Source: Lawrence O'Donnell. Playing With Fire - The 1968 Election
and the Transformation of American Politics (2017)
and the Transformation of American Politics (2017)
On 25 October 1968, eleven days before the election, Nixon accused LBJ of playing Election Year politics with the peace talks in Paris. Nixon knew he was risking his secret telephone conversations with LBJ, and sure enough, two days later, LBJ publicly attacked Nixon, and their phone calls came to and end. On 28 October 1968, LBJ finally agreed that the bombing halt was his best move, and the next day the USSR redoubled their efforts to get North Vietnam to the negotiating table. LBJ was told that South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu could get his diplomats to Paris in twenty-four hours, and the President planned a television announcement for three days later to officially announce the negotiations.
Just a few hours later, LBJ received reports that the Nixon campaign, specifically the campaign manager, John Mitchell, was trying to scuttle the peace talks. Then Secretary of State Dean Rusk told LBJ that Thieu had balked, saying there wasn’t enough time for him to get his diplomats to Paris. LBJ was in a frenzied hurry trying to figure out what Nixon was up to. LBJ called the FBI, and soon agents were surveilling Anna Chennault and the South Vietnamese Embassy in DC. The FBI reported that Chennault had spent thirty minutes with Ambassador Diem at the South Vietnamese Embassy. LBJ called Senator Everett Dirksen (R; Illinois) to give him fragments of what he knew, hoping that Dirksen would scare Nixon into backing off; LBJ didn’t mention any criminal aspects to Dirksen, just the political risks of what Nixon was doing.
Just a few hours later, LBJ received reports that the Nixon campaign, specifically the campaign manager, John Mitchell, was trying to scuttle the peace talks. Then Secretary of State Dean Rusk told LBJ that Thieu had balked, saying there wasn’t enough time for him to get his diplomats to Paris. LBJ was in a frenzied hurry trying to figure out what Nixon was up to. LBJ called the FBI, and soon agents were surveilling Anna Chennault and the South Vietnamese Embassy in DC. The FBI reported that Chennault had spent thirty minutes with Ambassador Diem at the South Vietnamese Embassy. LBJ called Senator Everett Dirksen (R; Illinois) to give him fragments of what he knew, hoping that Dirksen would scare Nixon into backing off; LBJ didn’t mention any criminal aspects to Dirksen, just the political risks of what Nixon was doing.
LBJ decided to use his upcoming scheduled phone call (outgoing President to Presidential candidate) to scare Nixon more directly. After that phone call, LBJ reached Humphrey and told him about what was really going on in Paris, and what Nixon was up to (and also that he didn’t have any proof). LBJ assumed that he had done enough to scare Nixon, and that Thieu’s delegation would soon arrive in Paris. As Humphrey gained on Nixon, the pressure on former Democratic candidate Senator Eugene McCarthy (MN) to endorse Humphrey rose in intensity. McCarthy was vacationing in France in order to sit out the campaign, but if McCarthy endorsed Humphrey, he would have broken the promise he made at Grant Park at the end of the Democratic National Convention (in essence he promised to not endorse Humphrey). Prominent McCarthy supporters had already gone public with their endorsements for Humphrey; McCarthy stood alone . . . no one, it seemed, was able to get McCarthy on board.
It took an open letter from prominent Civil Rights leaders, which in essence “triple-dog-dared” McCarthy to do the right thing and support Humphrey for Civil Rights reasons. To McCarthy, he now had a way out, in that in his mind, Civil Rights trumped his Grant Park pledge, so one week before the election, McCarthy officially endorsed Humphrey. McCarthy stated that Humphrey had a better understanding of the domestic needs of the nation, and that he would reduce military tensions. Then in the same breath, McCarthy stated that he would not run for re-election in the Senate in 1970, and that he would not be a candidate for the Democratic nomination in 1972; eleven months after he announced his candidacy, McCarthy announced the end of his political career.
It took an open letter from prominent Civil Rights leaders, which in essence “triple-dog-dared” McCarthy to do the right thing and support Humphrey for Civil Rights reasons. To McCarthy, he now had a way out, in that in his mind, Civil Rights trumped his Grant Park pledge, so one week before the election, McCarthy officially endorsed Humphrey. McCarthy stated that Humphrey had a better understanding of the domestic needs of the nation, and that he would reduce military tensions. Then in the same breath, McCarthy stated that he would not run for re-election in the Senate in 1970, and that he would not be a candidate for the Democratic nomination in 1972; eleven months after he announced his candidacy, McCarthy announced the end of his political career.
On 31 October, LBJ interrupted network programming to announce that he had halted the bombing of North Vietnam, and he outlined his hopes and expectations of the peace talks in Paris. The next day, after talking to Mitchell, Thieu betrayed LBJ. Thieu turned on the President that had propped him up in power for so long by refusing to participate in the peace talks. Thieu defended his decision by saying that there was no way he would be in the same room with the Viet Cong, and that he would only talk to North Vietnam. The news so shocked the White House that their only immediate response was “no comment”.
On that same day, Anna Chennault called Ambassador Diem at the South Vietnamese Embassy; LBJ knew she had done so since the FBI had wiretapped the Embassy’s phones. LBJ was informed that Chennault told Diem to “please tell your boss to hold on”. LBJ had unwittingly empowered Thieu to have more power in determining the outcome of the Election of 1968 than the President; LBJ’s announcement of a bombing halt now appeared to be a lame and desperate Democratic campaign tactic. With the election just three days away, LBJ had been humiliated and he simply didn’t know what to do, especially in terms of acknowledging how he knew what Nixon had done, since that meant admitting that the FBI used illegal wiretaps on foreign embassies.
LBJ told Senate Republican Leader Everett Dirksen as much as he felt he could, and then asked Dirksen to let Nixon know that the President knew about the sabotage of the peace talks. Nixon appeared on Meet the Press and covered himself by supporting LBJ’s efforts at peace. After that appearance, Nixon called LBJ, and the call went so well as far as Nixon was concerned that when he hung up, he and his staffers burst into laughter.
On that same day, Anna Chennault called Ambassador Diem at the South Vietnamese Embassy; LBJ knew she had done so since the FBI had wiretapped the Embassy’s phones. LBJ was informed that Chennault told Diem to “please tell your boss to hold on”. LBJ had unwittingly empowered Thieu to have more power in determining the outcome of the Election of 1968 than the President; LBJ’s announcement of a bombing halt now appeared to be a lame and desperate Democratic campaign tactic. With the election just three days away, LBJ had been humiliated and he simply didn’t know what to do, especially in terms of acknowledging how he knew what Nixon had done, since that meant admitting that the FBI used illegal wiretaps on foreign embassies.
LBJ told Senate Republican Leader Everett Dirksen as much as he felt he could, and then asked Dirksen to let Nixon know that the President knew about the sabotage of the peace talks. Nixon appeared on Meet the Press and covered himself by supporting LBJ’s efforts at peace. After that appearance, Nixon called LBJ, and the call went so well as far as Nixon was concerned that when he hung up, he and his staffers burst into laughter.
National Security Advisor Walt Rostow wanted LBJ to blow Nixon out of the water. After that meeting, LBJ met with Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford and SecState Rusk, and they pointed out that if LBJ exposed Nixon, then some not-so-legal wiretaps and intelligence-gathering would be exposed. Clifford and Rusk also pointed out that Chennault never used Nixon’s name, so there was plausible deniability on Nixon’s end if push came to shove. Nixon knew the advice that LBJ would receive from Clifford and Rusk, and that he was in the process of committing a crime (Nixon violated the Logan Act of 1799) that would lead to thousands more US soldiers getting killed and wounded in Vietnam.
But Nixon also knew that he was committing the “Perfect Crime”, in that he would not face any exposure or penalty since LBJ would not expose Nixon for the good of the nation; if Nixon was exposed and he won the election, then the impeachment and removal of a new President was a real possibility. It wouldn’t be until 2017 when some of H.R. Haldeman’s (he was Nixon’s Chief of Staff from 1969 - 1973) notes from the 1968 campaign were discovered that proved Nixon’s role in the crime (in 1977, Nixon flatly denied having any connection with the South Vietnamese government). The final Gallup poll before the election had Nixon at 43%, Humphrey at 42%, and Wallace at 15%. The Humphrey campaign knew they had momentum, but they also knew they would most likely be short a few, or even one, campaign days (that was the price the Democratic Party faced in scheduling the Democratic National Convention so late in the Summer of 1968; one wonders if Humphrey understood that he had waited far too long to distance himself from LBJ on Vietnam).
But Nixon also knew that he was committing the “Perfect Crime”, in that he would not face any exposure or penalty since LBJ would not expose Nixon for the good of the nation; if Nixon was exposed and he won the election, then the impeachment and removal of a new President was a real possibility. It wouldn’t be until 2017 when some of H.R. Haldeman’s (he was Nixon’s Chief of Staff from 1969 - 1973) notes from the 1968 campaign were discovered that proved Nixon’s role in the crime (in 1977, Nixon flatly denied having any connection with the South Vietnamese government). The final Gallup poll before the election had Nixon at 43%, Humphrey at 42%, and Wallace at 15%. The Humphrey campaign knew they had momentum, but they also knew they would most likely be short a few, or even one, campaign days (that was the price the Democratic Party faced in scheduling the Democratic National Convention so late in the Summer of 1968; one wonders if Humphrey understood that he had waited far too long to distance himself from LBJ on Vietnam).
The election was too close to call by the time most Americans went to bed that night. And again, like in 1960, the election centered around the results in Illinois. The vote in Chicago hadn’t yet been finalized, but this time the Republicans had a plan for the shenanigans of Mayor Richard Daley. Daley’s strategy was to release Chicago’s vote totals after the rest of the state had done so (which meant in 1960 that Daley could “manufacture” enough votes to give the state’s Electoral tally to JFK). This time, Republican precincts outside of Chicago refused to release their vote totals until Chicago released theirs. By Wednesday morning, Daley had run out of excuses for delay, and he released the vote totals without knowing how much Humphrey needed to win Illinois. Nixon carried the 26 Electoral Votes of Illinois, which put Nixon over 270 Electoral Votes.
Again, a Presidential Election that involved Nixon was decided by less than 1% of the popular vote, with Nixon at .434, Humphrey at .427, and Wallace at .135 (Electoral College: Nixon 301, Humphrey 191, Wallace 46; States Carried: Nixon 32, Humphrey 13 + DC, Wallace 5). Humphrey became the second sitting Vice-President to lose a Presidential Election (Nixon was the first in 1960). Nixon’s Inauguration on 20 January 1969 was the first to attract protesters (8000 or so; over 100,000 protesters showed up for Nixon’s 2nd Inauguration). Although Nixon’s fall from grace was due to the Watergate Scandal, he was never held to account for his crime that really mattered during the Campaign of 1968.
Again, a Presidential Election that involved Nixon was decided by less than 1% of the popular vote, with Nixon at .434, Humphrey at .427, and Wallace at .135 (Electoral College: Nixon 301, Humphrey 191, Wallace 46; States Carried: Nixon 32, Humphrey 13 + DC, Wallace 5). Humphrey became the second sitting Vice-President to lose a Presidential Election (Nixon was the first in 1960). Nixon’s Inauguration on 20 January 1969 was the first to attract protesters (8000 or so; over 100,000 protesters showed up for Nixon’s 2nd Inauguration). Although Nixon’s fall from grace was due to the Watergate Scandal, he was never held to account for his crime that really mattered during the Campaign of 1968.