Source: James M. Scott. Target Tokyo - Jimmy Doolittle and the
Raid That Avenged Pearl Harbor (2015)
Raid That Avenged Pearl Harbor (2015)
By 1941, Japan's population was 73 million, and it had tripled in the last century. Japan was "materially bankrupt", needing to import virtually every necessity, even rice. The growing military only increased Japan's reliance on imports and foreign resources in such areas as bauxite (planes) and cotton (uniforms) . . . but oil topped the list (by 1941, the U.S. was producing 700 times more oil than Japan). The hunger for natural resources led Japan to attack Manchuria in 1931, and then northern China in 1937.
In response, FDR (57 years old in 1941) ordered the U.S. Pacific Fleet moved from California to Pearl Harbor, over the fierce objections from high-ranking admirals. In July 1941 Japan invaded southern French Indochina, which was a clear signal that next on the list would be Hong Kong, Singapore, and the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. FDR stopped US gasoline shipments to Japan, which took away 80% of Japan's oil imports. FDR also ordered Japan's assets in the U.S. frozen.
In response, FDR (57 years old in 1941) ordered the U.S. Pacific Fleet moved from California to Pearl Harbor, over the fierce objections from high-ranking admirals. In July 1941 Japan invaded southern French Indochina, which was a clear signal that next on the list would be Hong Kong, Singapore, and the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. FDR stopped US gasoline shipments to Japan, which took away 80% of Japan's oil imports. FDR also ordered Japan's assets in the U.S. frozen.
But Japan had stockpiled raw materials, including a two year supply of oil/gas. In addition to a potential army of 5 million and 7500 planes, Japan had 381 warships featuring 10 battleships, 10 carriers, 18 heavy cruisers, and 112 destroyers. Japan's Imperial Navy not only outgunned the US Navy, but the navies of the US, Great Britain and the Netherlands combined. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed/damaged 18 US ships: all 8 battleships, 3 cruisers, several destroyers, as well as 188 planes with 2403 killed and 1178 wounded.
Japan also attacked Guam, the Phillipines, Wake Island, Hong Kong, and Midway. FDR, who loved the Navy (he was a former Ass't SecNav as was TR) just couldn't get his mind around why US ships were nothing more than sitting ducks for the Japanese at Pearl Harbor. Half of America listened to FDR give his 518 word Pearl Harbor speech on 8 December 1941; it was the largest daytime audience for a radio broadcast in US History, with 62 million listeners.
Japan also attacked Guam, the Phillipines, Wake Island, Hong Kong, and Midway. FDR, who loved the Navy (he was a former Ass't SecNav as was TR) just couldn't get his mind around why US ships were nothing more than sitting ducks for the Japanese at Pearl Harbor. Half of America listened to FDR give his 518 word Pearl Harbor speech on 8 December 1941; it was the largest daytime audience for a radio broadcast in US History, with 62 million listeners.
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox submitted a report to FDR on the damage at Pearl Harbor within two weeks after the Japanese attack. Of the 8 battleships, the Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee were not badly damaged. The Nevada and California would be back in action in a few months, but the West Virginia would need two years to be overhauled, with its entire port side ripped open by nine torpedoes. As far as the capsized Oklahoma, Knox felt that it would be far too costly to salvage the outdated battleship. The Arizona by far fared the worst, sunk with over 1100 killed.
Guam had soon fallen after Pearl was attacked, as had Wake Island. U.S. airpower in the Philippines was wiped out and Japan would soon take Manila. FDR understood that continued defeats would demoralize the US public. 50% of Americans believed that Japan would bomb U.S. cities; victory on the battlefields/sea was the way to allay public fears and improve morale so the unity after Pearl Harbor could be sustained (and that blame for Pearl would be lost in the rush of Patriotism). Many, many Americans were beyond-upset that the US Navy had been asleep at-the-switch at Pearl Harbor
Guam had soon fallen after Pearl was attacked, as had Wake Island. U.S. airpower in the Philippines was wiped out and Japan would soon take Manila. FDR understood that continued defeats would demoralize the US public. 50% of Americans believed that Japan would bomb U.S. cities; victory on the battlefields/sea was the way to allay public fears and improve morale so the unity after Pearl Harbor could be sustained (and that blame for Pearl would be lost in the rush of Patriotism). Many, many Americans were beyond-upset that the US Navy had been asleep at-the-switch at Pearl Harbor
As much as FDR wanted to take the fight to Japan in Asia and in the Pacific, the US was in no shape to do so. The long battle with the Isolationists was now coming home to roost. FDR wanted to know from his advisers when the US could fly operations from China, which appeared to be the only realistic location to retaliate against Japan, since the US had lost most of it strategic islands in the Pacific. Vladivostok was only 675 miles from Tokyo, but FDR knew that Stalin would not allow US planes on Russian soil since he had signed a neutrality agreement with Tokyo in April 1941. Also, Stalin didn't want to deal with Hitler PLUS Japan.
Admiral Ernest King, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Fleet, badly wanted to take any kind of offensive against Japan, and by 10 January 1942, the normally-agitated King was even more agitated/worked-up than usual with the continuous string of bad news coming from the Pacific. While the official plan was to be on the defensive in the Pacific while fighting in Europe, King wanted to take any opportunity to go at Japan in order to keep them off-guard, and perhaps to forestall or delay future attacks on strategic U.S. possessions in the Pacific.
Admiral Ernest King, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Fleet, badly wanted to take any kind of offensive against Japan, and by 10 January 1942, the normally-agitated King was even more agitated/worked-up than usual with the continuous string of bad news coming from the Pacific. While the official plan was to be on the defensive in the Pacific while fighting in Europe, King wanted to take any opportunity to go at Japan in order to keep them off-guard, and perhaps to forestall or delay future attacks on strategic U.S. possessions in the Pacific.
Captain Francis Low as King's Operations Officer, and it was Low's idea to try and get bombers to take off from a carrier to attack Japan, especially Tokyo. Instead of blowing up and yelling, King sat back and listened to Low, and then authorized Low to pursue his idea. Low then contacted Captain Donald Duncan, King's Air Operations Officer, and asked him if he would be interested in planning a carrier-based strike on Tokyo. Low wanted to know if a medium-size bomber could land on a carrier, and also if a land-based carrier could take off from a carrier. The answer to the first question was no, but Duncan told Low that he would get back to him on the second question.
Duncan was already thinking about landing planes on airfields in China, and also he would need bombers that could fly from outside the 300 mile range of Japan's patrol flights, strike Tokyo, and fly to China. Duncan viewed the B-25 (the Mitchell) as the best-suited for the mission, since it could handle the range, and also carry a heavy payload of bombs. As far as the carrier, Duncan had the USS Hornet in mind. The Hornet was a new carrier being readied for action in Virginia, and it could be ready in the Pacific at about the time (he figured) the bomber side of the plan was ready.
Duncan was already thinking about landing planes on airfields in China, and also he would need bombers that could fly from outside the 300 mile range of Japan's patrol flights, strike Tokyo, and fly to China. Duncan viewed the B-25 (the Mitchell) as the best-suited for the mission, since it could handle the range, and also carry a heavy payload of bombs. As far as the carrier, Duncan had the USS Hornet in mind. The Hornet was a new carrier being readied for action in Virginia, and it could be ready in the Pacific at about the time (he figured) the bomber side of the plan was ready.
While Low thought one carrier would suffice, Duncan was thinking two carriers would be necessary, since fighter escorts would be needed, and they would also need to protect the support ships of the two carriers. In terms of when to attack, mid-April to mid-May would provide a traditional window-of-opportunity weatherwise over Tokyo. Low told Duncan if General Henry
"Hap" Arnold was on board, Duncan would be in charge of the Navy side of the operation.
On 21 December 1941, Arnold was ordered by FDR to find a way to bomb Japan, but Arnold had no clear idea how to accomplish that order. Adding to Arnold's travails was that only 79 of 231 planes in the Pacific were still in action after Pearl Harbor. And demand for US Army Air Corps planes far exceeded supply. On 4 January 1942, Arnold was part of a conference over North Africa with Admiral King. King suggested to Arnold the idea of using US Army bombers from carriers. The idea piqued Arnold's curiosity, and Arnold instructed his staff to immediately start examining the idea.
By mid-January 1942, Low and Duncan appeared in Arnold's office and suggested B-25's instead of retrofitting cargo planes. Using B-25's would mean that two carriers wouldn't have to be nearly as close to Japan, and since the B-25's would be able to continue to China, the two carriers could turnaround and return home right after the B-25's took off.
"Hap" Arnold was on board, Duncan would be in charge of the Navy side of the operation.
On 21 December 1941, Arnold was ordered by FDR to find a way to bomb Japan, but Arnold had no clear idea how to accomplish that order. Adding to Arnold's travails was that only 79 of 231 planes in the Pacific were still in action after Pearl Harbor. And demand for US Army Air Corps planes far exceeded supply. On 4 January 1942, Arnold was part of a conference over North Africa with Admiral King. King suggested to Arnold the idea of using US Army bombers from carriers. The idea piqued Arnold's curiosity, and Arnold instructed his staff to immediately start examining the idea.
By mid-January 1942, Low and Duncan appeared in Arnold's office and suggested B-25's instead of retrofitting cargo planes. Using B-25's would mean that two carriers wouldn't have to be nearly as close to Japan, and since the B-25's would be able to continue to China, the two carriers could turnaround and return home right after the B-25's took off.
Arnold loved the idea, but he wanted to run it past his staff "Troubleshooter", Lt. Colonel James Doolittle. The 45 year old Doolittle was already famous as a stunt/race pilot, and also had an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; if anyone could figure out if the plan was doable, it was Doolittle. Arnold asked Doolittle if the USAAC had any planes that could take off in 500 feet with 2000 pounds of bombs and fly 2000 miles with a full crew. The next day Doolittle told Arnold that either the B-23 or the B-25 would work. but both would require extra fuel tanks.
Arnold then added another qualifier, in that the plane's wingspan couldn't exceed 75 feet. Doolittle told Arnold that the B-25 was the only option. Arnold was on the phone to King, and the plan was a go. The USS Hornet would depart the West Coast on-or-around 1 April 1942, and on that date the USS Hornet should be finished in Virginia, and en route to California via the Panama Canal.
Duncan would oversee the trial takeoffs of the B-25's from the Hornet as well as organizing a naval task force in Pearl Harbor. Arnold would need to select someone to modify the B-25's and to train the aircrews . . . Doolittle was the man, and Arnold told Doolittle to let him know if anyone "got in his way" with the plans for the mission.
Arnold then added another qualifier, in that the plane's wingspan couldn't exceed 75 feet. Doolittle told Arnold that the B-25 was the only option. Arnold was on the phone to King, and the plan was a go. The USS Hornet would depart the West Coast on-or-around 1 April 1942, and on that date the USS Hornet should be finished in Virginia, and en route to California via the Panama Canal.
Duncan would oversee the trial takeoffs of the B-25's from the Hornet as well as organizing a naval task force in Pearl Harbor. Arnold would need to select someone to modify the B-25's and to train the aircrews . . . Doolittle was the man, and Arnold told Doolittle to let him know if anyone "got in his way" with the plans for the mission.