Blog Archives

The Republican & Democratic National Conventions and the War in Europe, 1940

5/22/2015

Source: Lynne Olson. Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and
America's Fight Over World War II, 1939 - 1941 (2013)

Wendell Willkie's rise to political prominence in 1940 was swift and largely unexpected. He was an Internationalist, which meant that he strongly favored direct U.S. assistance to a beleaguered Great Britain. In essence, the Fall of France increased the likelihood that Willkie could be nominated as the Republican Presidential candidate.
At the dawn of the Great Depression, Willkie was not a politician, he was in charge of the largest Southern Electric Utility, Commonwealth & Southern; and the Tennessee Valley Authority entered his landscape. Commonwealth & Southern was "crowded out" of the utility marketplace by the federal government, and Willkie went on the attack against the New Deal, and FDR (despite being "crowded out", Willkie came out a winner, in that the government purchased Commonwealth & Southern for $78.6m). Like Lincoln in 1858, Willkie became a nationally known-and-respected political figure as a result of a high-profile debate. He became a voice for moderate middle class Americans, especially businessmen that believed the federal government had become too involved in their affairs.

Willkie, a native from Indiana, was a Democrat until 1939. Willkie changed his political party affiliation in part to falling in love with NYC (and with Irita Van Doren, a prominent book editor for the New York Herald Tribune; although he was married), but mostly due to events that unfolded in the War in Europe. The Herald formally endorsed Willkie for the Republican nomination over Thomas Dewey, who most everyone believed had already secured the nomination.
Willkie's NYC connections insured that he was introduced to many more East Coast Elites that could help him in his quest for the nomination. Magazine articles in Fortune magazine that profiled Willkie, as well as the nightmarish War in Europe, led to petition drives on Willkie's behalf. Those petition drives increased Willkie's profile and popularity in the rest of the nation. When Henry Luce (pictured), the owner of Time, Life, and Fortune magazines, committed to Willkie, those magazines shifted to flat-out advocacy for his nomination. Willkie had become so popular in the Midwest that he embarked on a public speaking tour; despite the increased popularity and support, Willkie was still a long shot to win the nomination at the Republican National Convention in Philadelphia in June, 1940.

The gavel opened the Republican National Convention in Philadelphia on 24 June, 1940, one week after the Fall of France. Willkie had called for immediate U.S. aid to Britain, oftentimes publicly stating that he was in full agreement with FDR. To Republican "Old Guard" Isolationists, Willkie was a vision from political hell. And since the "Old Guard" ran the party machinery, the battle for the nomination appeared to be between the Isolationist candidates Thomas Dewey (NY) or Robert A. Taft (OH; President Taft's oldest son).
Willkie was formally nominated on 26 June, 1940; the chants from the delegates on the floor of "We Want Willkie" became deafening. The convention became a showdown between Isolationists and Internationalists as to the role the U.S. should play in the War in Europe. The results of the first ballot were: Dewey 360, Taft 189, and Willkie 105; Dewey didn't have the necessary majority. As successive ballots were conducted, Willkie gained more-and-more delegates. After eight hours of balloting, the "Miracle in Philadelphia" occurred at 1:15 am when Willkie secured the nomination over the efforts of the party's "Old Guard" to block his victory. The Republican platform illustrated the ideological divide, in that it was an uneasy compromise between Isolationist and Internationalist points-of-view concerning America's role in European War.
The British Ambassador to the U.S., Phillip Kerr (a.k.a. Lord Lothian; who was VERY popular in America), cabled Prime Minister Winston Churchill that Britain was guaranteed to have a "friendly" U.S. President, no matter the result in November.

Hitler's invasion of Western Europe helped the Democrats far more than the Republicans. FDR had been losing serious political momentum during his disastrous second term in office, but Hitler brought FDR back to popularity within the party (the desire for a Commander-in-Chief became paramount). To be even more clear, FDR was politically dead-in-the-water before Germany invaded Poland on 1 September, 1939: Democratic Party leaders were not even planning on nominating the two-term President at the following year's convention . . . Hitler's actions on Europe saved FDR's political fortunes.
FDR made up his mind to pursue a third term just before France fell to the Nazis in June, 1940. FDR (in a maneuver that would have made Jefferson proud), refused to promote himself for the Democratic nomination; others would have to do so.
The Democratic National Convention started on 15 July, 1940, in Chicago . . . and it started out in listless fashion - there wasn't any "We Want FDR" chants from the floor. FDR's powerful supporters started the chant in support of FDR after the nominations were made with the infamous "Sewer Call" (the man in charge of building maintenance was below the floor, with a microphone and a deep sonorous voice; he started the "We Want FDR" chant). FDR wanted to be nominated by acclamation, but a roll call vote took place; FDR easily won the nomination. The delegates felt that they had been manipulated, but they believed that at least they would be able to select FDR's Vice-Presidential candidate; little did they know that FDR was all-in on his SecAg, Henry Wallace (to FDR's right).

FDR absolutely insisted that his Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, be the Vice-Presidential nominee (he wanted a VP 100% loyal to the New Deal); to the vast majority of delegates, Wallace was viewed as not only far too liberal, but also not qualified. FDR told his most trusted advisor, Harry Hopkins, that if the convention didn't select Wallace as the VP candidate, he would not run for President.
The convention was in an uproar over what delegates considered to be flat-out tyrannical behavior by FDR. The only reason why Wallace was selected as the VP candidate was that Eleanor Roosevelt agreed to speak, not only on behalf of Wallace, but also on behalf of party unity. Wallace narrowly won the VP nomination, but was not allowed to give his acceptance speech, due to fears of a convention revolt. The Democratic National Convention wasn't a coronation for FDR, it was a complete debacle. Polls showed that the Republicans were even with the Democrats by August, 1940.
After the Democratic Convention, Willkie was approached by FDR's representatives, asking him to not attack the pending "Destroyers for Bases" deal with Britain, and Willkie agreed. The deal was the largest and most significant decision yet to aid Great Britain against the Nazis. On 3 September, 1940, FDR announced the "Destroyers for Bases" deal on one of his "Fireside Chats"; as often occurred after a major decision, FDR expected to face defeat. The reality was that the "Destroyers for Bases" deal increased FDR's popularity a great deal, and cost Willkie, who had promised to stay silent.

The Good News: Britain received 50 destroyers from the U.S. The Bad News: those destroyers were in terrible condition. Despite their poor condition, they proved to be invaluable to Britain's naval strategies of securing their home island. Another result of the deal with Britain was that a shift had occurred in US public opinion: a majority favored overt, direct military assistance to Great Britain.
FDR would now be able to push for much more, especially with what would be known as the Lend-Lease Act. During the Battle for Britain
in 1940, U.S. Internationalist media focused on the courage and resilience of the British people to heavy Nazi bombing raids. Life magazine chronicled that experience: the Life magazine cover to the left (an injured British child in a hospital with a stuffed animal) touched the hearts of millions of Americans.

After the Republican and Democratic National Conventions, the journalist that did the most to influence public opinion to provide more direct assistance to Britain was Edward R. Murrow (pictured in CBS HQ in London). His broadcasts from London ("This is London" was his trademark sign-in) was required listening for millions. Morrow was unapologetic in his support for Britain, and in his belief that the Nazis were a threat to not only Europe, but to the U.S.
Adolf Hitler gave America someone to hate, and Britain provided something for Americans to love. By October, during the heat of the general campaign in the Election of 1940, most wanted FDR and the Government to provide direct military support for Britain. But even after defeating Wendell Willkie in November, FDR remained unwilling to provide leadership in that direction . . .
(Below: newsreel footage chronicling Willkie's upset win in Philadelphia in 1940)

0 Comments

Charles Lindbergh Goes to Europe (1935 - 1939)

5/22/2015

0 Comments

Source: Lynne Olson. Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and
America's Fight Over World War II, 1939 - 1941 (2013)

13 June, 1927: 75% of New York City's population
(four million) showed up for the ticker-tape parade honoring Charles Lindbergh for his miraculous solo flight across the Atlantic. Time Magazine also honored Lindbergh, naming him their first "Man of the Year". Lindbergh toured all 48 states in his beloved "Spirit of St. Louis"; 30 million people were able to see the "Lone Eagle". Shortly thereafter, Lindbergh became a technology advisor to Pan Am and TWA; he was instrumental in creating the first modern airports.
Try as he might, Lindbergh was unable to reclaim his treasured privacy, and restore equilibrium to his life. Wherever he went, he was besieged by the press and adoring citizens. A loner all his life, Lindbergh was unprepared for the trappings of immense fame. As he kept his distance, the public became more hysterical, demanding to see and know more about "Lucky Lindy". After the kidnapping/murder of his first-born son, 2 year-old Charles Jr., a "Paparazzi Attack" occurred on his 2nd-born; it was not too much to state that those events psychologically scarred Lindbergh. As a result, Lindbergh decided to take his family to Europe in December, 1935, in order to escape the insanity that was their life in America.

From 1936 to 1938, Charles Lindbergh, and his almost-as-famous wife, Anne Morrow, lived in England in a secluded estate called "Long Barn" (a friend of the Morrow family owned the estate). There, they were left alone by British citizens and the media. Then, in 1938, the Lindberghs moved to the tiny island of Illiec, off the coast of Brittany (France). That location was even more remote, which suited Lindbergh just fine.

(Below: the British estate nicknamed "Long Barn")

Though very thankful for their hospitality, he was exasperated by what he perceived to be British mediocrity and complacency. However, Lindbergh had formed his conclusions about Britain (and eventually Nazi Germany) without any connection with common citizens; in effect, he was clueless about what was really going on in England. Most of the British upper-class with which the Lindberghs interacted were pro-Nazi and pro-Appeasement. Lindbergh refused to socialize / associate with Winston Churchill, who was the leading anti-Nazi political figure in Britain.
(Below: Hermann Goering giving the Lindberghs a tour of a Nazi government building)

In Europe, Lindbergh was asked by the British and French, governments to inspect their aircraft factories and aviation facilities. In 1936, Lindbergh was invited to inspect the German Luftwaffe (Air Force), and to Hermann Goering's great delight, Lindbergh accepted. Lindbergh was shown the latest planes and factories, and witnessed demonstrations of precision bombing. He concluded that Nazi Germany was far ahead of Britain and France in every significant aviation category. Goering used Lindbergh to promote Nazi airpower, and to try and delay any resistance to Nazi expansion in Europe.
A major result of his visit to Nazi Germany in 1936 was that Lindbergh became convinced that America was on its descent, and that Germany was in its ascendency.
Lindbergh publicly stated that in quantity and quality, no nation(s) could challenge Nazi airpower. But Lindbergh's conclusion was flawed, in that the vaunted Luftwaffe, at that point, was only designed to lead/support troops, not for long-range bombing raids.
Lindbergh's omission of that fact meant that Britain, especially London, was very fearful of bombing runs by Nazi Germany. By publicly bragging about Nazi airpower, Lindbergh was partially responsible for the Appeasement in Munich in 1938.
(Below: Lindbergh at a party in Berlin hosted by the Nazis)

Lindbergh was (willingly?) used as a tool by the Nazi Government, of whom he had developed a personal & political affinity. Lindbergh preferred the spirit and attitude of Germany far more than that of Britain (or France). And, the Nazis protected his privacy to a far greater extent than the British or French, but ironically, Lindbergh's freedom in Germany came at the expense of the freedom of German citizens . . . who in their right mind would crash the estate of an official guest of Hitler and Goering?

In Germany, the Lindberghs only saw what the Nazis wanted them to see; all their interactions were with government or military men, and neither Charles or Anne spoke German. They were also shielded from the horrors of the pogroms against Jews; when informed of Kristallnacht, Lindbergh wondered why the Nazis could be so "silly". Lindbergh
was so far removed from the reality of life in Nazi Germany, that he wasn't outraged by the excesses and brutality of the Nazi regime.
In the U.S., news of Lindbergh's visits to Nazi Germany had started to erode his popularity. Erosion of popularity transformed to outright attacks against Lindbergh in the U.S. media when Goering presented Lindbergh with a medal on behalf of the Nazi Government. It was a surprise medal ceremony, and while Lindbergh was flabbergasted (his words), he took the honor in stride. Anne saw the medal much differently, referring to it as "The Albatross", which it would definitely become. The medal ceremony occurred just days before Kristallnacht, and that incidental timing increased the level of outrage in America; not since WW I had there been such anti-German fervor in America. After Kristallnacht, FDR actually recalled the US Ambassador from Berlin.

After the Nazi medal ceremony, Lindbergh's open contempt of the U.S. media came back to haunt him. The media felt totally entitled to go after his character and reputation, inventing "facts" to suit their allegations. An example: the media claimed that Lindbergh wore the medal all evening after Goering awarding it to him (Lindbergh never once wore the medal). Lindbergh refused to give his side of the story, despite being advised to do so by his wife and friends.
Lindbergh's political myopia explained why he didn't think the thunderstorm that was centered around him was very intense. From 1938-on, the "Medal Incident" was the instrument the media used to bludgeon Lindbergh. And then the federal government started to publicly attack Lindbergh, with FDR's blessing and encouragement. The government figure that ran point attacking Lindbergh was Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes (pictured); in effect, he was FDR's pit bull against Lindbergh. Ickes was already on the warpath against Hitler, so it wasn't too much of a leap at all, politically or personally, for him to start savaging Lindbergh.
The Lindberghs were informed by friends and acquaintances that he was being booed in American theaters when he appeared in newsreels. Anne was greatly shaken by the attacks on her husband; she believed that the media and the government were being beyond-unfair.

Lindbergh seemed to be totally unperturbed by the "scurrilous hoo-haw" that surrounded him. In 1939, just a few months after the "Medal Incident", he decided to go back to the U.S., giving up their privacy in exchange for the maelstrom of celebrity and political controversy in America. His decision to return to the U.S. occurred immediately after Hitler took the rest of Czechoslovakia on 15 March, 1939.
As a result, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain announced the "Line in the Sand": if Nazi Germany invaded Poland, Britain would declare war (France was in agreement). Europe was on the brink of another major war when Lindbergh came back to America. Upon his return, Lindbergh pressed for American neutrality in case of a European War; he believed that America should be the protector of Western Civilization, and the best way to accomplish that goal (in his opinion) was to avoid involvement in the upcoming War in Europe. Not long after Lindbergh's return to the U.S., President Franklin Roosevelt set his sights on trying to destroy the influence and reputation of the most prominent Isolationist in the nation . . . In less than four years, Charles Lindbergh went from the most famous man in America, to the most famous-and-controversial man in America . . . by 1938, that was a title that he shared with FDR . . .

Here is a Boston Globe Book Review of Lynne Olson's Those Angry Days

0 Comments

An Overview of the Most Divisive Years of the 20th Century

5/20/2015

1 Comment

Source: Lynne Olson. Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and
America's Fight Over World War II, 1939 - 1941 (2013)

President Franklin Roosevelt and Charles Lindbergh were alike not only in terms of popularity; they were also very strong-willed and stubborn . . . both viewed themselves as the "Lord of All They Surveyed". Both felt endowed with a special purpose, and were slow (sometimes unable) to acknowledge mistakes, and they both hated criticism. FDR and Lindbergh were both self-absorbed and emotionally detached . . . and they were absolute control freaks. In short, two competing egomaniacs were leading actors in the American conflict over the degree of U.S. involvement in the war in Europe between 1 September, 1939, and 7 December, 1941 . . . it proved to be the most divisive years in American History during the 20th Century.

The first clash between FDR and Lindbergh was in 1934, over the government scandal over Air Mail. FDR ordered the US Army Air Corps to deliver the mail instead of the airlines, and Lindbergh publicly "called him out" in the media. FDR was more than embarrassed when Lindbergh was proven right about the inability of the Air Corps to reliably deliver air mail; they didn't have the necessary training or the instruments to fly in bad weather . . . there were 12 deaths and 66 crashes. For the first time, FDR found himself bested in the court of public opinion; it proved to be his only political mistake during his 1st term in office . . . from that point on, FDR viewed Lindbergh as a personal and political enemy.

After the trial / conviction of Bruno Richard Hauptmann in "The Crime of the Century" (the kidnapping and murder of Charles, Jr.), Lindbergh moved his family to England, and then France during 1935 - 1938. He made several highly-publicized trips to Nazi Germany (pictured: Hermann Goering presenting a ceremonial sword to Lindbergh in 1936), and was invited to inspect the Luftwaffe. Lindbergh stated that the German Luftwaffe (Air Force) was invincible, and that Britain and France should, in essence, appease Hitler in Europe. On his return to the U.S., Lindbergh's job was to help General "Hap" Arnold build up the Army Air Corps; both viewed the role of the Air Corps as a defensive strategy for "Fortress America".
FDR invited Lindbergh to the White House in April, 1939, to "get his measure" of the only other American that equalled him in fame, and also to try and find out how much of a problem Lindbergh would be in the upcoming trouble-filled months. Lindbergh thought the meeting went well, and the Air Corps Mail controversy was in the past, but he knew that whatever "Honeymoon" that existed between him and President Roosevelt would probably not last very long.

On 1 September, 1939, Hitler invaded western Poland, and Britain and France declared war on Germany; that date was the "Lightning Rod" that started the most divisive period in US History during the 20th Century. By early-1940, Lindbergh had become the most famous spokesman for the "America First Committee" (pictured), and at that point, he became FDR's #1 adversary . . . what followed for 2+ years was a brutal, no-holds barred battle for the soul of the nation in terms of the level of American involvement in the War in Europe.
The shock of the Nazi blitzkrieg convinced many citizens that American military involvement in the war was very near. The national debate centered on this question: Should the U.S. aid Britain, and should the U.S. go further and enter the War in Europe? For the next 2+ years, that debate raged across America: should the U.S. be an Isolationist "Fortress" Nation, with a strong navy & air corps to defend itself (the Treaty of Versailles buttressed that perspective). Or, should the U.S. be an Internationalist Nation; that point of view held that the times were far too dire in Europe for the U.S. to avoid getting directly involved. To an Internationalist, Britain's existence was vital for America's security, and the U.S. had a moral obligation to stop the evil of Adolf Hitler; that view was challenged to the "nth degree" by the Isolationists.

Nothing in the 20th Century, not even the late-1960s, divided America more than the Isolationist / Internationalist Debate from 1939 - 1941. This "Great Debate" has been lost in history; that was mostly due to shock to the system that was the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December, 1941. Even the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, didn't want the U.S. military directly involved (until after Pearl, of course).
FDR convinced himself that Lindbergh and the "Firsters" posed a major threat to the U.S.; FDR embarked on a dirty, nasty campaign to destroy the influence / reputation of the America First Committee, and especially the reputation of Lindbergh. FDR authorized FBI investigations on Lindbergh and many other "Firsters", as well as publicly labeling Lindbergh (& the "Firsters") as subversives, or even Nazis. Lindbergh and America First portrayed FDR as a dictator who had destroyed free speech in his "Rush to War". . . Lindbergh went so far to say that Democracy no longer existed in America. (Theodor Geisel, also known as Dr. Seuss, was not only an author of children's books, but also a political cartoonist for PM, a New York City Internationalist newspaper. His political cartoons skewered Axis leaders and American Isolationists before Pearl Harbor)

Despite FDR's efforts to support Britain (who by 1940 was standing alone in Europe against the Nazis), he wanted to avoid sending U.S. troops to Europe. FDR was loathe to challenge Isolationists in Congress during his 2nd Term, which was the main obstacle in any meaningful progress towards helping an increasingly desperate Britain. FDR's 2nd Term would be marred by serious mistakes, as well as a lack of leadership in framing America's involvement in the War in Europe; most Americans were waiting for their President to lead them out of the contentious and divisive debate, but FDR placed far too much credence on the influence and power that Congressional Isolationists actually possessed. General Marshall (pictured) actually doubted FDR's ability to lead the U.S. in a major war; that would change after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor
(Below: Lynne Olson comments on FDR and Lindbergh before Pearl Harbor)

For the Stout-of-Heart, here is Lynne Olson in a lecture promoting her book; it's a great detailed synopsis if you don't have time to read the book!

1 Comment

President Woodrow Wilson Goes to Paris in 1919

5/2/2015

0 Comments

Source: Margaret MacMillan. Paris 1919:
Six Months That Changed the World (2007)

On 4 December, 1918, the SS George Washington set sail for Europe. Among those on board were President Woodrow Wilson, his (second) wife Edith, and Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Also on board were selected "experts" from universities and government, as well as prominent diplomats. On board the former German passenger ship were mountains of research/reference material for the President and his massive entourage to use in Paris.
No United States President had ever gone to Europe while in office (Theodore Roosevelt attended the funeral of King Edward VII in 1910 as an official representative of the U.S., but by then he was an ex-President); Wilson's opponents accused him of flat-out violating the Constitution by making the trip, while his supporters saw going to Paris as a very unwise decision. To Wilson, making the peace was as important as winning the war, and he felt that he owed it to all concerned that he head to Paris. A British diplomat compared Wilson's trip to Paris to that of a debutante entranced by the prospect of attending her first ball.
Wilson told his most trusted advisor, Colonel Edward House
(pictured; who was already in Paris) that he would focus on his "Big Picture" Ideals; he didn't want to remain too long in Paris, and get bogged down in any details . . . or to talk to German representatives. The "Preliminary Conference" actually became the main attraction, and Wilson wound up staying in Paris for six months. Other than a quick return to the U.S. from mid-February to mid-March, Wilson was in Paris from January through June in 1919.
(Below: The SS George Washington heads towards Europe in December, 1918)

President Wilson had a long list of enemies, many of which were former friends; his enemies viewed him as an ingrate and a liar. Wilson never forgave those that disagreed with him - he was a "Great Hater", in the mold of Robert Kennedy before JFK was assassinated.
According to Edward House, Wilson was only receptive to other perspectives when he was in the process of making a decision. Once Wilson had made a decision, it was inviolate, no longer open to discussion by anyone; some admired that trait, while others viewed it as egotism of the most dangerous magnitude. A French diplomat stated that Wilson would have been a great tyrant, in that he had no concept at all that he could ever be wrong.
Wilson was so sure he knew what he was going to do in Paris (and that he would succeed) that he only had four others with him in his "Circle of Trust" (five, if one counts Edith). One was his most trusted advisor, Edward House. Another was SecState Lansing (pictured); the only reason Wilson brought Lansing along was that it would have been very awkward to explain why the SecState wasn't with the President (also, Lansing had committed the Cardinal Sin of publicly disagreeing with Wilson). The other two were General Tinker Bliss (the military representative; Wilson only talked with him five times in Paris) and Henry White, a retired diplomat whose function was to help Edith Wilson on matters of French etiquette.
Wilson had deliberately slighted the Republicans, despite the fact that many (especially the moderates) at least shared some of Wilson's Post-World War I goals. By December of 1919, Wilson's hatred and distrust of the Republicans had reached a crescendo; this omission, plus Wilson's absolute refusal to compromise after he returned from Paris, led to the narrow defeat in the Senate of not only the Treaty of Versailles, but also American participation in the League of Nations.
(Below: The SS George Washington of the coast of France in December 1918)

President Wilson stated that he loved Democracy, but he absolutely hated most of his fellow politicians, regardless of party. Wilson wanted to serve humanity, but he had so few personal relationships. Wilson was an Idealist, and he was also someone that wanted as much power as possible in order to accomplish his great works and vision. Therefore, he was intolerant of perspectives of others that differed with his, and blind to legitimate concerns. Those that opposed Wilson weren't just wrong, they were wicked . . . like the Germans.
By December of 1919, Wilson had convinced himself that he spoke for the global masses, despite clear evidence to the contrary (that would be evident in Paris, but it wouldn't become in any way manifest to Wilson). Adding to the future problems he would face in Paris, Wilson often ignored established facts if they didn't fit with his Idealism.
During The Great War, America had become a huge provider of food for the Allies; more significantly, the US had supplanted Britain to become the world's financial power, due to the massive loans to the Allies. European allies owed $7 billion to the US Government, and $4 billion to US banks - Wilson believed that the financial debts alone would force Great Britain and France to see the Post-WW I world his way, and to follow his lead in Paris.

Wilson's well-publicized-in-advance proclamation of "Self-Determination" was controversial and opaque; it was kind of like trying to explain the Electoral College to the uninformed (or worse yet, the Bowl Championship Series before 2014). Many requests reached Wilson even before he arrived in Paris wanting him to define what he meant by "Self-Determination", but he never answered the queries, and never defined his flagship term while in Paris. It was left to others to interpret what he meant (historians aren't even sure that Wilson was able to define his own term): did Wilson mean a type of Democracy, or true "Self-Determination" in its literal sense, or even acceptable versions of autocracy . . . no one knew.
Complicating the landscape of "Self-Determination" was that Wilson had no sympathy for Irish Nationalists trying to free themselves from Britain, or for those asking for decolonization in Africa or Southeast Asia
(the person who would eventually call himself
Ho Chi Minh was in Paris, pictured at the right). SecState Lansing thought that Wilson had raised hopes in the world that would never be realized, and that the President was bound be be discredited. Lansing further wrote that a clear definition of what constituted a nation ("Self-Determination") would have gone a long way in Paris.

Wilson eventually stated that "Well-Defined" national aspirations would be satisfactory; but he never clarified that term either. It was beyond-difficult to categorize "Well-Defined" Nationalism in any case - a Poland for the Poles? A Slovakia for the Slovaks? A Ukraine for the Ukrainians? An Ireland for the Irish? In every case, there were other ethnicities and nationalities that were prominent minorities . . . when imposed borders are created, war is a likely result. Wilson's job in Paris would prove to be an "Impossible Dream". The possibilities of dividing people across yet-to-be-determined boundaries was unending, in particular in Central Europe. In short (according to MacMillan), an arrogant, inflexible, idealistic President Woodrow Wilson went to Europe, and basically made a very difficult situation worse. Basically, Wilson brought a Bible to a poker game.
American Idealism by 1919 featured two sides. One was an eagerness to set the world straight, assuming that American values were global and universal. The other was ready to turn its back with contempt if its message to the world was ignored. This has lead to a certain "obtuseness" from not only Wilson, but in the decades that followed - a tendency to preach to others, rather than listen. It has also led to a point-of-view that American principles are pure, while all others are suspect, even wicked or evil. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George summed up this American Idealism by sarcastically stating that Wilson came to Europe ready to rescue the heathen Europeans from themselves. (Pictured above, from Left-to-Right: French Premier Georges Clemenceau, President Woodrow Wilson, and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George)

It was easy to mock President Wilson, and many did, but SO MANY believed in him and his 14 Points as the year 1919 began. Wilson represented a brighter future; after The Great War, much of the world was ready to listen, and believe, in the American President. So many disparate populations took Wilson's 14 Points to heart; to these populations, his principles became a sort of sacred tract.
Wilson commented to George Creel, who was also on board the SS George Washington (his "Propaganda Chief"), that he may have done too good a job in spreading the 14 Points across the globe, especially in Europe. Wilson thought that Creel may have unconsciously spun a web from which there was no escape. On 13 December, 1918, the SS George Washington reached the French port of Brest; World War I had been over for a
little over a month - Wilson's reception in France was beyond-"Beatle-esque". Wilson, at a private dinner, expressed his pleasure at his reception: the French, in his words, were "most friendly."
Soon, Wilson would have to deal with British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and French Premier Georges Clemenceau, and their very different visions of Post-WW I Europe. And, added to that, Wilson would be expected to wave his "magic wand" and satisfy a myriad of impossible-to-satisfy requests and demands from people in Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Here is the New York Times book review of Paris 1919 by Margaret MacMillan

Below: A preview of a documentary based on MacMillan's Paris 1919

For the Stout-of-Heart, here are Parts 1 and 2 of Paris 1919, the full documentary

0 Comments

The Republican & Democratic National Conventions and the War in Europe, 1940

Charles Lindbergh Goes to Europe (1935 - 1939)

An Overview of the Most ﻿Divisive Years of the 20th Century

President Woodrow Wilson Goes to Paris in 1919

Archives

Categories

An Overview of the Most Divisive Years of the 20th Century