Source: Stuart Eizenstat. President Carter - The White House Years (2018)
The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan began during Christmas time in 1979 when USSR special forces parachuted into Kabul, assassinated the Afghani prime minister, and installed a Soviet puppet. The USSR invasion of Afghanistan occurred just weeks after dozens of Americans were taken hostage in Teheran, Iran. Afghanistan, far from a stable nation-state, is really a collection of tribes in constant conflict, and therefore has often been a black hole for aspiring/expanding empires.
By 1973 Afghanistan had been unofficially partitioned, with the USSR running the show in every region except the eastern part of the nation. By 1978 Afghanistan had in essence two rival governments, and the USSR favored the side that spoke their Communist language. During February 1979, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan was kidnapped and then killed in the crossfire of a rescue attempt by the Afghan government backed by USSR advisors, which deteriorated US/USSR relations even further. It was at that time that Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet premier, warned Afghanistan to get their house in order to avoid civil war or the USSR might be drawn in even further.
By the Spring of 1979, Zbig had started to press Carter to provide financial assistance for the mujahideen (the self-described “Holy Warriors” of Islam, which soon enough included Osama bin Laden) and six months before the USSR’s invasion, the mujahideen had started to receive US money/aid. By September 1979 the USSR had become paranoid that the current Afghan government was seeking alliances with Pakistan, China, and even the US.
By 1973 Afghanistan had been unofficially partitioned, with the USSR running the show in every region except the eastern part of the nation. By 1978 Afghanistan had in essence two rival governments, and the USSR favored the side that spoke their Communist language. During February 1979, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan was kidnapped and then killed in the crossfire of a rescue attempt by the Afghan government backed by USSR advisors, which deteriorated US/USSR relations even further. It was at that time that Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet premier, warned Afghanistan to get their house in order to avoid civil war or the USSR might be drawn in even further.
By the Spring of 1979, Zbig had started to press Carter to provide financial assistance for the mujahideen (the self-described “Holy Warriors” of Islam, which soon enough included Osama bin Laden) and six months before the USSR’s invasion, the mujahideen had started to receive US money/aid. By September 1979 the USSR had become paranoid that the current Afghan government was seeking alliances with Pakistan, China, and even the US.
On 14 September 1979, the CIA sent out an alert warning that the USSR was seriously considering an invasion in order to “stabilize” the Afghan government. On 3 November 1979, Brezhnev briefed Carter that Soviet advisors had been sent to Afghanistan in infused/embedded in the nation’s defense department and military leadership. On 19 December 1979, the CIA reported USSR mobilization on the Afghan forder, and on 22 December 1979 the National Security Agency reported their conclusion that the USSR would cross the border within 72 hours; two days later the NSA gave a 15 hour warning concerning the invasion that proved to be accurate.
The USSR invasion of Afghanistan began on 25 December 1979, with Soviet propaganda falsely stating that the existing government had “invited” them. To President Carter, the invasion represented an actual threat to US national security, in that to Carter it looked like the USSR was moving on the
Persian Gulf. Carter, on the Red Phone, made it clear to Brezhnev that any move on the Persian Gulf would be considered an attack by the USSR on the US. Zbig drew a straight line from Afghanistan to the Strait of Hormuz, and Carter fully agreed.
Carter wanted punitive action(s) that would be broadly supported against the USSR, with the US in the lead but followed/supported by many other nations, and those proposed actions fell into political, economic, and military categories. Direct military intervention was out of the question, so the plan was to deny the USSR the Persian Gulf and Iran. Carter increased and expanded the US Navy’s presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf while increasing military support to Pakistan.
The USSR invasion of Afghanistan began on 25 December 1979, with Soviet propaganda falsely stating that the existing government had “invited” them. To President Carter, the invasion represented an actual threat to US national security, in that to Carter it looked like the USSR was moving on the
Persian Gulf. Carter, on the Red Phone, made it clear to Brezhnev that any move on the Persian Gulf would be considered an attack by the USSR on the US. Zbig drew a straight line from Afghanistan to the Strait of Hormuz, and Carter fully agreed.
Carter wanted punitive action(s) that would be broadly supported against the USSR, with the US in the lead but followed/supported by many other nations, and those proposed actions fell into political, economic, and military categories. Direct military intervention was out of the question, so the plan was to deny the USSR the Persian Gulf and Iran. Carter increased and expanded the US Navy’s presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf while increasing military support to Pakistan.
Carter authorized the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to be quickly sent to areas where the US didn’t have any military bases in a friendly nation. Another military decision was to continue to support the mujahideen against the USSR-backed Afghan forces. The entire process had to remain covert so as not to provoke the USSR. The US secretly sent Soviet-made weapons to the mujahideen mostly through Pakistan, which eventually included Stinger missiles.
Of all the actions taken by the Carter administration against the USSR, the most controversial and contentious were the grain embargo, the boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, and draft registration. The embargo on grain sales to the USSR proved to be very difficult to make a reality, in part because the American agricultural sector felt that it had been forced to unfairly sacrifice. It wasn’t politically helpful that during his campaign in 1976, Carter made clear his opposition to grain embargoes. As someone that had been part of the world of agriculture in Georgia, Carter knew that farmers would be hit very hard. America had been the #1 grain supplier to the USSR since the early-1970s, and with the Iowa caucus coming up very soon, Carter had to decide whether or not to allow currently approved shipments of grain to the USSR before playing hardball.
Carter wanted to stop shipments of grain immediately, but could he do so with a stroke of his pen? Could Carter void an agreement in place from the Ford administration which meant that grain still due to the USSR had to be shipped; so far only about half of that agreed-upon amount of grain had been transported. And who should make the decision concerning the ports where the grain was ready to be shipped: the President or the dockworkers union (e.g. in CA), and how would Brezhnev regard either group. And finally, what was the legal position of the White House in terms of canceling existing contracts with the USSR concerning grain.
Of all the actions taken by the Carter administration against the USSR, the most controversial and contentious were the grain embargo, the boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, and draft registration. The embargo on grain sales to the USSR proved to be very difficult to make a reality, in part because the American agricultural sector felt that it had been forced to unfairly sacrifice. It wasn’t politically helpful that during his campaign in 1976, Carter made clear his opposition to grain embargoes. As someone that had been part of the world of agriculture in Georgia, Carter knew that farmers would be hit very hard. America had been the #1 grain supplier to the USSR since the early-1970s, and with the Iowa caucus coming up very soon, Carter had to decide whether or not to allow currently approved shipments of grain to the USSR before playing hardball.
Carter wanted to stop shipments of grain immediately, but could he do so with a stroke of his pen? Could Carter void an agreement in place from the Ford administration which meant that grain still due to the USSR had to be shipped; so far only about half of that agreed-upon amount of grain had been transported. And who should make the decision concerning the ports where the grain was ready to be shipped: the President or the dockworkers union (e.g. in CA), and how would Brezhnev regard either group. And finally, what was the legal position of the White House in terms of canceling existing contracts with the USSR concerning grain.
Vice-President Walter Mondale and many others in the government interpreted the existing agreement in a way in which the US didn’t have to lift a finger to export more than the already-agreed-upon eight tons. However, if the US didn’t finish transporting what was already in motion, the US would be far more negatively affected than the USSR. So, how could the government help farmers who would lose their future market to the USSR without increasing surpluses and driving down prices. Carter was willing to use taxpayer money to buy US grain and store it, but was Carter willing to use food as a weapon even though he was a champion of human rights, and how would other nations view the US as a result.
Carter wanted an operational grain embargo by 3 January 1980, and was basically not interested in the finer details of making it work; arguments that the US was shooting itself in the foot did not register with the President. Carter acted quickly and decisively, but without vetting and coordinating with the necessary key government departments. Carter justified the embargo by stating that the US access to oil was potentially at risk. Carter went further, saying that unchecked Soviet aggression would become a contagious disease
Carter, in an election year, was trying to balance the legal limits of economic sanctions versus national security interests, and there were countervailing arguments to every option that was examined. But Argentina wouldn’t play ball with the US since the Argentine military government decided that it would be a good time to make more money by selling grain to the USSR and to pay back Carter for meddling in their nation’s internal affairs in promoting human rights. Argentina had nine million tons of grain and were ready to sell all of it to the USSR.
Carter wanted an operational grain embargo by 3 January 1980, and was basically not interested in the finer details of making it work; arguments that the US was shooting itself in the foot did not register with the President. Carter acted quickly and decisively, but without vetting and coordinating with the necessary key government departments. Carter justified the embargo by stating that the US access to oil was potentially at risk. Carter went further, saying that unchecked Soviet aggression would become a contagious disease
Carter, in an election year, was trying to balance the legal limits of economic sanctions versus national security interests, and there were countervailing arguments to every option that was examined. But Argentina wouldn’t play ball with the US since the Argentine military government decided that it would be a good time to make more money by selling grain to the USSR and to pay back Carter for meddling in their nation’s internal affairs in promoting human rights. Argentina had nine million tons of grain and were ready to sell all of it to the USSR.
The Carter administration simply did not think that Argentina had the possible capacity to have that much grain ready to ship to the USSR; such it was when decision-making was done so fast that the relevant details were not accounted for. At an earlier summit in Brussels, Canada, Australia, and Argentina had promised that they wouldn’t sell grain to the USSR< but now Argentina was reneging on that agreement. Just a few days later, USSR negotiators went to Argentina, as did US negotiators to keep the shipment of grain from occurring; the Argentine government ignored the US representatives. In the end, the USSR was only able to purchase seven million tons from Argentina. Carter was seen in the US as penalizing farmers far more than the USSR, but the prices of grain remained stable and overall grain sales actually increased during the embargo. What hurt the USSR in terms of the embargo was that mean production decreased in Russia and that much higher prices were paid for alternative sources of grain.
Carter saw American participation in the Moscow Olympics in the Summer of 1980 as immoral, and as early as January 1980 Carter publicly floated the possibility of a US boycott. In February 1980, Carter told staffers that the US would not go to Moscow if Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan. The American public was surprisingly in favor of the boycott, but a whole host of complicating factors arose. Should Coca-Cola still be a sponsor even if the US government had no authority to say the corporation could not. Should there be an alternative competition for American athletes; the Berlin Olympics in 1936 were on Carter’s mind, in that US participation helped Nazi Germany gain global credibility. 55% of Americans polled supported the boycott, but Carter knew the numbers would fall if the US stood alone, which would also make the US look pitiful; boycotting the Moscow Olympics with the US were China, Japan, and West Germany. While the US boycott was a blow to sports-mad America and the dedicated athletes who were denied the chance to compete, the blow to Soviet prestige was greater, and the
1980 Moscow Olympics turned out to be largely a Soviet Eastern Bloc event.
Carter saw American participation in the Moscow Olympics in the Summer of 1980 as immoral, and as early as January 1980 Carter publicly floated the possibility of a US boycott. In February 1980, Carter told staffers that the US would not go to Moscow if Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan. The American public was surprisingly in favor of the boycott, but a whole host of complicating factors arose. Should Coca-Cola still be a sponsor even if the US government had no authority to say the corporation could not. Should there be an alternative competition for American athletes; the Berlin Olympics in 1936 were on Carter’s mind, in that US participation helped Nazi Germany gain global credibility. 55% of Americans polled supported the boycott, but Carter knew the numbers would fall if the US stood alone, which would also make the US look pitiful; boycotting the Moscow Olympics with the US were China, Japan, and West Germany. While the US boycott was a blow to sports-mad America and the dedicated athletes who were denied the chance to compete, the blow to Soviet prestige was greater, and the
1980 Moscow Olympics turned out to be largely a Soviet Eastern Bloc event.
Carter strengthened his stance against the USSR by reinstating registration for the military draft. Like the embargo, Carter acted very quickly, but many in the administration viewed the move as unnecessary. What Carter really wanted was to save six months instead of starting from scratch if the US had to get directly involved. Mondale was among those in the administration that put up a de facto rebellion against the draft registration, but Carter was undeterred. The fact was that at that point Carter was riding a high in that he felt his bold actions against the USSR had re-energized his Presidency.
Already by January 1980, the USSR had started to figure out that Afghanistan was no cake-walk. On 23 January 1980, Carter delivered what turned out to be his last State of the Union Address, with the level of tension and attention in the House Chamber was high due to Afghanistan and the Iranian Hostage Crisis. In his address, Carter issued his “Carter Doctrine”, which focused on freedom of the seas in the Persian Gulf by military means if necessary. Carter was at his highest point in his Presidency, and it was impossible for for the President and his administration to know that his fall would be so sudden, and that Reagan’s attacks on Carter that he was weak on national security would resonate (a charge that is historically false).
It could be argued that Carter’s actions against the USSR after it invaded Afghanistan were a main reason why the Soviet Union didn’t send troops into Poland in 1981 when Lech Walesa
and Solidarity reached critical mass. Every President from Truman to Bush the Elder played a significant role in the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War, but Carter’s efforts have been the most underappreciated . . . part of the reason was that Brezhnev and the Politburo pushed too far-and-fast with the invasion of Afghanistan, and Carter was the President that drew the short straw and had to respond.
Already by January 1980, the USSR had started to figure out that Afghanistan was no cake-walk. On 23 January 1980, Carter delivered what turned out to be his last State of the Union Address, with the level of tension and attention in the House Chamber was high due to Afghanistan and the Iranian Hostage Crisis. In his address, Carter issued his “Carter Doctrine”, which focused on freedom of the seas in the Persian Gulf by military means if necessary. Carter was at his highest point in his Presidency, and it was impossible for for the President and his administration to know that his fall would be so sudden, and that Reagan’s attacks on Carter that he was weak on national security would resonate (a charge that is historically false).
It could be argued that Carter’s actions against the USSR after it invaded Afghanistan were a main reason why the Soviet Union didn’t send troops into Poland in 1981 when Lech Walesa
and Solidarity reached critical mass. Every President from Truman to Bush the Elder played a significant role in the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War, but Carter’s efforts have been the most underappreciated . . . part of the reason was that Brezhnev and the Politburo pushed too far-and-fast with the invasion of Afghanistan, and Carter was the President that drew the short straw and had to respond.