Source: Robert A. Caro. The Years of Lyndon Johnson:
The Passage of Power (2012)
The Passage of Power (2012)
LBJ had a problem for the upcoming Election of 1960: he wanted to run for his US Senate seat from Texas AND for President of the United States. Using his powerful political base in Texas (and no doubt some political shenanigans), he was able to get the Texas state legislature, in 1959, to pass a law authorizing his name to be on the ballot for both the Senate and President (and by extension, Vice-President). (Pictured: Senator Lyndon Johnson at a birthday celebration of former President Harry Truman in 1959)
On 7 May, 1959, LBJ finally accepted an invitation to speak in Pennsylvania at a political rally supporting his bid to be the Democratic nominee for President. LBJ electrified the crowd that numbered in the thousands; many believed that this experience in a Northern state would convince LBJ to formally enter primary elections in Northern & Western states. LBJ, however, returned to his political shell (he was mortified by a fear of failure and humiliation) once again refusing invitations to speak at rallies organized on his behalf, often at the last minute.
LBJ needed delegates for the Democratic Convention, and they were there to be had in the Western states (but not in California; JFK had already secured those delegates), which totaled 172 delegates . . . LBJ was a shoe-in to win at least two Western primaries, and he was favored to win most of the others, but he hadn't formally entered any as of yet. Ted Kennedy was his brother's organizational guru out West, and he told JFK that the West (not California) was "Johnson Country". But LBJ would have needed to actually campaign in the West for those delegates; the decision to not campaign in the Western primaries would be the death-knell for LBJ's presidential aspirations in the Democratic National Convention of 1960.
On 7 May, 1959, LBJ finally accepted an invitation to speak in Pennsylvania at a political rally supporting his bid to be the Democratic nominee for President. LBJ electrified the crowd that numbered in the thousands; many believed that this experience in a Northern state would convince LBJ to formally enter primary elections in Northern & Western states. LBJ, however, returned to his political shell (he was mortified by a fear of failure and humiliation) once again refusing invitations to speak at rallies organized on his behalf, often at the last minute.
LBJ needed delegates for the Democratic Convention, and they were there to be had in the Western states (but not in California; JFK had already secured those delegates), which totaled 172 delegates . . . LBJ was a shoe-in to win at least two Western primaries, and he was favored to win most of the others, but he hadn't formally entered any as of yet. Ted Kennedy was his brother's organizational guru out West, and he told JFK that the West (not California) was "Johnson Country". But LBJ would have needed to actually campaign in the West for those delegates; the decision to not campaign in the Western primaries would be the death-knell for LBJ's presidential aspirations in the Democratic National Convention of 1960.
While LBJ was equivocating, JFK sent his secret weapon against LBJ to the West: Robert Kennedy. By 1959, RFK had developed a deep hatred for LBJ, and the feeling was reciprocated. The first time they encountered each other was in January, 1953, in the Senate cafeteria, next to Senate Minority Leader Lyndon Johnson's office. RFK was seated at a table with Senator Joseph McCarthy (to whom he was assistant counsel), and as LBJ walked by, everyone but RFK stood and shook LBJ's had, and called him "Leader".
RFK stayed seated, and glowered, and only kind of shook LBJ's hand, with no eye contact. RFK had come to hate LBJ since Johnson was with FDR when the President announced that he would remove Joseph Kennedy as Ambassador to England. LBJ relished in telling the story of how FDR tricked Joseph Kennedy to come back to the US, give a national radio address as Ambassador, and then forced him to resign . . . RFK was VERY protective of his father.
(Pictured: RFK as the chief counsel during a McClellan Committee hearing on the Teamsters
in 1959)
LBJ continued to force RFK to shake his hand every day for awhile; it was truly "Hate at First Sight" for both of them. LBJ took every chance he could to rub in his dislike for RFK in front of others, such as calling him "Sonny Boy". LBJ disliked RFK, but he didn't take him seriously, since RFK was a staffer, not a Senator. RFK on the other hand, hated LBJ, and took him very seriously indeed, seeing him as a threat to JFK's path to the Presidency.
RFK stayed seated, and glowered, and only kind of shook LBJ's hand, with no eye contact. RFK had come to hate LBJ since Johnson was with FDR when the President announced that he would remove Joseph Kennedy as Ambassador to England. LBJ relished in telling the story of how FDR tricked Joseph Kennedy to come back to the US, give a national radio address as Ambassador, and then forced him to resign . . . RFK was VERY protective of his father.
(Pictured: RFK as the chief counsel during a McClellan Committee hearing on the Teamsters
in 1959)
LBJ continued to force RFK to shake his hand every day for awhile; it was truly "Hate at First Sight" for both of them. LBJ took every chance he could to rub in his dislike for RFK in front of others, such as calling him "Sonny Boy". LBJ disliked RFK, but he didn't take him seriously, since RFK was a staffer, not a Senator. RFK on the other hand, hated LBJ, and took him very seriously indeed, seeing him as a threat to JFK's path to the Presidency.
RFK knew that US Senators couldn't deliver very many delegates at the Convention, but Governors could do so; LBJ either didn't know, or care, about that political reality. More to the point, RFK knew that LBJ had no idea where the real power was located as far as corralling convention delegates. Unlike LBJ, RFK had learned a lot from the 1956 Democratic National Convention, and applied those lessons to the upcoming convention in order to try and secure JFK's nomination on the first ballot.
In 1959, RFK resigned as chief counsel from the McClellan Committee (investigating shenanigans with organized labor, including Jimmy Hoffa), and campaigned for JFK full-time. When LBJ finally decided to start campaign organizations in Western states, his people found that JFK had set up organizations months beforehand, and also had a tremendous head start in gathering committed delegates. LBJ fear-of-trying had held him back, and by early-1960, it was far too late to catch up to the JFK primary machine.
A young representative from Massachusetts named Tip O'Neill (pictured: he would become Speaker of the House) told LBJ that JFK would win the Democratic nomination on the first ballot, and there was nothing that LBJ could do to alter that outcome. LBJ was unwilling to concede even the most remote possibility that JFK could (or had) outmaneuvered him before the Democratic National Convention.
In 1959, RFK resigned as chief counsel from the McClellan Committee (investigating shenanigans with organized labor, including Jimmy Hoffa), and campaigned for JFK full-time. When LBJ finally decided to start campaign organizations in Western states, his people found that JFK had set up organizations months beforehand, and also had a tremendous head start in gathering committed delegates. LBJ fear-of-trying had held him back, and by early-1960, it was far too late to catch up to the JFK primary machine.
A young representative from Massachusetts named Tip O'Neill (pictured: he would become Speaker of the House) told LBJ that JFK would win the Democratic nomination on the first ballot, and there was nothing that LBJ could do to alter that outcome. LBJ was unwilling to concede even the most remote possibility that JFK could (or had) outmaneuvered him before the Democratic National Convention.
In terms of the 1960 Democratic Primaries, LBJ was confident that the other candidates would "kill off each other". On 10 May, 1960, West Virginia, a predominantly Protestant state, held its Democratic primary election. If JFK could win in WVA, he would show that he was an electable candidate for President; if he didn't win, then in all likelihood, LBJ would get his "Back Room" scenario where he would wheel-and-deal for delegates. JFK took 60% of the popular vote in the WVA primary, in part because he had made the conscious effort to minimize his Catholicism on a state-wide television address.
(Pictured: JFK campaigning in West Virginia)
After West Virginia, when it was far too late, LBJ showed how much he wanted to become President. With only two months before the convention in Los Angeles, he made a desperate lunge for the prize. LBJ worked hard for delegates in Indiana, then finally made his long-delayed trip to campaign in the West. Despite his herculean efforts in the 11th Hour, LBJ was not able to come close to JFK's impressive total of committed convention delegates.
Pennsylvania was the final battleground between LBJ and JFK; if LBJ could deny JFK the state's 81 delegates, then he would deny JFK a victory on the first ballot, and his "Back Room" scenario would become a reality.
(Pictured: JFK campaigning in West Virginia)
After West Virginia, when it was far too late, LBJ showed how much he wanted to become President. With only two months before the convention in Los Angeles, he made a desperate lunge for the prize. LBJ worked hard for delegates in Indiana, then finally made his long-delayed trip to campaign in the West. Despite his herculean efforts in the 11th Hour, LBJ was not able to come close to JFK's impressive total of committed convention delegates.
Pennsylvania was the final battleground between LBJ and JFK; if LBJ could deny JFK the state's 81 delegates, then he would deny JFK a victory on the first ballot, and his "Back Room" scenario would become a reality.
The Governor of Pennsylvania, "Don't Call Me Boss" David Lawrence, did not support JFK, mostly due to his belief that a Catholic could not be elected President. Lawrence was a supporter of two-time Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson (1952 & 1956, losing to Eisenhower in both elections); in fact, he idolized Stevenson. Lawrence had the same political view towards a Southern Democrat in terms of Presidential "electability", so LBJ also did not receive support from Governor Lawrence. Despite Lawrence's wishes and designs, most of Pennsylvania's delegates were pledged to JFK.
Adlai Stevenson was non-committal when Lawrence asked him to formally declare his candidacy, which meant that Lawrence did not have a candidate to champion during his state's caucus. JFK left Pennsylvania with 64 committed delegates, Stevenson garnered 7.5, while LBJ only secured 4; those results meant that it was conceivable that JFK could win the Democratic nomination on the first ballot. (Pictured: JFK, Stevenson, and LBJ at the Beverly Hilton during the Democratic National Convention in LA)
Adlai Stevenson was non-committal when Lawrence asked him to formally declare his candidacy, which meant that Lawrence did not have a candidate to champion during his state's caucus. JFK left Pennsylvania with 64 committed delegates, Stevenson garnered 7.5, while LBJ only secured 4; those results meant that it was conceivable that JFK could win the Democratic nomination on the first ballot. (Pictured: JFK, Stevenson, and LBJ at the Beverly Hilton during the Democratic National Convention in LA)
During the Democratic National Convention,, LBJ and JFK actually debated each other. JFK sent telegrams to all states, stating the he would meet with their delegation of they so desired. LBJ basically "Triple-Dog-Dared" JFK to debate him in front of the Texas delegation, and JFK accepted. JFK got the better of LBJ, in that he was classy and self-deprecating, while LBJ was loud-mouthed and petty. JFK basically won-over the hearts, if not their minds, of the Texas delegation. LBJ finally came to the conclusion that JFK had enough delegates to win the party's nomination.
In the end, it all came down to Wyoming's 15 delegates, and JFK needed them all to win on the first ballot, and avoid any behind-the-scenes political chicanery. JFK and RFK negotiated with the Wyoming delegation, and secured the 5 uncommitted delegates to their total, as well as the Democratic nomination for President on the first ballot. LBJ could have had the Wyoming delegates, and the other Western states in his delegate total, but he waited far too long to actively campaign, and JFK and RFK took full advantage. The final tally of delegates at the 1960 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles: JFK 806, LBJ 409 (Senators Hubert Humphrey and Stuart Symington totaled 306 between the two).
(Pictured: Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, LBJ's #1 supporter, grieves with LBJ when it was confirmed that JFK won on the first ballot)
Below: A portion of the LBJ/JFK debate in front of the Texas delegation in LA
In the end, it all came down to Wyoming's 15 delegates, and JFK needed them all to win on the first ballot, and avoid any behind-the-scenes political chicanery. JFK and RFK negotiated with the Wyoming delegation, and secured the 5 uncommitted delegates to their total, as well as the Democratic nomination for President on the first ballot. LBJ could have had the Wyoming delegates, and the other Western states in his delegate total, but he waited far too long to actively campaign, and JFK and RFK took full advantage. The final tally of delegates at the 1960 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles: JFK 806, LBJ 409 (Senators Hubert Humphrey and Stuart Symington totaled 306 between the two).
(Pictured: Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, LBJ's #1 supporter, grieves with LBJ when it was confirmed that JFK won on the first ballot)
Below: A portion of the LBJ/JFK debate in front of the Texas delegation in LA