Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who
Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)
Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)
By the Fall of 1943, the Luftwaffe was clearly winning the battle in the skies over Europe. On 30 March 1944, ten weeks before D-Day and fourteen months after Casablanca, 795 Royal Air Force (RAF) bombers were sent to attack Nuremberg in Germany: 95 bombers failed to return, a dozen were scrapped on their return, and 59 were very badly damaged. But those losses paled in comparison to the losses of trained crews . . . by early-1944, things were going backwards for the Allies in terms of strategic bombing in Nazi Germany.
It was amazing that the Allies didn't learn much from the Battle for Britain (overall plane/crew #'s pictured). The Germans "royally" failed in that not nearly enough bombers were sent to "get through" British defenses, the bombers didn't fly high enough, didn't have enough bombs, and had poor discipline in formation. The Allies felt when it was their turn to strategically bomb Germany, they would be much smarter with larger numbers of bombers flying at greater speeds and altitudes. Among other bombers, the Allies would fly B-24 Liberators and
B-17 Flying Fortresses at 24,000 feet (opposed to the Luftwaffe's 12,000 feet), which would minimize the loss of bombers. The Allies also assumed that the German people wouldn't be as tough as the British, which was the same conclusion reached by Hitler/Goering towards the enemy before the Battle for Britain. From late-1942 to early-1944, strategic bombing in Europe reached a level of stalemate much like trench warfare in World War I . . . no real attention was paid to the really important aspects of strategic bombing, such as distance, targeting, and detection.
It was amazing that the Allies didn't learn much from the Battle for Britain (overall plane/crew #'s pictured). The Germans "royally" failed in that not nearly enough bombers were sent to "get through" British defenses, the bombers didn't fly high enough, didn't have enough bombs, and had poor discipline in formation. The Allies felt when it was their turn to strategically bomb Germany, they would be much smarter with larger numbers of bombers flying at greater speeds and altitudes. Among other bombers, the Allies would fly B-24 Liberators and
B-17 Flying Fortresses at 24,000 feet (opposed to the Luftwaffe's 12,000 feet), which would minimize the loss of bombers. The Allies also assumed that the German people wouldn't be as tough as the British, which was the same conclusion reached by Hitler/Goering towards the enemy before the Battle for Britain. From late-1942 to early-1944, strategic bombing in Europe reached a level of stalemate much like trench warfare in World War I . . . no real attention was paid to the really important aspects of strategic bombing, such as distance, targeting, and detection.
Spring 1942: British and Nazi stupidity. The RAF inexplicably bombed Lubeck, Germany, an ancient wooden-framed city. Hitler became so enraged that he ordered bombing raids on British cathedral and university cities such as York, Norwich, and Exeter. Bombs and crews were wasted, and hatreds become more inflamed; the Luftwaffe didn't touch the Rolls Royce engine factories or the Spitfire and Lancaster assembly lines.
Hitler's "Retribution Bombing" served no strategic purpose for the Nazis, and it also took the focus off what should have been targeted in Britain. Hitler's "Retribution Bombing" desensitized Britain to the coming indiscriminate aerial bombings in Germany. A desire to payback German civilians for what the Luftwaffe did rose incredibly in Great Britain in 1942.
Hitler's "Retribution Bombing" served no strategic purpose for the Nazis, and it also took the focus off what should have been targeted in Britain. Hitler's "Retribution Bombing" desensitized Britain to the coming indiscriminate aerial bombings in Germany. A desire to payback German civilians for what the Luftwaffe did rose incredibly in Great Britain in 1942.
By the time the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) started bombing German targets, it was natural that their first raids would be tentative and would stick close to their bases. From August through September 1942, the USAAF was having a "dream season"; everything seemed to go right. But on 9 October 1942, 108 USAAF bombers raided the heavy industries at/near Lille in France (pinned in the map), Luftwaffe fighters rushed past 156 Allied fighter escorts, and focused their attack on the B-17s and B-24s. The Luftwaffe fighters shot down 4 bombers, seriously damaged 4 more, and damaged 42 other bombers . . . the bloodletting had begun.
More significant was that the Luftwaffe fighters caused a drastic drop-off in accuracy; only 9 of 588 high-explosive bombs fell within 1500 feet of any target. Many USAAF bombers aborted their runs entirely, and B-17 and B-24 gunners wildly inflated the number of Luftwaffe fighters they downed. These new crews were green-and-nervous, and after-action analysis was sub-standard. Of the 70+ claimed kills from the gunners on 9 October 1943, only ONE Luftwaffe fighter plane was actually shot down.
More significant was that the Luftwaffe fighters caused a drastic drop-off in accuracy; only 9 of 588 high-explosive bombs fell within 1500 feet of any target. Many USAAF bombers aborted their runs entirely, and B-17 and B-24 gunners wildly inflated the number of Luftwaffe fighters they downed. These new crews were green-and-nervous, and after-action analysis was sub-standard. Of the 70+ claimed kills from the gunners on 9 October 1943, only ONE Luftwaffe fighter plane was actually shot down.
The raid on the Schweinfurt's 3 ball bearing factories occurred on 14 October 1943. 60 bombers were lost, and 138 damaged; that meant that only 14% of the 229 USAAF aircraft that actually attacked the targets returned unscathed. The Luftwaffe defenses had been greatly improved; the first wave of defense were single-engine fighters, followed by a second wave of two-engine fighters, all firing rockets and large-caliber machine guns. The single-engine and two-engine fighters refueled and re-engaged from all directions, and the fighters concentrated on one USAAF formation at a time (here the Luftwaffe targeted, which they didn't do in Britain).
Rocket attacks were used against the formation, while machine guns were used against the crippled aircraft. At Schweinfurt (pinned in the map), an entire combat wing of the 1st Bombardment Division was almost completely wiped out. While some targets on the ground were hit, the bomber attrition rate was unsustainable; Schweinfurt was the highest bomber attrition rate to that point of WW II. The USAAF strategic bombing offensive had to be shut down - only short range targets were approved.
The upcoming winter allowed USAAF to take inventory, reassess strategy, and to rebuild morale . . . the USAAF was forced to admit that they had lost air superiority over Germany. Long-range fighter escorts now became absolutely necessary, but their current range wasn't close to what was needed. Fortunately for the battered USAAF bomber crews, solutions were just around the corner.
Rocket attacks were used against the formation, while machine guns were used against the crippled aircraft. At Schweinfurt (pinned in the map), an entire combat wing of the 1st Bombardment Division was almost completely wiped out. While some targets on the ground were hit, the bomber attrition rate was unsustainable; Schweinfurt was the highest bomber attrition rate to that point of WW II. The USAAF strategic bombing offensive had to be shut down - only short range targets were approved.
The upcoming winter allowed USAAF to take inventory, reassess strategy, and to rebuild morale . . . the USAAF was forced to admit that they had lost air superiority over Germany. Long-range fighter escorts now became absolutely necessary, but their current range wasn't close to what was needed. Fortunately for the battered USAAF bomber crews, solutions were just around the corner.
In late-April 1942, Ronnie Harker, a RAF liaison test pilot for Rolls Royce engines was asked to test a problematic USAAF plane, Pursuit-Fighter 51 (P-51). The P-51 was a poor performing plane compared to the P-38 Lightning and the P-47 Thunderbolt . . . the P-51 seemed to be a round peg in a square hole. Harker first flew a P-51 on 30 April 1952; he was puzzled, in that it the plane turned easily and didn't stall, and functioned well in low-to-medium altitudes, and was aerodynamically superb (which meant low drag, less resistance in flight).
Harker wrote that if the P-51 had a Rolls Royce Merlin 61 engine, it would be 35 mph faster than a British Spitfire, and have the same power. As it turned out, the Merlin 61 engine was a perfect fit for the P-51; a Polish mathematician calculated that a P-51 with a Merlin 61 engine would outperform the Spitfire, reaching speeds of 432 mph and altitudes of 40,000 feet.
(pictured above: the P-51 Mustang and the British Spitfire)
Harker wrote that if the P-51 had a Rolls Royce Merlin 61 engine, it would be 35 mph faster than a British Spitfire, and have the same power. As it turned out, the Merlin 61 engine was a perfect fit for the P-51; a Polish mathematician calculated that a P-51 with a Merlin 61 engine would outperform the Spitfire, reaching speeds of 432 mph and altitudes of 40,000 feet.
(pictured above: the P-51 Mustang and the British Spitfire)
Those calculations would prove to be correct. In the RAF, Wilfrid Freeman (Churchill's favorite in the RAF, pictured) was in charge of the types of planes to be used, and he immediately saw the potential of the P-51 and ordered Merlin 61 engines to be installed on 5 P-51's despite Bomber Command wanting more Merlin engines. Soon thereafter, Freeman ordered 500 P-51's with the Merlin 61 engine . . . by now, the fighter plane was named the P-51 Mustang. Freeman pressured Churchill to pressure FDR to have the P-51 Mustang mass-produced in the U.S.
At that point, good old U.S. government bureaucratic bungling and military competition for resources interfered. Devotees of other planes just didn't believe the P-51 Mustang was as good as advertised. The USAAF, therefore, kept making inferior aircraft that was doomed to fail against German and Japanese fighters. The powerful political backers for each inferior plane were formidable, and FDR was unwilling to stand up to them, at least at that point.
At that point, good old U.S. government bureaucratic bungling and military competition for resources interfered. Devotees of other planes just didn't believe the P-51 Mustang was as good as advertised. The USAAF, therefore, kept making inferior aircraft that was doomed to fail against German and Japanese fighters. The powerful political backers for each inferior plane were formidable, and FDR was unwilling to stand up to them, at least at that point.
Eventually, the P-51 Mustang appeared in Europe in ever-increasing numbers, and became the most effective protectors of the USAAF daytime bombers. For unfathomable reasons, the P-51 Mustang was more efficient and more powerful than the Spitfire despite being heavier, which included the astounding fuel capacity of the aerodynamically-awesome plane. With maximum fuel tanks, the P-51 Mustang had a combat radius of 750 miles, twice that of a Spitfire.
Also developed were "drop tanks" (pictured: a P-51 Mustang with drop tanks) which contained extra fuel. The purpose of the drop tanks was to burn the extra fuel BEFORE entering combat. They were used for every fighter, whether RAF or USAAF; the demand for aluminum drop tanks was such that the RAF developed a stiffened paper drop tank (108 gallons), which worked wonderfully, and also denied the enemy of any aluminum tanks on the ground. With these drop tanks, ALL Allied fighters could provide 100% protection for the bombers.
Also developed were "drop tanks" (pictured: a P-51 Mustang with drop tanks) which contained extra fuel. The purpose of the drop tanks was to burn the extra fuel BEFORE entering combat. They were used for every fighter, whether RAF or USAAF; the demand for aluminum drop tanks was such that the RAF developed a stiffened paper drop tank (108 gallons), which worked wonderfully, and also denied the enemy of any aluminum tanks on the ground. With these drop tanks, ALL Allied fighters could provide 100% protection for the bombers.
All these developments led to the true breakthrough for the Allies in order to gain control of the skies in Europe: the destruction of the Luftwaffe fighter squadrons. The USAAF stuck to specific targets, such as oil refineries, which meant that, since there was less oil, the Luftwaffe fighters were unable to wait until USAAF escort fighters abandoned their bombers. Also, with so many P-51's in the USAAF, the order was given for many of the Mustangs to head-hunt Luftwaffe fighters while others protected the bombers.
In the early months of 1944, RAF & USAAF losses were still severe, but reinforcing squadrons kept on the pressure, and the Luftwaffe was unable to replace/reinforce what it lost. Hitler and Goering re-tasked planes from the Eastern Front, which gave the Red Army more advantage. P-51 Mustangs were flying in broad daylight over Berlin (pinned in the map) by mid-1944; Goering stated "We have lost the war". P-51 Mustangs were destroying three-to-five times more fighters than the P-47 Thunderbolts, and the P-47's were putting up devastating totals of their own. By the Spring of 1944, P-51 Mustangs with drop tanks could escort B-17's all the way to Western Russia, over 1000 miles from their base.
The Luftwaffe cracked in the Spring of 1944; there simply weren't enough planes, pilots, production, or communications. The Luftwaffe was hurt far more by aerial battles than the bombing of German factories. Then, in the late-Spring of 1944, Allied Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the strategic bombing of key German railroad, road, and communications centers . . . it was time for Operation Overlord.
In the early months of 1944, RAF & USAAF losses were still severe, but reinforcing squadrons kept on the pressure, and the Luftwaffe was unable to replace/reinforce what it lost. Hitler and Goering re-tasked planes from the Eastern Front, which gave the Red Army more advantage. P-51 Mustangs were flying in broad daylight over Berlin (pinned in the map) by mid-1944; Goering stated "We have lost the war". P-51 Mustangs were destroying three-to-five times more fighters than the P-47 Thunderbolts, and the P-47's were putting up devastating totals of their own. By the Spring of 1944, P-51 Mustangs with drop tanks could escort B-17's all the way to Western Russia, over 1000 miles from their base.
The Luftwaffe cracked in the Spring of 1944; there simply weren't enough planes, pilots, production, or communications. The Luftwaffe was hurt far more by aerial battles than the bombing of German factories. Then, in the late-Spring of 1944, Allied Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the strategic bombing of key German railroad, road, and communications centers . . . it was time for Operation Overlord.
Eisenhower's strategy of bombing key transportation/communication targets drastically limited Germany's ability to respond in force during D-Day, and beyond. The issue now was not how to get control of the skies, but WHAT to attack by air to end the war as soon as possible. On 6 June 1944, the whole thing, sea, land, and air came together for the Western Allies; 11,590 Allied planes were in the air during D-Day . . . amazingly, the Allies had gained control of the skies only 90-or-so days before Operation Overlord. (Below: an overview of Operation Overlord, showing the Allied mastery of the skies)