Source: Andrew Burstein & Nancy Isenberg. Madison and Jefferson (2013)
James Madison and the Virginia delegation were ready for the Constitutional Convention to begin in early-May, 1787, but there was a problem: there weren't enough state delegations in Philadelphia to start the convention. Finally, on 25 May 1787, seven state delegations were present, which was enough to organize the convention. George Washington (a member of the VA delegation) was unanimously selected the President of the Convention "una voca" (by a voice vote).
Shays' Rebellion (pictured above is a depiction of the fire-fight at the Springfield Arsenal in early-1787) was still not only a fresh memory, but it had hit a nerve on the 50+ delegates, in that it raised the specter of class warfare in America (e.g. all the Massachusetts politicians that supported the tax increases and military response to the rebellion were voted out of office). To
James Madison, Shays' Rebellion was a major symptom of what was wrong with the Articles of Confederation (A of C). And, to Madison's absolute horror, some of the rebels even won elected office in Massachusetts.
The delegates at the Constitutional Convention hated paper money, and most, if not all, saw massive government debt as a catalyst that could cause social upheaval. For the delegates, a new government was needed to protect property, raise desperately needed revenue, and most of all to Madison, discipline rogue state legislatures.
Shays' Rebellion (pictured above is a depiction of the fire-fight at the Springfield Arsenal in early-1787) was still not only a fresh memory, but it had hit a nerve on the 50+ delegates, in that it raised the specter of class warfare in America (e.g. all the Massachusetts politicians that supported the tax increases and military response to the rebellion were voted out of office). To
James Madison, Shays' Rebellion was a major symptom of what was wrong with the Articles of Confederation (A of C). And, to Madison's absolute horror, some of the rebels even won elected office in Massachusetts.
The delegates at the Constitutional Convention hated paper money, and most, if not all, saw massive government debt as a catalyst that could cause social upheaval. For the delegates, a new government was needed to protect property, raise desperately needed revenue, and most of all to Madison, discipline rogue state legislatures.
If Roger Sherman (Connecticut, pictured) was the true maestro of the Constitutional Convention, then James Madison was the frustrated rival composer; as brilliant as Madison was, Sherman constantly bested him in terms of strategy and parliamentary procedure. To start, Sherman was able to pass a motion in which all 12 delegations (Rhode Island boycotted the convention) were given equal weight, as in all previous conventions, and in the A of C . . . Madison reluctantly agreed, in that he didn't want to immediately alienate smaller states.
The most difficult aspect of the convention to enforce was preserving the secrecy of the proceedings. It was decided that nothing could be published or discussed with non-delegates; even correspondence (letters) were included. On 29 May 1787, Edmund Randolph (Governor of VA, and the "Voice" of the VA delegation) was the first speaker. Randolph focused on the need for greater national security against a foreign invasion. Then, after presenting a mild persona, he introduced the Virginia Plan to the Constitutional Convention.
The most difficult aspect of the convention to enforce was preserving the secrecy of the proceedings. It was decided that nothing could be published or discussed with non-delegates; even correspondence (letters) were included. On 29 May 1787, Edmund Randolph (Governor of VA, and the "Voice" of the VA delegation) was the first speaker. Randolph focused on the need for greater national security against a foreign invasion. Then, after presenting a mild persona, he introduced the Virginia Plan to the Constitutional Convention.
The VA Plan featured a bicameral legislature, with both houses based on representation (or wealth). Those in the House of Representatives would be elected directly by eligible voters, and then the House would elect the members of the Senate (from nominations from state legislatures). To Madison (pictured from a drawing completed during the Constitutional Convention), the most important aspect of his VA Plan was the "Absolute Negative", where the Senate could negate any nefarious actions of what he considered "rogue" state legislatures. But Madison was not only frustrated by Sherman, but also by his fellow VA delegates George Mason and Edmund Randolph, in that they succeeded in noticeably reducing Madison's "Absolute Negative".
The VA Plan also had members of the Executive and Judicial branches chosen by Congress; the Chief Executive would serve a single term. Madison also insisted that Ratification of the future Constitution be conducted by specially-called state conventions, rather than state legislatures. One of Madison's main goals of the convention was to limit the influence of state legislatures on national policy.
The VA Plan also had members of the Executive and Judicial branches chosen by Congress; the Chief Executive would serve a single term. Madison also insisted that Ratification of the future Constitution be conducted by specially-called state conventions, rather than state legislatures. One of Madison's main goals of the convention was to limit the influence of state legislatures on national policy.
Under the Virginia Plan, states could only submit nominations to the House for Senators; Madison counted on a coalition of Southern states and large Northern states for passage . . . then delegates from Delaware, Connecticut, and New Jersey started to whittle away at the VA Plan. Delaware threatened to leave the convention; only the cajoling of fellow small-state delegations kept them in Philadelphia. Sherman introduced a plan in which the state legislatures would select members of the Senate (that proposal would eventually become part of the Constitution, which was eventually canceled by the 17th Amendment, which provided for the direct election of Senators).
The VA Plan's major weakness was that it only addressed the "shenanigans" of the state legislatures to the proposed national government; there was no reciprocal protection for the states against the national government. Also, under the VA Plan, Delaware would have a 1/90th share of representation, while Virginia and Pennsylvania combined would have 1/3.
Madison's main problem at this point in the convention was his lack of sympathy for the small states. He viewed states such as Rhode Island as holding the interests of the nation, and especially those of Virginia, hostage in the A of C. But what was really eroding Madison's influence in the convention was his insistence on his "Absolute Negative" (which would make the Senate the ultimate authority under the Constitution, able to discipline state legislatures); despite, or perhaps in spite of, his constant insistence, the "Absolute Negative" proposal was defeated 7 to 3.
The VA Plan's major weakness was that it only addressed the "shenanigans" of the state legislatures to the proposed national government; there was no reciprocal protection for the states against the national government. Also, under the VA Plan, Delaware would have a 1/90th share of representation, while Virginia and Pennsylvania combined would have 1/3.
Madison's main problem at this point in the convention was his lack of sympathy for the small states. He viewed states such as Rhode Island as holding the interests of the nation, and especially those of Virginia, hostage in the A of C. But what was really eroding Madison's influence in the convention was his insistence on his "Absolute Negative" (which would make the Senate the ultimate authority under the Constitution, able to discipline state legislatures); despite, or perhaps in spite of, his constant insistence, the "Absolute Negative" proposal was defeated 7 to 3.
On 19 June 1787, the New Jersey Plan (which basically wanted the A of C to continue) was voted down, but the significant end result of the vote was that Madison's VA Plan coalition was destroyed. On 29 June 1787, Oliver Ellsworth (CT, pictured) proposed that the House of Representatives be based on population, but that the Senate would be based on equal representation. Also, in what would become the Connecticut (or Great) Compromise, 3/5's of the African slave population in the South would be counted for representation in the House (that was not a new idea; it was originally proposed in 1783).
What was new was a proposal that the Southern states pay taxes on 3/5's of their African slave population for representation, which was mostly posturing since no one at the convention really anticipated any meaningful revenue from the new tax. On 16 July 1787, the Connecticut Compromise was adopted; the VA Plan coalition met, but it was clear that all their momentum was lost.
After all his preparation for the convention, Madison had seen most of his ideas rejected in only six weeks. To Madison, the worst development was that Senators would be the pawns of the state legislatures. Some delegates left the Constitutional Convention after the Connecticut Compromise, but not Madison, who regrouped and refocused his efforts. For the remainder of the convention, Madison did his best to reduce the power of the Senate. Madison looked to the House, and the Executive & Judicial branches to diffuse the power of the proposed Senate.
What was new was a proposal that the Southern states pay taxes on 3/5's of their African slave population for representation, which was mostly posturing since no one at the convention really anticipated any meaningful revenue from the new tax. On 16 July 1787, the Connecticut Compromise was adopted; the VA Plan coalition met, but it was clear that all their momentum was lost.
After all his preparation for the convention, Madison had seen most of his ideas rejected in only six weeks. To Madison, the worst development was that Senators would be the pawns of the state legislatures. Some delegates left the Constitutional Convention after the Connecticut Compromise, but not Madison, who regrouped and refocused his efforts. For the remainder of the convention, Madison did his best to reduce the power of the Senate. Madison looked to the House, and the Executive & Judicial branches to diffuse the power of the proposed Senate.
Discussion then drifted toward electing the President, and again, Electors were brought up in the debate. General agreement existed among Southern delegates that a direct election would favor Northern states. In September 1787, it was decided that the President would serve a four-year term, and would be eligible for re-elections. Also, it was decided that Electors in each state would be determined by the state legislature, and that each would cast two votes. And, if there was no majority reached in the Electoral Vote, the Senate would decide the election among the top 5 that received votes.
To Madison, that meant that too much power rested in the Senate; ironically, it was Sherman's revision that suggested that the House of Representatives decide the Presidential Election if the Electors could not, with each state's Congressional delegation counting as one vote . . . Sherman's revision passed by a vote of 10 to 1 (pictured: a dramatization of the Signing of the Constitution).
Madison now focused his attention and energies on vesting as much power as possible in the Executive, based on what had been decided in the convention. To Madison, the Presidential veto represented at least partial success for his defeated "Absolute Negative". However, Madison failed in his attempt to require a 3/4's majority in both houses of Congress to override a veto . . . he had to be satisfied with a 2/3's majority. But Madison was pleased that the President had more "latitude and discretion" than the other two branches.
To Madison, that meant that too much power rested in the Senate; ironically, it was Sherman's revision that suggested that the House of Representatives decide the Presidential Election if the Electors could not, with each state's Congressional delegation counting as one vote . . . Sherman's revision passed by a vote of 10 to 1 (pictured: a dramatization of the Signing of the Constitution).
Madison now focused his attention and energies on vesting as much power as possible in the Executive, based on what had been decided in the convention. To Madison, the Presidential veto represented at least partial success for his defeated "Absolute Negative". However, Madison failed in his attempt to require a 3/4's majority in both houses of Congress to override a veto . . . he had to be satisfied with a 2/3's majority. But Madison was pleased that the President had more "latitude and discretion" than the other two branches.
Rufus King (MA) ignited the discussion of the Slave Trade; he was adamant that the convention end the practice. The Slave Trade Compromise was mostly crafted by a "Committee of Eleven", which included Madison. The committee's recommendation was that Congress should be prohibited from interfering with the Slave Trade until 1800 (but a duty on imported slaves was authorized; revenue was desired). The Lower South (NC, SC, & GA) held out until the year was extended to 1808 (keep in mind, African slavery was slowly ebbing away, due to the colossal expense, and no one at the convention could predict the impact of the Cotton Gin that was patented in 1793). Pictured: another depiction of the Signing of the Constitution
George Mason and Edmund Randolph were so dispirited that they refused to sign the Constitution. Randolph wanted the state conventions empowered to add amendments, while Mason loudly called for a 2nd Constitutional Convention (Elbridge Gerry was the third delegate that was present on 17 September, 1787, that didn't sign). For those that did sign the Constitution, their experience was far more wearisome than glorious. Madison saw the President as the only vehicle in the Constitution that could be in line with Virginia's interests; Madison wanted to make sure that Virginia would remain the most preeminent state in the U.S.
George Mason and Edmund Randolph were so dispirited that they refused to sign the Constitution. Randolph wanted the state conventions empowered to add amendments, while Mason loudly called for a 2nd Constitutional Convention (Elbridge Gerry was the third delegate that was present on 17 September, 1787, that didn't sign). For those that did sign the Constitution, their experience was far more wearisome than glorious. Madison saw the President as the only vehicle in the Constitution that could be in line with Virginia's interests; Madison wanted to make sure that Virginia would remain the most preeminent state in the U.S.
The President of the Constitutional Convention, George Washington, didn't speak out until the end, when he asked for permission to address the convention. His reason for doing so was to officially favor the proposal that each representative in the House be based on 40,000 people, rather than 30,000. It was his way to tell the delegates that he supported the Constitution, and he expected them to fall in line with his stance.
Madison succeeded in having the A of C send copies of the proposed Constitution to each state without a direct endorsement, or offering any proposed amendments. Madison also stood firm that state conventions should ratify the Constitution, not the state legislatures. Madison wrote Jefferson (who was still in Paris), expressing anger and frustration with the convention; he thought that the new government was far-too weak . . . soon, Jefferson, and even Madison, would view the new federal government under the Constitution to be too powerful at the expense of the states, especially towards their beloved Virginia.
Madison succeeded in having the A of C send copies of the proposed Constitution to each state without a direct endorsement, or offering any proposed amendments. Madison also stood firm that state conventions should ratify the Constitution, not the state legislatures. Madison wrote Jefferson (who was still in Paris), expressing anger and frustration with the convention; he thought that the new government was far-too weak . . . soon, Jefferson, and even Madison, would view the new federal government under the Constitution to be too powerful at the expense of the states, especially towards their beloved Virginia.
