Source: John A. Farrell. Richard Nixon - The Life (2017)
In terms of running for a seat in Congress, according to Pat Nixon her and her husband’s friends were sympathetic but dubious, and the upper-class San Marino Set (the 12th District’s equivalent to the Georgetown Set in DC) simply sneered and mocked. After finding a decent suit and ties and some peace, quiet, and solitude, Nixon had to deal with his uneasiness with women at political fundraisers (e.g. tea parties). Nixon simply had a problem looking at women in the eye, and that was a problem in that Republican ladies groups were prime political avenues for district votes. Many women in the district were “Rosies” (as in “Rosie the Riveter”) during World War II, and they were very active in politics with an expanded sense of independence despite most being relegated back to the domestic sphere after the war.
Nixon had to be coached to look women in the eye so as not to offend/insult them. Nixon drew heavily on his high school and college acting experience/skills, and Nixon, after a while, was able to make interacting with women part of his political strategy. In Southern California in 1946, television wasn’t common in households, which meant Nixon had no choice but to speak directly to audiences which were mostly made up of men who were “Joiners” (e.g. Elks, Masons, Kiwanis). By the end of March 1946, Nixon had made 36 speaking engagements in front of over 3700 people.
Nixon had to be coached to look women in the eye so as not to offend/insult them. Nixon drew heavily on his high school and college acting experience/skills, and Nixon, after a while, was able to make interacting with women part of his political strategy. In Southern California in 1946, television wasn’t common in households, which meant Nixon had no choice but to speak directly to audiences which were mostly made up of men who were “Joiners” (e.g. Elks, Masons, Kiwanis). By the end of March 1946, Nixon had made 36 speaking engagements in front of over 3700 people.
Soon, Nixon campaigned on President Truman’s decision to maintain wartime economic conditions to try and keep inflation under control, but that policy led to massive shortages during the changeover to peacetime, most notably in housing and cars. But as the Spring of 1946 progressed, Nixon started to focus on the evils of Communism, especially after 5 March 1946 “Iron Curtain Speech” from former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Missouri with Truman in attendance. Nixon was enlightened in his speeches, in that he called for containing the USSR, not war, using America’s economic, political, and military might to do so (this was before George Kennan formally came out with his suggestion of containing Communism).
Nixon hit his stride making speeches, attracting attention and voters, and he knew to focus on returning veterans, in part because so many veterans were moving to the district. Nixon’s promise of economic liberty resonated and was contagious, and many in the district felt that Washington, D.C. wasn’t listening to what they needed or wanted. As the Republican primary in the district approached, it became clear that Nixon would have to raise money for his campaign on his own since the Amateurs had mostly stopped their financial contributions. While a serious obstacle, Nixon had no way of knowing that the Voorhis campaign was confident (perhaps even overconfident) and complacent.
Nixon hit his stride making speeches, attracting attention and voters, and he knew to focus on returning veterans, in part because so many veterans were moving to the district. Nixon’s promise of economic liberty resonated and was contagious, and many in the district felt that Washington, D.C. wasn’t listening to what they needed or wanted. As the Republican primary in the district approached, it became clear that Nixon would have to raise money for his campaign on his own since the Amateurs had mostly stopped their financial contributions. While a serious obstacle, Nixon had no way of knowing that the Voorhis campaign was confident (perhaps even overconfident) and complacent.
Nixon didn’t face any real Republican opposition in the district primary on 4 June 1946. However, California had a cross-filing policy which meant that Democrats and Republicans could run in each other’s primary. So, while Nixon was the leading Republican in the primary, he was hammered by Voorhis to the tune of several thousand votes. Nixon focused on another number, and was encouraged: in 1944, Voorhis had garnered .600 of the primary vote, but in 1946, it was down to .535.
After the primary, Nixon knew he needed an infusion of campaign funds, which meant the go-to guy was Perry, and he would have to go to the oil men. California oil was the US leader in 1946 in terms of production and profits, but they had also been exposed for war profiteering by Voorhis and other members in Congress . . . the CA oil industry had never forgotten or forgiven their Democratic representative.
What didn’t help matters was that on 28 September 1945, Truman in essence nationalized the California tidelands (underwater oil/minerals) which meant that the US government, not the oil companies, owned California Pacific Ocean water. Voorhis was one of three California members in Congress that voted in favor of the measure, and the next day Perry contacted Nixon to see if he would be interested in challenging Voorhis.
After the primary, Nixon knew he needed an infusion of campaign funds, which meant the go-to guy was Perry, and he would have to go to the oil men. California oil was the US leader in 1946 in terms of production and profits, but they had also been exposed for war profiteering by Voorhis and other members in Congress . . . the CA oil industry had never forgotten or forgiven their Democratic representative.
What didn’t help matters was that on 28 September 1945, Truman in essence nationalized the California tidelands (underwater oil/minerals) which meant that the US government, not the oil companies, owned California Pacific Ocean water. Voorhis was one of three California members in Congress that voted in favor of the measure, and the next day Perry contacted Nixon to see if he would be interested in challenging Voorhis.
Nixon outlined his money problems to Perry, and even gave him an itemized list of predicted campaign expenses. Nixon’s plan was to spend most of the money on mailings to voters, not on radio or billboards; to Nixon’s surprise, $7300 was raised, which was enough for billboard ads. The campaign funds were channeled through Perry so there in essence was no transparency for campaign spending.
Nixon also knew that he needed a message with a “punch”. Murray Chotiner had sent a letter to Nixon saying that laudatory statements alone would not get him elected to Congress. Chotiner was a 36 year old California lawyer and a good friend of Kyle Palmer of the Los Angeles Times (the newspaper would remain very supportive of Nixon well into the 1950s), who was also a fan of Nixon. In short order, Chotiner became the first of Nixon’s political hatchet men (the more influential he became, the less influential Pat became to her husband).
Nixon had known from his time in DC that Voorhis and his ilk were beloved by the “Pinko Set” (very liberal New Deal Democrats), but he needed to sculpt and define his attack on Voorhis. On the surface, Voorhis looked to be safe from being accused of being sympathetic to Communists, in that he was the sponsor of the Voorhis Act of 1940, which required that Communists and other subversives register with the US government. But Nixon and his campaign were very selective with what they used and ignored from Voorhis’ voting record, and Voorhis was made to look like what he was not, a Communist dupe.
Nixon also knew that he needed a message with a “punch”. Murray Chotiner had sent a letter to Nixon saying that laudatory statements alone would not get him elected to Congress. Chotiner was a 36 year old California lawyer and a good friend of Kyle Palmer of the Los Angeles Times (the newspaper would remain very supportive of Nixon well into the 1950s), who was also a fan of Nixon. In short order, Chotiner became the first of Nixon’s political hatchet men (the more influential he became, the less influential Pat became to her husband).
Nixon had known from his time in DC that Voorhis and his ilk were beloved by the “Pinko Set” (very liberal New Deal Democrats), but he needed to sculpt and define his attack on Voorhis. On the surface, Voorhis looked to be safe from being accused of being sympathetic to Communists, in that he was the sponsor of the Voorhis Act of 1940, which required that Communists and other subversives register with the US government. But Nixon and his campaign were very selective with what they used and ignored from Voorhis’ voting record, and Voorhis was made to look like what he was not, a Communist dupe.
Voorhis was part of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC, who ironically was created in the 1930s to conduct hearings on the New Deal), and Nixon simply ignored that part of Voorhis’ Congressional record, and instead focused on his last two terms. For example, Nixon focused on Voorhis’ vote against making HUAC a permanent committee; Nixon’s intent was to portray Voorhis as at least clueless of the Communist threat, or worse, a protector of subversives.
Nixon also featured “lunchbucket” issues in his campaign, attacking the Truman administration’s handling of the post-WW II economy, speaking up for Civil Rights, and denouncing Southern right wing racists, saying they were just as dangerous as Communists. Nixon also joined a local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which was a fairly brave thing to do since the Ku Klux Klan was active in Los Angeles County.
Sometime during the Spring of 1946, Voorhis came to see Nixon as a serious threat to his seat in Congress, since it was then that he recognized that the political winds were changing direction. Voorhis’ colleagues in the House saw him as a political lightweight, and Voorhis himself actually didn’t like the job of being a Congressman very much. Still, Voorhis was determined to run a “dignified” campaign, and he remained in DC for the first eight months of 1946 to deal with House matters.
Nixon also featured “lunchbucket” issues in his campaign, attacking the Truman administration’s handling of the post-WW II economy, speaking up for Civil Rights, and denouncing Southern right wing racists, saying they were just as dangerous as Communists. Nixon also joined a local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which was a fairly brave thing to do since the Ku Klux Klan was active in Los Angeles County.
Sometime during the Spring of 1946, Voorhis came to see Nixon as a serious threat to his seat in Congress, since it was then that he recognized that the political winds were changing direction. Voorhis’ colleagues in the House saw him as a political lightweight, and Voorhis himself actually didn’t like the job of being a Congressman very much. Still, Voorhis was determined to run a “dignified” campaign, and he remained in DC for the first eight months of 1946 to deal with House matters.