Source: Jean Edward Smith. FDR (2008)
Before, during, and after Pearl Harbor, the U.S. and Japan grossly underestimated each other. Japan had no concept about our industrial capacity or national spiritualism, and since women in Japan had no civil rights, their government and military thought American women would play no part in the war. Had Japan attacked Singapore or Borneo, Americans would have been divided on war with Japan, and President Franklin Roosevelt would have been in an untenable position as Commander-in-Chief. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December, 1941, unified America like nothing else possibly could, and just days later, Hitler declared war on America. Hitler did not have to declare war on the U.S. based on Germany's Axis Pact with Japan, but he and Italy's dictator, Benito Mussolini, were more than overjoyed to do so . . . across the board, it seemed underestimation was the norm in the early years of World War II. It was in this atmosphere of underestimation that Japan made its plans for an attack on Midway Island, which they were sure would end America's ability to be a dominant presence in the Pacific.
On 26 December, 1941, Britain's Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, addressed a Joint Session of Congress; he was the first foreigner accorded that privilege since the Marquis de Lafayette's "Farewell Tour" in 1824. Churchill was able to garner a "Germany-First" strategy from FDR and Congress, despite serious misgivings about being unable to focus enough attention in the Pacific.
On 6 January, 1942, FDR gave his 10th State of the Union Address to a Joint Session of Congress. Unlike the sweeping rhetoric of Churchill, Hitler, and Mussolini, when FDR addressed an audience, it seemed like an individual conversation. FDR stated production goals, featuring 60,000 planes and 45,000 tanks; FDR just made up the numbers, figuring that those responsible for production would meet those figures . . . quietly, behind the scenes, FDR's production goals were revised in order to meet the necessary military balance and realities.
On 19 February, 1942, FDR signed Executive Order 9066, ordering over 100,000 Japanese-Americans (and non-resident Japanese aliens) on the West Coast relocated to concentration camps - there was no real military or security need in play (FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover thought the order was unnecessary, since he believed all Japanese spies had already been arrested). Pearl Harbor was not the impetus of the order; a series of serious naval defeats in the Pacific in the weeks after Pearl Harbor caused fear to spread like contagion. As far as the U.S. Government was concerned by early-1942, the only way to explain these defeats was that there was an "Enemy Within", and Japanese-Americans on the West Coast were an obvious and convenient target. It was also a culmination of decades of racism against Japanese-Americans, combined with extreme jealousy/coveting of Japanese-American property. For example, in California, Japanese-Americans owned 1% of the cultivated land, yet produced an incredible 40% of the state's crops.
One of the results of the Doolittle Raid in April, 1942, was that Japan badly wanted to strike back. The Admiral of Japan's Navy, Isoroku Yamamoto, got greedy, and tried for another surprise attack on Midway Island. Yamamoto believed that whoever controlled Midway controlled the Pacific, and if Japan had the island, Hawaii would be directly threatened (tectonically, Midway is the western-most Hawaiian Island), and maybe the U.S. would believe the West Coast would also be threatened. If Japan had Midway, Yamamoto believed that negotiations would occur, and Japan would once again to be the unchallenged Master of the Pacific. On the other hand, if America had Midway, Yamamoto thought the home islands of Japan would never be truly secure.
Yamamoto faced some opposition in the Japanese government, in that the favored political strategy was to focus on an impenetrable naval defense perimeter in the Pacific. As a result of these two different strategies, it was decided to do BOTH: Japan would go for Australia and Midway at about the same time, which would stretch the Japanese military capacity to the limit. On 4 May, 1942, the Battle of the Coral Sea occurred, northeast of Australia; the two opposing forces were separated by 175 miles of open ocean. Ships never came into contact; it was an air battle with carrier-based planes. Japan sank the U.S. aircraft carrier Lexington (pictured), and badly destroyed the carrier Yorktown's flight deck. The U.S. sank a Japanese light carrier, one of their large aircraft carriers, and Japan lost twice the number of planes compared to the U.S. As a result, Japan cancelled their planned invasion of Australia.
Yamamoto faced some opposition in the Japanese government, in that the favored political strategy was to focus on an impenetrable naval defense perimeter in the Pacific. As a result of these two different strategies, it was decided to do BOTH: Japan would go for Australia and Midway at about the same time, which would stretch the Japanese military capacity to the limit. On 4 May, 1942, the Battle of the Coral Sea occurred, northeast of Australia; the two opposing forces were separated by 175 miles of open ocean. Ships never came into contact; it was an air battle with carrier-based planes. Japan sank the U.S. aircraft carrier Lexington (pictured), and badly destroyed the carrier Yorktown's flight deck. The U.S. sank a Japanese light carrier, one of their large aircraft carriers, and Japan lost twice the number of planes compared to the U.S. As a result, Japan cancelled their planned invasion of Australia.
The Battle of Midway began on 4 June, 1942, with Admiral Nagumo in command of four large carriers (he was also in charge of Japan's large carriers during Pearl Harbor). In support of Nagumo's carriers were 11 Japanese battleships, 16 cruisers, and 53 destroyers to crush the remnants of the American fleet. Yamamoto was in personal command of the attack, with his flagship the Yamoto, the world's largest battleship.
Yamamoto's strategy was as follows: Nagumo would lead the attack, the U.S. would respond and engage in battle, and then he would quickly advance for the kill, and the decisive victory. However, this time the U.S. knew Japan's plan of attack, having broken their communications code some weeks prior, and the U.S. plan was to destroy all of Nagumo's carriers. As the battle raged over Midway Island, the U.S. sank three Japanese carriers, and the fourth was so badly damaged that it was scuttled (Japan only had two large carriers left in their navy at that time); that meant that the Japanese planes and pilots that had savaged Midway had no place to land on their return.
Yamamoto had no choice but to retreat in disgrace with a badly damaged navy; in just six months after Pearl Harbor, as a result of Midway, Japan lost their naval superiority in the Pacific. In the two years after Midway, Japan had six battlefleet (large) carriers (all would be badly damaged or destroyed before the end of 1944), while the U.S. had 17 battlefleet carriers (but not the Yorktown; that carrier was sunk by a Japanese submarine as it was being towed to Pearl Harbor after Midway), as well as 10 medium carriers, and 86 escort carriers.
Yamamoto's strategy was as follows: Nagumo would lead the attack, the U.S. would respond and engage in battle, and then he would quickly advance for the kill, and the decisive victory. However, this time the U.S. knew Japan's plan of attack, having broken their communications code some weeks prior, and the U.S. plan was to destroy all of Nagumo's carriers. As the battle raged over Midway Island, the U.S. sank three Japanese carriers, and the fourth was so badly damaged that it was scuttled (Japan only had two large carriers left in their navy at that time); that meant that the Japanese planes and pilots that had savaged Midway had no place to land on their return.
Yamamoto had no choice but to retreat in disgrace with a badly damaged navy; in just six months after Pearl Harbor, as a result of Midway, Japan lost their naval superiority in the Pacific. In the two years after Midway, Japan had six battlefleet (large) carriers (all would be badly damaged or destroyed before the end of 1944), while the U.S. had 17 battlefleet carriers (but not the Yorktown; that carrier was sunk by a Japanese submarine as it was being towed to Pearl Harbor after Midway), as well as 10 medium carriers, and 86 escort carriers.
Post-Midway: On 8 November, 1942, the Allied invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch) began; Britain landed in the Mediterranean, while the U.S. landed in Morocco - by 12 November, Algiers and Morocco were under Allied control. In January, 1943, FDR and Churchill met at Casablanca (Morocco). It was decided that after the Nazis were defeated in North Africa (and Britain's petroleum reserves in the Middle East secured), that an invasion of Sicily would be next, especially since General Eisenhower said that an invasion on the Western Front would not be possible until 1944 at the earliest. Also at Casablanca, FDR & Churchill announced that only "Unconditional Surrender" would be acceptable from Germany, Italy, and Japan.