Source: Stuart Eizenstat. President Carter - The White House Years (2018)
As fast as the tide turned in Carter’s favor after his “Crisis of Confidence’ speech in terms of public support, the tide turned against the President though another unforced error on Carter’s part. Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan was far more interested in exerting discipline on the Cabinet from the White House than any of the Ivory Tower themes Caddell had proposed. Ironically, Jordan, like Caddell, had a vision of what should occur in a Carter Presidency, and as Chief of Staff he was in prime position to see it through.
Jordan believed that Carter should fire some of the Cabinet to show the public that Carter was in charge of the Executive Branch. Jordan repeatedly told Carter that if he didn’t remove at least some of the member of the Cabinet, then his “Crisis of Confidence” speech would be nothing more than meaningless superfluous platitudes. Even First Lady Rosalynn Carter told her husband that it was time to remove disloyal members of the Cabinet.
Carter, at least somewhat like Nixon, did not like personal confrontations and was upset at the prospect of removing Cabinet officials, even one that he knew should be shown the door. In what could be seen as an irony on top of ironies, Carter dismissed Caddell from Camp David, citing him as a disruptive presence, and the President refused to talk to him for several days, even though Caddell was the main reason for the the speech that increased Carter’s public support.
Jordan believed that Carter should fire some of the Cabinet to show the public that Carter was in charge of the Executive Branch. Jordan repeatedly told Carter that if he didn’t remove at least some of the member of the Cabinet, then his “Crisis of Confidence” speech would be nothing more than meaningless superfluous platitudes. Even First Lady Rosalynn Carter told her husband that it was time to remove disloyal members of the Cabinet.
Carter, at least somewhat like Nixon, did not like personal confrontations and was upset at the prospect of removing Cabinet officials, even one that he knew should be shown the door. In what could be seen as an irony on top of ironies, Carter dismissed Caddell from Camp David, citing him as a disruptive presence, and the President refused to talk to him for several days, even though Caddell was the main reason for the the speech that increased Carter’s public support.
Carter, originally opposed to removing Cabinet members, came to agree with Jordan and other in his administration that by doing so after the speech he would show great “vigor”. By dealing with his Cabinet in that way, Carter literally stepped on and canceled his winning lines from his “Crisis of Confidence” speech that wanted Americans to have faith in the people in the government.
On 17 July 1979, the White House Senior Staff Meeting was held in the Roosevelt Room, and Carter was uncharacteristically blunt and brutal, which was in stark contrast to his recent triumphant speeches. Carter by then had taken to heart at least some of the criticism from various people that he had heard during the Domestic Summit at Camp David before the speech, especially comments aimed at the Cabinet. Carter made his perspective clear at the meeting and also announced that Jordan had agreed to become Chief of Staff, and that Jordan would have sweeping powers within the administration.
Carter, in a sharp tone that staffers close to him hadn’t heard or seen, announced that at least some Cabinet members would be let go, and then Carter dropped the bombshell that he might ask all the Cabinet to put forth pro forma resignations. Carter continued by saying that some Cabinet members that submitted those resignations would be put on “probation” or let go if their conduct did not change for the better. With only 18 months left in his Presidency, this was a stunning threat to make, and rare was the staff member that wasn’t deeply concerned; after Carter made the announcement, he left the meeting in flash, refusing to take any questions.
On 17 July 1979, the White House Senior Staff Meeting was held in the Roosevelt Room, and Carter was uncharacteristically blunt and brutal, which was in stark contrast to his recent triumphant speeches. Carter by then had taken to heart at least some of the criticism from various people that he had heard during the Domestic Summit at Camp David before the speech, especially comments aimed at the Cabinet. Carter made his perspective clear at the meeting and also announced that Jordan had agreed to become Chief of Staff, and that Jordan would have sweeping powers within the administration.
Carter, in a sharp tone that staffers close to him hadn’t heard or seen, announced that at least some Cabinet members would be let go, and then Carter dropped the bombshell that he might ask all the Cabinet to put forth pro forma resignations. Carter continued by saying that some Cabinet members that submitted those resignations would be put on “probation” or let go if their conduct did not change for the better. With only 18 months left in his Presidency, this was a stunning threat to make, and rare was the staff member that wasn’t deeply concerned; after Carter made the announcement, he left the meeting in flash, refusing to take any questions.
Jordan took over the meeting and stated that the time for democracy in the administration was over, and the time for organization had come, telling those assembled that even Carter would have to make changes in how he conducted his job. Jordan said that the key was to keep Carter from being bogged down by details (in other words, save Carter from his micromanaging self). Jordan then announced that changes would be coming to the administration itself in that he was going to weed out the disloyal and incompetent people. This was a remarkable development in that Carter had run in opposition to Nixonian Executive Branch centralization of power through his Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman. The difference, at least to Jordan, was that this time honesty and integrity would be the difference, not a blatant power-grab.
Carter next descended on the Cabinet meeting and in about 25 minutes he got the pro forma resignations, and it appeared that Carter had primed SecState Vance in advance, since Vance offered up everyone’s resignation so that Carter could accept all or some of them. But Vance firmly stated after the meeting that he was as surprised as everyone else when Carter made his announcement, and that he told Carter that everyone on the Cabinet served at the pleasure of the President, and that he should ask for individual resignations. No matter whose perspective was right, there was plenty of stunned silence when Carter ignored asked for individual letters of resignation, and then the President left the room.
Carter next descended on the Cabinet meeting and in about 25 minutes he got the pro forma resignations, and it appeared that Carter had primed SecState Vance in advance, since Vance offered up everyone’s resignation so that Carter could accept all or some of them. But Vance firmly stated after the meeting that he was as surprised as everyone else when Carter made his announcement, and that he told Carter that everyone on the Cabinet served at the pleasure of the President, and that he should ask for individual resignations. No matter whose perspective was right, there was plenty of stunned silence when Carter ignored asked for individual letters of resignation, and then the President left the room.
The next four days were in effect political hell for the administration since it seemed that everything was unraveling and all the goodwill that Carter had built up was thrown away by his sophomoric effort to look tough. So, the dilemma was which Cabinet officials should go, and among those immediately targeted was the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Joseph Califano. Califano had made enemies that even his political patron Mondale could not counter, such as Rosalynn, who saw the SecHEW as in impediment to her efforts at improving mental health care; and Jordan saw Califano as flat-out disloyal.
SecEnergy James Schlesinger and SecTreas Michael Blumenthal were also targeted, with Blumenthal being a head-scratcher given his stature in the financial world. SecTrans Brock Adams left on his own volition believing that Carter was simply pulling a Nixon-style power grab, and Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill let Carter know what he thought about forcing out Adams. Eizenstat told Carter that it was the White House staff that needed to be purged, not the Cabinet, and that Carter had cut off the wrong heads in the Cabinet.
Lesley Stahl of CBS News called the Cabinet firings a “slaughterhouse” and a “purge”. Years later Jordan admitted that the Cabinet firings were an awful idea due to too much panic and that among the biggest panickers was Caddell, who had Rosalynn’s ear. Predictably, Rosalynn blamed Jordan for the political morass, and Caddell argued that he wasn’t at fault in that in no way was he in favor of anything that took away the luster of the “Crisis of Confidence” speech. Caddell went further stating that Jordan’s Cabinet machinations ruined his goal of repositioning Carter as a transformative leader. Caddell also refused to take responsibility for introducing the word malaise to the media, which was a very interesting claim since he did indeed (albeit perhaps unintentionally) do so.
SecEnergy James Schlesinger and SecTreas Michael Blumenthal were also targeted, with Blumenthal being a head-scratcher given his stature in the financial world. SecTrans Brock Adams left on his own volition believing that Carter was simply pulling a Nixon-style power grab, and Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill let Carter know what he thought about forcing out Adams. Eizenstat told Carter that it was the White House staff that needed to be purged, not the Cabinet, and that Carter had cut off the wrong heads in the Cabinet.
Lesley Stahl of CBS News called the Cabinet firings a “slaughterhouse” and a “purge”. Years later Jordan admitted that the Cabinet firings were an awful idea due to too much panic and that among the biggest panickers was Caddell, who had Rosalynn’s ear. Predictably, Rosalynn blamed Jordan for the political morass, and Caddell argued that he wasn’t at fault in that in no way was he in favor of anything that took away the luster of the “Crisis of Confidence” speech. Caddell went further stating that Jordan’s Cabinet machinations ruined his goal of repositioning Carter as a transformative leader. Caddell also refused to take responsibility for introducing the word malaise to the media, which was a very interesting claim since he did indeed (albeit perhaps unintentionally) do so.
If Carter had limited his Cabinet purge to a few selected members with justified reasons, his poll numbers would have risen further in all likelihood, but the disastrous overreach was realized far too late by Carter and Jordan. The actual purge of targeted members of the Cabinet had become, to the media, the forced resignations of the entire Cabinet since the pro forma resignation idea had been leaked.
Next came the drive to exert greater discipline on the sub-Cabinet appointees which numbered a little over 300 people. After Carter started the meeting by throwing down the gauntlet as he had done with the Cabinet, one of the 300+ assembled told Carter that this was the first time he had been in the same room as the President. Carter responded by saying that the claim was impossible, and asked for a show of hands for those in which the meeting was their first with him, and over half of those in the room raised their hands. In the end few of the sub-Cabinet appointees were let go, since they were the ones that actually ran the departments.
So, how did events after the speech reach such a calamitous farce? Jordan was a major factor, but so was his media advisor who actually came up with the idea of all the Cabinet resigning but taking some back. That media advisor did not properly anticipate how the media and the public would interpret the President’s action, that Carter no longer looked like he was in charge, which is a political killer for any President.
Next came the drive to exert greater discipline on the sub-Cabinet appointees which numbered a little over 300 people. After Carter started the meeting by throwing down the gauntlet as he had done with the Cabinet, one of the 300+ assembled told Carter that this was the first time he had been in the same room as the President. Carter responded by saying that the claim was impossible, and asked for a show of hands for those in which the meeting was their first with him, and over half of those in the room raised their hands. In the end few of the sub-Cabinet appointees were let go, since they were the ones that actually ran the departments.
So, how did events after the speech reach such a calamitous farce? Jordan was a major factor, but so was his media advisor who actually came up with the idea of all the Cabinet resigning but taking some back. That media advisor did not properly anticipate how the media and the public would interpret the President’s action, that Carter no longer looked like he was in charge, which is a political killer for any President.
Vice-President Mondale was so disillusioned by the self-inflicted wounds by the Carter administration that he seriously considered resigning, with Eizenstat the only one outside the VP’s staff being told of the possibility. The Cabinet purge had been one of the very few times that Mondale had been cut out of the decision-making process by Carter and his top aides. Mondale didn’t find out about the Cabinet firings until Califano called the the VP who was in Tennessee. To Mondale, the whole thing looked like panicked pandemonium, and the top it off, he had to face a hostile media in Philadelphia on his next stop.
Mondale believed that Carter’s closest advisors, including Caddell, were not plugged into the main concerns of the American people. But Mondale was basically venting his frustrations, knowing that he couldn’t really resign over policy differences with Carter. What brought Mondale out of his deep funk was Senator Ted Kennedy’s challenge in the Democratic primaries, and by then the cycle of Caddell’s impact had ended; the VP once again regained the sense of loyalty to Carter that he had earlier.
As a result, Carter was forced to change, and he changed for the better, with a Chief of Staff to help run the show and to limit his focus to a few priorities such as energy and foreign policy. Also included in the changes that Carter implemented was to limit his time reading documents and getting mired in details and spend more time engaging with the American people . . . if only that had been his approach from the beginning of his term in office.
Additionally, Carter knew that he had to play the “Inside Game” in DC while maintaining his “outsider” image to the public, with which Carter struggled, but Reagan thrived by doing so. Soon, the political revolution in Iran would prevent Carter from building a level of even modest momentum and Carter was denied a chance to once again reconnect with the American people during the general campaign for President in 1980.
Mondale believed that Carter’s closest advisors, including Caddell, were not plugged into the main concerns of the American people. But Mondale was basically venting his frustrations, knowing that he couldn’t really resign over policy differences with Carter. What brought Mondale out of his deep funk was Senator Ted Kennedy’s challenge in the Democratic primaries, and by then the cycle of Caddell’s impact had ended; the VP once again regained the sense of loyalty to Carter that he had earlier.
As a result, Carter was forced to change, and he changed for the better, with a Chief of Staff to help run the show and to limit his focus to a few priorities such as energy and foreign policy. Also included in the changes that Carter implemented was to limit his time reading documents and getting mired in details and spend more time engaging with the American people . . . if only that had been his approach from the beginning of his term in office.
Additionally, Carter knew that he had to play the “Inside Game” in DC while maintaining his “outsider” image to the public, with which Carter struggled, but Reagan thrived by doing so. Soon, the political revolution in Iran would prevent Carter from building a level of even modest momentum and Carter was denied a chance to once again reconnect with the American people during the general campaign for President in 1980.