Source: David Halberstam. The Powers That Be (2012)
Sam Rayburn had been Speaker of the House for the last 16 years, but in 1960 he was 78 and in failing health. Rayburn’s preferred Democratic nominee (and friend/protege) was Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Baines Johnson (TX). LBJ’s grand strategy to win the Democratic nomination in 1960 was to have everyone else take risks in the primaries to thwart the rise of Senator John Kennedy (MA) while he was safe on the sidelines. Rayburn was not a fan of JFK, and he hated Nixon, so he was furious with LBJ and his “play it safe” strategy. After JFK garnered the Democratic nomination, Rayburn counseled LBJ to take the Vice-President slot after it was offered, mostly as a check on Nixon in the Election of 1960.
By 1960, Rayburn was appalled at the new generation of politicians (e.g. JFK), the role of TV, and the faster pace; Rayburn hated the new age of politics. In 1971, LBJ, interviewed by CBS, blamed the media for not only forcing him out of the Presidency, but for changing politics for the worse. LBJ stated that without the media, there would not have been a JFK, or a Robert Kennedy, or a Ted Kennedy.
By 1960, Rayburn was appalled at the new generation of politicians (e.g. JFK), the role of TV, and the faster pace; Rayburn hated the new age of politics. In 1971, LBJ, interviewed by CBS, blamed the media for not only forcing him out of the Presidency, but for changing politics for the worse. LBJ stated that without the media, there would not have been a JFK, or a Robert Kennedy, or a Ted Kennedy.
President Franklin Roosevelt forever changed the relationship between the President and the media; under FDR, the federal government became the focal point, and the media (including radio) had something interesting to cover. FDR gave two press conferences a week, and soon 25% of all world news from the Associated Press came from Washington, D.C. FDR manipulated the press, knowing what they needed and when they needed information. FDR provided a staggering amount of information, and of course it was all flattering to him. The media, both print and radio, allowed FDR to increase the power of the Presidency, while at the same time, in many ways, the media became the national architects of the national agenda.
FDR used the media during the Great Depression to enhance his image as a President fighting for the common man, and radio was the medium that locked that image into place. FDR’s speeches were designed for the radio, not for print. FDR would repeat vital parts of the radio broadcasts (‘Fireside Chats”) for newsreels, since they were not allowed during the actual broadcast (the cameras were very loud on those days). Usually, 50+ million Americans listened to FDR on the radio. White House correspondents of course hated the new medium, and especially hated radio correspondents, refusing to see them as their equals in journalism. (ironically, radio forced print journalism to improve their quality and their standards). By the late-1930s, more Americans listened to CBS Radio than read the New York Times.
FDR used the media during the Great Depression to enhance his image as a President fighting for the common man, and radio was the medium that locked that image into place. FDR’s speeches were designed for the radio, not for print. FDR would repeat vital parts of the radio broadcasts (‘Fireside Chats”) for newsreels, since they were not allowed during the actual broadcast (the cameras were very loud on those days). Usually, 50+ million Americans listened to FDR on the radio. White House correspondents of course hated the new medium, and especially hated radio correspondents, refusing to see them as their equals in journalism. (ironically, radio forced print journalism to improve their quality and their standards). By the late-1930s, more Americans listened to CBS Radio than read the New York Times.
JFK understood what TV could do for a President (or a politician with Presidential ambitions) the same way that FDR understood radio. In the late-1950s, other Presidential hopefuls had been building their power base from the Senate (e.g. Hubert Humphrey and LBJ) or through the party (e.g. Humphrey and Nixon), but JFK made the extra effort to cultivate journalists. To his fellow Senators, JFK was a colleague that didn’t work very hard in-or-out of the chamber (which was true), but to journalists JFK was a potential political superstar that needed to be covered.
By a combination of timing, talent, and ability, JFK arrived on the national political landscape at the perfect time, and JFK knew that TV would amplify his power base. As early as 1956, JFK used TV to his political advantage, becoming a national figure. JFK became an expert at indirectly engaging journalists. Instead of formal face-to-face encounters (e.g. dinner parties), JFK often found it more effective to cultivate a journalist by sharing their main interest, the one in which they were most fascinated/passionate (it could be as simple as discussing a book or movie).
JFK was the first politician to use a political pollster in his “Circle of Trust’; that pollster was Lou Harris, and he gave JFK as close to real-time feedback as possible. JFK discovered that using a pollster was another tool (as was TV) a politician could use to avoid relying on the party’s infrastructure/power-brokers.
By a combination of timing, talent, and ability, JFK arrived on the national political landscape at the perfect time, and JFK knew that TV would amplify his power base. As early as 1956, JFK used TV to his political advantage, becoming a national figure. JFK became an expert at indirectly engaging journalists. Instead of formal face-to-face encounters (e.g. dinner parties), JFK often found it more effective to cultivate a journalist by sharing their main interest, the one in which they were most fascinated/passionate (it could be as simple as discussing a book or movie).
JFK was the first politician to use a political pollster in his “Circle of Trust’; that pollster was Lou Harris, and he gave JFK as close to real-time feedback as possible. JFK discovered that using a pollster was another tool (as was TV) a politician could use to avoid relying on the party’s infrastructure/power-brokers.
In essence, the birth of using modern political polling occurred in the 1960 West Virginia Democratic primary. Harris, unlike the Gallup polls, provided not only numbers for JFK, but also interpretation. Harris soon discovered that he had a client in JFK that could interpret the data as well as he could. JFK, unlike LBJ or NIxon, knew that polling had its limits, but if used right, it was beyond-useful and an advantage over his rivals. JFK’s father, Joe Kennedy Sr., shelled out $300k for Harris’ services (a huge sum in those days), and if it wasn’t for Harris, JFK would have probably lost to Hubert Humphrey in the Wisconsin primary.
JFK’s religion (he was a Catholic) became an issue in Wisconsin (to his benefit), but in heavily Protestant West Virginia, his religion became a liability according to the polls. JFK’s opponents, especially Humphrey (and in the shadows, LBJ), looked forward to the WVA primary as the club that would finally derail JFK’s bid for the nomination. Adding to the pressure heading to WVA was an editorial in the Washington Post that argued that the WVA primary, not the earlier Indiana primary, was the “true test” of JFK’s Catholicism. JFK had very little time to make inroads in WVA, since recent polls had Humphrey at 60% to JFK’s 40%. What JFK needed to know most was whether or not he should openly confront the religion issue in WVA.
JFK’s religion (he was a Catholic) became an issue in Wisconsin (to his benefit), but in heavily Protestant West Virginia, his religion became a liability according to the polls. JFK’s opponents, especially Humphrey (and in the shadows, LBJ), looked forward to the WVA primary as the club that would finally derail JFK’s bid for the nomination. Adding to the pressure heading to WVA was an editorial in the Washington Post that argued that the WVA primary, not the earlier Indiana primary, was the “true test” of JFK’s Catholicism. JFK had very little time to make inroads in WVA, since recent polls had Humphrey at 60% to JFK’s 40%. What JFK needed to know most was whether or not he should openly confront the religion issue in WVA.
JFK had closed the gap with Humphrey as the WVA primary approached, but he was simply running out of time. Harris pushed JFK to meet the religious issue head-on, telling JFK that everywhere he went in WVA, JFK’s Catholicism was the deal-breaker for voters, and without it, JFK would easily defeat Humphrey. Robert Kennedy, JFK’s campaign manager, believed that doing so would only fan the flames, but Harris argued that the flames were already fanned, and that his strategy would prove best.
Two days before the WVA primary, JFK appeared on statewide television with Franklin Roosevelt, Jr, who was a political rock-star in the state. JFK stated that he believed in the separation of church and state, and if he violated that tenet as President, he should be impeached. JFK went further, saying that it would be a sin against God to violate that promise. The very next day, Harris had data that told him that JFK would win the WVA Democratic primary; winning WVA proved that JFK was a national level political figure, and major figure within the Democratic Party.
Not only did JFK had to deal with his religion, he also had to battle the perception that being 42 years old was too young to be President. Television helped make the “age thing” a non-issue in the minds of millions of voters across the nation. Also by using TV, JFK could bypass the Democratic Party apparatus and take his candidacy straight to the people. LBJ believed that the party apparatus would work in his favor, no matter what JFK did, so he didn’t see the need to run in any primaries. By the eve of the Democratic National Convention in 1960, JFK’s nomination was a fait accompli.
Two days before the WVA primary, JFK appeared on statewide television with Franklin Roosevelt, Jr, who was a political rock-star in the state. JFK stated that he believed in the separation of church and state, and if he violated that tenet as President, he should be impeached. JFK went further, saying that it would be a sin against God to violate that promise. The very next day, Harris had data that told him that JFK would win the WVA Democratic primary; winning WVA proved that JFK was a national level political figure, and major figure within the Democratic Party.
Not only did JFK had to deal with his religion, he also had to battle the perception that being 42 years old was too young to be President. Television helped make the “age thing” a non-issue in the minds of millions of voters across the nation. Also by using TV, JFK could bypass the Democratic Party apparatus and take his candidacy straight to the people. LBJ believed that the party apparatus would work in his favor, no matter what JFK did, so he didn’t see the need to run in any primaries. By the eve of the Democratic National Convention in 1960, JFK’s nomination was a fait accompli.
The only Democrat in the primaries that challenged JFK was Senator Hubert Humphrey (MN), who was a throwback to the 1930s and didn’t translate well to TV. Humphrey still gave speeches that were tailored for radio, which was already passe by 1956. In other words, Humphrey didn’t learn much from the failures of Adlai Stevenson in 1952 and 1956 who also eschewed using television for political purposes. Humphrey, unlike JFK, didn’t know how to gain and hold the respect of journalists that were covering him on the campaign; he too often appeared too eager to please. Humphrey’s inability to adapt to TV cost him dearly in the 1960s. Humphrey refused to appear on “Face the Nation” until 1969 after losing the Election of 1968; it wasn’t until that appearance that Humphrey learned how to present himself on television, but by then it was too late for his Presidential ambitions.
JFK understood the power of TV during his political ascendancy in the mid-1950s. Television helped most Americans overcome their suspicions of JFK’s religion in that the was handsome and didn’t “look Catholic”. JFK was not able to get the hardcore anti-Catholic crowd in his corner, so he never tried, but TV helped change the minds of the mildly anti-Catholic voters, which was a far more numerous segment of the population. The excitement that JFK generated on TV helped with the print media, in that their readers wanted more, not less, of this new rising political star. JFK was like a great dramatic novel that was being played out on television and in the newspapers and magazines.
JFK understood the power of TV during his political ascendancy in the mid-1950s. Television helped most Americans overcome their suspicions of JFK’s religion in that the was handsome and didn’t “look Catholic”. JFK was not able to get the hardcore anti-Catholic crowd in his corner, so he never tried, but TV helped change the minds of the mildly anti-Catholic voters, which was a far more numerous segment of the population. The excitement that JFK generated on TV helped with the print media, in that their readers wanted more, not less, of this new rising political star. JFK was like a great dramatic novel that was being played out on television and in the newspapers and magazines.