Source: Larry Tye. Bobby Kennedy - the Making of a Liberal Icon (2016)
Statecraft came naturally to John Fitzgerald Kennedy, but Robert Francis Kennedy had to work very hard to cultivate those skills. By the end of the campaign in 1960, RFK had learned much from JFK, and they blazed a path to the White House using both the "High Road" and the "Low Road", a strategy that would be copied by Lyndon Johnson in 1964 and Richard Nixon in 1968 and 1972. The Election of 1960 also introduced America to the "Kennedy Brothers", and each would depend on the other in ways that were inconceivable when they were younger, and that relationship would lead to a sharing of Presidential power and trust.
RFK's road to becoming JFK's campaign guru in 1960 started in 1946 with JFK's run for a Congressional seat in a district in Massachusetts. JFK didn't want-or-need assistance from RFK, since he was already swamped with well-meaning relatives trying to help. And, RFK, just out of the Navy after being stationed in the Caribbean, didn't have any political experience. JFK patronized his younger (by 8.5 years) brother, and RFK was hurt, but he was determined to show his worth.
In the 11th Congressional District in Massachusetts, the real race was in the Democratic primary. RFK assigned himself the three poorest wards in the district (they were also the most hostile to JFK), and he knocked on doors and ate a lot of Italian food. RFK felt far more comfortable meeting real people face-to-face instead of dealing with politicians and advisers. JFK's victory in the Democratic primary was due in large part to RFK's efforts; RFK showed his mettle in wards that were in effect enemy territory, wards that JFK had written off. So, it was during the 1946 Democratic primary for the 11th Congressional District in Massachusetts where JFK saw that his brother could be of immense value to his political ambitions.
RFK's road to becoming JFK's campaign guru in 1960 started in 1946 with JFK's run for a Congressional seat in a district in Massachusetts. JFK didn't want-or-need assistance from RFK, since he was already swamped with well-meaning relatives trying to help. And, RFK, just out of the Navy after being stationed in the Caribbean, didn't have any political experience. JFK patronized his younger (by 8.5 years) brother, and RFK was hurt, but he was determined to show his worth.
In the 11th Congressional District in Massachusetts, the real race was in the Democratic primary. RFK assigned himself the three poorest wards in the district (they were also the most hostile to JFK), and he knocked on doors and ate a lot of Italian food. RFK felt far more comfortable meeting real people face-to-face instead of dealing with politicians and advisers. JFK's victory in the Democratic primary was due in large part to RFK's efforts; RFK showed his mettle in wards that were in effect enemy territory, wards that JFK had written off. So, it was during the 1946 Democratic primary for the 11th Congressional District in Massachusetts where JFK saw that his brother could be of immense value to his political ambitions.
That being said, RFK was on the sidelines during the Congressional Elections of 1946, 1948, and 1950. But when JFK gave up his secure House seat to challenge Republican Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. for a seat in the U.S. Senate in 1952, JFK asked his younger brother for help. Even though it seemed like an impossibility that JFK could unseat Lodge, Jr. (Lodge, Jr. treated his Senate seat as a birthright, much like Ted Kennedy in later decades), it was just the kind of gamble that, if successful, would catapult JFK into the national limelight.
RFK was in the process of launching his career in the Justice Department (in the criminal division), and was reluctant to join JFK's Senate campaign, especially due to the family dynamics he expected to endure from both JFK and their wealthy-and-influential father, Joseph Kennedy, Sr. RFK convinced one of his friends from Harvard, Ken O'Donnell, to join JFK's campaign, but when Joe (the father) forced out JFK's long-time campaign manager over false claims of impropriety, O'Donnell called RFK and told him that he was the only one that could bring order out of the campaign's chaos. RFK knew that his presence would be the only way to get his father to back off from running (and perhaps ruining) JFK's bid for the Senate.
RFK's first task was to convince voters in Massachusetts that they needed to elect a new Senator; there was little to distinguish the moderate Democrat from the moderate Republican, and the U.S. was experiencing tremendous prosperity. RFK figured out that the main things that separated the two candidates was JFK's charisma/personal magnetism, and JFK's idealism didn't sound ideological. RFK wouldn't realize until later that he possessed the same characteristics as his older brother.
RFK was in the process of launching his career in the Justice Department (in the criminal division), and was reluctant to join JFK's Senate campaign, especially due to the family dynamics he expected to endure from both JFK and their wealthy-and-influential father, Joseph Kennedy, Sr. RFK convinced one of his friends from Harvard, Ken O'Donnell, to join JFK's campaign, but when Joe (the father) forced out JFK's long-time campaign manager over false claims of impropriety, O'Donnell called RFK and told him that he was the only one that could bring order out of the campaign's chaos. RFK knew that his presence would be the only way to get his father to back off from running (and perhaps ruining) JFK's bid for the Senate.
RFK's first task was to convince voters in Massachusetts that they needed to elect a new Senator; there was little to distinguish the moderate Democrat from the moderate Republican, and the U.S. was experiencing tremendous prosperity. RFK figured out that the main things that separated the two candidates was JFK's charisma/personal magnetism, and JFK's idealism didn't sound ideological. RFK wouldn't realize until later that he possessed the same characteristics as his older brother.
RFK constructed a campaign that was more scientific and dynamic than any other political campaign in the history of Massachusetts. In essence, RFK organized JFK's on individual party structure, not wanting to rely on the state's Democratic leadership. RFK recruited 286 local secretaries, who were new to politics but knowledgeable about their communities/areas. RFK also set up committees that made people feel special/connected, such as Women for JFK, Italians for JFK, and even Dentists for JFK. RFK wanted a lot of people to a little work instead of just a few doing most of the work.
Among those working in the campaign was Lawrence O'Brien (who years later became the
Commissioner of the NBA), whose role was to be the ultimate detail man to complement RFK's grand overall strategy. RFK also got the campaign running full speed during the summer instead of waiting for the traditional post-Labor Day starting point. Joe was working behind the scenes to advance JFK's political career; the Boston Post, after Joe agreed to lend the editor $500,000, broke with Lodge, Jr. and officially endorsed JFK (JFK later acknowledged that what his father did was necessary in order to obtain that very valuable/indispensable endorsement).
"Ruthless" was the label that was attached to RFK starting with this campaign, and that label stuck. Those that got to know RFK saw, rather, that he was rude to others far more than he was ruthless, since in 1952 RFK was shy and not-quite-as assimilated as JFK. As far as RFK was concerned, he didn't care what was thought of him, he only cared about what people thought about JFK.
Among those working in the campaign was Lawrence O'Brien (who years later became the
Commissioner of the NBA), whose role was to be the ultimate detail man to complement RFK's grand overall strategy. RFK also got the campaign running full speed during the summer instead of waiting for the traditional post-Labor Day starting point. Joe was working behind the scenes to advance JFK's political career; the Boston Post, after Joe agreed to lend the editor $500,000, broke with Lodge, Jr. and officially endorsed JFK (JFK later acknowledged that what his father did was necessary in order to obtain that very valuable/indispensable endorsement).
"Ruthless" was the label that was attached to RFK starting with this campaign, and that label stuck. Those that got to know RFK saw, rather, that he was rude to others far more than he was ruthless, since in 1952 RFK was shy and not-quite-as assimilated as JFK. As far as RFK was concerned, he didn't care what was thought of him, he only cared about what people thought about JFK.
RFK kept offering himself as the political lightning rod during the campaign, which insulated JFK from any unwanted controversy; in effect, RFK was JFK's consigliere. Every major politician in Massachusetts was angry with RFK after JFK's campaign in 1952, but RFK had created the most effective campaign in the state's history. The Senate race between JFK and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. was very, very close, and it wasn't until 3 am after Election Day that RFK calculated that JFK had won by 71,000 votes. RFK confirmed that his strategy of going-it-alone without the state Democratic network worked, and JFK's victory in 1952 cut against the grain of the political trends in not only Massachusetts, but the nation as well (e.g. Ike's victory over Stevenson).
JFK's margin of victory was almost identical to the number of women that attended receptions hosted by JFK's & RFK's mother, Rose Kennedy; according to Lodge, Jr., those tea parties were the difference. RFK attributed JFK's victory mostly due to what he considered to be Lodge, Jr.'s shortcomings; he thought Lodge, Jr. was a very lazy campaigner/politician. RFK was always uncomfortable looking back, and he didn't give himself enough credit for the successes that occurred due his efforts-and-abilities. But JFK understood what RFK meant to his now-Presidential political aspirations, and RFK was back at the helm as JFK pursued the Vice-Presidential slot on the Democratic ticket in 1956.
JFK's margin of victory was almost identical to the number of women that attended receptions hosted by JFK's & RFK's mother, Rose Kennedy; according to Lodge, Jr., those tea parties were the difference. RFK attributed JFK's victory mostly due to what he considered to be Lodge, Jr.'s shortcomings; he thought Lodge, Jr. was a very lazy campaigner/politician. RFK was always uncomfortable looking back, and he didn't give himself enough credit for the successes that occurred due his efforts-and-abilities. But JFK understood what RFK meant to his now-Presidential political aspirations, and RFK was back at the helm as JFK pursued the Vice-Presidential slot on the Democratic ticket in 1956.
Joe felt it was far-too-early for JFK to make this political move, especially since President Eisenhower was a lock to be re-elected in 1956 (RFK even called his father to let him know that both sons were ignoring his advice). But JFK wanted to try anyway, and RFK was at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, trying to convince delegates to support JFK for VP. For the second straight Democratic National Convention, Adlai Stevenson was the party's nominee, and he left it to the convention's delegates to select his Vice-Presidential running mate.
In the end, it came down to JFK and Senator Estes Kefauver (TN), with JFK at one point just 15 delegates away from the nomination (it was very possible that Joe played a role in denying JFK the spot on the ticket). RFK concluded that he had been out-planned and out-hustled; up to that moment, RFK didn't know what it felt like to lose. But as RFK told JFK, the result was probably the best thing that could have happened in terms of positioning JFK for the Democratic nomination for President in 1960.
In the end, it came down to JFK and Senator Estes Kefauver (TN), with JFK at one point just 15 delegates away from the nomination (it was very possible that Joe played a role in denying JFK the spot on the ticket). RFK concluded that he had been out-planned and out-hustled; up to that moment, RFK didn't know what it felt like to lose. But as RFK told JFK, the result was probably the best thing that could have happened in terms of positioning JFK for the Democratic nomination for President in 1960.
RFK learned some valuable lessons during the 1956 Democratic National Convention, and among them was that he needed to become far more knowledgeable about parliamentary procedure, and that he needed to "schmooze", something that Kefauver did to great effect. So, very much against his will, RFK would become a "back-slapper" and a "Hail Fellow Well Met" in order to help JFK become the Democratic nominee for President.
RFK agreed to help Adlai Stevenson in the general campaign against President Eisenhower, and RFK was so impressed with Stevenson after working with him for six weeks that he voted for Ike. RFK's actions on behalf of Stevenson were more like a journalist taking notes instead of a campaign partisan, which Stevenson found very off-putting and irritating. During the general campaign, most prominent Democrats concluded that JFK and RFK were (silently) rooting for a Stevenson defeat to bolster their chances in 1960.
RFK agreed to help Adlai Stevenson in the general campaign against President Eisenhower, and RFK was so impressed with Stevenson after working with him for six weeks that he voted for Ike. RFK's actions on behalf of Stevenson were more like a journalist taking notes instead of a campaign partisan, which Stevenson found very off-putting and irritating. During the general campaign, most prominent Democrats concluded that JFK and RFK were (silently) rooting for a Stevenson defeat to bolster their chances in 1960.