Source: James Donovan. A Terrible Glory: Custer and Little Bighorn -
The Last Great Battle of the American West (2009).
The Last Great Battle of the American West (2009).
The village on the Little Bighorn numbered over 1000 lodges, with over 8000 Natives, and around 2000 warriors. And, unlike the 3 columns of U.S. Cavalry that were heading their way in a 3-pronged advance, these 2000 warriors had extensive experience with guerilla warfare on the Plains.
Members from all seven tribes of the Lakota were in the village (Hunkpapa, Sans Arc, Two Kettles, Oglala, Brule, Minneconjou, and Blackfoot), as well as some Dakota, Nakota, and Cheyenne. The list of war chiefs was the equivalent of the U.S. Men's Basketball Team from the Barcelona Olympics in 1992 - they were all superstars to the "nth" degree.
Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer (his superior officer was General Alfred Terry) only had about 660 men (he was part of a single column), including only 31 officers, 578 enlisted men, and 45 or so scouts/guides (most of them Natives). Each soldier had the single-shot breech-loading 1873 Springfield carbine, which had an Achilles Heel - the copper cartridges would heat and jam upon firing, and had to be pried loose, usually with a knife. Other than that, the Springfield was a relatively cheap and reliable carbine with stopping power (each soldier had 100 rounds of ammunition). Also, there was the Colt .45 sidearm (24 - 74 rounds issued), and the pack mules carried 26,000 more carbine rounds.
Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer (his superior officer was General Alfred Terry) only had about 660 men (he was part of a single column), including only 31 officers, 578 enlisted men, and 45 or so scouts/guides (most of them Natives). Each soldier had the single-shot breech-loading 1873 Springfield carbine, which had an Achilles Heel - the copper cartridges would heat and jam upon firing, and had to be pried loose, usually with a knife. Other than that, the Springfield was a relatively cheap and reliable carbine with stopping power (each soldier had 100 rounds of ammunition). Also, there was the Colt .45 sidearm (24 - 74 rounds issued), and the pack mules carried 26,000 more carbine rounds.
Custer told his officers that he expected to deal with between 1000 and 1500 Native warriors. When the regiment of the 7th Cavalry under Custer's command started advancing in earnest, Captain Frederick Benteen was put in charge of the pack mules. Benteen's orders were to assist the movement of the pack train, and to provide rearguard protection (up to then, he had been in charge of the lead element of the regiment, the "Point of the Spear").
Custer saw many diverging trails, but the Native scouts knew that they were actually CONVERGING trails, instead. Custer (and the other officers in the 3 columns) was too obsessed with the belief that the Natives were in the process of scattering, like cowards, in their view; there was a collective sense among the officers that if they took too long to engage, they would miss their chance at a decisive victory since the Natives would scatter and disappear. Custer calculated that he was only one day's march from much-desired and much-delayed glory . . . he ordered his regiment to follow the trail leading to the lower reaches of the Little Bighorn River.
Custer saw many diverging trails, but the Native scouts knew that they were actually CONVERGING trails, instead. Custer (and the other officers in the 3 columns) was too obsessed with the belief that the Natives were in the process of scattering, like cowards, in their view; there was a collective sense among the officers that if they took too long to engage, they would miss their chance at a decisive victory since the Natives would scatter and disappear. Custer calculated that he was only one day's march from much-desired and much-delayed glory . . . he ordered his regiment to follow the trail leading to the lower reaches of the Little Bighorn River.
Custer divided his regiment into three wings (battalions); he would take command of the right wing (the horses of those soldiers were the most fatigued of the regiment). Custer assigned Major Marcus Reno and Captain Benteen three companies each; his plan was that his right wing would be the attacking force, driving fleeing Natives into the other wings.
Benteen was ordered to move toward the bluffs, deal with whatever he came across, and then rejoin Custer's right wing, all the while tending to the pack train. Custer expected Benteen to return fairly soon (as in an hour or two) if he didn't find any Native warriors. Benteen had gone from leading the regiment on the initial advance to being given a secondary mission; to him, it was the playground football equivalent of being told to go long, and the QB would fake a pass towards him. Benteen firmly believed that Custer was getting his long-delayed revenge against him for voicing concerns about Custer's decision-making at the Washita in 1868.
Benteen was ordered to move toward the bluffs, deal with whatever he came across, and then rejoin Custer's right wing, all the while tending to the pack train. Custer expected Benteen to return fairly soon (as in an hour or two) if he didn't find any Native warriors. Benteen had gone from leading the regiment on the initial advance to being given a secondary mission; to him, it was the playground football equivalent of being told to go long, and the QB would fake a pass towards him. Benteen firmly believed that Custer was getting his long-delayed revenge against him for voicing concerns about Custer's decision-making at the Washita in 1868.
Custer ordered Major Reno (pictured) to chase the escaping Natives that he believed were only two miles ahead. Custer also promised Reno that he would provide support if Reno engaged Native warriors. Reno had 175 men (140 troopers and 35 scouts), and after advancing three miles, he came in sight of the Little Bighorn River.
Custer had about 220 men; he not only didn't have enough enlisted men, but he was short officers as well. Although the officers he did have at this point were inexperienced, they were accepted as members of the "Custer Family" (a.k.a. Custer's "Circle of Trust"; officers such as Reno and Benteen hated Custer). Custer knew Reno was under attack, and he changed his mind about directly supporting him; Custer decided to attack the Native warriors from the flank . . . the perceived benefit to Custer was that he could secure even more glory.
However, Custer never sent a messenger to let Reno know of his change in tactics. Back with Reno's wing, the major gave the order to attack, but his speech was slurred . . . he had been drinking whisky from his flask (Reno was an alcoholic).
Custer had about 220 men; he not only didn't have enough enlisted men, but he was short officers as well. Although the officers he did have at this point were inexperienced, they were accepted as members of the "Custer Family" (a.k.a. Custer's "Circle of Trust"; officers such as Reno and Benteen hated Custer). Custer knew Reno was under attack, and he changed his mind about directly supporting him; Custer decided to attack the Native warriors from the flank . . . the perceived benefit to Custer was that he could secure even more glory.
However, Custer never sent a messenger to let Reno know of his change in tactics. Back with Reno's wing, the major gave the order to attack, but his speech was slurred . . . he had been drinking whisky from his flask (Reno was an alcoholic).
The village that Custer suddenly saw had at least 1000 lodges; it was much larger than he had envisioned. Meanwhile, Major Reno should have kept charging into the village from the east/southeast to disrupt any organization from the Native warriors, but he ordered a halt in the open. The decision was a combination of no elan, no experience, and his "liquid courage" had dissipated.
Reno's 100+ men dismounted about half-a-mile from the nearest teepees; they were spread out across 250 yards, and Native warriors were advancing towards their skirmish line. When Custer saw Reno and his men retreat to the timbers and scrub by the Little Bighorn, he decided it was time to make his glorious attack.
Reno's 100+ men dismounted about half-a-mile from the nearest teepees; they were spread out across 250 yards, and Native warriors were advancing towards their skirmish line. When Custer saw Reno and his men retreat to the timbers and scrub by the Little Bighorn, he decided it was time to make his glorious attack.
Crazy Horse finally entered the picture, leading up to 1000 warriors against Major Reno and his men in the timber/scrub by the river. Reno gave the order to retreat from that position, but since he didn't arrange for a bugler, most of his men didn't hear his order. The order was passed down verbally, and lost quite a bit in the translation - his men were under fire, and were panicked and confused. Reno in rapid succession ordered "Mount" and "Dismount"; it made sense to him, but it didn't to anyone else that was nearby.
Reno then gave his "Come With Me" order, but didn't arrange for any rearguard action, which was standard military procedure, and more-than-warranted in this situation. To the pursuing Native warriors, it seemed like a '"Buffalo Chase"; Reno lost about half his men on the badly organized-and-led retreat to the bluffs across the Little Bighorn River.
Reno then gave his "Come With Me" order, but didn't arrange for any rearguard action, which was standard military procedure, and more-than-warranted in this situation. To the pursuing Native warriors, it seemed like a '"Buffalo Chase"; Reno lost about half his men on the badly organized-and-led retreat to the bluffs across the Little Bighorn River.
At about 4 pm on 25 June, 1876, Custer was informed of Reno's retreat, and that he was out-of-action. Custer had a dilemma, in that he needed to cut off the escaping Native civilians (he wanted them as potential hostages, leverage to use against the warriors), and he also needed to provide (delayed) support to Major Reno.
As Custer surveyed his situation, he saw a dust cloud in the distance; he believed that it was Captain Benteen's wing, and that he was no more than 30 miles away. Custer thought that victory was still possible with an attack, not so with a retreat. So Custer once again (for the third time overall) split his troops (this time, he divided his battalion) - his goal was to help Reno, and stay on the offensive . . .
A relevant segment from "Son of the Morning Star" (1991 TV Miniseries)
a) Benteen's frustration at being "sent long"
b) Reno's initial attack on the village . . . notice how there is a bugler . . . inaccurate!
c) Reno stops his charge and forms a skirmish line; Custer goes for glory
d) Reno orders a retreat to the timbers/scrub by the LBH
e) Custer makes his flanking move on the village; the village gets more organized
As Custer surveyed his situation, he saw a dust cloud in the distance; he believed that it was Captain Benteen's wing, and that he was no more than 30 miles away. Custer thought that victory was still possible with an attack, not so with a retreat. So Custer once again (for the third time overall) split his troops (this time, he divided his battalion) - his goal was to help Reno, and stay on the offensive . . .
A relevant segment from "Son of the Morning Star" (1991 TV Miniseries)
a) Benteen's frustration at being "sent long"
b) Reno's initial attack on the village . . . notice how there is a bugler . . . inaccurate!
c) Reno stops his charge and forms a skirmish line; Custer goes for glory
d) Reno orders a retreat to the timbers/scrub by the LBH
e) Custer makes his flanking move on the village; the village gets more organized