The battle lines were set for the Election of 1800: to the Federalists, if Thomas Jefferson became President, it would be a government of "Experiment" instead of "Order". To Republicans, Federalist "Order" had slaughtered Liberty; political rancor was at a fever pitch.
As far as the Republicans were concerned, Jefferson was the only one that could defeat President John Adams, but to do so, Jefferson needed the New York Electors, especially since Pennsylvania's Electors had proven to be unpredictable in 1796. Jefferson and James Madison did the math: New York was the key to winning the Election of 1800, and Aaron Burr was the agent to deliver the state's Electors. Burr succeeded in outmaneuvering his rival, Alexander Hamilton, in New York City, making sure candidates loyal to him prevailed in the 13 NYC Assembly elections. Those men would select the state's 12 Electors, which would vote for Jefferson (Hamilton petitioned Governor Clinton to overturn the results of a fair election . . . he wasn't a very good loser).
Burr's efforts convinced Virginia's 21 Electors that he should be Jefferson's running mate. Virginia was one of the first states to adopt the "Winner-Take-All" strategy for their Electors (only Nebraska and Maine do not do so today), so therefore Jefferson and Burr secured all 42 of Virginia's Electoral Votes (each Elector cast two ballots for President until the 12th Amendment). In order to try and gain as many Electoral votes as possible in Northern states, the Republicans touted Jefferson as the primary author of the Declaration of Independence, which was not widely known until the end of the century. Federalists countered that Jefferson did indeed write the document, but he was not the author, only the "recorder" of the ideas of others in an effort to minimize any Republican advantage.
As far as the Republicans were concerned, Jefferson was the only one that could defeat President John Adams, but to do so, Jefferson needed the New York Electors, especially since Pennsylvania's Electors had proven to be unpredictable in 1796. Jefferson and James Madison did the math: New York was the key to winning the Election of 1800, and Aaron Burr was the agent to deliver the state's Electors. Burr succeeded in outmaneuvering his rival, Alexander Hamilton, in New York City, making sure candidates loyal to him prevailed in the 13 NYC Assembly elections. Those men would select the state's 12 Electors, which would vote for Jefferson (Hamilton petitioned Governor Clinton to overturn the results of a fair election . . . he wasn't a very good loser).
Burr's efforts convinced Virginia's 21 Electors that he should be Jefferson's running mate. Virginia was one of the first states to adopt the "Winner-Take-All" strategy for their Electors (only Nebraska and Maine do not do so today), so therefore Jefferson and Burr secured all 42 of Virginia's Electoral Votes (each Elector cast two ballots for President until the 12th Amendment). In order to try and gain as many Electoral votes as possible in Northern states, the Republicans touted Jefferson as the primary author of the Declaration of Independence, which was not widely known until the end of the century. Federalists countered that Jefferson did indeed write the document, but he was not the author, only the "recorder" of the ideas of others in an effort to minimize any Republican advantage.
By October 1800, Alexander Hamilton was less powerful than at any time before George Washington was President. Hamilton tried to make his political comeback by attacking President John Adams in a 54 page pamphlet (he was embittered largely due to being thwarted by Adams in his pursuit of becoming the commander of the newly created Provisional Army). Hamilton attacked Adams in the pamphlet, and let it be known that he preferred and supported Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina as the Federalist candidate for President.
There was not an Election Day for a popular vote in 1800 (the first such Presidential election that featured a meaningful popular vote occurred in 1824); the Electors voted on 3 December 1800 for President and Vice-President. The states that voted a "Straight Ticket" selected Jefferson with one Electoral vote, and Burr with the other vote. In the states that split their Electoral vote between the two parties, Jefferson and Burr received an equal number (again, each of an Elector's two votes was a vote for President in 1800).
In South Carolina, Thomas Pinckney (Cotesworth Pinckney's cousin, not his famous brother), worked to hand the state's Electors to Jefferson and Burr. It was arranged during this wheeling-and-dealing that one Electoral vote was to be withheld from Burr in South Carolina, thereby avoiding an unnecessary (and embarrassing) tie. However, either the Elector chosen for the "honor" of doing so failed to properly cast his ballot, or the whole endeavor was inadequately organized and communicated. Republican unity proved greater than practical calculations in other states as well as South Carolina, and as a result, Jefferson and Burr each received 73 Electoral votes.
There was not an Election Day for a popular vote in 1800 (the first such Presidential election that featured a meaningful popular vote occurred in 1824); the Electors voted on 3 December 1800 for President and Vice-President. The states that voted a "Straight Ticket" selected Jefferson with one Electoral vote, and Burr with the other vote. In the states that split their Electoral vote between the two parties, Jefferson and Burr received an equal number (again, each of an Elector's two votes was a vote for President in 1800).
In South Carolina, Thomas Pinckney (Cotesworth Pinckney's cousin, not his famous brother), worked to hand the state's Electors to Jefferson and Burr. It was arranged during this wheeling-and-dealing that one Electoral vote was to be withheld from Burr in South Carolina, thereby avoiding an unnecessary (and embarrassing) tie. However, either the Elector chosen for the "honor" of doing so failed to properly cast his ballot, or the whole endeavor was inadequately organized and communicated. Republican unity proved greater than practical calculations in other states as well as South Carolina, and as a result, Jefferson and Burr each received 73 Electoral votes.
Federalists had dominated Congress for the previous six years, but after the Election of 1800, 2/3's of the House of Representatives would be Republicans . . . but the 7th Congress wouldn't convene until 7 December 1801, nine months after Inauguration Day. It was in the Lame Duck Federalist-controlled House that the Election of 1800 would be decided, and the Federalists (especially the Hamiltonian "High Federalists") made every effort to sabotage the process of electing a new President. (Below: the Electoral College results for the Election of 1800 - notice how the Federalists were able to avoid a tie between Adams & Pinckney; an Elector from Rhode Island cast an Electoral vote for New York's John Jay)
Many Federalists (especially the "High Federalists") were willing to reverse the intended order of the Republicans for President, and tried to elect Burr; these Federalists also entertained the idea of delaying the process until after Inauguration Day. Jefferson thought that a candid conversation with Adams would help resolve the impasse in the House, but Madison (Jefferson's de facto campaign manager in 1796 & 1800) advised him not to do so, in that a conversation with Adams could easily be misconstrued and backfire for the Republicans.
Many Federalists (especially the "High Federalists") were willing to reverse the intended order of the Republicans for President, and tried to elect Burr; these Federalists also entertained the idea of delaying the process until after Inauguration Day. Jefferson thought that a candid conversation with Adams would help resolve the impasse in the House, but Madison (Jefferson's de facto campaign manager in 1796 & 1800) advised him not to do so, in that a conversation with Adams could easily be misconstrued and backfire for the Republicans.
Contrary to popular history (which is often too accepting of historical hearsay as credible evidence), Jefferson and Madison held no hard feelings towards Burr at this time in terms of any illicit behavior towards them or the Republicans. The main factor why Burr was attractive to many Federalists was that he was a New Yorker, not a Virginian. Burr stayed away from the capital during the scurrilous hoo-haw, not wanting to get directly entangled in the political morass.
James Bayard, the lone representative from Delaware, could have ended the election in the House on the first ballot, since he was the lone representative from his state. If Bayard had voted for Jefferson on the first ballot, the election in the House would have been over, but Bayard deeply resented the Planter Class, and cast his ballot for Burr. The results of the first ballot in the House were as follows: Jefferson had 8 states, Burr 6, and there were 2 undecided delegations . . . with all 16 states voting, Jefferson needed 9 states in order to become President.
James Bayard, the lone representative from Delaware, could have ended the election in the House on the first ballot, since he was the lone representative from his state. If Bayard had voted for Jefferson on the first ballot, the election in the House would have been over, but Bayard deeply resented the Planter Class, and cast his ballot for Burr. The results of the first ballot in the House were as follows: Jefferson had 8 states, Burr 6, and there were 2 undecided delegations . . . with all 16 states voting, Jefferson needed 9 states in order to become President.
Bayard announced, after well over two dozen ballots, that he would abstain from voting, since he was assured by a Virginia Republican he respected that Jefferson would continue Federalist fiscal policies if elected. The "High Federalists" freaked-out, since Bayard's abstention meant that Jefferson would become President with the 8 states he already had in his fold. Burr was the wildcard in the equation: Bayard was waiting to see if Burr would offer a better deal compared to Jefferson. A letter from Burr was received by Bayard, but the contents must have been less-than-satisfactory to Bayard and the other Federalists.
On the 36th ballot, Bayard and members of the South Carolina delegation abstained, and with other movement among the Congressional delegations (Hamilton had convinced other Federalists that Jefferson was the "Lesser Evil" compared to Burr), Jefferson received 10 states to Burr's 4 (and with the two abstentions from DE & SC, all 16 states were on the record). Many of the Republicans believed that Burr was a schemer; to them in appeared that Burr made a play for President, and then failed to make a satisfactory deal with the Federalists (that may well have been true) . . . however, the true instigators of the "Nightmare in the House" were the outgoing Federalists.
On the 36th ballot, Bayard and members of the South Carolina delegation abstained, and with other movement among the Congressional delegations (Hamilton had convinced other Federalists that Jefferson was the "Lesser Evil" compared to Burr), Jefferson received 10 states to Burr's 4 (and with the two abstentions from DE & SC, all 16 states were on the record). Many of the Republicans believed that Burr was a schemer; to them in appeared that Burr made a play for President, and then failed to make a satisfactory deal with the Federalists (that may well have been true) . . . however, the true instigators of the "Nightmare in the House" were the outgoing Federalists.
Epilogue: On 4 March 1801, James Madison was unable to attend Jefferson's Inauguration since his father had recently died. Albert Gallatin (pictured: the statue of Albert Gallatin in front of the Treasury Building in Washington, D.C.), who had been a thorn in the side of the Federalists in the House for nearly a decade, was confirmed as Secretary of the Treasury when the Senate convened in December. Gallatin became Jefferson's most influential adviser, convincing the 3rd President to reduce federal spending, with the most obvious cuts to the Navy (Gallatin would serve in the Cabinet for both Jefferson and Madison).
Madison was unanimously confirmed as Secretary of State, even though he had never left the shores of America; SecState in the early decades after the Constitution was considered the stepping-stone to the Presidency (Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Martin Van Buren all served as SecState before going to the White House).
Soon, John Marshall would be #1 on Jefferson's "Enemies List", replacing Patrick Henry (who died in 1799) and Alexander Hamilton (who was no longer a threat). Marshall was not only a Federalist, but also a popular Virginian, which presented two threats as far as Jefferson was concerned (Marshall and Jefferson were also second cousins). By the time Jefferson was sworn in as President, Marshall had made the transition from being John Adams' last Secretary of State to the 4th Chief Justice of the Supreme Court . . . Marshall would soon show that he was not afraid to flex his legal muscles in interpreting Executive and Legislative decisions in relation to the Constitution as Chief Justice (1801 - 1835), most famously in Marbury v. Madison in 1803.
Madison was unanimously confirmed as Secretary of State, even though he had never left the shores of America; SecState in the early decades after the Constitution was considered the stepping-stone to the Presidency (Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Martin Van Buren all served as SecState before going to the White House).
Soon, John Marshall would be #1 on Jefferson's "Enemies List", replacing Patrick Henry (who died in 1799) and Alexander Hamilton (who was no longer a threat). Marshall was not only a Federalist, but also a popular Virginian, which presented two threats as far as Jefferson was concerned (Marshall and Jefferson were also second cousins). By the time Jefferson was sworn in as President, Marshall had made the transition from being John Adams' last Secretary of State to the 4th Chief Justice of the Supreme Court . . . Marshall would soon show that he was not afraid to flex his legal muscles in interpreting Executive and Legislative decisions in relation to the Constitution as Chief Justice (1801 - 1835), most famously in Marbury v. Madison in 1803.