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LBJ & JFK: Before the 1960 Democratic Nat'l Convention, Part 1

3/20/2015

Source: Robert A. Caro. The Years of Lyndon Johnson:
The Passage of Power (2012)

In the late-1950s, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson didn't think that any U.S. Senator was a serious challenger to his pursuit of the Democratic nomination in 1960, including John F. Kennedy. But, to be fair, most everyone in Washington, D.C. had misread JFK to this point in his political career. While both Senators seethed with Presidential ambition, their backgrounds and how they approached their job in the Senate varied greatly.
LBJ's experience in World War II was of a "behind the scenes" sort; he spent a total of 13 minutes in action as an observer on a plane in the Pacific. As Senate Majority Leader, LBJ wore a silver star pin on his label, and regaled his colleagues with his WW II "experiences". In reality, this self-proclaimed "Tailgunner" was an intelligence officer who debriefed pilots behind a desk. JFK was a "Millionaire Playboy" Congressman, and then Senator, who lived lavishly, but was a decorated WW II hero. JFK basically phoned-in his duties as a member of Congress; no serious legislation bore his name in his nearly decade-and-a-half as a Congressman/Senator . . . but there were physical & political reasons for doing so.

In 1952, JFK shocked everyone when he not only announced that he was running for U.S. Senator against the powerful and popular incumbent Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (both candidates pictured bottom-right), but that he actually won (by a very narrow margin). While LBJ was a genius at gathering votes in the Senate as Majority Leader, JFK was very effective as a campaigner gathering votes. When JFK ran for the Senate against Lodge, Jr., he sent out thousands of invitations to women voters to "Meet JFK in Person" at voter rallies. While LBJ had very powerful Texas businessmen and politicians in his corner, JFK had his father, Joseph Kennedy - JFK's father bailed out a Boston newspaper to the tune of $500k, and then made sure the newspaper endorsed his son for the Senate race.
JFK had very serious health problems, including chronic back trouble, as well as Addison's Disease. Part of the reason why JFK wasn't a constant physical presence in the Senate was that he had two major back surgeries; upon his return to the Senate in 1955 after an almost two-year absence, the views of his colleagues towards him remained unchanged. Despite his relative lack of import in the Senate, JFK almost became Adlai Stevenson's Vice-Presidential candidate in 1956, being narrowly edged out on a floor vote among delegates by fellow Senator Estes Kefauver.
Below: The 1956 Democratic Convention Vice-President Nomination Ballot

LBJ, after Joseph Kennedy's prompting, appointed JFK to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; foreign policy was the one area that JFK embraced as a US Senator. LBJ figured that since JFK's father "owed him one", he had JFK lined up to be HIS Vice-Presidential running mate in 1960. LBJ measured Senators by what they had accomplished, and in his estimation, Senator Kennedy didn't measure up to his standards. To LBJ, "Work Horse" Senators did their job, while "Show Horse" Senators, such as JFK, were merely posers. Had LBJ known JFK's "Back Story", what it took for JFK to even get to Capitol Hill, LBJ may have significantly revised his opinion of JFK. (Pictured: Senators Johnson, Kennedy, and Hubert Humprey (MN) in the center)
Below: JFK, early in his first term as Senator, talks about US involvement in SE Asia

JFK overcame crippling health problems en route to Congress; LBJ just assumed that Senator Kennedy was a wealthy and lazy dilettante. In fact, JFK had very few days in his life when he wasn't in pain or sick in some way. He was diagnosed with deteriorating lumbar / discs in 1940, yet he served in the Navy in the Pacific in World War II. JFK wanted to serve on a PT Boat, which was the worst possible posting for a man w/ his back condition. JFK was beyond-heroic after his PT boat (PT-109) was cut in half by a Japanese destroyer (historians are still divided on his activity beforehand): during the six days before their rescue, JFK spent far more time in the water than out, helping his men to shore, and trying to signal for help. Not long after, JFK got command of PT-59, and 5 men from PT-109 followed him as part of his crew. JFK was in command for six weeks, then the degeneration of his discs reached a point in which he could no longer actively serve his nation in the Navy.

Once JFK became used to campaigning (in pain) in 1946, he found that he had a talent for making connections with voters. His quick wit, intelligence, people skills, and an ability to speak whether prepared or "off the cuff" resonated with voters . . . that was a side of JFK that LBJ never saw, or bothered to see. But once in elected office, health-related problems kept JFK from doing what his colleagues saw as the bare-minimum to be an effective member of Congress. After years of jaundiced-skin and vomiting with little-or-no appetite, JFK was finally diagnosed with Addison's Disease in the late-1940s. JFK's adrenal glands were failing, and he had lost significant weight, experienced fevers and fatigue - his doctor thought that he only had a year left to live.
Cortisone injections saved JFK in terms of stopping the immediate effects of Addison's Disease - he gained weight and energy, while his yellow skin was passed off as a nice sun tan. However, those same life-saving injections actually made his back far-worse . . . JFK, before he even pursued the Democratic nomination for President in 1960, was in very bad physical condition. In addition to his physical state being a limiting factor in terms of his workload in the Senate, JFK also saw being an obscure Senator as a drawback to pursuing the Presidency, so he spent as little time in the Senate as possible, choosing to focus on the upcoming Democratic primary elections.

JFK recognized the value and potential that TV had for gaining popularity and votes, while LBJ (as well as most other politicians) didn't see TV as an asset in 1956, or even in 1960. One added benefit of the cortisone injections was that JFK was far more telegenic by the late-1950s. Not only did he look very handsome and knowledgeable, but his self-deprecating humor blazed through the TV set as well, which he used to tremendous advantage.

JFK's media appearances drowned out his lackluster performance and attendance in the Senate, much to the chagrin and irritation of his colleagues, especially LBJ. JFK and his campaign advisors (such as Theodore Sorensen) knew that they would have to secure the nomination on the first ballot; in other words, they needed to have a clear majority of undisputed delegates committed to them before the convention opened. If they failed to have that majority heading in, then the nomination would very likely be decided, literally, in a "Back Room", where LBJ would almost certainly be able to maneuver and be able to corral enough delegates for the nomination. JFK knew that LBJ was counting on that outcome, and starting in 1958, JFK and his campaign advisors started to aggressively organize their efforts in the primaries, and JFK started to make many appearances as a candidate for the Democratic nomination. LBJ, on the other hand, decided to spend his hours working in the Senate as Majority Leader, hoping-and-assuming that he could secure the Democratic nomination without campaigning in the primary elections.
Below: JFK addresses an audience in Wisconsin on the topic of direct primaries

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LBJ & JFK: Before the 1960 Democratic Nat'l Convention, Part II

3/20/2015

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Source: Robert A. Caro. The Years of Lyndon Johnson:
The Passage of Power (2012)

LBJ had a problem for the upcoming Election of 1960: he wanted to run for his US Senate seat from Texas AND for President of the United States. Using his powerful political base in Texas (and no doubt some political shenanigans), he was able to get the Texas state legislature, in 1959, to pass a law authorizing his name to be on the ballot for both the Senate and President (and by extension, Vice-President). (Pictured: Senator Lyndon Johnson at a birthday celebration of former President Harry Truman in 1959)
On 7 May, 1959, LBJ finally accepted an invitation to speak in Pennsylvania at a political rally supporting his bid to be the Democratic nominee for President. LBJ electrified the crowd that numbered in the thousands; many believed that this experience in a Northern state would convince LBJ to formally enter primary elections in Northern & Western states. LBJ, however, returned to his political shell (he was mortified by a fear of failure and humiliation) once again refusing invitations to speak at rallies organized on his behalf, often at the last minute.
LBJ needed delegates for the Democratic Convention, and they were there to be had in the Western states (but not in California; JFK had already secured those delegates), which totaled 172 delegates . . . LBJ was a shoe-in to win at least two Western primaries, and he was favored to win most of the others, but he hadn't formally entered any as of yet. Ted Kennedy was his brother's organizational guru out West, and he told JFK that the West (not California) was "Johnson Country". But LBJ would have needed to actually campaign in the West for those delegates; the decision to not campaign in the Western primaries would be the death-knell for LBJ's presidential aspirations in the Democratic National Convention of 1960.

While LBJ was equivocating, JFK sent his secret weapon against LBJ to the West: Robert Kennedy. By 1959, RFK had developed a deep hatred for LBJ, and the feeling was reciprocated. The first time they encountered each other was in January, 1953, in the Senate cafeteria, next to Senate Minority Leader Lyndon Johnson's office. RFK was seated at a table with Senator Joseph McCarthy (to whom he was assistant counsel), and as LBJ walked by, everyone but RFK stood and shook LBJ's had, and called him "Leader".
RFK stayed seated, and glowered, and only kind of shook LBJ's hand, with no eye contact. RFK had come to hate LBJ since Johnson was with FDR when the President announced that he would remove Joseph Kennedy as Ambassador to England. LBJ relished in telling the story of how FDR tricked Joseph Kennedy to come back to the US, give a national radio address as Ambassador, and then forced him to resign . . . RFK was VERY protective of his father.
(Pictured: RFK as the chief counsel during a McClellan Committee hearing on the Teamsters
in 1959)
LBJ continued to force RFK to shake his hand every day for awhile; it was truly "Hate at First Sight" for both of them. LBJ took every chance he could to rub in his dislike for RFK in front of others, such as calling him "Sonny Boy". LBJ disliked RFK, but he didn't take him seriously, since RFK was a staffer, not a Senator. RFK on the other hand, hated LBJ, and took him very seriously indeed, seeing him as a threat to JFK's path to the Presidency.

RFK knew that US Senators couldn't deliver very many delegates at the Convention, but Governors could do so; LBJ either didn't know, or care, about that political reality. More to the point, RFK knew that LBJ had no idea where the real power was located as far as corralling convention delegates. Unlike LBJ, RFK had learned a lot from the 1956 Democratic National Convention, and applied those lessons to the upcoming convention in order to try and secure JFK's nomination on the first ballot.
In 1959, RFK resigned as chief counsel from the McClellan Committee (investigating shenanigans with organized labor, including Jimmy Hoffa), and campaigned for JFK full-time. When LBJ finally decided to start campaign organizations in Western states, his people found that JFK had set up organizations months beforehand, and also had a tremendous head start in gathering committed delegates. LBJ fear-of-trying had held him back, and by early-1960, it was far too late to catch up to the JFK primary machine.
A young representative from Massachusetts named Tip O'Neill (pictured: he would become Speaker of the House) told LBJ that JFK would win the Democratic nomination on the first ballot, and there was nothing that LBJ could do to alter that outcome. LBJ was unwilling to concede even the most remote possibility that JFK could (or had) outmaneuvered him before the Democratic National Convention.

In terms of the 1960 Democratic Primaries, LBJ was confident that the other candidates would "kill off each other". On 10 May, 1960, West Virginia, a predominantly Protestant state, held its Democratic primary election. If JFK could win in WVA, he would show that he was an electable candidate for President; if he didn't win, then in all likelihood, LBJ would get his "Back Room" scenario where he would wheel-and-deal for delegates. JFK took 60% of the popular vote in the WVA primary, in part because he had made the conscious effort to minimize his Catholicism on a state-wide television address.
(Pictured: JFK campaigning in West Virginia)
After West Virginia, when it was far too late, LBJ showed how much he wanted to become President. With only two months before the convention in Los Angeles, he made a desperate lunge for the prize. LBJ worked hard for delegates in Indiana, then finally made his long-delayed trip to campaign in the West. Despite his herculean efforts in the 11th Hour, LBJ was not able to come close to JFK's impressive total of committed convention delegates.
Pennsylvania was the final battleground between LBJ and JFK; if LBJ could deny JFK the state's 81 delegates, then he would deny JFK a victory on the first ballot, and his "Back Room" scenario would become a reality.

The Governor of Pennsylvania, "Don't Call Me Boss" David Lawrence, did not support JFK, mostly due to his belief that a Catholic could not be elected President. Lawrence was a supporter of two-time Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson (1952 & 1956, losing to Eisenhower in both elections); in fact, he idolized Stevenson. Lawrence had the same political view towards a Southern Democrat in terms of Presidential "electability", so LBJ also did not receive support from Governor Lawrence. Despite Lawrence's wishes and designs, most of Pennsylvania's delegates were pledged to JFK.
Adlai Stevenson was non-committal when Lawrence asked him to formally declare his candidacy, which meant that Lawrence did not have a candidate to champion during his state's caucus. JFK left Pennsylvania with 64 committed delegates, Stevenson garnered 7.5, while LBJ only secured 4; those results meant that it was conceivable that JFK could win the Democratic nomination on the first ballot. (Pictured: JFK, Stevenson, and LBJ at the Beverly Hilton during the Democratic National Convention in LA)

During the Democratic National Convention,, LBJ and JFK actually debated each other. JFK sent telegrams to all states, stating the he would meet with their delegation of they so desired. LBJ basically "Triple-Dog-Dared" JFK to debate him in front of the Texas delegation, and JFK accepted. JFK got the better of LBJ, in that he was classy and self-deprecating, while LBJ was loud-mouthed and petty. JFK basically won-over the hearts, if not their minds, of the Texas delegation. LBJ finally came to the conclusion that JFK had enough delegates to win the party's nomination.
In the end, it all came down to Wyoming's 15 delegates, and JFK needed them all to win on the first ballot, and avoid any behind-the-scenes political chicanery. JFK and RFK negotiated with the Wyoming delegation, and secured the 5 uncommitted delegates to their total, as well as the Democratic nomination for President on the first ballot. LBJ could have had the Wyoming delegates, and the other Western states in his delegate total, but he waited far too long to actively campaign, and JFK and RFK took full advantage. The final tally of delegates at the 1960 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles: JFK 806, LBJ 409 (Senators Hubert Humphrey and Stuart Symington totaled 306 between the two).
(Pictured: Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, LBJ's #1 supporter, grieves with LBJ when it was confirmed that JFK won on the first ballot)
Below: A portion of the LBJ/JFK debate in front of the Texas delegation in LA

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LBJ: A "Reader" of Men, and Silent Presidential Candidate (1960)

3/6/2015

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Source: Robert A. Caro. The Passage of Power (2012).

As a boy growing up in rural Texas, hard work, as well as humiliation and fear, were woven into Lyndon Baines Johnson's personality. In his late-teens, he predicted (to anyone that would be in a position to listen) that he would be President. LBJ's path to the Presidency was first, get elected to the House of Representatives, then to the Senate, then using that elected position to ascend to the White House (LBJ was elected to the House in 1936). So focused was LBJ on his "Path to the Presidency" that he turned down an offer from FDR to head the Rural Electrification Administration in 1939. LBJ also turned down an opportunity to run for Governor in Texas (he almost certainly would have won), since being a Governor wasn't part of the "Path".
After ten years in the House, he seemed stuck in that position, which was for him was basically torture; not only was he not progressing towards the Presidency, he was also a political non-entity. LBJ entered a Senate race in Texas in 1948 in which it seemed he had no real chance of winning . . . so desperate was LBJ that he (and his powerful patrons) cheated before and after the election in terms of certain precincts and absentee ballots. His margin of victory was so slight, and so controversial, that his detractors referred to him as "Landslide Lyndon."

The U.S. Senate was a much better fit for LBJ, for it was in there that he could be a leader of men. Among the many talents that LBJ possessed was that he was able to "read" a man, usually through his eyes; he was also able to wring out as much information as possible from those he questioned. LBJ seemed to "sense" a man's price, and had a gift for using what he learned from others. The Senate was also a perfect place for LBJ to excel in that he thrived in small groups, and even more-so with one-on-one situations, especially with the elder statesmen of the Senate.

LBJ rose to power in the Senate with unprecedented speed. The Senate was just the right size for LBJ, in that he could make personal connections with the other 95 Senators. In 1955, LBJ became the youngest Senate Majority Leader in history, and soon after, he brought the Senate into the 20th Century, making it once again a relevant legislative body. LBJ's wife, Lady Bird, said that the 12 years that LBJ was in the Senate were the happiest of their lives. While he was very happy as Senate Majority Leader, he hadn't forgotten about his "Path to the Presidency"; in the 1956 Democratic National Convention, he refused to withdraw his name from consideration for the nomination.
Below: An absolute treat - a portion of Walter Cronkite's CBS coverage
of the Democratic National Convention

Adlai Stevenson was a shoe-in for the Democratic nomination in 1956, but LBJ just couldn't let go, despite knowing that the delegate count was 905 for Stevenson, while he had only garnered 80 delegates. In 1956, there was a major obstacle to LBJ's path to the Presidency: no Southerner had been elected President since Zachary Taylor in 1848. Also, in terms of Civil Rights bills through 1956, LBJ had voted against every single one, which made him at best a suspect Presidential candidate to Liberal Democrats. After the Democratic National Convention in 1956, LBJ decided that the only way that the Senate could be a springboard to the Presidency was that he needed to steer Civil Rights bills through the Senate as Majority Leader.
Through legislative miracle-making, LBJ was able to get the Civil Rights Bill of 1957 through the Senate (it became law soon after); however, it was mostly symbolic (and toothless), but it was the first such legislation in 82 years. LBJ figured that he would have an automatic Southern bloc of 352 delegates locked-and-loaded for the 1960 Democratic National Convention, which would put him over halfway to the nomination. LBJ didn't see any other formidable opponent in the Democratic Party that could deny him his coveted nomination for President. In LBJ's eyes, he was not only THE Senator, but he was THE Politician; in the late-1950s, he didn't think much of other Senators in terms of challenging him for the nomination, such as Stuart Symington, Hubert Humphrey, or John F. Kennedy.

LBJ controlled the Senate, even though the Democrats only had a one-vote majority. There was no lack of confidence in his abilities as Senate Majority Leader, on LBJ's part, or from the other Senators. His run as Majority Leader was similar to FDR's first term as President, in that both had a 100% success rate in passing their priority bills. LBJ's confidence vanished when the topic moved to the nomination for President in 1960. LBJ turned down all requests to speak (even one from Eleanor Roosevelt!), and then would regret doing so after the speaking date had passed.
LBJ still believed (it was remotely possible) that the first ballot at the Democratic National Convention in nominating a candidate for President would not produce an outright winner. Therefore, he believed, the Party Leaders would work behind the scenes on his behalf, and he would be nominated on the 2nd, 3rd, or at worst, the 4th ballot. But LBJ, this great "Reader of Men", had read one man entirely wrong . . . John F. Kennedy.

If LBJ wanted to be the Democratic nominee for President in 1960, the time to strike was during 1958, except that he did not make his move at that crucial moment, and month-after-month went by, with LBJ doing nothing in terms of campaign organization. Like Hitler at Dunkirk, LBJ had formed his men, but hadn't given them their marching orders. LBJ needed to create campaign organizations in 16 crucial Northern & Eastern states, but he did no such thing, which meant that he wouldn't have any impact in those primaries (and wouldn't add to his delegate total). The end result was that he wasn't able to establish his bona fides at a national level, and remained a regional (and nationally unelectable) Presidential hopeful.
LBJ did enlist the man behind Truman's 1948 miracle campaign for advice, but he wound up ignoring that sage advice (e.g. organization, primaries, speeches, press conferences). In short, LBJ gambled that he would enter the 1960 Democratic National Convention with a strong plurality of delegates, and that none of the other challengers would even be close to his total. That, in turn, would lead to his mentor, House Speaker Sam Rayburn (at LBJ's left), and powerful established members of Congress that were loyal to him (or that owed him), working behind the scenes to deliver enough delegates to secure his nomination.
LBJ had badly miscalculated: Governors, not Representatives or Senators, were the key figures in delivering delegates for nomination at the national convention. Outside of Washington, D.C., most Americans didn't know, and couldn't care less, about Lyndon Johnson's impact as Senate Majority Leader.

LBJ was advised by the best political minds that he was waiting too long to campaign for the Democratic nomination; why did he delay, despite a deep desire to be President? It was the old bugaboo, his fear of humiliation and losing; those fears absolutely haunted LBJ. He saw his father, Samuel Ealy Johnson, Jr. (pictured), go from a renown Texas state legislator to someone that became penniless, and was ridiculed by the same people that had shown him immense respect as a state senator (he died in 1937).
LBJ's ascendency into politics occurred the moment his father's fortunes changed. In 1948, although he ran and won a U.S. Senate seat, LBJ vacillated before deciding to run; the fear of losing and being humiliated (like his father) almost trumped his desire to pursue his "Path to the Presidency." In 1958, with the stakes much greater, LBJ decided to play it close-to-the-vest heading to the 1960 Democratic National Convention; if events went his way, he wouldn't need to face an outright election until 8 November, 1960.

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How a German Battleship Made World War I a Greater Nightmare

3/1/2015

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Source: Barbara Tuchman. The Guns of August:
The Outbreak of World War I (1962)

By August of 1914, Turkey had many enemies, and no allies . . . no one in Europe considered Turkey "Alliance-Worthy". The Ottoman Empire was considered the "Sick Man of Europe" by the European powers, but Turkey had started to make a comeback in the early-1900s. Russia, France, and Great Britain had rival ambitions in Turkey's sphere of influence, which increased Germany's determination to become Turkey's patron. Turkey, since the turn-of-the-century, felt the shadow of the upcoming war creep up on them . . . Turkey feared Russia, resented Great Britain, and mistrusted Germany; with whom should Turkey align as the hour of the Great War approached? In early-August, 1914, Turkey formally agreed to an alliance with Germany, which was solidified due to the actions of the Goeben, a German battleship.

Turkey had one asset of inestimable value: her geographical position. Russia wanted Constantinople (Istanbul) for centuries, since the Dardanelles were her only year-round exit point to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Great Britain had been Turkey's traditional protector due to her strategic location, but Britain had tired of "propping up" what the government considered a corrupt, decrepit, and broke Turkey. Britain allowed her relations with Turkey to lapse at exactly the worst possible time; Britain turned down Turkey's request of a permanent alliance between the two nations in 1911. Even Winston Churchill (pictured), in charge of the Royal Navy, didn't recognize the value of an alliance with Turkey at that crucial point in history.

Great Britain held two state-of-the-art battleships that were made for Turkey in 1914. Turkey had made the initial payments towards the huge total sum of $30 million. Britain wanted to appropriate the ships for her own use, and kept providing excuses why the ships couldn't be turned over to Turkey. Turkey threatened to board and take the ships while in dock; Britain threatened to repel all boarders.
The British government didn't understand the deep insult (and expense) experienced by Turkey, in that those two ships had become a national obsession; on the same day that Britain officially notified Turkey that the ships were British property, Turkey formally aligned with Germany. Yet Turkey didn't actively do anything that would have been of assistance to Germany, such as declare war on Russia, or shut down Russia's access to-and-through the Black Sea, or compromise her overall neutrality with other nations . . . the Turkish government wanted to see how Germany performed in the early days of the war before fully committing herself as an ally.

Germany had the 2nd-largest fleet in the world, but only two of those ships were in the Mediterranean Sea; the battle cruiser Goeben (a de facto dreadnought), and the light cruiser Breslau. The Goeben was a concern for Great Britain and France, due to its top speed of 27.8 knots per hour; the Goeben could outflank, outmaneuver, and attack all ships in the Mediterranean. While the Goeben was an impressive ship, the British placed too much stock in how Germany planned to use the Goeben (the British placed far too much stock in the entire German surface fleet, which Kaiser Wilhelm II basically refused to use-and-risk during the entire war).
On 3 August, 1914, Admiral Souchon, commander of the Goeben (pictured), was ordered to sail to Constantinople, as a show of good faith in the VERY recently agreed-upon alliance. Souchon wanted to restore his supply of coal in Italy, but Italy, still a neutral nation, refused to cooperate. In addition, the Goeben needed mechanical attention, especially with her main boilers. In order to break through to Constantinople past French & British ships, he needed the Goeben to perform at 100% capacity.
Souchon found a safe port at Messina in Sicily for repairs and coal. Churchill (the 1st Lord of the Admiralty) knew where the Goeben was located, but as of yet Britain and Germany were not at war (although by 3 August, Germany had declared war on France after entering Luxembourg and Belgium). Therefore, Churchill's orders to his ships in the Mediterranean were that they were not to be "brought into action versus a superior force". To Churchill at that point-in-time, the Austrian navy was that "Superior Force"; to the captains on the British warships, Churchill's orders meant that they could operate on their own discretion. Souchon was also in a position to act on his own discretion, in that his orders to sail to Constantinople were put on hold by Admiral Tirpitz; there was confusion as to whether the German-Turkish treaty had actually been formalized.

Souchon,, once the Goeben was ready for departure at Messina, decided to go to North Africa to bombard French locations in Algiers. Churchill's orders to Admiral Milne, the senior Royal Navy admiral in the Mediterranean, was to shadow the Goeben, and be ready to attack when war was declared between the two nations; the problem was that Milne didn't know the location of the Goeben. The French fleet was ordered to intercept and attack the Goeben, and as it turned out, the French fleet and the Goeben were both heading to North Africa independently of each other.
Souchon had almost reached North Africa, when once again he was ordered to go to Constantinople, but he was unwilling to do so until he bombarded the Algerian coast. When the Goeben shelled French positions in Algiers, Souchon raised the RUSSIAN flag, and his men were in (kind-of) Russian uniforms, in the hope that Germany wouldn't be readily identified for the attack. After that, Souchon headed east, back to Messina to resupply his battleship.
The French fleet assumed that the Goeben would continue west, and waited to engage the German warship; they had no idea that the Goeben was heading east on a portentous political mission that would result in intensifying and prolonging the war that had just started.

The British ships, the Indomitable and the Indefatigable, encountered the Goeben heading east, but since there wasn't a state of war between the two nations, the ships passed each other without event. However, the two British ships turned around, and reported the Goeben's position, but could do nothing else. Churchill actually believed that the Goeben was heading WEST, and didn't give specific orders to the Indomitable and the Indefatigable. The Goeben (with the Breslau) were able to escape the two British ships, due to its speed, as well as darkness and weather.
By that time there was a state of war between Germany and Britain, but the British could not attack the Goeben at Messina, since that was in the sphere of (still) neutral Italy. Since the British fleet couldn't enter the Strait of Messina, Admiral Milne ordered ships to patrol both exit points. However, Milne believed that the Goeben was going to head west, and only had one ship patrolling the eastern exit; Britain's best ships were not in the right location to intercept the Goeben.
Due to continued frustration by Italy's lack of cooperation, Souchon couldn't get enough coal in Messina to reach Constantinople. Then, amazingly, Souchon received orders from Admiral Tirpitz to once again place his mission to Constantinople on hold. Souchon was also informed that the Austrian navy would be of no assistance in the Mediterranean - in essence, Souchon was in command of a fleet of two ships, and it was up to him as what to do next.

Admiral Souchon decided to make a run for Constantinople, despite orders to the contrary. He decided that he would force the Turks into formalizing the alliance with Germany to aid his nation in the war. The British ships near the Adriatic Sea decided that the Goeben was a "Superior Force", and decided not to engage. Meanwhile, the Liberals in charge of the British government just didn't like Turkey, and therefore didn't connect any of the dots in terms of the Goeben's trek in the Mediterranean. Souchon evaded the British at the Aegean Sea, and was able to meet up with his German collier (coal ship). The British fleet at the Aegean settled for bottling-up the Goeben, since they were certain of being able to intercept the Goeben as it tried to exit the Aegean; it just didn't register to the British fleet, or the British government, that the Goeben was sailing towards Turkey.
Once the Goeben reached the Dardanelles, the burden was on the Turkish government whether to let the Goeben and the Breslau enter, and then to sail beyond that point. The military leader of Turkey, Enver Pasha ("The Young Turk", pictured), decided to let the Goeben and the Breslau enter the Dardanelles, and to be escorted to Constantinople. Pasha's next order was to instruct the forts guarding the entrance to the Dardanelles to fire on the British ships if they appeared. Once the Goeben and the Breslau were guided to Constantinople, the war that was just underway was guaranteed to become the nightmare of the Great War, featuring unfathomable slaughter and misery.

The Goeben and the Breslau were actually purchased by Turkey in order to bolster their navy, but also as a slap in the face to Great Britain. Renamed the Jawus and Midilli, they flew the Turkish flag, and were reviewed by the Sultan . . . but Admiral Souchon and the German crew was still aboard the Goeben (nee Jawus). Still, for three months, Turkey wavered in terms of being an active wartime ally for Germany in the Black Sea region. Admiral Souchon, for the second time, made a decision that would alter World War I for the worse; he entered the Black Sea with the Goeben, and started firing on Russian targets. Since this act of war was conducted by a ship flying the Turkish flag, Russia declared war on Turkey on 4 November, 1914 . . . Britain and France declared war on Turkey on 5 November, 1914.
Due to the Goeben reaching Turkey, and forcing Turkey into war, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, and Italy (reluctantly allied with Germany) were drawn into the war. Since the Black Sea was shut down to Russian ships (Archangel was their only real port left, and it was frozen half of the year), Russia lost 98% of their exports, and 95% of its imports . . . the resulting economic catastrophe was a large factor in causing the Russian Revolution in 1917.
Also as a result of the Goeben, the ridiculously unnecessary and costly Battle of Gallipoli
occurred. Allied strength was diverted to campaigns in Mesopotamia, Suez, and Palestine, and the break-up of the Ottoman Empire occurred during the Great War . . . . all due to Admiral Souchon's decisions in command of the Goeben from August to November, 1914.

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LBJ & JFK: Before the 1960 Democratic Nat'l Convention, Part 1

LBJ & JFK: Before the 1960 Democratic Nat'l Convention, Part II

LBJ: A "Reader" of Men, and Silent Presidential Candidate (1960)

How a German Battleship Made World War I a Greater Nightmare

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