Source: Stuart Eizenstat. President Carter - The White House Years (2018)
In the weeks before the election, the Democratic coalition had fractured and the Republicans had united under Reagan’s aggressive-yet-easy-to-understand brand of conservatism. Reagan’s economic program is remains Republican orthodoxy to this day. The theory is that deep tax cuts for the wealthy would lead to job growth, which would then lead to more consumption (consumer spending), and then to increased government revenue. A little-known economist named Arthur Laffer (of the Laffer Curve) offered the American people the theory that they could have their cake and eat it too, in that lower taxes would lead to economic growth. Republican candidate George H.W. Bush derided the theory as “Voodoo Economics” in the primaries, but soon enough it became the mantra of not only the Republican Party, but also of Wall Street and Main Street. In an election year, the Republican economic program seemed like an easy remedy for never-ending Stagflation.
The year 1980 marked a reversal of party practices and traditions, in that traditionally Democrats were the party of programs/initiatives while the Republicans were the budget-balancers (w/ the exception of Nixon). Now Carter was the budget-balancer and Reagan was the one with the program. Carter was a New Democrat that was unable to articulate a framework that voters could appreciate and and understand during harsh economic times, while in comparison the Republicans had an easy time selling lower taxes and economic growth.
Reagan was optimistic and kept talking about a great future for America while Carter preached sacrifice and limits, coming off as a “Public Scold” from the Bible Belt. Nevermind that the Republican program of lower taxes (“Supply Side Economics”, a.k.a. “Reaganomics”) led to insanely high deficits in the 1980s; in the 1980 campaign, Americans preferred Reagan’s optimism and remedies far more than Carter’s realism.
The year 1980 marked a reversal of party practices and traditions, in that traditionally Democrats were the party of programs/initiatives while the Republicans were the budget-balancers (w/ the exception of Nixon). Now Carter was the budget-balancer and Reagan was the one with the program. Carter was a New Democrat that was unable to articulate a framework that voters could appreciate and and understand during harsh economic times, while in comparison the Republicans had an easy time selling lower taxes and economic growth.
Reagan was optimistic and kept talking about a great future for America while Carter preached sacrifice and limits, coming off as a “Public Scold” from the Bible Belt. Nevermind that the Republican program of lower taxes (“Supply Side Economics”, a.k.a. “Reaganomics”) led to insanely high deficits in the 1980s; in the 1980 campaign, Americans preferred Reagan’s optimism and remedies far more than Carter’s realism.
In a normal election year Reagan probably wouldn’t have been nearly as popular, and perhaps one could even argue he may have been unelectable. However, Stagflation and the Iranian Hostage Crisis (among many other reasons) dramatically changed the political landscape. Reagan proved to not only be beyond-attractive to the vast majority of voters, but also very charismatic person and an adroit politician, and he had a message that resonated. Also, the nation as a whole since the mid-1960s had started to trend towards conservatism: Reagan’s conservative beliefs weren’t much different from Goldwater’s in 1964, but the nation had changed greatly in the intervening years, and Reagan was far more likeable as a candidate than Goldwater.
The only real strategy employed against Reagan by the Carter campaign was to try and play the “fear card”, which meant the overall strategy of the Democrats was negative. Painting Reagan as a wild-eyed out-of-control conservative like Goldwater didn’t work; that same strategy was used by the Democrats in 2016 against President Trump, and again it failed miserably. Reagan enlisted an expert in Presidential campaigning, James Baker III, who had learned much from Ford’s loss to Carter in 1976 when he was Ford’s campaign manager. Baker kept the Reagan campaign focused on the economy and the so-called “Misery Index”.
The 28 October 1980 Presidential debate between Carter and Reagan proved decisive, in part because Carter and his campaign staff were outsmarted by Baker in terms of the timing of the debate. As Baker well knew a week before the election, a Reagan landslide was not a foregone conclusion. The race was close until the debate put Reagan ahead for good, and still the polls swung back to Carter in that short period of time . . . until Carter’s reaction to a last-minute offer from Iran sealed his fate.
The only real strategy employed against Reagan by the Carter campaign was to try and play the “fear card”, which meant the overall strategy of the Democrats was negative. Painting Reagan as a wild-eyed out-of-control conservative like Goldwater didn’t work; that same strategy was used by the Democrats in 2016 against President Trump, and again it failed miserably. Reagan enlisted an expert in Presidential campaigning, James Baker III, who had learned much from Ford’s loss to Carter in 1976 when he was Ford’s campaign manager. Baker kept the Reagan campaign focused on the economy and the so-called “Misery Index”.
The 28 October 1980 Presidential debate between Carter and Reagan proved decisive, in part because Carter and his campaign staff were outsmarted by Baker in terms of the timing of the debate. As Baker well knew a week before the election, a Reagan landslide was not a foregone conclusion. The race was close until the debate put Reagan ahead for good, and still the polls swung back to Carter in that short period of time . . . until Carter’s reaction to a last-minute offer from Iran sealed his fate.
The advice that Carter received in the Democratic primaries was to debate Senator Ted Kennedy, and then Reagan, anywhere and anytime using the strength of the Presidency to his advantage . . . but Carter refused to do so. On 21 September 1980, Reagan debated John Anderson (the independent Presidential candidate), and in essence taunted Carter for his absence. In terms of being on the political attack, Carter was never good at wielding a stiletto, and his attacks on Reagan were shrill and personal. During September/October 1980, Reagan insisted that any future Presidential debate should include Anderson, while Carter’s campaign insisted on excluding Anderson. Baker (as well as others in the campaign) felt that Reagan would not match up well to Carter’s overall knowledge, and might lose the debate with an embarrassing stumble on nationwide television. Reagan’s pollster had the race very close, and he told Reagan he needed to debate Carter. Baker, while worried, knew that Reagan was a master of television, and that he would come out ahead of Carter in the debate based on perception, image, and appeal.
Carter was pushed into a dilemma once Anderson’s poll numbers fell, and Reagan accepted Carter’s terms, which meant that the debate would occur very close to the election, something that worried Caddell a great deal. As it turned out, Carter would be no match for Reagan in a televised Presidential debate. Reagan almost playfully swatted away Carter’s verbal jabs (“There you go again . . .”), and Reagan closed by asking Americans if they were better off now than they were four years ago. Reagan successfully dispelled the “fear factor” that the Carter campaign had trumpeted; Reagan’s optimistic and avuncular manner on television turned the campaign on a dime. A record 100 million Americans watched the debate. Going into the debate, Reagan held a narrow lead in the polls by 2 or 3 points, but after the debate, his lead rose to several points; usually debates don’t move the polls, but this debate certainly did. As a result, Carter’s strategy shifted to the “risk factor” if Reagan became President.
Carter was pushed into a dilemma once Anderson’s poll numbers fell, and Reagan accepted Carter’s terms, which meant that the debate would occur very close to the election, something that worried Caddell a great deal. As it turned out, Carter would be no match for Reagan in a televised Presidential debate. Reagan almost playfully swatted away Carter’s verbal jabs (“There you go again . . .”), and Reagan closed by asking Americans if they were better off now than they were four years ago. Reagan successfully dispelled the “fear factor” that the Carter campaign had trumpeted; Reagan’s optimistic and avuncular manner on television turned the campaign on a dime. A record 100 million Americans watched the debate. Going into the debate, Reagan held a narrow lead in the polls by 2 or 3 points, but after the debate, his lead rose to several points; usually debates don’t move the polls, but this debate certainly did. As a result, Carter’s strategy shifted to the “risk factor” if Reagan became President.
Several years after the election, it was proven that the Reagan campaign had in its possession a stolen “Debate Book” from the Carter campaign, which was confirmed to Eizenstat by Baker. Even though Baker claimed the book didn’t help Reagan, Carter believed that it made a huge difference in the outcome of the debate. How Reagan gained the debate book illustrated how his campaign operated, but Ted Kennedy was involved as well, desperately wanting Carter to lose.
William Casey (a future Director of the CIA), literally dropped the debate book on Baker’s desk and told Baker that he didn’t want to know where it came from. The story leaked in 1983, and resulted in a ten month Congressional investigation, where Casey denied ever giving the book to Baker, while Baker testified that he had seen the debate book. The investigation never determined who actually stole the debate book from the Carter campaign. Almost thirty years came the truth, and what made the theft possible were rogue elements within the Kennedy campaign that truly hated Carter. While never proven beyond a doubt, it seems that there were Kennedy people in the Carter administration that made the theft possible.
William Casey (a future Director of the CIA), literally dropped the debate book on Baker’s desk and told Baker that he didn’t want to know where it came from. The story leaked in 1983, and resulted in a ten month Congressional investigation, where Casey denied ever giving the book to Baker, while Baker testified that he had seen the debate book. The investigation never determined who actually stole the debate book from the Carter campaign. Almost thirty years came the truth, and what made the theft possible were rogue elements within the Kennedy campaign that truly hated Carter. While never proven beyond a doubt, it seems that there were Kennedy people in the Carter administration that made the theft possible.
Nevertheless, Carter made a comeback in the polls in the days leading up to the election, but one more misstep by the President led to electoral disaster. In the early morning of the Sunday before the election, Iran made another offer: their parliament had voted to release the hostages but only if certain conditions were met. Carter publicly suspended his campaign to go back to DC, which was the worst thing the President could have done that close to the election. Even the First Lady told Carter to stay on the campaign trail, but Carter refused to follow that sage advice.
As far as the media (and the public) was concerned, Carter had cried wolf before on the potential release of the hostages, and not it appeared he might be doing so to garner votes, which wasn’t true at all. In effect, Khomeini was interfering with the election, and Carter totally enabled Khomeini without wanting to do so. Iran wanted a yes-or-no answer to their offer by Monday, the day before the election, and to Carter’s credit he refused to play ball, knowing it was nothing more than a political trap. Carter told the media that the offer was a step forward but it wasn’t close to an acceptable agreement, which was a statement that he could have made from the campaign trail.
Carter had one last chance on that Sunday when he returned to Chicago to campaign. Carter was advised to give a very angry public reply to Iran, but Carter was worried that Iran’s response would be taken out on the hostages. Carter appeared on television, interrupting a Redskins game, to make a mild statement on the Iranian offer that featured no anger at all. Carter’s decisions to go back to DC and make a tepid television appearance reminded voters of the humiliation of the Iranian Hostage Crisis, and those voters figuratively threw up their hands and gave up on Carter.
As far as the media (and the public) was concerned, Carter had cried wolf before on the potential release of the hostages, and not it appeared he might be doing so to garner votes, which wasn’t true at all. In effect, Khomeini was interfering with the election, and Carter totally enabled Khomeini without wanting to do so. Iran wanted a yes-or-no answer to their offer by Monday, the day before the election, and to Carter’s credit he refused to play ball, knowing it was nothing more than a political trap. Carter told the media that the offer was a step forward but it wasn’t close to an acceptable agreement, which was a statement that he could have made from the campaign trail.
Carter had one last chance on that Sunday when he returned to Chicago to campaign. Carter was advised to give a very angry public reply to Iran, but Carter was worried that Iran’s response would be taken out on the hostages. Carter appeared on television, interrupting a Redskins game, to make a mild statement on the Iranian offer that featured no anger at all. Carter’s decisions to go back to DC and make a tepid television appearance reminded voters of the humiliation of the Iranian Hostage Crisis, and those voters figuratively threw up their hands and gave up on Carter.
On Election Day, Caddell let Carter et al know that as of the previous Saturday the polls had been very close, but after Sunday, the polls once again had Reagan in the lead by a significant margin. One voter told Caddell “that little son-of-a-bitch can’t handle a two-bit ayatollah, I’ll take my chances with Reagan”. Americans didn’t blame Carter for the hostages being taken but for the disgrace and humiliation for not being able to resolve the crisis.
Carter didn’t even wait for the polls to close in the western states before he called Reagan to concede, and then he informed the media of his concession. Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill fumed from his home in Cambridge (MA), telling a pro-Carter Democrat in the House that the “Carter Bunch” came in like a bunch of jerks and went out the same way. It was a landslide for Reagan in virtually every electoral measure, with Reagan receiving 489 Electoral Votes (and 44 states) to Carter’s 49 (6 states + DC). However, Reagan only had .507 of the popular vote, but he had a margin of 8.5+ million votes over Carter.
O’Neill, over his Election Night hissy fit, told Carter that history would treat him well. Carter exercised the full powers of the Presidency until the moment he could do so no longer. When the hostages were allowed to leave Iranian air space on Inauguration Day 1981, Reagan graciously offered Carter the use of Air Force One to go to West Germany to greet the hostages. Among those with Carter was Mondale, and at Rhein-Main Air Force Base in West Germany, some of the hostages tearfully embraced Carter while others, angry at their long captivity, refused to interact with the former President.
Carter didn’t even wait for the polls to close in the western states before he called Reagan to concede, and then he informed the media of his concession. Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill fumed from his home in Cambridge (MA), telling a pro-Carter Democrat in the House that the “Carter Bunch” came in like a bunch of jerks and went out the same way. It was a landslide for Reagan in virtually every electoral measure, with Reagan receiving 489 Electoral Votes (and 44 states) to Carter’s 49 (6 states + DC). However, Reagan only had .507 of the popular vote, but he had a margin of 8.5+ million votes over Carter.
O’Neill, over his Election Night hissy fit, told Carter that history would treat him well. Carter exercised the full powers of the Presidency until the moment he could do so no longer. When the hostages were allowed to leave Iranian air space on Inauguration Day 1981, Reagan graciously offered Carter the use of Air Force One to go to West Germany to greet the hostages. Among those with Carter was Mondale, and at Rhein-Main Air Force Base in West Germany, some of the hostages tearfully embraced Carter while others, angry at their long captivity, refused to interact with the former President.