Source: Lawrence O'Donnell. Playing With Fire - The 1968 Election
and the Transformation of American Politics (2017)
and the Transformation of American Politics (2017)
Ohio Congressman John Gilligan, who was running for the Senate, believed that a “Peace Plank” would help Humphrey in that at least some of the delegates that supported McCarthy might switch, which would be the best chance for party unity. Gilligan and other anti-war Democrats lined up a high-profile coalition in support of the Peace Plank. To become part of the platform, the Peace Plank would have to look-and-sound more Establishment than Insurgent (e.g. avoid criticizing LBJ), which was a lot to ask of McCarthy and his supporters.
Despite mutual suspicion, unity on the Peace Plank held up generally, and there was hope that the anti-war Democrats could force it on Humphrey. Humphrey knew that he needed to move away from LBJ on Vietnam in order to distance himself to show that he was his “own man”. Humphrey showed LBJ the most recent draft of his position on Vietnam, and LBJ really let Humphrey have it, and the Vice-President left the White House humiliated. Humphrey gave the paper to David Ginsburg to “fix” while telling no one about his conversation with LBJ. The next day LBJ met with Nixon. LBJ believed that Nixon, far more than Humphrey, would continue his policies in Vietnam. LBJ needed to keep Nixon from promising a permanent halt to the bombing; after all, why would North Vietnam negotiate if they could just wait for the next President.
Despite mutual suspicion, unity on the Peace Plank held up generally, and there was hope that the anti-war Democrats could force it on Humphrey. Humphrey knew that he needed to move away from LBJ on Vietnam in order to distance himself to show that he was his “own man”. Humphrey showed LBJ the most recent draft of his position on Vietnam, and LBJ really let Humphrey have it, and the Vice-President left the White House humiliated. Humphrey gave the paper to David Ginsburg to “fix” while telling no one about his conversation with LBJ. The next day LBJ met with Nixon. LBJ believed that Nixon, far more than Humphrey, would continue his policies in Vietnam. LBJ needed to keep Nixon from promising a permanent halt to the bombing; after all, why would North Vietnam negotiate if they could just wait for the next President.
LBJ and Nixon met on 26 July 1968 in the Cabinet Room. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was also in attendance, as was National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, in large part to convince Nixon that it was a “real” meeting, not just a courtesy. LBJ told Nixon of his secret conditions for negotiations (of which LBJ didn’t tell Humphrey), hoping to win Nixon’s confidence. LBJ had no idea that Nixon in no way wanted to call a halt to the bombing, in that Nixon simply thought that he would do a much better job prosecuting the war than LBJ. To increase the odds of a Nixon victory in 1968, Nixon needed the quagmire to continue in Vietnam.
LBJ told Nixon that Humphrey was “under control”, and that information alone made Nixon’s visit to the White House more than worthwhile. The deal LBJ floated was that Nixon wouldn’t push for a bombing halt and would keep from directly criticizing LBJ as long as LBJ didn’t make any moves towards arriving at a resolution in terms of negotiations without informing Nixon. But LBJ kept the deepest secret of all from both Nixon and Humphrey: the President believed that he was on the verge of a breakthrough in negotiations after receiving a secret message from the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin (who in effect shared power with Leonid Brezhnev). Kosygin informed LBJ that if the US stopped the bombing, the USSR would convince North Vietnam to agree to all three of LBJ’s conditions. LBJ believed that the USSR had the necessary leverage to convince North Vietnam to do so in that 80% of its war supplies came from the Soviet Union . . . LBJ dared to think about “Peace With Honor”. But Nixon was keeping a secret of his own about Vietnam, which wouldn’t be fully revealed until long after his death.
LBJ told Nixon that Humphrey was “under control”, and that information alone made Nixon’s visit to the White House more than worthwhile. The deal LBJ floated was that Nixon wouldn’t push for a bombing halt and would keep from directly criticizing LBJ as long as LBJ didn’t make any moves towards arriving at a resolution in terms of negotiations without informing Nixon. But LBJ kept the deepest secret of all from both Nixon and Humphrey: the President believed that he was on the verge of a breakthrough in negotiations after receiving a secret message from the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin (who in effect shared power with Leonid Brezhnev). Kosygin informed LBJ that if the US stopped the bombing, the USSR would convince North Vietnam to agree to all three of LBJ’s conditions. LBJ believed that the USSR had the necessary leverage to convince North Vietnam to do so in that 80% of its war supplies came from the Soviet Union . . . LBJ dared to think about “Peace With Honor”. But Nixon was keeping a secret of his own about Vietnam, which wouldn’t be fully revealed until long after his death.
Two weeks before Nixon met with LBJ, Nixon met with the South Vietnamese Ambassador to the US, Bui Diem. Diem had flown from Washington, D.C. to New York City with Anna Chennault, a very wealthy widow of General Claire Chennault, who was also the daughter of a Chinese ambassador. Nixon asked Chennault, whose contacts in Asia were very numerous and significant, for help in developing a secret communications network with the government of South Vietnam and Chennault introduced Nixon to Bui Diem. Nixon and Diem agreed that Chennault would be the sole contact between the government of South Vietnam, and that John Mitchell, who was in charge of Nixon’s campaign, would be Chennault’s contact.
In 1968, no other government on the planet had a greater interest in the US Presidential Election than South Vietnam. Nixon wanted South Vietnam to keep him up to to date about any developments concerning the talks in Paris; both Nixon and South Vietnam feared the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam. Nixon didn’t want any progress towards ending the war before the election, since that development would only be to his disadvantage. As far as the government of South Vietnam was concerned, their whole existence depended on US troops remaining in their nation.
While the Democrats debated on the Peace Plank and the platform, Nixon told South Vietnam to hold out on the talks since they would get a better deal with him as President. Nixon had to keep his plan secret since he was breaking a law. Since 1799, the Logan Act prohibited private US citizens from negotiating with a foreign nation on behalf of the US. Nixon was more-than-comfortable committing the “Perfect Crime” to win the Presidency; not only did he know more US soldiers would be killed/wounded by his delaying tactics, but he also knew that LBJ would not blow the whistle on his shenanigans. If LBJ accused Nixon of violating the Logan Act, then LBJ would have to admit how he came about that knowledge, which would lead to admitting that the US had wiretapped embassies.
In 1968, no other government on the planet had a greater interest in the US Presidential Election than South Vietnam. Nixon wanted South Vietnam to keep him up to to date about any developments concerning the talks in Paris; both Nixon and South Vietnam feared the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam. Nixon didn’t want any progress towards ending the war before the election, since that development would only be to his disadvantage. As far as the government of South Vietnam was concerned, their whole existence depended on US troops remaining in their nation.
While the Democrats debated on the Peace Plank and the platform, Nixon told South Vietnam to hold out on the talks since they would get a better deal with him as President. Nixon had to keep his plan secret since he was breaking a law. Since 1799, the Logan Act prohibited private US citizens from negotiating with a foreign nation on behalf of the US. Nixon was more-than-comfortable committing the “Perfect Crime” to win the Presidency; not only did he know more US soldiers would be killed/wounded by his delaying tactics, but he also knew that LBJ would not blow the whistle on his shenanigans. If LBJ accused Nixon of violating the Logan Act, then LBJ would have to admit how he came about that knowledge, which would lead to admitting that the US had wiretapped embassies.
On 10 August 1968, Senator George McGovern (SD) announced his candidacy right before the convention, having lost confidence in McCarthy. In essence, McGovern tried to fill the void of RFK by using the Inside Game, and again McCarthy felt betrayed by the entry of another peace candidate into the fray. McCarthy viewed McGovern as nothing more than a shill for Humphrey, since he could split the anti-war delegates. However, if McCarthy had simply returned McGovern’s phone call in which he offered to endorse McCarthy, McGovern wouldn’t have announced. McGovern’s strategy appeared to be that by announcing his candidacy, he believed the odds of adding the Peace Plank were improved.
The Chairman of the Platform Committee was Congressman Hale Boggs (LA), the House Majority Whip and an LBJ man, and Boggs wanted to bury the Peace Plank. On 19 August 1968, the hearings in front of the Platform Committee started, and Boggs told Ginsburg that he wanted the Peace Plank to be what Humphrey wanted. Humphrey asked Senator Edmund Muskie (ME) to represent him at the Platform Committee, and also there were Senators McGovern and Fulbright in order to show a strong presence of the party’s Establishment. About 40 of the 100 members of the Platform Committee were ready to support a Peace Plank, which meant that the least that should happen was that a minority report for the Peace Plank would be presented to the delegates on the floor and a vote would be taken. If the 40 or so on the Platform Committee could get Humphrey to join them, then the Peace Plank would be part of the majority position on the Democratic Party Platform. The next day LBJ called Nixon and coached him on what to say about criticizing the Peace Plank, hoping it would weaken the position of those in support.
The Chairman of the Platform Committee was Congressman Hale Boggs (LA), the House Majority Whip and an LBJ man, and Boggs wanted to bury the Peace Plank. On 19 August 1968, the hearings in front of the Platform Committee started, and Boggs told Ginsburg that he wanted the Peace Plank to be what Humphrey wanted. Humphrey asked Senator Edmund Muskie (ME) to represent him at the Platform Committee, and also there were Senators McGovern and Fulbright in order to show a strong presence of the party’s Establishment. About 40 of the 100 members of the Platform Committee were ready to support a Peace Plank, which meant that the least that should happen was that a minority report for the Peace Plank would be presented to the delegates on the floor and a vote would be taken. If the 40 or so on the Platform Committee could get Humphrey to join them, then the Peace Plank would be part of the majority position on the Democratic Party Platform. The next day LBJ called Nixon and coached him on what to say about criticizing the Peace Plank, hoping it would weaken the position of those in support.
On 20 August 1968, Soviet tanks rolled into Czechoslovakia, stunning LBJ, but not Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford. As far as Clifford was concerned, LBJ had blown it by being far too slow to accept the USSR offer to help pressure North Vietnam into negotiations (but of course Clifford couldn’t tell LBJ what he thought). After calling Nixon to reaffirm their previous discussion, LBJ called Humphrey and read him the riot act about standing firm on Vietnam.
The naked aggression of the USSR in Czechoslovakia hit the Peace Plank supporters hard in that most voters now saw them as out of tune idealists at best, or at worst, appeasers. McCarthy’s reaction to the USSR aggression was soft and didn’t help the Peace Plank coalition at all. On 22 August 1968, four days before the convention started, the Platform Committee moved to Chicago. Chairman Boggs continued to throw up roadblocks and the level of confidence eroded among the members of the Peace Plank coalition. The coalition started to fall apart and the hearing in front of the Platform Committee became a fractured free-for-all.
The outcome was a mix of compromises that called for a halt to the unconditional bombing, and a government in South Vietnam that would recognize (and even include) the Viet Cong. Now it came down to whether or not Humphrey would be in support of the patchwork of compromises. After meeting with LBJ, Boggs became convinced that a Peace Plank would cost more US soldiers’ lives, and finally Humphrey realized that LBJ was still in complete control of not only the convention, but also the Democratic Party. The Platform Committee had 65 votes for LBJ’s Vietnam plank at 35 votes for the Peace Plank, which meant both would be brought to the convention floor for a vote by the assembled delegates.
The naked aggression of the USSR in Czechoslovakia hit the Peace Plank supporters hard in that most voters now saw them as out of tune idealists at best, or at worst, appeasers. McCarthy’s reaction to the USSR aggression was soft and didn’t help the Peace Plank coalition at all. On 22 August 1968, four days before the convention started, the Platform Committee moved to Chicago. Chairman Boggs continued to throw up roadblocks and the level of confidence eroded among the members of the Peace Plank coalition. The coalition started to fall apart and the hearing in front of the Platform Committee became a fractured free-for-all.
The outcome was a mix of compromises that called for a halt to the unconditional bombing, and a government in South Vietnam that would recognize (and even include) the Viet Cong. Now it came down to whether or not Humphrey would be in support of the patchwork of compromises. After meeting with LBJ, Boggs became convinced that a Peace Plank would cost more US soldiers’ lives, and finally Humphrey realized that LBJ was still in complete control of not only the convention, but also the Democratic Party. The Platform Committee had 65 votes for LBJ’s Vietnam plank at 35 votes for the Peace Plank, which meant both would be brought to the convention floor for a vote by the assembled delegates.