Source: Lawrence O'Donnell. Playing With Fire - The 1968 Election
and the Transformation of American Politics (2017)
and the Transformation of American Politics (2017)
Vice-President Hubert Humphrey’s staff had a much superior “Inside Game” compared to McCarthy’s in that Humphrey and his entourage had a lot of experience and they loved the inside game; Humphrey’s public awkwardness disappeared when he was in private. When it came to the Inside Game, the weakest part of the McCarthy campaign was actually the candidate. For example, McCarthy never called back Senator George McGovern (SD) who had phoned to offer McCarthy his endorsement, and McCarthy canceled three scheduled meetings with Mayor Richard J. Daley. McCarthy, simply put, was a terrible player when it came to the Inside Game, and he and his advisors weren’t nearly as connected as Humphrey and his staff.
However, on the hustings (the campaign trail), Humphrey’s popularity lagged behind McCarthy’s, and the Vice-President constantly heard “We Want Gene” and “Dump the Hump”. Humphrey’s crowds were often sparse, and on college campuses / inner cities, the crowds were even abusive. Humphrey was very nervous about keeping his pledged delegates from defecting to McCarthy, or even the independent candidate for President, Alabama’s Democratic Governor, George Wallace. Humphrey believed that he could not win the nomination without LBJ’s support, and the President wasn’t reassuring; LBJ preferred to keep Humphrey in suspense, which was his normal approach. After RFK’s assassination, LBJ felt no need to soften his stance on Vietnam to help Humphrey with the anti-war crowd.
However, on the hustings (the campaign trail), Humphrey’s popularity lagged behind McCarthy’s, and the Vice-President constantly heard “We Want Gene” and “Dump the Hump”. Humphrey’s crowds were often sparse, and on college campuses / inner cities, the crowds were even abusive. Humphrey was very nervous about keeping his pledged delegates from defecting to McCarthy, or even the independent candidate for President, Alabama’s Democratic Governor, George Wallace. Humphrey believed that he could not win the nomination without LBJ’s support, and the President wasn’t reassuring; LBJ preferred to keep Humphrey in suspense, which was his normal approach. After RFK’s assassination, LBJ felt no need to soften his stance on Vietnam to help Humphrey with the anti-war crowd.
LBJ micromanaged the preparation of the Democratic convention along with Mayor Daley. LBJ controlled the day-to-day program of the convention and refused to allow Humphrey to share in the power of the decision-making. One result was that Humphrey never knew what LBJ thought of him from one day to the next. Humphrey campaigned that summer as if he was a suspect in a crime and everything he said could be used against him; by the time Humphrey arrived in Chicago, LBJ still hadn’t endorsed his Vice-President.
Normally the committee meetings before the convention are pro forma (non-events), but not in 1968, where each committee found itself battling for what they considered to be the soul of the Democratic Party; the future of political conventions were changed forever that summer. The Rules Committee chickened out and allowed the delegates decide on the “Unit Rule”, which allowed state delegations to go winner-take-all for the state delegation’s preference for a candidate. McCarthy wanted the Unit Rule abolished since it was an obvious advantage for Humphrey. And, much to the astonishment of Democratic power brokers, Humphrey wanted the Unit Rule abolished as well. What hurt Humphrey was that it was mostly likely organizational ineptitude that led to his campaign’s opposition to the Unit Rule, and to the Democratic bosses, it looked like Humphrey didn’t have much of a clue as to what was occurring.
Normally the committee meetings before the convention are pro forma (non-events), but not in 1968, where each committee found itself battling for what they considered to be the soul of the Democratic Party; the future of political conventions were changed forever that summer. The Rules Committee chickened out and allowed the delegates decide on the “Unit Rule”, which allowed state delegations to go winner-take-all for the state delegation’s preference for a candidate. McCarthy wanted the Unit Rule abolished since it was an obvious advantage for Humphrey. And, much to the astonishment of Democratic power brokers, Humphrey wanted the Unit Rule abolished as well. What hurt Humphrey was that it was mostly likely organizational ineptitude that led to his campaign’s opposition to the Unit Rule, and to the Democratic bosses, it looked like Humphrey didn’t have much of a clue as to what was occurring.
The mission of the Credentials Committee was to decide who was officially recognized as a delegate from each state, and the Democratic bosses were prepared to fight McCarthy in terms of any challenges. McCarthy was so new to campaigning that he and his staff were shocked to find out how states really selected their delegates; McCarthy was on the outside-looking-in. McCarthy wanted to challenge the legitimacy of as many delegates as possible in order to try and force the Credentials Committee to replace them with delegates pledged to him. McCarthy’s mantra was “achieve panic, then win”; so the question for McCarthy, then, was whether to work inside or outside the convention system. Joseph Rauh was the McCarthy point man during the Credentials Committee hearings, and Rauh’s goal was to bring the entire credentials system crashing down by using an attack so narrow in scope that nobody in a position to stop him would realize what was occurring until it was too late.
In 1964, Rauh challenged the credentials of the Mississippi delegation in that he wanted the delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Party recognized. Rauh remembered Humphrey’s promise that segregated delegations would not be seated in 1968. Rauh wanted to challenge the Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama delegations along those lines, and he hoped to replace them w/ delegates loyal to McCarthy. And, if the Southern delegations were no longer in a unified bloc, then the result could be a brokered convention. If Humphrey allowed the MS, GA, and AL delegations to be seated, then he would be allowing the ultra-conservative wing of the Democratic Party to flex their political muscles.
In 1964, Rauh challenged the credentials of the Mississippi delegation in that he wanted the delegates of the Mississippi Freedom Party recognized. Rauh remembered Humphrey’s promise that segregated delegations would not be seated in 1968. Rauh wanted to challenge the Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama delegations along those lines, and he hoped to replace them w/ delegates loyal to McCarthy. And, if the Southern delegations were no longer in a unified bloc, then the result could be a brokered convention. If Humphrey allowed the MS, GA, and AL delegations to be seated, then he would be allowing the ultra-conservative wing of the Democratic Party to flex their political muscles.
There were 212 African-American delegates heading to Chicago, and there was a strong possibility that Southern delegations could bolt to Wallace. Rauh’s strategy had the potential to put Humphrey in an impossible bind, but the younger staff members in the McCarthy campaign didn’t have the experience or imagination of Rauh. What the younger staffers wanted was a credentials challenge that was far more broad in focus, a challenge that encompassed the primaries as well as the convention.
19 August 1968 was the first meeting of the Credentials Committee, and they faced an unprecedented and unheard of number of challenges. McCarthy’s campaign challenged 15 state delegations, including northern states such as Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Minnesota. Humphrey joined McCarthy in challenging the Mississippi delegation in that this time he knew the challenge would be successful, and Humphrey didn’t want to expend any energy in fighting what was going to be inevitable. The Credentials Committee decided to split Georgia’s segregated delegation 50/50 between white delegates and the challenge delegates put forth by Georgia state representative Julian Bond. Humphrey had nothing to lose in supporting the challenge against Georgia in that the state was going to vote for Wallace.
On 24 August 1968, the Credentials Committee voted 84-10 to deny the segregated Mississippi delegation and to replace them with delegates evenly split among McCarthy and Humphrey. With Georgia and Mississippi taken care of, the Credentials Committee was able to stop any challenges to the northern delegations, just as Rauh had predicted.
19 August 1968 was the first meeting of the Credentials Committee, and they faced an unprecedented and unheard of number of challenges. McCarthy’s campaign challenged 15 state delegations, including northern states such as Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Minnesota. Humphrey joined McCarthy in challenging the Mississippi delegation in that this time he knew the challenge would be successful, and Humphrey didn’t want to expend any energy in fighting what was going to be inevitable. The Credentials Committee decided to split Georgia’s segregated delegation 50/50 between white delegates and the challenge delegates put forth by Georgia state representative Julian Bond. Humphrey had nothing to lose in supporting the challenge against Georgia in that the state was going to vote for Wallace.
On 24 August 1968, the Credentials Committee voted 84-10 to deny the segregated Mississippi delegation and to replace them with delegates evenly split among McCarthy and Humphrey. With Georgia and Mississippi taken care of, the Credentials Committee was able to stop any challenges to the northern delegations, just as Rauh had predicted.
The Credentials Committee also recommended changes in how delegates were selected at the state level so a candidate (such as Humphrey) that didn’t run in a primary couldn’t lock up delegates before the convention; 1968 was the last time primaries were less important than the Inside Game. Thwarted by the young McCarthy staffers that didn’t have his experience/vision, Rauh’s only play was to wait until the convention to try and challenge the seating of targeted Southern delegations in order to gain McCarthy delegates.
The battle in the Platform Committee far exceeded what occurred in the Credentials Committee. The platform is the written outline of the party’s position on the issues and the promises of what the party’s candidate hopes to achieve once in office. Platforms are usually bland and vague in order to avoid contradictions/violations once the candidate has been elected, but after the New Hampshire primary, it was certain that there would be a huge showdown on the Platform Committee concerning the Vietnam War.
McCarthy wanted a “Peace Plank” in the Democratic Party Platform for 1968, and Humphrey wanted whatever LBJ would allow. Preliminary talks between the US and North Vietnam began on 10 May 1968 in Paris, and while LBJ had ordered a temporary bombing halt, North Vietnam refused to negotiate until LBJ made a promise to stop bombing altogether.
The battle in the Platform Committee far exceeded what occurred in the Credentials Committee. The platform is the written outline of the party’s position on the issues and the promises of what the party’s candidate hopes to achieve once in office. Platforms are usually bland and vague in order to avoid contradictions/violations once the candidate has been elected, but after the New Hampshire primary, it was certain that there would be a huge showdown on the Platform Committee concerning the Vietnam War.
McCarthy wanted a “Peace Plank” in the Democratic Party Platform for 1968, and Humphrey wanted whatever LBJ would allow. Preliminary talks between the US and North Vietnam began on 10 May 1968 in Paris, and while LBJ had ordered a temporary bombing halt, North Vietnam refused to negotiate until LBJ made a promise to stop bombing altogether.
LBJ had three conditions to which he wanted North Vietnam to accept before he agreed to stop bombing. First was a reduction in North Vietnamese attacks in South Vietnam, the second was a demilitarized zone between the two nations, and the third was acceptance of South Vietnam as a participant in the negotiations. But accepting South Vietnam was an impossibility for not only the North Vietnamese, but also the Viet Cong, and South Vietnam refused to participate if the Viet Cong was a participant.
So, on 10 May 1968, the US and North Vietnam were the only ones at the negotiating table in Paris . . . and the delegations of the two nations literally argued about the shape/size of the table that would be used. North Vietnam wanted a large circular table so everyone was equal (there would be no “Head of the Table”). South Vietnam, using the US delegation as its proxy, wanted a rectangular table so they and North Vietnam would be across from each other, and so that there would be no room for the Viet Cong. At that pace, there would be no progress before the Election of 1968, so no progress in Paris meant all the more pressure on the Democratic Party as it prepared for its national convention in Chicago . . .
So, on 10 May 1968, the US and North Vietnam were the only ones at the negotiating table in Paris . . . and the delegations of the two nations literally argued about the shape/size of the table that would be used. North Vietnam wanted a large circular table so everyone was equal (there would be no “Head of the Table”). South Vietnam, using the US delegation as its proxy, wanted a rectangular table so they and North Vietnam would be across from each other, and so that there would be no room for the Viet Cong. At that pace, there would be no progress before the Election of 1968, so no progress in Paris meant all the more pressure on the Democratic Party as it prepared for its national convention in Chicago . . .