Source: Robert A. Caro. The Passage of Power (2012).
As a boy growing up in rural Texas, hard work, as well as humiliation and fear, were woven into Lyndon Baines Johnson's personality. In his late-teens, he predicted (to anyone that would be in a position to listen) that he would be President. LBJ's path to the Presidency was first, get elected to the House of Representatives, then to the Senate, then using that elected position to ascend to the White House (LBJ was elected to the House in 1936). So focused was LBJ on his "Path to the Presidency" that he turned down an offer from FDR to head the Rural Electrification Administration in 1939. LBJ also turned down an opportunity to run for Governor in Texas (he almost certainly would have won), since being a Governor wasn't part of the "Path".
After ten years in the House, he seemed stuck in that position, which was for him was basically torture; not only was he not progressing towards the Presidency, he was also a political non-entity. LBJ entered a Senate race in Texas in 1948 in which it seemed he had no real chance of winning . . . so desperate was LBJ that he (and his powerful patrons) cheated before and after the election in terms of certain precincts and absentee ballots. His margin of victory was so slight, and so controversial, that his detractors referred to him as "Landslide Lyndon."
After ten years in the House, he seemed stuck in that position, which was for him was basically torture; not only was he not progressing towards the Presidency, he was also a political non-entity. LBJ entered a Senate race in Texas in 1948 in which it seemed he had no real chance of winning . . . so desperate was LBJ that he (and his powerful patrons) cheated before and after the election in terms of certain precincts and absentee ballots. His margin of victory was so slight, and so controversial, that his detractors referred to him as "Landslide Lyndon."
The U.S. Senate was a much better fit for LBJ, for it was in there that he could be a leader of men. Among the many talents that LBJ possessed was that he was able to "read" a man, usually through his eyes; he was also able to wring out as much information as possible from those he questioned. LBJ seemed to "sense" a man's price, and had a gift for using what he learned from others. The Senate was also a perfect place for LBJ to excel in that he thrived in small groups, and even more-so with one-on-one situations, especially with the elder statesmen of the Senate.
LBJ rose to power in the Senate with unprecedented speed. The Senate was just the right size for LBJ, in that he could make personal connections with the other 95 Senators. In 1955, LBJ became the youngest Senate Majority Leader in history, and soon after, he brought the Senate into the 20th Century, making it once again a relevant legislative body. LBJ's wife, Lady Bird, said that the 12 years that LBJ was in the Senate were the happiest of their lives. While he was very happy as Senate Majority Leader, he hadn't forgotten about his "Path to the Presidency"; in the 1956 Democratic National Convention, he refused to withdraw his name from consideration for the nomination.
Below: An absolute treat - a portion of Walter Cronkite's CBS coverage
of the Democratic National Convention
LBJ rose to power in the Senate with unprecedented speed. The Senate was just the right size for LBJ, in that he could make personal connections with the other 95 Senators. In 1955, LBJ became the youngest Senate Majority Leader in history, and soon after, he brought the Senate into the 20th Century, making it once again a relevant legislative body. LBJ's wife, Lady Bird, said that the 12 years that LBJ was in the Senate were the happiest of their lives. While he was very happy as Senate Majority Leader, he hadn't forgotten about his "Path to the Presidency"; in the 1956 Democratic National Convention, he refused to withdraw his name from consideration for the nomination.
Below: An absolute treat - a portion of Walter Cronkite's CBS coverage
of the Democratic National Convention
Adlai Stevenson was a shoe-in for the Democratic nomination in 1956, but LBJ just couldn't let go, despite knowing that the delegate count was 905 for Stevenson, while he had only garnered 80 delegates. In 1956, there was a major obstacle to LBJ's path to the Presidency: no Southerner had been elected President since Zachary Taylor in 1848. Also, in terms of Civil Rights bills through 1956, LBJ had voted against every single one, which made him at best a suspect Presidential candidate to Liberal Democrats. After the Democratic National Convention in 1956, LBJ decided that the only way that the Senate could be a springboard to the Presidency was that he needed to steer Civil Rights bills through the Senate as Majority Leader.
Through legislative miracle-making, LBJ was able to get the Civil Rights Bill of 1957 through the Senate (it became law soon after); however, it was mostly symbolic (and toothless), but it was the first such legislation in 82 years. LBJ figured that he would have an automatic Southern bloc of 352 delegates locked-and-loaded for the 1960 Democratic National Convention, which would put him over halfway to the nomination. LBJ didn't see any other formidable opponent in the Democratic Party that could deny him his coveted nomination for President. In LBJ's eyes, he was not only THE Senator, but he was THE Politician; in the late-1950s, he didn't think much of other Senators in terms of challenging him for the nomination, such as Stuart Symington, Hubert Humphrey, or John F. Kennedy.
Through legislative miracle-making, LBJ was able to get the Civil Rights Bill of 1957 through the Senate (it became law soon after); however, it was mostly symbolic (and toothless), but it was the first such legislation in 82 years. LBJ figured that he would have an automatic Southern bloc of 352 delegates locked-and-loaded for the 1960 Democratic National Convention, which would put him over halfway to the nomination. LBJ didn't see any other formidable opponent in the Democratic Party that could deny him his coveted nomination for President. In LBJ's eyes, he was not only THE Senator, but he was THE Politician; in the late-1950s, he didn't think much of other Senators in terms of challenging him for the nomination, such as Stuart Symington, Hubert Humphrey, or John F. Kennedy.
LBJ controlled the Senate, even though the Democrats only had a one-vote majority. There was no lack of confidence in his abilities as Senate Majority Leader, on LBJ's part, or from the other Senators. His run as Majority Leader was similar to FDR's first term as President, in that both had a 100% success rate in passing their priority bills. LBJ's confidence vanished when the topic moved to the nomination for President in 1960. LBJ turned down all requests to speak (even one from Eleanor Roosevelt!), and then would regret doing so after the speaking date had passed.
LBJ still believed (it was remotely possible) that the first ballot at the Democratic National Convention in nominating a candidate for President would not produce an outright winner. Therefore, he believed, the Party Leaders would work behind the scenes on his behalf, and he would be nominated on the 2nd, 3rd, or at worst, the 4th ballot. But LBJ, this great "Reader of Men", had read one man entirely wrong . . . John F. Kennedy.
LBJ still believed (it was remotely possible) that the first ballot at the Democratic National Convention in nominating a candidate for President would not produce an outright winner. Therefore, he believed, the Party Leaders would work behind the scenes on his behalf, and he would be nominated on the 2nd, 3rd, or at worst, the 4th ballot. But LBJ, this great "Reader of Men", had read one man entirely wrong . . . John F. Kennedy.
If LBJ wanted to be the Democratic nominee for President in 1960, the time to strike was during 1958, except that he did not make his move at that crucial moment, and month-after-month went by, with LBJ doing nothing in terms of campaign organization. Like Hitler at Dunkirk, LBJ had formed his men, but hadn't given them their marching orders. LBJ needed to create campaign organizations in 16 crucial Northern & Eastern states, but he did no such thing, which meant that he wouldn't have any impact in those primaries (and wouldn't add to his delegate total). The end result was that he wasn't able to establish his bona fides at a national level, and remained a regional (and nationally unelectable) Presidential hopeful.
LBJ did enlist the man behind Truman's 1948 miracle campaign for advice, but he wound up ignoring that sage advice (e.g. organization, primaries, speeches, press conferences). In short, LBJ gambled that he would enter the 1960 Democratic National Convention with a strong plurality of delegates, and that none of the other challengers would even be close to his total. That, in turn, would lead to his mentor, House Speaker Sam Rayburn (at LBJ's left), and powerful established members of Congress that were loyal to him (or that owed him), working behind the scenes to deliver enough delegates to secure his nomination.
LBJ had badly miscalculated: Governors, not Representatives or Senators, were the key figures in delivering delegates for nomination at the national convention. Outside of Washington, D.C., most Americans didn't know, and couldn't care less, about Lyndon Johnson's impact as Senate Majority Leader.
LBJ did enlist the man behind Truman's 1948 miracle campaign for advice, but he wound up ignoring that sage advice (e.g. organization, primaries, speeches, press conferences). In short, LBJ gambled that he would enter the 1960 Democratic National Convention with a strong plurality of delegates, and that none of the other challengers would even be close to his total. That, in turn, would lead to his mentor, House Speaker Sam Rayburn (at LBJ's left), and powerful established members of Congress that were loyal to him (or that owed him), working behind the scenes to deliver enough delegates to secure his nomination.
LBJ had badly miscalculated: Governors, not Representatives or Senators, were the key figures in delivering delegates for nomination at the national convention. Outside of Washington, D.C., most Americans didn't know, and couldn't care less, about Lyndon Johnson's impact as Senate Majority Leader.
LBJ was advised by the best political minds that he was waiting too long to campaign for the Democratic nomination; why did he delay, despite a deep desire to be President? It was the old bugaboo, his fear of humiliation and losing; those fears absolutely haunted LBJ. He saw his father, Samuel Ealy Johnson, Jr. (pictured), go from a renown Texas state legislator to someone that became penniless, and was ridiculed by the same people that had shown him immense respect as a state senator (he died in 1937).
LBJ's ascendency into politics occurred the moment his father's fortunes changed. In 1948, although he ran and won a U.S. Senate seat, LBJ vacillated before deciding to run; the fear of losing and being humiliated (like his father) almost trumped his desire to pursue his "Path to the Presidency." In 1958, with the stakes much greater, LBJ decided to play it close-to-the-vest heading to the 1960 Democratic National Convention; if events went his way, he wouldn't need to face an outright election until 8 November, 1960.
LBJ's ascendency into politics occurred the moment his father's fortunes changed. In 1948, although he ran and won a U.S. Senate seat, LBJ vacillated before deciding to run; the fear of losing and being humiliated (like his father) almost trumped his desire to pursue his "Path to the Presidency." In 1958, with the stakes much greater, LBJ decided to play it close-to-the-vest heading to the 1960 Democratic National Convention; if events went his way, he wouldn't need to face an outright election until 8 November, 1960.