Source: Evan Thomas. Being Nixon: A Man Divided (2015)
Freshman Congressman Richard M. Nixon didn't know anyone in Washington, D.C. and was unsure of his place. Nixon wasn't a member of any "in" group, but as he always did, Nixon made do. Nixon actually made his own club (similar to what he did at Whittier College), and after a couple of years he was a charter member of the "Chowder and Marching Club". The 15 freshmen/junior Republican members of the Chowder Club got together once a month or so for food, drink,etc. Among the members was Congressman Gerald Ford (MI); Ford noticed that Nixon was fine during the actual gathering, but afterwards while waiting for a cab, he saw Nixon often mumbling to himself. Ford thought Nixon seemed sad, detached, and unconnected.
Nixon was placed on the House Education and Labor Committee, and was the lowest-ranking Republican . . . the lowest-ranking Democrat on the committee was John F. Kennedy.
During April 1947, Nixon and JFK traveled by rail to locations where they became "debating partners" on issues chosen by the committee. But the two also spent time alone in their berth, where they discussed politics and foreign policy. Nixon discovered that like him, JFK wasn't a "backslapper"; they both hated superficial camaraderie, they were both shy, and both appeared aloof since they each guarded their privacy.
Nixon was placed on the House Education and Labor Committee, and was the lowest-ranking Republican . . . the lowest-ranking Democrat on the committee was John F. Kennedy.
During April 1947, Nixon and JFK traveled by rail to locations where they became "debating partners" on issues chosen by the committee. But the two also spent time alone in their berth, where they discussed politics and foreign policy. Nixon discovered that like him, JFK wasn't a "backslapper"; they both hated superficial camaraderie, they were both shy, and both appeared aloof since they each guarded their privacy.
Congressman Nixon was (surprisingly) selected to be on the 19 member Herter Committee that was to go to Europe and scout out the scene for the Marshall Plan; Nixon was the only Westerner. Nixon saw the Herter Committee as his chance to move up the House ladder and prove himself on a big political stage. The committee was Nixon's chance to work with some of the powerful people in Washington, D.C., while also showing them his insights on foreign policy.
In Western Europe, Nixon saw nightmarish devastation and misery. On his return, Nixon was told by his main backer for his Congressional campaign that he shouldn't be swayed or pressured by the State Department into wasting taxpayer's money on non-US citizens. Nixon's main backer wasn't alone: 75% of the constituents in Nixon's district felt the same way. But Nixon followed his conscience on the matter, even though he was very tuned-in to his district.
Nixon possessed a long-range vision on foreign policy that most of his peers in Congress lacked. Nixon believed that the Republican Party would become irrelevant if it became the party of Isolationism; in other words, Nixon saw his (and his party's) future as an Internationalist . . . he believed in time the rest of the government and public would come around. During December 1947, Nixon voted for the Marshal Plan. Back in his district, Nixon's strategy was to argue that the billions of dollars spent in Western Europe would contain the spread of Communism. Not only was that a very persuasive argument on which to justify his vote, but it was also true.
In Western Europe, Nixon saw nightmarish devastation and misery. On his return, Nixon was told by his main backer for his Congressional campaign that he shouldn't be swayed or pressured by the State Department into wasting taxpayer's money on non-US citizens. Nixon's main backer wasn't alone: 75% of the constituents in Nixon's district felt the same way. But Nixon followed his conscience on the matter, even though he was very tuned-in to his district.
Nixon possessed a long-range vision on foreign policy that most of his peers in Congress lacked. Nixon believed that the Republican Party would become irrelevant if it became the party of Isolationism; in other words, Nixon saw his (and his party's) future as an Internationalist . . . he believed in time the rest of the government and public would come around. During December 1947, Nixon voted for the Marshal Plan. Back in his district, Nixon's strategy was to argue that the billions of dollars spent in Western Europe would contain the spread of Communism. Not only was that a very persuasive argument on which to justify his vote, but it was also true.
The House Republican leadership place Nixon on the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), hoping he would be a voice of moderation. Nixon not only did so, he also, with his legal training, steered HUAC to actual USSR spies. During Truman's Special Session of the "Do Nothing" 80th Congress, HUAC called in Whittaker Chambers to testify. Among others Chambers named as Communist agents in the U.S. was Alger Hiss. Hiss was a pillar of the Eastern Establishment Elite. Hiss had clerked for Associate Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and had worked his way up in the State Department with support from such Establishment titans as Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles.
Alger Hiss was a member of FDR's entourage at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, and a member of the conference that created the United Nations in San Francisco . . . Hiss was on track for a glorious and lengthy diplomatic career. The morning after Chambers testified, Hiss demanded the right to publicly deny the charges in front of HUAC. On 5 August 1948, Hiss
testified in front of HUAC, not only denying that he knew Chambers, but that he had also never heard about Chambers.
Nixon thought that Hiss delivered a virtuoso performance, leaving the impression that in terms of Hiss, Chambers was guilty of mistaken identity. All the members of HUAC wanted to wash their hands of the Hiss matter, folding like the schoolyard bullies they were . . . all except their voice of moderation - Richard Nixon.
Alger Hiss was a member of FDR's entourage at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, and a member of the conference that created the United Nations in San Francisco . . . Hiss was on track for a glorious and lengthy diplomatic career. The morning after Chambers testified, Hiss demanded the right to publicly deny the charges in front of HUAC. On 5 August 1948, Hiss
testified in front of HUAC, not only denying that he knew Chambers, but that he had also never heard about Chambers.
Nixon thought that Hiss delivered a virtuoso performance, leaving the impression that in terms of Hiss, Chambers was guilty of mistaken identity. All the members of HUAC wanted to wash their hands of the Hiss matter, folding like the schoolyard bullies they were . . . all except their voice of moderation - Richard Nixon.
After further contemplation and reflection, Nixon thought that Hiss had overplayed his hand during his testimony, and he continued to investigate Hiss. Nixon had an instinct for the political "Big Play" that would launch his political career into the stratosphere, and Nixon also believed that Hiss was an "Establishment Phony". On 17 August 1948, Hiss appeared before Nixon and a HUAC investigator in the fancy Commodore Hotel in New York City. Hiss had that incurable need to let Nixon know that he was Nixon's social superior (e.g. Harvard v. Whittier), which many in the D.C. Establishment would continue to do over the subsequent years.
Nixon's political ambition plus his patriotism and an almost eerie sense of timing moved Nixon forward investigating Hiss. Nixon was acting alone, but he wasn't "swinging wildly"; Secretary of state John Foster Dulles confirmed that Hiss knew Chambers, and Dulles told Nixon that he would be derelict in his duty if he (and HUAC) didn't press on with Hiss. Dulles saw the "writing on the wall", and due to Nixon's investigation, decided to begin to distance himself from Hiss.
F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover wasn't much help, seeking to limit Nixon's power even then.
At least partially as a result, Nixon played the press, and Nixon arranged exclusive access to Whittaker Chambers for a New York Herald Tribune reporter, Bert Andrews. By the fall of 1948, interest in the press concerning Alger Hiss had mushroomed, leading to the first-ever televised Congressional hearing. Nixon and HUAC questioned Hiss, and slowly, under the hot lights and the TV spotlight, Hiss' veneer of aloofness and haughty innocence peeled away. Afterwards, Nixon saw himself as a fully-committed patriotic political warrior, and it affected him in terms of how he treated those around him, both positively and negatively.
Nixon's political ambition plus his patriotism and an almost eerie sense of timing moved Nixon forward investigating Hiss. Nixon was acting alone, but he wasn't "swinging wildly"; Secretary of state John Foster Dulles confirmed that Hiss knew Chambers, and Dulles told Nixon that he would be derelict in his duty if he (and HUAC) didn't press on with Hiss. Dulles saw the "writing on the wall", and due to Nixon's investigation, decided to begin to distance himself from Hiss.
F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover wasn't much help, seeking to limit Nixon's power even then.
At least partially as a result, Nixon played the press, and Nixon arranged exclusive access to Whittaker Chambers for a New York Herald Tribune reporter, Bert Andrews. By the fall of 1948, interest in the press concerning Alger Hiss had mushroomed, leading to the first-ever televised Congressional hearing. Nixon and HUAC questioned Hiss, and slowly, under the hot lights and the TV spotlight, Hiss' veneer of aloofness and haughty innocence peeled away. Afterwards, Nixon saw himself as a fully-committed patriotic political warrior, and it affected him in terms of how he treated those around him, both positively and negatively.
Nixon was on a long-delayed vacation with his wife Pat when he received a telegram which stated that specific evidence was found that showed that Hiss was a spy for the USSR. Nixon immediately returned to D.C. (much to Pat's consternation); Chambers had led investigators to the fields of his farm, took off the top of a pumpkin, and produced 5 rolls of microfilm which appeared to prove Hiss guilty of espionage . . . the "Pumpkin Papers" made Nixon famous.
Nixon declared Hiss' crimes to be the greatest treason since Benedict Arnold, which was basically true. Then an expert from Eastman Kodak stated that the film was made in 1945, seven years AFTER Chambers had allegedly photographed the secret documents . . . now Chambers was the liar. Nixon braced himself for the biggest political crow-eating session in recent Washington D.C. history. Then, literally five minutes before Nixon was to make his public mea culpa, the expert from Eastman Kodak called to say the film was made in 1938, not in 1945 . . . he had made a mistake. Nixon now had in his hands credible evidence that Alger Hiss was a spy for the USSR . . . and he knew he was politically a "made-man".
The Hiss Case dragged on in the courts until Hiss was finally convicted of perjury (for lying that he wasn't a spy), since the statute of limitations for committing treason had expired. Years later, with declassified documents from the former Soviet Union, it was conclusively proven that Alger Hiss was a spy for the USSR . . . to his dying day in 1996, Hiss claimed he was innocent.
Nixon declared Hiss' crimes to be the greatest treason since Benedict Arnold, which was basically true. Then an expert from Eastman Kodak stated that the film was made in 1945, seven years AFTER Chambers had allegedly photographed the secret documents . . . now Chambers was the liar. Nixon braced himself for the biggest political crow-eating session in recent Washington D.C. history. Then, literally five minutes before Nixon was to make his public mea culpa, the expert from Eastman Kodak called to say the film was made in 1938, not in 1945 . . . he had made a mistake. Nixon now had in his hands credible evidence that Alger Hiss was a spy for the USSR . . . and he knew he was politically a "made-man".
The Hiss Case dragged on in the courts until Hiss was finally convicted of perjury (for lying that he wasn't a spy), since the statute of limitations for committing treason had expired. Years later, with declassified documents from the former Soviet Union, it was conclusively proven that Alger Hiss was a spy for the USSR . . . to his dying day in 1996, Hiss claimed he was innocent.
Hiss was the turning point for Nixon and the nation . . . an increasing number of Americans was asking "who else is a spy?". Nixon viewed his triumph as a Pyrrhic victory, in that he felt the Eastern Establishment and the press, who he thought had largely backed Hiss, never really got over being wrong . . . especially when it was a socially-inept non-Elite graduate from Whittier College in California that was responsible.
It was during-and-after the Hiss investigation where, in Nixon's mind at least, it had become Nixon v. the Media. Actually, most of the press coverage was positive for Nixon in the aftermath of the HUAC hearings and the discovery of the "Pumpkin Papers". But as far as Nixon was concerned, after the Hiss Case, he had become a target of the Establishment.
The parallels of Nixon after Hiss and President George H.W. Bush after Desert Storm are striking, in that after significant victories in which they spearheaded, a sense of despondency followed. Their despondency was due, at least in part, to the feeling each had that the landscape had changed in a way that wasn't in their favor. Nixon, now the most famous member of the House of Representatives, seriously considered leaving Congress and government service for good . . . instead, Nixon doubled-down and ran for a seat in the United States Senate in California in 1950 . . .
It was during-and-after the Hiss investigation where, in Nixon's mind at least, it had become Nixon v. the Media. Actually, most of the press coverage was positive for Nixon in the aftermath of the HUAC hearings and the discovery of the "Pumpkin Papers". But as far as Nixon was concerned, after the Hiss Case, he had become a target of the Establishment.
The parallels of Nixon after Hiss and President George H.W. Bush after Desert Storm are striking, in that after significant victories in which they spearheaded, a sense of despondency followed. Their despondency was due, at least in part, to the feeling each had that the landscape had changed in a way that wasn't in their favor. Nixon, now the most famous member of the House of Representatives, seriously considered leaving Congress and government service for good . . . instead, Nixon doubled-down and ran for a seat in the United States Senate in California in 1950 . . .