Source: Richard Brookhiser. James Madison (2011)
James Madison was on top of the world in 1789. The Constitution was ratified due in no small part to his efforts, there would be no question that George Washington, a man firmly in his corner, would be the first President, and Madison was the leader of the new House of Representatives. Although Madison knew there would be challenges concerning the new federal system of government, in 1789 he did not (and could not) envision the development of political parties. Political parties developed largely due to events in Europe and the battle over how to interpret (and who should interpret) the Constitution. In leading the opposition to Hamilton's Economic Plan, and supporting (at least in spirit) the French Revolution, Madison became the "Father of Politics." Madison, who skillfully used politics to extend the sphere of influence of the national government by 1789, used politics in the 1790s to contain the influence of the Federalists, the Anglophiles, and even the federal government that he helped create. As a result, by 1800 Madison's and Jefferson's political party, the Republicans, were poised to capture the Presidency and the majority of both houses in Congress.
While there was no doubt that Washington would be the first President and John Adams the first Vice-President under the Constitution, all other elective offices were up for grabs. Washington wanted James Madison to be one of Virginia's U.S. Senators, but Patrick Henry was out for political revenge from losing the battle for Ratification. Henry had the state legislature appoint two anti-Constitution Virginians to the Senate (before the 17th Amendment, state senators selected U.S. Senators), and he also redrew district lines in the state for the House of Representatives. By doing so, Henry made it very difficult for Madison to win an election from his district to the House; and (Henry must have really despised Madison) he made sure that Madison's opponent would be James Monroe, a young politician that Thomas Jefferson had also brought into his orbit.
Madison learned from his defeat from the first time he ran for elective office, and campaigned for votes. He made it very clear that he supported a Bill of Rights, and opposed a new Constitutional Convention, which he believed would be the "End of Days," so-to-speak. Madison garnered 1,308 votes to Monroe's 972; Baptists and Lutherans rallied to Madison's side, due to his stance on free exercise of religion, but also for his support of a Bill of Rights. On 30 April, 1789, George Washington took the Oath of Office as the first President, and soon thereafter Madison was sworn in as a member of the House of Representatives. Once sworn in, Madison wanted to get the Bill of Rights added to the Constitution as soon as possible.
Madison learned from his defeat from the first time he ran for elective office, and campaigned for votes. He made it very clear that he supported a Bill of Rights, and opposed a new Constitutional Convention, which he believed would be the "End of Days," so-to-speak. Madison garnered 1,308 votes to Monroe's 972; Baptists and Lutherans rallied to Madison's side, due to his stance on free exercise of religion, but also for his support of a Bill of Rights. On 30 April, 1789, George Washington took the Oath of Office as the first President, and soon thereafter Madison was sworn in as a member of the House of Representatives. Once sworn in, Madison wanted to get the Bill of Rights added to the Constitution as soon as possible.
Very soon in the First Congress, James Madison became the leader of the House of Representatives. Although Pennsylvania's Frederick Muhlenberg was elected Speaker of the House, he (and his successors until Henry Clay in 1811) didn't believe in using the position to pursue his political goals. Madison had no qualms at all about using his position in the House to advance his politics, and he decided to write out the draft of the Bill of Rights. Madison's draft featured twelve rights, drawn from centuries of Anglo-American precedents.
Two of his twelve proposed rights were defeated. The first was a proposal that wanted to force the state governments to honor the rights of citizens; that would eventually become the 14th Amendment. Among the reasons why that proposal was defeated was that many pointed out that it seemed inconsistent with Madison's argument in Federalist Paper No. 45 during the Ratification debate. The other one that was defeated wanted to be sure that members of Congress couldn't vote themselves a raise during their term in office - that proposal would become the 27th Amendment. Members of Congress also made their preference clear that the Bill of Rights should be listed at the end of the Constitution; Madison envisioned that they would be embedded within the appropriate Articles.
There was no magical reason why the Bill of Rights are in the order they are listed; it was merely the order that was in Madison's draft based on how his brain operated. Once the ten Bill of Rights were ratified, Madison became a "Secular Moses" in Congress, and the ratification of the first ten amendments also killed opposition to the Constitution. As Brookhiser stated, the Constitution (with the Bill of Rights) had "A Thousand Fathers", but Madison was it midwife.
Two of his twelve proposed rights were defeated. The first was a proposal that wanted to force the state governments to honor the rights of citizens; that would eventually become the 14th Amendment. Among the reasons why that proposal was defeated was that many pointed out that it seemed inconsistent with Madison's argument in Federalist Paper No. 45 during the Ratification debate. The other one that was defeated wanted to be sure that members of Congress couldn't vote themselves a raise during their term in office - that proposal would become the 27th Amendment. Members of Congress also made their preference clear that the Bill of Rights should be listed at the end of the Constitution; Madison envisioned that they would be embedded within the appropriate Articles.
There was no magical reason why the Bill of Rights are in the order they are listed; it was merely the order that was in Madison's draft based on how his brain operated. Once the ten Bill of Rights were ratified, Madison became a "Secular Moses" in Congress, and the ratification of the first ten amendments also killed opposition to the Constitution. As Brookhiser stated, the Constitution (with the Bill of Rights) had "A Thousand Fathers", but Madison was it midwife.
Early in Washington's first term, Madison defended the President's dignity and power. Now the clear leader of the House, Madison spearheaded the successful effort to make the official title "Mr. President" (even Washington thought the title should be more grand - his suggestion: "Your Elective Highness"). Madison also garnered support in the House to be sure that Washington had the "Power of Removal" in the Executive Branch (while not really used until Jackson's Presidency, Washington wanted the power to remove nonetheless).
Madison labored hard in pushing Thomas Jefferson to become Washington's SecState, and he initially supported Alexander Hamilton as SecTreas. While Hamilton was flat-out bursting to be the Secretary of the Treasury (no one else was even remotely close to his abilities, and he knew it), Jefferson played hard-to-get. While it was the tradition to be "reluctant" to hold office (the behavior was modeled after Cincinnatus in Rome), Washington became tired of the act, and Madison had to convince Jefferson to basically "get over himself." Finally, in 1790, Jefferson was confirmed as the nation's first Secretary of State, and Washington's first Cabinet was complete (including SecWar Henry Knox, and Attorney General Edmund Randolph).
President Washington's "team" started to fragment early, due to Hamilton's proposed Economic Plan. Hamilton first wanted to repay the foreign and domestic debt incurred from the Revolutionary War. Hamilton knew that the U.S. needed to make good on its foreign debt in order to be able to effectively trade and to have a good credit rating abroad. Hamilton also wanted to repay the domestic debt (calling it "Assumption") by having the federal government "assume" the state debts, which would not only increase the trust in the new government from the citizens, but would also mean that states would become beholden to the national government. This was the moment that Madison aligned himself as an opponent to his former ally, mostly due to his belief that Hamilton's plan extended the sphere of influence of the national government at the expense of the states - it was the genesis of the debate on how to interpret the Constitution.
Madison labored hard in pushing Thomas Jefferson to become Washington's SecState, and he initially supported Alexander Hamilton as SecTreas. While Hamilton was flat-out bursting to be the Secretary of the Treasury (no one else was even remotely close to his abilities, and he knew it), Jefferson played hard-to-get. While it was the tradition to be "reluctant" to hold office (the behavior was modeled after Cincinnatus in Rome), Washington became tired of the act, and Madison had to convince Jefferson to basically "get over himself." Finally, in 1790, Jefferson was confirmed as the nation's first Secretary of State, and Washington's first Cabinet was complete (including SecWar Henry Knox, and Attorney General Edmund Randolph).
President Washington's "team" started to fragment early, due to Hamilton's proposed Economic Plan. Hamilton first wanted to repay the foreign and domestic debt incurred from the Revolutionary War. Hamilton knew that the U.S. needed to make good on its foreign debt in order to be able to effectively trade and to have a good credit rating abroad. Hamilton also wanted to repay the domestic debt (calling it "Assumption") by having the federal government "assume" the state debts, which would not only increase the trust in the new government from the citizens, but would also mean that states would become beholden to the national government. This was the moment that Madison aligned himself as an opponent to his former ally, mostly due to his belief that Hamilton's plan extended the sphere of influence of the national government at the expense of the states - it was the genesis of the debate on how to interpret the Constitution.
Although political parties didn't exist in 1790, opposing factions had formed around "Assumption", in particular. Jefferson hosted a very small dinner party; among the very few in attendance were Madison and Hamilton. The task at hand, as directed by President Washington, was to discuss the possibility of relocating the nation's capital to the shores of the Potomac in exchange for enough votes in Congress to pass "Assumption." As a result of the dinner party, the capital would, after another stay in Philadelphia, be permanently located in what was already rumored to be called "Washington's City".
Very soon after that compromise, Hamilton unveiled his plan for a National Bank. Hamilton viewed repaying the foreign and domestic debts as a short-term strategy, but he saw the National Bank as a long-term safeguard for the nation's economic future Hamilton wanted twenty percent of the National Bank start-up capital to come from customs duties and tax receipts, with the remaining eighty percent from investors, who would have a (in)vested interest in the success of the institution. Hamilton's vision of a National Bank that largely controlled the flow of money and the liquidity of assets stirred up a hornet's nest of opposition, with Madison leading the charge.
Hamilton's argument that the bank was authorized due to the "Necessary and Proper" clause in the Constitution did not resonate with Madison (or Jefferson). For political reasons, Madison had become a "Strict Constructionist" in terms of interpreting the Constitution. We can tell that politics (the art of who has the power to make the rules) motivated Madison to oppose Hamilton, because in Federalist #44, authored by Madison, he argued that the "Necessary and Proper" clause was not only valid, it was good government.
In 1791, Congress rejected Madison's claim that the National Bank was unconstitutional, and although Washington signed the National Bank into law, he (behind the scenes) had secured his flank by having Madison write a veto statement, just in case he was of a mind to do so. The "Political Score" so far by 1791: Hamilton, 1.5, and Madison/Jefferson 0.5, with Hamilton securing a clear victory with the National Bank.
Very soon after that compromise, Hamilton unveiled his plan for a National Bank. Hamilton viewed repaying the foreign and domestic debts as a short-term strategy, but he saw the National Bank as a long-term safeguard for the nation's economic future Hamilton wanted twenty percent of the National Bank start-up capital to come from customs duties and tax receipts, with the remaining eighty percent from investors, who would have a (in)vested interest in the success of the institution. Hamilton's vision of a National Bank that largely controlled the flow of money and the liquidity of assets stirred up a hornet's nest of opposition, with Madison leading the charge.
Hamilton's argument that the bank was authorized due to the "Necessary and Proper" clause in the Constitution did not resonate with Madison (or Jefferson). For political reasons, Madison had become a "Strict Constructionist" in terms of interpreting the Constitution. We can tell that politics (the art of who has the power to make the rules) motivated Madison to oppose Hamilton, because in Federalist #44, authored by Madison, he argued that the "Necessary and Proper" clause was not only valid, it was good government.
In 1791, Congress rejected Madison's claim that the National Bank was unconstitutional, and although Washington signed the National Bank into law, he (behind the scenes) had secured his flank by having Madison write a veto statement, just in case he was of a mind to do so. The "Political Score" so far by 1791: Hamilton, 1.5, and Madison/Jefferson 0.5, with Hamilton securing a clear victory with the National Bank.
European politics also created opposing factions within Washington's Cabinet and Congress, with Hamilton and his followers supporting Great Britain, and Jefferson's and Madison's followers supporting France (it seemed to have the fervor of the World Cup). As early as 1789, Madison tried to convince Congress to trade less with Great Britain, and more with France, using trade barriers if necessary. The House passed the bill, but the Senate killed it (commercial self-interests were far stronger in the Upper House). Madison's bill had no basis in economic reality - it was actually very bad economics, but he viewed the world around him politically, and acted accordingly. Madison's problem at this juncture was simply this: he was only basing his political views on his planter class background - most Americans were not of the same social standing. Soon, though, Madison would revolutionize politics by including many of those Americans that at this point he had ignored . . .
In 1789, the French Revolution started with the Fall of the Bastille, and that conflict started to affect American politics in 1791. Madison & Jefferson believed it was necessary to fully support France; to them it was de facto payback for losing to Alexander Hamilton on the National Bank. Madison and Jefferson had no intention of creating and organizing a political party, yet it happened in 1791. Both disliked factions, but they never admitted to themselves (based on their letters, etc.) that they were in fact partisan politicians.
In 1791, Madison AND Jefferson traveled north in order to recruit Aaron Burr (New York) to their camp - who better to challenge Hamilton in his home state than Burr, who had worked with and opposed Hamilton over the years . . . they seemed to be creating an Anti-Hamilton League of Extraordinary Gentlemen. During their trip north, Madison and Jefferson found political disciples and "worker bees", such as Philip Frenau and his newspaper, The Gazette. Using Frenau's newspaper in 1791, Madison espoused his long-term views of what would secure America's future, in direct opposition to Hamilton. Agrarian over Industrial, and Self-Sufficiency over Markets were the Madison and Jefferson watchwords of the day (only Madison, as President, will see the error of these politics), countering Hamilton's very influential "Report on Manufactures."
Madison introduced something new in political theory in the early-1790s: public opinion and its role in government. Madison came to believe in more than "popular choice" (voting); people should be "partners" in government as well. This was a key development, in that in the not-too-distant future, Madison would prevail against at Hamilton, in part due to Hamilton's rigid belief that only a small talented elite should be involved in the business of government. It was this new political theory that allowed Madison to create a political party that he and Jefferson would call Republicans in 1792, and their party would have far more voters than the opposing party, the Federalists, by the late-1790s.
In 1789, the French Revolution started with the Fall of the Bastille, and that conflict started to affect American politics in 1791. Madison & Jefferson believed it was necessary to fully support France; to them it was de facto payback for losing to Alexander Hamilton on the National Bank. Madison and Jefferson had no intention of creating and organizing a political party, yet it happened in 1791. Both disliked factions, but they never admitted to themselves (based on their letters, etc.) that they were in fact partisan politicians.
In 1791, Madison AND Jefferson traveled north in order to recruit Aaron Burr (New York) to their camp - who better to challenge Hamilton in his home state than Burr, who had worked with and opposed Hamilton over the years . . . they seemed to be creating an Anti-Hamilton League of Extraordinary Gentlemen. During their trip north, Madison and Jefferson found political disciples and "worker bees", such as Philip Frenau and his newspaper, The Gazette. Using Frenau's newspaper in 1791, Madison espoused his long-term views of what would secure America's future, in direct opposition to Hamilton. Agrarian over Industrial, and Self-Sufficiency over Markets were the Madison and Jefferson watchwords of the day (only Madison, as President, will see the error of these politics), countering Hamilton's very influential "Report on Manufactures."
Madison introduced something new in political theory in the early-1790s: public opinion and its role in government. Madison came to believe in more than "popular choice" (voting); people should be "partners" in government as well. This was a key development, in that in the not-too-distant future, Madison would prevail against at Hamilton, in part due to Hamilton's rigid belief that only a small talented elite should be involved in the business of government. It was this new political theory that allowed Madison to create a political party that he and Jefferson would call Republicans in 1792, and their party would have far more voters than the opposing party, the Federalists, by the late-1790s.
In 1792, there was a potential catastrophic calamity that was about to hit the new government under the Constitution: President Washington wanted to retire to Mount Vernon. This may have been the only time since 1790 that Madison and Hamilton agreed on anything - both men were key in convincing Washington to continue for a second term. Not long after Washington's "Official Family" convinced him to stay in office, they went back to abusing each other whenever they could. To Hamilton, Jefferson was dangerous, and Madison was devious - both were a threat to the nation. Madison and Jefferson believed that Hamilton would drag America down into the same industrial cesspool as Europe, and both thought that Hamilton was a threat to the nation. For many of the early years of our nation, if anyone disagreed with someone else's politics, it was common and logical to see them as a threat to the nation, and therefore political passions ("Hyper-Passion") ran high, with the two political parties fanning the flames.
In January of 1792 the King of France, Louis XVI, was beheaded, and in February, Great Britain declared war on France. As a leading Francophile and Republican, Madison was thrilled with the events unfolding in France; unfortunately, Madison (and Jefferson) often denied or excused the massacres and atrocities that were common in that revolution. What existed of the French Government sent Charles Genet to America as the chief diplomat in charge of securing American assistance in helping them in their war, using the Treaty of Alliance (1778) from the Revolutionary War as the legal framework. Washington issued his neutrality stance, and Madison saw the policy as Anti-French. Madison's and Jefferson's political party, the Republicans (with Genet's help), used their newspapers to attack not only Washington's policy, but Washington himself. The mistake that Madison, Jefferson, and Genet made was that Washington was far more popular in America than the far-off French Revolution . . . Madison discovered that there were limits to what public opinion could accomplish, especially if he tried to manufacture / inflate public opinion.
In January of 1792 the King of France, Louis XVI, was beheaded, and in February, Great Britain declared war on France. As a leading Francophile and Republican, Madison was thrilled with the events unfolding in France; unfortunately, Madison (and Jefferson) often denied or excused the massacres and atrocities that were common in that revolution. What existed of the French Government sent Charles Genet to America as the chief diplomat in charge of securing American assistance in helping them in their war, using the Treaty of Alliance (1778) from the Revolutionary War as the legal framework. Washington issued his neutrality stance, and Madison saw the policy as Anti-French. Madison's and Jefferson's political party, the Republicans (with Genet's help), used their newspapers to attack not only Washington's policy, but Washington himself. The mistake that Madison, Jefferson, and Genet made was that Washington was far more popular in America than the far-off French Revolution . . . Madison discovered that there were limits to what public opinion could accomplish, especially if he tried to manufacture / inflate public opinion.
In 1793, Jefferson resigned as SecState (it was yet another of his grand gestures that showed he believed he was the center of things), leaving Madison in charge of the Republican party, just as events in Western Pennsylvania started to reach a crescendo. Hamilton's Excise Tax (one of the pillars of his Economic Plan) was viewed by Western Pennsylvanians much the same way that colonists viewed the Stamp Act - a far-off government was oppressing them, they felt, and in the tradition of the day, many picked up their muskets, and tried to change the landscape to their favor. One of the myths surrounding the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 was that the only way Western Pennsylvanians could ship their grain was by distilling it into whiskey . . . yet there were no ads in Philadelphia's newspapers for people to buy whiskey from that region of the state. Western Pennsylvanians had a ready market for their grain and whiskey: the U.S. Army was in the West, and the Western Pennsylvanians did a good job themselves of consuming their grain and whiskey.
Madison didn't believe that an excise tax was a good enough reason for a revolution. Not only that, but he also believed that the actions of a minority were a threat to the majority - he viewed the rebellion in much the same way as did Washington & Hamilton, but offering his support would not be good politics. It must have galled Madison to no end to see that the Federalists linked the rebellion to the many "Democratic Societies" that had sprouted up in America (groups of Republicans meeting in homes, for example); Madison saw them as using public opinion against his own party. It was the Federalists that scored another huge win against the Republicans when Washington peacefully ended the conflict, in part by offering amnesty to the rebels. All the while, Madison kept looking for any political leverage or advantage to use against the Federalists in 1794 - it must have seemed to Madison that the Federalists still held most of the cards . . .
Madison didn't believe that an excise tax was a good enough reason for a revolution. Not only that, but he also believed that the actions of a minority were a threat to the majority - he viewed the rebellion in much the same way as did Washington & Hamilton, but offering his support would not be good politics. It must have galled Madison to no end to see that the Federalists linked the rebellion to the many "Democratic Societies" that had sprouted up in America (groups of Republicans meeting in homes, for example); Madison saw them as using public opinion against his own party. It was the Federalists that scored another huge win against the Republicans when Washington peacefully ended the conflict, in part by offering amnesty to the rebels. All the while, Madison kept looking for any political leverage or advantage to use against the Federalists in 1794 - it must have seemed to Madison that the Federalists still held most of the cards . . .
In 1794, James Madison married Dolley Payne (she lost her first husband to Yellow Fever in 1793); Madison now had an extension of his personality, in that Dolley completed him as a public figure.
The Jay Treaty, negotiated in 1794, and ratified in 1795, all in secret, became public in the Summer of 1795. Alexander Hamilton strongly supported the treaty (he was the main reason why it was narrowly ratified), and although the Republicans thought Jay sold-out the United States, Madison was reluctant to engage in a "Word-War" with Alexander Hamilton again. The partisan politics over the Jay Treaty is what finally ended the connection between Madison and Washington (it had been steadily declining since 1792, when the Republican party was established). On 30 April, 1796, the House of Representatives voted 51-48 to appropriate money to put the Jay Treaty in effect. Over twenty Republicans flipped, and voted for the appropriation - it was official, in political terms - James Madison had become damaged goods.
The Jay Treaty, negotiated in 1794, and ratified in 1795, all in secret, became public in the Summer of 1795. Alexander Hamilton strongly supported the treaty (he was the main reason why it was narrowly ratified), and although the Republicans thought Jay sold-out the United States, Madison was reluctant to engage in a "Word-War" with Alexander Hamilton again. The partisan politics over the Jay Treaty is what finally ended the connection between Madison and Washington (it had been steadily declining since 1792, when the Republican party was established). On 30 April, 1796, the House of Representatives voted 51-48 to appropriate money to put the Jay Treaty in effect. Over twenty Republicans flipped, and voted for the appropriation - it was official, in political terms - James Madison had become damaged goods.
Even before the Election of 1796 occurred, James Madison decided to retire from the House of Representatives at the end of his term that would end in March, 1797. As far as the Election of 1796 went, Jefferson was truly reluctant to run; in essence, he was drafted into service by his party, mostly due to James Madison's downward political spiral. Vice-President John Adams received 71 Electoral Votes, while Jefferson received 68, and under the rules of the day, became Adams' Vice-President (Jefferson is sometimes called the "1-2-3 Man", because he was the first SecState, the second V-P, and the third President).
Jefferson actually wrote a rather nice letter to John Adams after the results of the election were made official, but before he sent it to Adams, he sent it to Madison for some feedback. Madison convinced Jefferson that he should not sent the letter, in that it would be disloyal to his supporters, and the Federalist President John Adams would soon attack Jefferson anyway. In short, Jefferson had tried to reach across party lines, but Madison nixed it. In the same spirit, John Adams actually thought about appointing Madison as the Minister Plenipotentiary to France, and contacted Madison feeling him out in terms of the posting. Madison made it clear to President-Elect Adams that he would not accept the position, doing so for political reasons. To Madison, it seemed counterintuitive and counterproductive for a Republican help a Federalist President.
At about the same time, Hamilton was taken down by the Republican political machinery, but not by Madison; by that time, Albert Gallatin (who would become an absolute historical superstar during the Presidencies of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe) was the leader of the party. Under Gallatin's leadership, and using the newspaper controlled by James Callendar (the "Pitbull Publisher" of the Republicans), the "Reynolds Affair" was resurrected, and Hamilton lost favor with many Americans, regardless of party, with his out-of-proportion defense of his actions.
Jefferson actually wrote a rather nice letter to John Adams after the results of the election were made official, but before he sent it to Adams, he sent it to Madison for some feedback. Madison convinced Jefferson that he should not sent the letter, in that it would be disloyal to his supporters, and the Federalist President John Adams would soon attack Jefferson anyway. In short, Jefferson had tried to reach across party lines, but Madison nixed it. In the same spirit, John Adams actually thought about appointing Madison as the Minister Plenipotentiary to France, and contacted Madison feeling him out in terms of the posting. Madison made it clear to President-Elect Adams that he would not accept the position, doing so for political reasons. To Madison, it seemed counterintuitive and counterproductive for a Republican help a Federalist President.
At about the same time, Hamilton was taken down by the Republican political machinery, but not by Madison; by that time, Albert Gallatin (who would become an absolute historical superstar during the Presidencies of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe) was the leader of the party. Under Gallatin's leadership, and using the newspaper controlled by James Callendar (the "Pitbull Publisher" of the Republicans), the "Reynolds Affair" was resurrected, and Hamilton lost favor with many Americans, regardless of party, with his out-of-proportion defense of his actions.
France continued to affect American politics; in the Spring of 1798, it was widely believed that the French had insulted America's honor during the "XYZ Affair", and a "Quasi-War" with France ensued in the Atlantic. Then, that summer, both houses of Congress passed, and John Adams signed into law, the Alien and Sedition Acts (the Sedition Act was actually set to expire on 3 March, 1801, the last day of the presidential term in office). Madison and Jefferson responded with the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, with Madison writing the latter - they were basically Republican position papers. In essence, they both argued that the states have the authority to interpret the Constitution, plus Jefferson established "Nullification" as a political tool. Madison wanted the states to supersede the courts, which were in the hands of the Federalists.
The initial reaction to the resolutions was overwhelmingly negative; Madison and Jefferson were way-out on a political limb, but the Federalists broke ranks and over-reacted. The Federalists enforced the Sedition Act to the point where they actually lost political support across the nation. The over-reaching by the Federalists resulted in a political goldmine for the Republicans, and James Madison was able to begin his political comeback, winning election to the Virginia Assembly in 1799, the same year that George Washington died. James Madison claimed that Republicans were the real defenders of liberty (back then, liberty was defined as state's rights), and the Federalists, in their zeal to destroy the opposing party, wound up being the Republicans' best friend.
The initial reaction to the resolutions was overwhelmingly negative; Madison and Jefferson were way-out on a political limb, but the Federalists broke ranks and over-reacted. The Federalists enforced the Sedition Act to the point where they actually lost political support across the nation. The over-reaching by the Federalists resulted in a political goldmine for the Republicans, and James Madison was able to begin his political comeback, winning election to the Virginia Assembly in 1799, the same year that George Washington died. James Madison claimed that Republicans were the real defenders of liberty (back then, liberty was defined as state's rights), and the Federalists, in their zeal to destroy the opposing party, wound up being the Republicans' best friend.
In many ways, James Madison was a changed man by 1799. In 1789, he was a champion of extending the sphere of influence of the new federal government under the Constitution. But Madison then wrote the Bill of Rights, limiting the power of the federal government that he was instrumental in creating. With the emergence of political parties, which Brookhiser argues was due to the actions and ambitions of Madison, he changed his views on how the Constitution should be interpreted, and who should have the power to interpret the document, all in the name of furthering the influence of the Republican Party at the expense of the Federalists. The "Father of Politics" was just getting started, for he would shortly become Jefferson's Secretary of State, and then the fourth President, and undergo more political transformations, especially during the War of 1812.
NY Times Book Review of Brookhiser's James Madison