Source: Stuart Eizenstat. President Carter - The White House Years (2018)
Carter became President when the Cold War was heading towards a crescendo. After detente with Nixon and successes in Africa and Latin America, by 1977 the USSR believed that history was on their side. Carter applied human rights at least as much as realpolitik towards the Soviet Union; to Carter, human rights abroad was the same as Civil Rights in America. Carter wanted to challenge the repressiveness of the USSR by promoting the rights of those oppressed by the Soviets.
Carter’s limits towards extending an Olive Branch to the USSR ended in 1979 when Russia invaded Afghanistan. Sadly, Carter’s surprise at the USSR invasion of Afghanistan overshadowed his steady strengthening of the US military as well as those of America’s allies. Carter was unfairly criticized for waving the Olive Branch instead of adding arrows to the quiver of the US military. Among the military moves made by Carter was stealth technology and a negotiated SALT II agreement, which stopped the nuclear missile build-up of the USSR, even though it was never ratified by the Senate.
Carter’s limits towards extending an Olive Branch to the USSR ended in 1979 when Russia invaded Afghanistan. Sadly, Carter’s surprise at the USSR invasion of Afghanistan overshadowed his steady strengthening of the US military as well as those of America’s allies. Carter was unfairly criticized for waving the Olive Branch instead of adding arrows to the quiver of the US military. Among the military moves made by Carter was stealth technology and a negotiated SALT II agreement, which stopped the nuclear missile build-up of the USSR, even though it was never ratified by the Senate.
Carter extended Nixon’s opening to China and normalized diplomatic relations with Beijing, at least in part as a counterweight to the USSR. At the same time, Carter strengthened the defenses of Taiwan against any military attack from China. But instead of being recognized for his Cold War accomplishments, to this day the main focus remains on Carter’s bungling of the B-1 bomber and the attempt to feature neutron bombs in the European nuclear arsenal.
The practical part of Carter’s foreign policy was that he needed as many allies as possible in the corner of the US against the USSR, and if some leaders were brutal repressors, then so be it. Detente meant the US didn’t care about what happened inside the USSR, and to Nixon and Kissinger, what happened inside other nations simply didn’t matter to US interests. Carter’s dilemma was that in pushing the USSR along the front of human rights instead of detente, there would very likely be less tranquility in the world.
In 1975, the Helsinki Accords, negotiated by Henry Kissinger on behalf of President Gerald Ford, acknowledged that Eastern Europe was the province of the USSR. In return for that acknowledgement, the USSR promised to improve human rights, which the Soviets simply believed they could ignore. No one realized it at the time, but Helsinki was one of the points that marked the beginning-of-the-end for the USSR, in that the Soviets, under external pressures, had to eventually agree to at least some internal reforms.
The practical part of Carter’s foreign policy was that he needed as many allies as possible in the corner of the US against the USSR, and if some leaders were brutal repressors, then so be it. Detente meant the US didn’t care about what happened inside the USSR, and to Nixon and Kissinger, what happened inside other nations simply didn’t matter to US interests. Carter’s dilemma was that in pushing the USSR along the front of human rights instead of detente, there would very likely be less tranquility in the world.
In 1975, the Helsinki Accords, negotiated by Henry Kissinger on behalf of President Gerald Ford, acknowledged that Eastern Europe was the province of the USSR. In return for that acknowledgement, the USSR promised to improve human rights, which the Soviets simply believed they could ignore. No one realized it at the time, but Helsinki was one of the points that marked the beginning-of-the-end for the USSR, in that the Soviets, under external pressures, had to eventually agree to at least some internal reforms.
Carter’s Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, and his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinkski (“Zbig”), were polar opposites in how the US should deal with the USSR. Zbig saw Carter daily, more often than any other member of the administration, and Zbig was eager to be Carter’s public face on foreign policy. But as comfortable as Carter was with his National Security Advisor, Carter still saw Zbig’s rhetoric as too provocative, and his suggested policies too extreme. Vance was cautious to a fault, while Zbig was very aggressive.
Carter’s personality was closer to Vance’s, but he wanted Zbig’s differing perspectives; to Carter, Vance was like an anchor while Zbig was like a test pilot pushing the limits. To Vance, the USSR was to be carefully managed within the framework of international affairs, not as American’s #1 adversary. In other words, detente was still the watchword as far as Vance was concerned, even though the SecState fully supported Carter’s agenda in promoting human rights.
Zbig was a native Pole, and he was an expert on history, and he knew what Russia/USSR had done to Poland over the centuries. Zbig wanted Carter to link the conduct of the USSR with how the US approached foreign policy. In other words, Zbig wanted Moscow to pay a price for their misbehaviors. It wasn’t until the USSR invaded Afghanistan that Carter saw things more Zbig’s way than Vance’s . . . and soon thereafter, Vance resigned as Secretary of State.
Carter’s personality was closer to Vance’s, but he wanted Zbig’s differing perspectives; to Carter, Vance was like an anchor while Zbig was like a test pilot pushing the limits. To Vance, the USSR was to be carefully managed within the framework of international affairs, not as American’s #1 adversary. In other words, detente was still the watchword as far as Vance was concerned, even though the SecState fully supported Carter’s agenda in promoting human rights.
Zbig was a native Pole, and he was an expert on history, and he knew what Russia/USSR had done to Poland over the centuries. Zbig wanted Carter to link the conduct of the USSR with how the US approached foreign policy. In other words, Zbig wanted Moscow to pay a price for their misbehaviors. It wasn’t until the USSR invaded Afghanistan that Carter saw things more Zbig’s way than Vance’s . . . and soon thereafter, Vance resigned as Secretary of State.
Zbig believed that externally opposing the USSR would internally weaken the Soviets. To Zbig, human rights was a weapon to be wielded against the USSR in the Cold War. Carter saw himself as a moralist and a realist, and he didn’t see any problem in getting different views from Vance or Zbig. Historically, Carter’s stance on human rights with the USSR was a greater Cold War weapon than detente and the realpolitik used by Nixon and Kissinger, not that Carter receives any historical credit on that front.
As the Soviets refused to change their conduct, Carter’s attitude towards the USSR began to change, since the USSR simply refused to honor the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords. After the conviction of Natan Sharansky (a “refusenik” who spent nine years in prison) in the USSR, Carter became the first President to employ sanctions against a nation that violated human rights. Carter’s focus on human rights forced people around the world to compare the US and the USSR; to this day, Carter’s stance against the USSR is associated with weakness instead of strength, which simply isn’t true.
Carter didn’t help himself out early in his Presidency by sending mixed signals in canceling the neutron bomb and the B-1 bomber while at the same time increasing military spending. Carter’s habit was to take different opinions and synthesize them into a coherent policy/goal, which often proved to be very difficult to accomplish and also to effectively communicate to the public, government, and the media. But for those that focused on Carter’s human rights policies, Carter looked weak militarily, and Carter’s preference for diplomatic solutions enhanced that perspective. But even before the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Carter authorized increased military spending, albeit very grudgingly, since he was a fiscal conservative.
As the Soviets refused to change their conduct, Carter’s attitude towards the USSR began to change, since the USSR simply refused to honor the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords. After the conviction of Natan Sharansky (a “refusenik” who spent nine years in prison) in the USSR, Carter became the first President to employ sanctions against a nation that violated human rights. Carter’s focus on human rights forced people around the world to compare the US and the USSR; to this day, Carter’s stance against the USSR is associated with weakness instead of strength, which simply isn’t true.
Carter didn’t help himself out early in his Presidency by sending mixed signals in canceling the neutron bomb and the B-1 bomber while at the same time increasing military spending. Carter’s habit was to take different opinions and synthesize them into a coherent policy/goal, which often proved to be very difficult to accomplish and also to effectively communicate to the public, government, and the media. But for those that focused on Carter’s human rights policies, Carter looked weak militarily, and Carter’s preference for diplomatic solutions enhanced that perspective. But even before the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Carter authorized increased military spending, albeit very grudgingly, since he was a fiscal conservative.
Carter focused on military technological superiority compared to the USSR with an array of weapons systems which included stealth technology. Carter was creating a more adaptable military that started the process of forcing the USSR to spend too much money on redundant strategic weapons. That being said, Carter refused to authorize the B-1 bomber, mostly due to its fatal strategic flaws (and its price tag). So it was Carter, not Reagan, that laid the groundwork for a more balanced military that would overwhelm the USSR and force the Soviets to spend far too much money on their military; Politburo documents prove that the Soviets saw Carter as the difference-maker in the late-1970s in that regard. In effect, Reagan reaped the harvest sown by Nixon, Ford, and then Carter. One reason why Carter is still seen as militarily weak is that he kept repeating during his campaign in 1976 that he would decrease military spending, so when Carter said no to a military program (e.g. the B-1), it was a high-profile no.
The SALT II Treaty was submitted to the Senate on 22 June 1979, four days after Carter and Brezhnev signed it in Vienna. But Carter’s popularity was low and the USSR was very active in Africa via Cuban proxies. And SALT II did not contain the deep USSR spending cuts that the defense hawks (e.g. Senator Scoop Jackson) demanded, and Senator Howard Baker (R; TN) had expended his political capital with the conservative Republicans with the two Panama Canal Treaties, so he was not an effective force in support of ratification. Various Senate committee votes indicated that SALT II didn’t have the necessary support, but Reagan and Gorbachev followed the tenets of SALT II in the 1980s nonetheless.
The SALT II Treaty was submitted to the Senate on 22 June 1979, four days after Carter and Brezhnev signed it in Vienna. But Carter’s popularity was low and the USSR was very active in Africa via Cuban proxies. And SALT II did not contain the deep USSR spending cuts that the defense hawks (e.g. Senator Scoop Jackson) demanded, and Senator Howard Baker (R; TN) had expended his political capital with the conservative Republicans with the two Panama Canal Treaties, so he was not an effective force in support of ratification. Various Senate committee votes indicated that SALT II didn’t have the necessary support, but Reagan and Gorbachev followed the tenets of SALT II in the 1980s nonetheless.