rule was abolished, which meant that there would be no winner-take-all vote totals from the individual state delegations.
Then it was the turn of the Credentials Committee, and a floor fight occurred over the seating of the Georgia delegation (Joseph Rauh had challenged the delegations of three Southern states, including Governor Connally’s Texas delegation). Some McCarthy delegates wanted the Credentials Committee to deny seating all of Humphrey’s delegates, which infuriated the party’s power brokers regardless of region. Never before, in the brief history of televised political conventions, had viewers seen this level of conflict and antagonism on the floor amongst the delegates and the party leaders. At 11 pm in Lincoln Park, the scene was worse than the previous night, and this time TV cameras were positioned to capture the mayhem; to viewers, it seemed that there was no such thing to Chicago police as an innocent bystander.
At 3 am, with no end in sight to the debate in terms of delegate credentials, the convention was gaveled to a close for the day, and soon the delegates came to realize that Chicago had become a war zone. Tuesday morning a closed session took place among those that wanted to “Draft Teddy”, and at the same time McCarthy in essence gave up, saying there was no way he could gain enough delegates to win the nomination. As a result, McCarthy offered to step aside in order to support Kennedy, and while many McCarthy delegates would refuse, he calculated that enough of his pledged delegates would go to Kennedy which would then deny Humphrey a victory on the first ballot.
McCarthy admitted to some that he would never have stepped aside for RFK, and nobody in the Ted Kennedy camp really trusted McCarthy. But the larger problem for those that wanted to draft Kennedy was Teddy himself, in that they needed to find a way to launch the Draft Kennedy movement without Kennedy stopping it. In other words, they needed to find a way to get it started, and then after it became public, be sure that Teddy said nothing afterwards to quash it . . . it needed to be a fait accompli. Anticipation among the delegates would quickly grow if Kennedy didn’t stop the draft, and when McCarthy took the state to endorse Teddy, the lid would pop off the floor. At that point, the Draft Kennedy supporters believed, Teddy would fly to Chicago to accept the nomination, and Humphrey (and the party bosses) would be denied.
McCarthy admitted to some that he would never have stepped aside for RFK, and nobody in the Ted Kennedy camp really trusted McCarthy. But the larger problem for those that wanted to draft Kennedy was Teddy himself, in that they needed to find a way to launch the Draft Kennedy movement without Kennedy stopping it. In other words, they needed to find a way to get it started, and then after it became public, be sure that Teddy said nothing afterwards to quash it . . . it needed to be a fait accompli. Anticipation among the delegates would quickly grow if Kennedy didn’t stop the draft, and when McCarthy took the state to endorse Teddy, the lid would pop off the floor. At that point, the Draft Kennedy supporters believed, Teddy would fly to Chicago to accept the nomination, and Humphrey (and the party bosses) would be denied.
The only problem left for the Draft Kennedy people was McCarthy, who had proven to be very erratic and moody during previous dealings with RFK; if McCarthy didn’t handle his end perfectly, the resulting humiliation for Teddy would be tremendous. The worst fear of the Draft Kennedy crowd was that once McCarthy’s name was placed in nomination, the ensuing cheering and adulation would encourage McCarthy to deviate from the plan, and he would refuse to release his delegates to Kennedy.
To Senator Edward Kennedy, the Draft Kennedy movement that was gaining steam on television looked like it was orchestrated by McCarthy; Teddy was afraid that it would appear that he was trying to push aside McCarthy, and that perception would damage his political standing then and for the future. So, Teddy believed that he had to immediately end the Draft Kennedy movement before any lasting damage could be done to his political career. Tuesday morning, Teddy called Humphrey and assured the Vice-President that he would not run; it would be another twelve years before Senator Edward Kennedy tried to pursue the nomination of the Democratic Party for President.
To Senator Edward Kennedy, the Draft Kennedy movement that was gaining steam on television looked like it was orchestrated by McCarthy; Teddy was afraid that it would appear that he was trying to push aside McCarthy, and that perception would damage his political standing then and for the future. So, Teddy believed that he had to immediately end the Draft Kennedy movement before any lasting damage could be done to his political career. Tuesday morning, Teddy called Humphrey and assured the Vice-President that he would not run; it would be another twelve years before Senator Edward Kennedy tried to pursue the nomination of the Democratic Party for President.